*Vol:29 Iss:05* *URL:
http://www.flonnet.com/fl2905/stories/20120323290505700.htm*
*Syria, Libya and Security Council *
VIJAY PRASHAD
*Interview with Hardeep Singh Puri, Permanent Representative of India to
the United Nations. *
*Hardeep Singh Puri: “ I am one of those who believe that if you didn't
have the United Nations, you would have to invent the United Nations.” *
THE United Nations Security Council sits in a solemn “emergency room” in
the heart of the U.N. complex in New York City. The 15 members of the
Council, including the five permanent members, sit around a horseshoe
table, under a mural done by the Norwegian artist Per Krogh. The panels of
the mural showcase everyday life in northern Europe. At its bottom centre
there is a phoenix, emergent from the flames, around which stand people who
seem stereotypically “Eastern” (the women here have their faces covered,
and the men wear turbans). A field artillery gun points at these people. It
is their fate. Under an imagination that trusts in the good faith of the
West and the perfidy of the East, the Council deliberates.
After the U.N. was formed in the 1940s, serious-minded people in its orbit
wondered if the organisation needed its own military force. When conflicts
break out, the U.N. would only have the power of moral suasion, and perhaps
the authority to call for trade embargos. Nothing more was possible.
Article 47 of the U.N. Charter called for the creation of a “Military Staff
Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions
relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the
maintenance of international peace and security”. As the Cold War heated
up, neither the Atlantic powers nor the Soviet bloc would permit the U.N.
to create its own military force. The idea went into permanent hibernation.
Both the Atlantic powers and the Soviets built up their own military
capacity, and the U.N. became the preserve of the Third World, which took
refuge there to try and build an alternative to the dangers of a nuclear
showdown and the proxy wars on their lands. The United States and Western
Europe created the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), a robust
military alliance that has now outlived the context in which it emerged.
That context was the contest with the Soviet Union, which ran out of steam
in the 1980s and ended finally in 1991. NATO remained, and thrived. It has
since expanded out of its original base and absorbed most of Europe,
including Eastern Europe, and has created networks with countries outside
its region (through the NATO-Russia Council and the Mediterranean
Dialogue). The singular aim of protecting Europe is now gone. Remarkably,
in NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept paper, a new mission appeared, “Allies
could further be called upon to contribute to global stability and peace by
providing forces for United Nations mission.”
The Atlantic powers had ignored or tried deliberately to undermine the U.N.
through the Cold War, and this tendency remained in the musty corners of
the Far Right in the U.S. (represented by President George W. Bush's
Ambassador to the U.N., John Bolton). NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept paper
went a long way in establishing the centrality of NATO for “preserving
peace, preventing war and enhancing security and stability” outside the
lands of the member-states. But NATO would no longer act without seeking
U.N. authorisation. The communiqué that was prepared by NATO's Defence
Planning Committee meeting on December 7, 1990, pointed explicitly to U.N.
Security Council Resolution 678, which “authorised the use of all necessary
means if Iraq does not comply” with its withdrawal from Kuwait. NATO
members would, the committee noted, “continue to respond positively to
United Nations request”, namely to go to war against Iraq. From 1991
onwards, NATO began to be the de facto military arm of the U.N. No other
member had the capacity to bring “all necessary means” to bear on countries
that did not follow through on U.N. resolutions.
Since NATO is not the U.N.'s official military force, it is only the U.N.
resolutions that NATO finds most in line with the national interests of its
member-states that feel the full brunt of its military power: NATO did not
act to protect Palestinian civilians in 2006, nor Congolese civilians
during the long war from 1998 to 2007 that cost the region eight million
lives. NATO members entered the Iraq war under a U.N. resolution; NATO went
to war against Yugoslavia without U.N. authorisation but sought it
afterwards; NATO threw itself into the War on Terror slowly in the 1990s
and then forcefully after 9/11 (when it invoked Article 5 of its treaty, to
defend one of its member-states that had been attacked and to go “out of
area” to do so). There has been a substantial increase in the expansion of
NATO's geographic domain, from the narrow confines of the North Atlantic to
Afghanistan. It likes U.N. authorisation, but its troops do not put on the
blue hats of the U.N. command.
