The London conference on Somalia: Rhetoric and reality
Muuse Yuusuf
2012-03-24, Issue <
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Will the rhetoric at the London meeting change the reality on the ground in
Somalia? Maybe. But the motives of Prime Minister David Cameron and other
world leaders, especially those from eastern Africa, are not above
suspicion.
Since the collapse of the central government in 1991, over 17 conferences
have been held to reconcile Somalia’s different stakeholders and factions.
Most of these conferences, sponsored mainly by the international community,
have failed to resolve the seemingly never-ending Somali conflict. The
question is, will the London conference make any difference this time?
>From the outset, I cannot help but to compare the conference with previous
reconciliation conferences held in foreign countries. Just like the past
ones, the London conference seems a top-down process in which some powerful
foreign leaders have taken the lead to ‘coerce’ Somalis to reach some form
of a political agreement. The 1993 UN-sponsored Addis Ababa conference, held
at the height of the civil war, was one of those top-down conferences, which
failed Somalis. While different Somali factions were negotiating political
settlement, the United Nations Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali,
supported by president Bill Clinton, both determined to make the UN a
peace-enforcing organisation in the post-cold war era, was threatening to
place Somalia under a UN trusteeship unless Somali factions reached a
political agreement. The Addis conference failed for the following reasons.
[1]
First, UN sponsors of the conference wrongly assumed armed factional leaders
as representatives of all sections of the Somali society in a war-torn
country where representation and legitimate authority were bitterly
contested issues. Indeed, while self-appointed factional leaders enjoyed the
comfort of luxury hotels in Addis Ababa, as Somali leaders did in London,
the nitty-gritty business of resolving daily clan conflict at village,
district and regional levels were left to traditional leaders who were
marginalised from the process. This was at the height of the civil war when
society was disintegrating into fiefdoms, and powerful clans or factions
easily manipulated and intimidated fearful and weaker communities.
Second, a pressurised time framework of a few weeks with foreign-led agenda
was allocated to the conference to force factional leaders to come up with a
comprehensive political roadmap of nation building. In fact, while factional
leaders were discussing the huge issues of state building, the Security
Council adopted resolution no. 814 in March 1993, which authorised the
United Nations Mission of Somalia, known as the UNOSOM II. The resolution
made the UN effectively the highest authority in the country. The fact of
the matter was the UN leadership hurried up the process because it wanted a
political agreement to coincide with the authorisation and deployment of the
UNOSOM II forces in Somalia to replace the earlier UN missions (UNOSOM-I).
In other words, to say to the world, here is an agreement reached by Somalis
to be supported by the UNOSOM II. The pressurised time factor destroyed any
hope of a real reconciliation among Somalis considering the importance of
allocating plenty of time to traditional Somali conflict resolution process.
The main outcome of the conference was an ‘agreement’ document signed by
unscrupulous ‘leaders’ with no intention of implementing them for their
parochial interests. They had even exploited flaws in the process to
undermine it, claiming it was ‘forced on’ them by external forces, although
this was true to some extent. Regrettably, any hope of implementing the
Addis Ababa agreement, which was to establish a transitional national
council, was destroyed by the massacre of the Pakistani peace-keeping troops
by General’s Mohamed Farah Aideed’s faction. This led to a manhunt operation
to arrest the belligerent general who was an obstacle to the UN’s mission.
The huge and ambitious nation-building mission was aborted prematurely and
the UNOSOM II was terminated after some American helicopters were shot down
and a few UNOSOM soldiers killed in the fighting involving General Aideed’s
militia and the UNOSOM forces.
Another reconciliation conference, known as the Mbagathi process, held in
Kenya, was more or less similar to the Addis Ababa one because regional
powers, such as Ethiopia supporting different Somali factions, were accused
of dictating the outcome of the conference. Daniel Arap Moi, former
president of Kenya, was reported admitting the reconciliation process could
not be entrusted with Kenya and Ethiopia because of the two countries’ fear
of Somali nationalism and a Greater Somalia. [2] The outcome of the two-year
long or so conference was the formation of a government dominated by
warlords, which was unpopular among Somalis who saw Ethiopia as the long
hand behind the Mbagathi process. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG),
rather than promoting peace and reconciliation among Somalis, became a
warmongering government and led Ethiopian forces to invade southern Somalia
in 2006 after a political fallout between the TFG and the Islamic Courts
Union over power sharing.
Just like the previous two conferences, sponsors of the London conference
assumed most Somalis were represented at the conference by the leaders of
Puntland, Somaliland, Galmudug, the Transitional Federal Government, and
Ahlu Sunna Wal-Jama (ASWJ), a religious Sufi organisation, which is fighting
the Al-Qaeda-linked Al-Shabaab extremist group. The reality on the ground is
most regions in central and southern Somalia are under the control of the
Al-Shabaab who have not participated the conference. Therefore, once can
assume the views of the Somali people under their rule are unknown and were
not taken into consideration at the conference. The question that imposes
itself is then, how could one pretend that most Somalis were represented in
the conference?
