China and Russia Act To Block a New Precedent for Intervention
February 7, 2012 | 0326 GMT
China and Russia vetoed a resolution on Syria this weekend that the
United States and others had introduced at the U.N. Security Council
(UNSC). The resolution itself was not particularly aggressive and
committed the United Nations and its members to minimal actions,
including expressing support for an Arab League proposal that would
call for Syrian President Bashar al Assad to step down. Nevertheless,
the United States responded to the vetoes with anger and fairly
intense rhetoric. After its veto at the UNSC, Russia is sending a
delegation led by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to Damascus
on Tuesday for talks with the Syrian leadership.
It is interesting that China and Russia acted together in the first
place. The willingness of both to cast vetoes when one would have
sufficed indicates the emergence of a bloc on Syria and beyond. The
reasons for the bloc are not difficult to understand. China and Russia
were both unsettled by the principles on which NATO intervened in
Libya. The logic behind that intervention was simple: The Libyan
government was historically oppressive and, in the course of an
uprising, was planning to impose mass murder on its enemies. Given
this, the international community decided that it had an obligation to
intervene in order to save innocent lives.
The Russian and Chinese view was that this doctrine opened the door to
unlimited interventions not in response to mass murder, but in order
to prevent mass murder. From the Chinese and Russian perspective, this
would allow intervention based on fears. Fears can be feigned and
anyone can assert the threat of mass murder and war crimes. Therefore,
the Libyan precedent seemed to be a doctrine that justified
intervention based on suspicion of intent. Or, to put it more bluntly,
the Russian and Chinese view was that the intervention in Libya was
designed to achieve political and economic goals, and the threat of
impending mass murder was simply the justification.
China and Russia viewed the Syrian resolution as a preface to more
aggressive resolutions also based on the doctrine of preventing
atrocities much greater than those already committed. They felt that
this would set a permanent principle of international law that they
opposed. Their opposition was based on the perception that this was
merely a justification for interventions against regimes of which the
West disapproved. They also saw themselves as potential victims over
the long term. Both regimes are authoritarian, to say the least, and
both face potential domestic opposition. Events could transpire such
that Russia and China could one day be weakened and coping with
insurgencies, and they would have implicitly agreed, by supporting
multiple U.N. interventions, to interventions in their countries. It
might be seen as a far-fetched idea, but it is of sufficient
significance that neither Russia nor China was willing to allow the
principle to take hold.
There were, of course, more immediate geopolitical issues. As we have
argued before, Iran is in the process of establishing a sphere of
influence in which Syria plays a strategic role. If al Assad survives,
his regime will be heavily dependent on Iran. Neither China nor Russia
would be particularly troubled by this. Certainly, Russia does not
want to see an excessively powerful Iran, but it would welcome any
dynamic that would tie American power down in a long-term duel with
Iran. Creating a regional balance of power would divert U.S. power in
directions that would provide Russia with freedom for maneuver.
The same can be said of China, with the additional proviso that the
Chinese do not want to see anything interfere with their energy trade
with Iran. So there were two issues for China. First, China did not
want a precedent set that might allow an American intervention in
Iran. Second, China, like Russia, welcomed the diversion of American
power from the South China Sea, where it had been planning to shift
forces.
In the expansion of Iranian influence, Syria is now the major
battlefield. What we have now seen is that China and Russia recognize
the battlefield and for now are prepared to side with Iran against the
United States, a move that makes clear sense from a balance of power
perspective. At the same time, challenging the United States is always
potentially dangerous, and the Russians reverted to an old strategy of
thwarting the United States in the United Nations, then sending a
senior delegation to Syria to speak with al Assad. It is assumed that
what the delegation will say are the things that the Americans would
like to hear. That is undoubtedly the wink and nod behind the
delegation.
What is more likely is that the Russians will make a warning to al
Assad as a formality and perhaps will look around for a personality
who might take al Assad’s place while preserving the regime. But the
Russians understand that such a move could destabilize the Syrian
regime, and they are satisfied with the way things are. Therefore,
sending a Russian delegation to Damascus on Tuesday is a gesture
toward settlement. It will not placate the United States. Ultimately,
the Russians know that and don’t seem to care.
http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/china-and-russia-act-block-new-precedent-intervention
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Received on Tue Feb 07 2012 - 19:32:23 EST