The Yugoslavian war allowed NATO to extend its own sense of itself. No
longer was NATO simply a defensive pact. It was now to be the defender of
human rights, and it permitted itself to abrogate national sovereignty if
this meant that it would prevent atrocities from taking place outside its
domain. The shadow of the 1994 Rwandan genocide hung heavy over this shift,
as did the 1995 killings in Srebrenica (Bosnia). It was because of these
grotesque events that the NATO member-states pushed the U.N. to consider
what must be done to protect populations from harm. The Canadian government
created the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
in 2000, and its report (The Responsibility to Protect) was produced the
next year. The idea of “responsibility to protect” (R2P) won out among the
committee over the ideas of “right to intervene” and “obligation to
intervene”. The notion of intervention was to be kept out of the concept,
although R2P is often seen as synonymous with Humanitarian Interventionism.
In 2006, the U.N. adopted R2P as a mandate. NATO was to be its enforcer,
and the International Criminal Court (which came into being in 2002) was to
be its juridical arm.
The entire ensemble of the U.N. Security Council, R2P, the ICC and NATO was
tested in the 2011 Libyan war. No prior war had seen all of these elements
on display in one conflict. At an informal meeting on R2P at the U.N. on
February 21, 2012, India's Permanent Representative to the United Nations,
Hardeep Singh Puri, said, “The Libyan case has already given R2P a bad
name.” Why was this so? “As soon as the [U.N. Security Council] resolution
was adopted, the overenthusiastic members of the international community
stopped talking of the [African Union]. Its efforts to bring about a
ceasefire were completely ignored. Only aspect of the resolution [that was]
of interest to them was ‘use of all necessary means' to bomb the hell out
of Libya. In clear violation of the resolution, arms were supplied to
civilians without any consideration of its consequences. No-fly zone was
selectively implemented, only for flights in and out of Tripoli. Targeted
measures were implemented insofar as they suited the objective of regime
change. All kinds of mechanisms were created to support one party to the
conflict and attempts were made to bypass the sanctions committee by
proposing resolutions to the Council. It goes without saying that the
pro-interventionist powers did not ever try to bring about a peaceful end
to the crisis in Libya.” In other words, the “international community”,
namely the NATO member-states, used the U.N. Security Council resolution
for their own ends, disregarding the protocols in the resolution itself.
“The principle of R2P is being selectively used to promote national
interest rather than protect civilians,” noted Ambassador Puri. In August
2010, Puri reminded the General Assembly that “even the cautious go-ahead
for developing R2P in 2005 emphasised the use of appropriate diplomatic,
humanitarian and other peaceful means to help protect populations. The
responsibility to protect should in no way be seen as providing a pretext
for humanitarian intervention or unilateral action.” Puri's rear-guard
defence of the principles of R2P and the U.N. Charter runs up against the
determination of the West to exercise its authority through the fog of
“human rights”.
When the February resolution on Syria failed to pass the U.N. Security
Council, U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice called the Russian and Chinese veto
“disgusting”. Germany's Ambassador Peter Witting told reporters that it was
a “disgrace”. For the U.S. and its NATO allies, the protocols of their new
system (UN-R2P-NATO-ICC) had to be put into motion. Smarting from the
experience of Libya, the Russians and the Chinese decided to use their
power to put a stop to it. India voted for the resolution, even though
Ambassador Puri is one of the main figures who have offered an intellectual
criticism of the way in which R2P has operated. In this interview in New
York on February 18, Puri explains why India abstained from the vote on the
Libyan resolution (1973) and why India voted for the Syrian resolution now.
*India has been on the U.N. Security Council for a year now. You have been
India's representative for the duration. What is the mood in the Security
Council during this year? What has been India's role?*
The Security Council is primarily entrusted with the task of dealing with
situations that constitute a threat to international peace and security.
That has not changed over the years. What has changed and what is clearly
demonstrable is that countries that wield political and economic power want
to use the Security Council much more vigorously to deal with issues whose
relationship with the maintenance of international peace and security is at
best remote. This new approach started a few years ago. It is conditioned
by the fact that in the major Western capitals there is a reinforced desire
to seek legitimacy for their policy choices through the Security Council.