Even, for the sake of argument, if we accept the argument that members of
the current transitional parliament, which was formed through a selection
criterion, represent all Somalis regardless of where they live the fact of
the matter is that these MPs do not have any real presence or constituencies
on the ground. They are merely a bunch of people who are being holed up in
some office buildings in Mogadishu, tormented by Al-Shabaab’s daily attacks.
The main point here is, the issue of representation was not really addressed
in the conference, although leaders of Somaliland who have been boycotting
reconciliation conferences attended the conference.
Despite the rhetoric made by the leaders of the conference that the future
of Somalia lie in the hands of Somalis, looking at the conference closely,
it would seem it was dominated by foreign powers from Kenya and Ethiopia
with their national interests at heart where their forces are deeply
involved in Somalia to other foreign powers whose warships are in the Red
Sea, chasing Somali pirates. The few Somali leaders in the conference seemed
to have been sandwiched between powerful world leaders, in which the British
prime minister, in a photo opportunity, was shown standing in front of these
mainly third world leaders as though he was a colonial master marshalling
his troops. And worst of all, president Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the
symbol of Somalia’s sovereignty, was missing from the photo. Perhaps he was
deliberately excluded!
Somali leaders were treated as good guests and some of them were welcomed by
the prime minister himself who entertained them at No. 10 Downing Street.
However, the burning question is whether the ownership of the conference was
really in the hands of Somalis, or they were just listening to a political
dictate by some foreign leaders, including USA’s foreign secretary, Hillary
Clinton, who clearly stated the current Transitional Federal Government’s
term in office should not be extended beyond August 2012.
Let alone respecting Somalia’s sovereignty where Kenyan and Ethiopian forces
are violating the country’s territorial integrity on a daily basis, by
telling Somali leaders what they can or cannot do, the conference has
breached one of the basic principles of international diplomacy which is not
to tell other heads of states directly what to do. The message to instruct
another world leader is subtle and not direct. Given Somalis’ notorious
factionalism and their non-ending squabble over power, it was probably right
to tell them bluntly the TFG’s time in office was over. However, the way the
message that was conveyed was like telling a child they have to go to bed by
10pm! This was disastrous diplomacy, and in international diplomatic
language it normally means war between the concerned heads of states.
After all Somalia, although is going through difficult and testing times, is
still a sovereign state and its territorial integrity are protected by
international laws and conventions. In case you have forgotten, Somalia was
once a respected leader in Africa’s diplomatic and military fields. From
1960s, Somalia enjoyed a relatively stable democratic system where
governments were borne out of legitimate elections. Indeed, Somalia was one
of the first few African countries which had an elected president who then
retired from politics and lived in his country peacefully until his death.
This was president Aden Abdulle Hersi, the first Somali president.
At the regional diplomatic stage, Somali leaders played a leading role in
ending the white minority rule in Rhodesia and South Africa as they
campaigned for the self-determination of the peoples of Mozambique and
Angola. They were also good mediators who played an important role in
resolving conflicts between some African states. A classic example of this
was when Somali leaders averted an imminent war between Julius Nyereere of
Tanzania and Idi Amin of Uganda in 1972 through diplomacy.
Furthermore, at the height of its national pride, the proud Somali Republic
once severed its diplomatic relationship with the United Kingdom in 1963 as
a protest against Britain’s draconian decision to annex the Somali region in
its former east Africa colony to Kenya, although the overwhelming majority
of Somalis voted to be united with their brethren in the Somali Republic.
This could have happened at the London conference when Somali leaders were
told what to do with their future, which was interference in their internal
affairs, but the only difference this time is Somalia is a broken country
with no political, economic or military clout. Sadly, any country can bully
Somalia.
Despite world leaders’ rhetorical agreements on actions intended to defeat
terrorism and eradicate piracy and their support for the African Union’s
peace-keeping forces in Somalia, the loudest message that came out of the
conference was not to extend TFG’s term in office beyond August. However,
the question is, what next? Although it was agreed to convene a constituent
assembly which is representative of the views of all Somali regions, which
will then select a parliament based on clan representation to replace the
current transitional assembly, the reality on the ground may suggest
otherwise. For example, although leaders of the break away region of Somalia
(Somaliland) have agreed to the principles concluded at the London
conference, Somaliland leaders have not signed to the Garowe Principles
which laid down the foundation of convening the constituent assembly.
