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[dehai-news] (Int. CrisisGroup) Somalia: An Opportunity that Should Not Be Missed

From: Biniam Tekle <biniamt_at_dehai.org_at_dehai.org>
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2012 07:45:12 -0500

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/B087-somalia-an-opportunity-that-should-not-be-missed.aspx
Somalia: An Opportunity that Should Not Be Missed

Africa Briefing N°8722 Feb 2012

*OVERVIEW*

The next six months will be crucial for Somalia. The international
community is taking a renewed interest in the country; the mandate of the
feeble and dysfunctional Transitional Federal Government (TFG) expires in a
half-year; and emboldened troops from the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM), Kenya and Ethiopia are keen to deal the weakened (though still
potent) extremist Islamist movement Al-Shabaab further defeats. This
confluence of factors presents the best chance in years for peace and
stability in the south and centre of the country. To achieve that, however,
requires regional and wider international unity of purpose and an agreement
on basic principles; otherwise spoilers could undermine all peacebuilding
efforts.

The crisis has been climbing steadily back up the international agenda. The
one-day London Somalia Conference on 23 February will bring together senior
representatives from over 40 countries, the UN, African Union (AU),
European Union (EU), World Bank, Inter-Governmental Authority for
Development (IGAD), Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and League of
Arab States. Somalia’s Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) will
participate, as well as the presidents of Somaliland, Puntland, Galmudug
(regional governments) and representatives of the largest armed group, Ahlu
Sunnah Wal Jama’a (ASWJ). It should prepare the way for desperately needed
greater coordination, especially with Gulf and regional states, as well as
between AMISOM and the UN.

Coordination is required because the mandate of the TFG is set to run out
in August 2012. Although it has failed to achieve any of its core
objectives, many officials desire another extension, such as it received a
year ago. But it is unreformable – too many of its members benefit from the
fully unsatisfactory status quo. It must not be extended. Instead, the
London Conference should agree on a new political framework and principles
for governing Somalia.

This is important, because AMISOM and regional forces have made impressive
gains against Al-Shabaab and are poised to renew their offensive.
Nevertheless, their greatest challenge will probably be not to drive the
militants out of major cities and towns, but rather to secure peace
thereafter. Al-Shabaab, though weakened, is far from a spent force; its
militant jihadi ideology is radicalising young Somalis at home and abroad;
veteran foreign jihadis are exerting ever-greater influence; and recently
its emir pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and global jihad. But it is no
longer the only threat to stability; the resurgence of inter-clan
competition and warlordism is as serious. While there is an understandable
inclination to strengthen the central state in Mogadishu (in the form of
the TFIs) and its security apparatus, past and present transitional
administrations have failed to bring stability, in large part because many
clans do not support the reestablishment of a strong central government. A
more decentralised political framework and local inter-clan reconciliation
are required.

The root cause of Somalia’s many troubles – terrorism, piracy, periodic
famine and constant streams of refugees – is collapse of effective
governance, with resulting chronic conflict, lawlessness and poverty. The
most effective and durable solution to these ills is to build gradually an
inclusive, more federal government structure that most clans can support.
Otherwise, Al-Shabaab (or some similar successor) and other disparate
groups of would-be strongmen with guns will exploit continued
dissatisfaction with Mogadishu and innate Somali hostility to “foreign
occupation”.

This coming six-month period is a critical time for Somalia. To make the
most of the opportunity to end more than two decades of chronic conflict,
the international community should:

q increase AMISOM’s force strength and provide more resources. To maintain
momentum and consolidate gains, AMISOM should quickly assume full tactical
and operational command of the AU, Ethiopian, and Kenyan missions and
coordinate closely with Somali allies. Any major offensive should be
accompanied by a political strategy to win the support of local clans and
social groups and stabilise those areas in which they are present;


   - rebuild internal cohesion among core members of the International
   Contact Group;
   - enhance the role of Turkey and other Muslim nations in the
   stabilisation effort, so as to build Somali confidence in the process;
   - endorse closer UN/AU cooperation and insure that the two
   organisations’ Special Representatives work closely together;
   - endorse the formation of a truly inclusive Somali deliberative body,
   one that represents all clans and most regions of the country, and can
   establish an interim government to replace the TFG if necessary;
   - create a Local Stability Fund to help local administrations that are
   economically viable, can administer and impose law and order, are committed
   to peace and renounce terrorism and are willing to engage in an inclusive
   dialogue and give priority to cross-clan alliances that seek to establish
   viable administrations;
   - create a joint financial management board and consider establishing
   within it a governance and economic management program for the major
   national sources of revenue, such as Mogadishu port and airport, as well as
   Kismayo port, based on the kind of partnership between local government and
   internationals to promote transparency and accountability that lowered
   corruption in post-civil war Liberia. Once funds enter the treasury,
   Somalis should transparently decide their use; and
   - encourage the Somali authorities to indicate continued willingness to
   negotiate a political accommodation with or incorporate into a
   national/regional security force Al-Shabaab commanders and fighters willing
   to renounce terrorism and work towards peace, since this would weaken the
   group further and could help stabilise newly recovered areas*.*

*Nairobi/Brussels, 22 February 2012 *



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