Contrast this with the Bush administration, when they had a permanent
representative here, John Bolton, whom my predecessor had the distinction
of interacting with. Bolton said that if you knock 10 floors off the U.N.
building the world would not be any worse off.
In our small limited world of people who join the foreign services of their
respective countries, our tribe is broadly divided into two categories –
the bilateralists and those who have some kind of fascination for
pluri-lateral or multilateral work. I have no hesitation in saying that,
yes, bilateral work is extremely important. But for a country like India,
which has both the civilisational past and the recent history as a young
modern secular nation, and with aspirations to play a role, I don't think
those objectives can be achieved without a multilateral arena. So I am one
of those who believe that if you didn't have the United Nations, you would
have to invent the United Nations.
The mood in the Security Council is determined by the overall global
situation, the number of hot spots and so on. But the mood is also
determined by those who have the capacity to influence and the capacity to
mould the Council. There is a fundamental difference in the Council between
those years of the Bush administration and [those of] the Obama
administration. When we were first elected to the Council in October 2010,
before we took our seat, we were invited to Washington for a discussion.
President Barack Obama dropped in and engaged in a discussion of the major
issues in which the Council was engaged. That shows the extent to which the
U.S. under the Obama administration wants to utilise the Council and wants
to pursue matters in the Security Council.
This has to be nuanced. The interest in engagement by Washington doesn't
mean that they want to bring all issues to the Security Council. In fact,
the cynic would tell you that Western governments only bring those issues
to the Security Council which they do not want to handle entirely by
themselves, through coalitions of the willing, Afghanistan being a case in
point. They went in alone first, and subsequently U.N. missions came in.
The mood is also determined by the fact that global hot spots have suddenly
proliferated. I mean when we were elected, Côte d'Ivoire was simmering.
Côte d'Ivoire was relatively a simple situation. This was a question on an
election in which the U.N. had a certification role. When the election
results came out, the incumbent, Laurent Gbagbo, refused to step down. The
U.N. had a role to play. The talk at this time was, if Gbagbo does not step
down, then let us get an interventionary force involved. The politics
between ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] and the African
Union interrupted this talk. You suddenly discover that talk about
interventionary force is easier said than done. I think that in some
capitals, the excitement of action gets the better of hard decision-making.
*This excitement leaks into the Arab Spring, no doubt?*
The fact of the matter is that most of the governments affected by the Arab
Spring had the support of the West. I think the relationship between
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and the West is well documented. The
situation of Egypt in the context of the Israeli security calculus is well
known. The fact that there was a sense of ferment on the Arab Street was
well known. You could witness that in places like Tunisia where all it
required was an inspector and an act of oppression against a helpless fruit
vendor. It's palpable everywhere. But then there was this expectation that
the Arab Spring is going to result in an outcome, which would have a
democratic ending. Democracy being defined in Western liberal terms, not in
terms of whatever majority comes up, as is the case in the West Bank [when
Hamas won the elections in 2006]. Everyone welcomes the fact that the
people of a country must express themselves; they must articulate their
aspirations. Up to there, everyone is in agreement.
But the minute the result is such that the composition of the Egyptian
legislature is 60 per cent Islamic Brotherhood and 25 per cent Salafists,
then people start saying, “you know, this is not what we bargained for”.
And the prospect of change as a part of the Arab Spring ushering in
radicalised Islam is something which, I think, gives cause for concern to
those who were operating on a Western liberal democratic template.
*What about the role of the mood created by the non-permanent members?*
The mood in the Security Council during 2011 was, I think, determined by
the fact that the Council had five aspiring members: Brazil, Nigeria,
India, South Africa and Germany. So, at the very least, that makes for
richness of debate. Therefore, the traditional, you know, somewhat
apathetic approach to the Security Council was not on display. The
permanent members, by virtue of their continued presence, tend to call the
shots. But the non-permanent members do have views. However, the Council's
outcomes are not always determined by those views.
*Give me an example of when the five aspiring members were able to change
the tone…*
In fact, I am going to make a different point. So the world is perceived as
being divided between the five permanent members and the other 10. So the
first baby steps that we took in the Council is that we formed a group
called the E10: the Elected 10 or the Elegant 10! As with any organisation
which is looking at real life issues that affect people, you invariably end
up – as my experience in trade negotiations in Geneva showed – introducing
what are called Coalitions of the Interested. Now it would not be correct
for me to say that all five aspiring members invariably took positions and
were on the same page. In terms of broad policy, yes. In terms of the
nature of the statement that they made, yes. But there were aberrations.
For instance, we repeatedly found one of the African members, a declared
aspirant for permanent membership of the Security Council, adopting a very
low-key approach and voting invariably with the West.
*Including in Resolution 1973 on Libya.*
Including in Resolution 1973, if you are referring to a particular African
state. You had another member from Africa which supported the resolution.
Surprisingly, one of the European members did, too. Germany abstained.
Well, one needs to understand why this took place. It is only when you get
that clarity that you know what happened between U.N. Resolution 1970 (on
Libya), 1973 (on Libya again) and then the Syria resolution, which was
vetoed, and in between, the unanimous articulation of the Security
Council's position on Syria in the Presidential Statement (PRST) on August
3, 2011, when I was chairing the Council. That will remain for a long time
to come as the only such unanimous PRST. We got a lot of kudos for it then,
but I think in retrospect not many people who focus on the Council's work
realised the value of the August 3 statement, both its content and the
manner in which we got it through. But we will come to that in a minute. In
order to understand what happened in Resolution 1973, you have to
understand what happened prior to that, in Resolution 1970, which was the
resolution of the Security Council on Libya that was unanimously voted.
The only disagreement that I recall on 1970 was the formulation contained
therein, referring Colonel Muammar Qaddafi and some others to the
International Criminal Court. There was a lively discussion within the
Council, and some of us said, “Look, the threat of a referral would be more
appropriate, because once you've referred somebody to the ICC then the
clock is ticking, and you don't have the leverage which is required.” The
Americans agreed with our view, but some of the European members were in a
terrible rush. They said, “No, no, we have to [refer it to the ICC]. This
is the minimum.” So I said, “Alright, in which case, what will happen when
you come back because the situation is not going to change.” I mean the
manner in which the situation in Libya was spiralling out of control in
February. So the short point is that that we got a unanimous resolution
(1970), even though there was unease in the Council on that resolution.
By the time we came to 1973, there were major disagreements. Why? That is
entirely due to what was being proposed. It was very clear that many
Western capitals were openly espousing regime change to begin with.
Secondly, the language of 1973 contains explicit provisions for punitive
and coercive action. It contains an explicit formulation, “all means
necessary”, which is a euphemism or code word for military action. Now you
don't need knowledge of rocket science to realise what these provisions
mean. We were going in for a Western-NATO military operation.
In the negotiations for Resolution 1973, all people of goodwill tried to
insert some formulations in there, such as the call for a ceasefire, an
arms embargo, and so on and so forth. The final outcome of 1973: I knew
that this was going to be a stepping stone to disaster. Why? Not because
any of us wanted to hold a brief for Colonel Qaddafi . Let's be clear.
India, in any case, did not have the kind of relationship with Qaddafi that
some Western leaders had. You remember two visits by [British Prime
Minister Tony] Blair to Qaddafi's tent in the desert, in 2008 and in June
2009. If you look at the nature of the relationship many Western capitals
had with Qaddafi, it is well documented that many sold arms to him. And
there are allegations that Qaddafi's money was not only subverting academic
principles (at the London School of Economics), but also financing
elections in Western Europe. India didn't have this kind of relationship.
In fact, the only known interaction at head of government level that I can
recall was when Indira Gandhi visited Tripoli in 1984.
Yes, there were Indian workers in Libya, about 18,000 of them. But they
were not working as part of large commercial contracts that India had.
These were poor people who were hired by Western economic entities. They
were in a difficult situation. After the last Western citizens were pulled
out, the West declared war on Libya. And China and India had to start, you
know, locating their citizens, making arrangements for them being taken to
safety.
It's interesting that there were news reports that suggested that the
reason India abstained from voting on Resolution 1973 was that it was
preoccupied with the problem of its nationals.
I know a little bit about that because I was the person here negotiating,
and I was the person in charge of the Mission in New York. No. We abstained
because we understood what was happening. Nobody wanted to hold a brief for
Colonel Qaddafi. But we realised that this is a society that is
characterised by tribal animosities and that the use of force is going to
exacerbate the situation. But the interesting thing here is we were not
alone in that assessment. There were several others, including people who
voted for the resolution. The South Africans have told me on a number of
occasions that their vote for the resolution was a mistake. But they said
that their decision was not influenced, but conditioned, by the expectation
that Resolution 1973 would help bring peace to Libya. Our assessment was
different. Our assessment was that this was going to result in an Iraq kind
of situation, with a Security Council rubber stamp. And I think in
retrospect we were absolutely right. Interestingly, Russia and China also
abstained. But you talk to the Russians and the Chinese now; they say, “We
made a mistake. We should have cast the veto.”
*What is their assessment? If they had vetoed Resolution 1973, how would
events have played out?*
That is very difficult to say because that involves a hypothetical
scenario. The military operations commenced on March 14, 2011. In the
run-up to the commencement of the military operations, the question was,
“where would the assets come from?” And it was very clear that it would
have to be a NATO operation, and within NATO also there wasn't much of an
appetite from the U.S. But they were talked into the situation, or they
decided to get involved, and then they pulled back. All of us realised
immediately that this talk about countries in the region participating was
without a solid basis. I don't know how many Arab countries in the region
could participate. But it was essentially a NATO military operation.
When military operations ostensibly concluded, it was clear that the
post-conflict Libya would require a lot of attention. But during the
military operation justified by Resolution 1973, the Council faced the
spectacle of not being able to enforce a ceasefire, which was in the
resolution. When we all asked for a ceasefire, we were told that, no, they
were not in the mood until the entire Qaddafi establishment, the entrenched
establishment, was overthrown. So even though Resolution 1973 does not talk
about regime change, that was certainly the standard.
*What about the arms embargo, which was also in 1973?*
You know the only reason the Council agreed to the arms embargo was that
there was a desperate plea from the Arab League. And they said, if the
Council does not intervene there will be rivers of blood, and they went on
to say that the Council owed it to the poor people in Libya who were being
slaughtered. Saif al-Islam [Qaddafi's son] had made a statement on the
previous day that they would hunt down all the Benghazi rebels like rats. I
remember the statement that I made in the Council. This was all in a closed
session. I said, first of all, the phrase “rivers of blood” is the
intellectual property of Enoch Powell, the Member of the British Parliament
from Wolverhampton. Powell said that in the context of immigration of
coloured immigrants from the Commonwealth. And you know, that turned out to
be baloney. So we don't know what will happen.
In that atmosphere nobody wanted to be seen to be doing nothing, and the
intentions of those who were asking for the resolution were not suspect
till then. The arms embargo means that you will not be arming the Benghazi
rebels while you are conducting military operations against Qaddafi. We
kept asking this. I remember asking, “Do you know who these guys [the
rebels] are? These chaps that you are arming, etc?” Now we know the facts
of who these people are, such as Belhadj [Abdelhakim Belhadj, the emir of
the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group] who had been handed over in a terrorism
rendition case. They kept saying that this is a grand alliance between the
people of Libya and the West in order to get rid of a tyrant. We kept
telling them to listen, just think this one through. And now we are told by
a senior human rights officer that about 8,000 people in detention centres
are being held without trial in today's Libya… about the rampant abuse of
human rights and extrajudicial killings: that's exactly what we were saying.
*Is there a mechanism in the Security Council to go back and revisit the
Libyan war, Resolution 1973, and exactly how you are laying it out? Is
there a way for the U.N. to do this in order to understand the precedent
set for the Council?*
Russia has asked for the Security Council to undertake an evaluation of
protection of civilians, because Resolution 1973 is about protecting
civilians. So what kind of damage was there, collateral damage to
civilians, etc? There is great reluctance to undertake that. That is the
issue. So I hope you are very clear as to why India abstained on Resolution
1973. You know, as students of history, one does not know how it's going to
work, but with the benefit of hindsight, you should have voted against it.
That is the predominant view on the Council. Those who clamoured for
military action wanted it with enthusiasm. Now they don't want to have a
discussion about what is going on in Libya. That is why they don't want any
open sessions.
*What about Syria, then?*
Look clearly, given a situation in which the Alawites constitute 12 per
cent of the population, with the total minority at about 26 per cent. Any
society where there is a minority of 26 per cent and a majority of 74 per
cent, there is going to have to be a social compact. That compact worked
because different communities were co-opted. But one thing is very clear
about Syria. As we proceeded in the Council, it became clear (and this also
comes out in the [al-Dabi] report to the League of Arab States) that there
is an armed component to the opposition. Those who want a strong
condemnation of Damascus will tell you that helpless civilians turned to
the opposition, and they armed themselves only when they were being
slaughtered. Be that as it may. It is very difficult to calibrate as to
when one became the other, when the peaceful became the armed, when a
qualitative change took place. My sense is that you cannot get peace in
Syria unless both sides walk back. Therefore, you need complete cessation
of violence. You need an inclusive Syrian-led dialogue without
preconditions, and you need the engagement of all sections of civilian
society on issues related to constitutional reform.
*Do you think the Libyan experience has made it impossible for both sides
in Syria to take a step back?*
Well, there is some suggestion that President Bashar al-Assad might be
willing to talk, but those who are financing and arming the opposition
think that they will be able to succeed, drawing on the Libyan experience.
I must say frankly: whether we vote for or against or abstain on the Syrian
resolution is not the issue. Because of the Libyan experience other members
of the Security Council, such as China and Russia, will not hesitate in
exercising a veto if a resolution – and this is the big if – contains
actions under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, which permits the use of force
and punitive and coercive measures. So your question is absolutely
pertinent. And, you know, the Libyan experience means different things to
different people. The unsettled state of Libya means that there are
mercenaries who are operating in Libya, who are going back to Niger and
Mali, bringing chaos.
Nothing that I've said should lead to any inference being drawn that we are
unhappy with the transitional government. We want to see the people of
Libya being able to vote, and we hope for a positive outcome. What we are
doing here is understanding Resolution 1970 and Resolution 1973.
We were able to get unanimity in the Council, under the Indian presidency,
on the presidential statement in the Council on Syria on August 3, 2011. We
stopped short of incorporating Chapter 7. We condemned the violence. We
called on both parties to step back and we asked for a dialogue abjuring
violence. That was the message we had given bilaterally through IBSA
[India-Brazil-South Africa]. That is a message we have given collectively.
We were told we – that is, the PRST [U.N. Security Council President's
Statement] – need unanimity. So our contribution, apart from making sure
that we got the text that we wanted, was to get unanimity. We have seen
statements by former U.S. diplomats who said, “Oh, this was not an Indian
thing, this was negotiated between Brazil and France.” I mean, I can tell
you, you can talk to the Secretariat, the Indian presidency was the first
time in the history of the Security Council when the President did the
negotiating. I mean full marks to all the delegations because they came on
board, but we were doing the negotiating. We were not only chairing. Then
we knew that this would fall apart because Lebanon would not be able to
join the PRST. So we looked for a precedent to allow them to disassociate
from the statement. We found one in 1974. So we got a unanimous
Presidential Statement in August 2011.
Then two months later, on October 4, Britain and France brought a
resolution before the Council which was essentially the same as the PRST,
except it had a reference to Article 41. This would mean we would consider
further measures, including from Article 41. Not that they will take these
measures, but if this does not work, then they would. Two permanent members
of the Security Council co-sponsored the resolution. Two permanent members
[Russia and China] vetoed it, and the fifth, the U.S., under provocation
from the Syrian ambassador, walked out.
So this is it. There is a complete difference between August and October.
We abstained in October. So why did we vote in favour of the February
resolution on Syria? Because the February resolution [which Russia and
China vetoed] was explicitly clear that it was not under Chapter 7 [use of
force]. So Resolution 1973 and this one are fundamentally different. So
that's the reason why we supported one and didn't support the other.
*So you think now the sense is that people are going to be extremely
concerned about Chapter 7?*
Yes.
**
------------------------------
----[Mailing List for Eritrea Related News ]----
Received on Tue Mar 06 2012 - 20:57:54 EST