Indeed, Somaliland leaders have not participated in any of the political
agreements mentioned in the conference’s communiqué, including the Djibouti
Agreement under which the current TFG was formed, the Roadmap, and the
Kampala Accord, which reconciled Somali leaders. Although the assumption was
peoples in Somaliland were represented in these political agreements by some
members of the current transitional parliament who hail from Somaliland, the
reality on the ground is peoples in the break away region have their own
elected parliament.
It is therefore one thing to make or ‘coerce’ Somaliland leaders to sign an
agreement, which includes agreements they have never been part of, but it is
entirely different thing to implement such agreement on the ground for
obvious reasons. One can only speculate why Somaliland leaders have accepted
the London principles; this may include their wish to please the British
government in the hope Britain will be sympathetic to their quest for
recognition as an independent state, although the British government,
defending the United Kingdom against secessionists in Scotland, have
categorically said no to such request.
Furthermore, it is one thing to promise to convene a constituent assembly,
but it is entirely a different matter when you examine realities on the
ground in a country where competing political factions rule different
regions. The biggest question that the conference has failed to answer is:
How on earth can one expect realistically to organise a constituent
assembly, which is supposed to be representative of all Somali views, within
six months? The time framework is very short and unpractical considering
Somalis’ notorious factionalism in which different groups or ‘spoilers of
peace’ would do any thing to disrupt any political programme that do not
serve their interests. Even to organise elections or other huge political
events in mature democratic countries require resources and time, at least
six to one year. To expect Somalis to organise such important political
event in a six months’ time is asking too much from a country with no good
infrastructure and no mature political institutions, a country recovering
from a long and protracted civil war.
On the other hand, although their power is being weakened by the combined
forces of Ethiopia, Kenya, AMISOM and Somali forces, the Al-Shabaab movement
still controls vast areas in central and southern Somalia and its leaders
are not willing to talk to the TFG at least as the Taliban in Afghanistan
are doing at the moment by talking to the Americans and the Afghanistan
government. Therefore, they are a formidable force which can disrupt the
process of organising the conference. Indeed, only this week a suicide
bomber has killed four people in front of the presidential palace in
Mogadishu.
If any thing, even if the constituent assembly which will be selected by the
TFG, Puntland and Galmudug assisted by traditional leaders was held
successfully, the likely outcome of their political deliberation is to
select members of a new federal parliament which will be based on the 4.5
clan-quota as the case was in the previous parliaments. The only difference
this time is the number of parliamentarians, the lower house, will be half
of the current 550 members, as there will be an upper house of 54 members,
representing federal states. The rhetoric about the emerging federal
structure envisioned in the Roadmap, the Garowe I and II principles seems to
be far away as long as the break away region of Somalia insists on its quest
for independence although its leaders seem to have accepted some kind of a
federal structure by signing the agreement concluded at the London
conference.
In conclusion, if Mr Cameron, the British prime minister who is feeling
invincible after his military victory in Libya, has decided to do something
about the unabating Somali conflict to enhance his country’s national
interests, he has succeeded in doing so to some extent. He has re-focussed
world’s attention at Somali pirates who are not only threatening his
country’s commercial interests, but are also jeopardising the multi-million
international trade that passes through the Gulf of Aden every day. He has
made clear to the world that the Al-Qaeda inspired Islamic extremists in
Somalia are not only poisoning young minds with extremist ideologies, but
are also exporting their terror activities down to the streets of British
cities and towns where young Somalis are being recruited to carry out terror
activities inside and outside Somali. He has promised not to tolerate such
threats coming from what he described a ‘failed state’.
On the other hand, it has also been reported recent oil exploration in
Somalia, particularly in the Puntland state, might have encouraged Britain
to take the lead in resolving the Somali conflict in the hope a stable
Somalia will be a good source of oil for Britain. If that was one of the
motives behind his action, then he did succeed on this front as well because
leader of the Puntland state of Somali was present at the conference. If Mr
Cameron’s ulterior motive was to fulfil Britain’s moral responsibility
towards Somalia for being a former colonial power, he has demonstrated to
the world that Britain is doing something about the Somali conflict. Mr
Cameron can now sleep peacefully with a clear conscience feeling he has done
something about the Somali predicament.
However, the real question is whether too much rhetoric from the conference
will change realities on the ground? It is unlikely the current statuesque
will change soon. Al-Shabaab will probably be a nuisance for sometime; the
break away region has already refused to negotiate with other Somalis, and
any new parliament/government will be more or less the same, a bunch of MPs
selected through a clan-based criterion with no constituents on the ground.
Despite above short-comings, by making leaders of the break away region of
Somalia to come to the negotiating table with other Somali stakeholders for
the first time, Mr Cameron has done a favour to the Somali people given how
they have been boycotting any reconciliation conference involving wider
Somali stakeholders. As a unionist, I welcome the British government’s
efforts in supporting Somali unity especially at a time when it is defending
the unity of the United Kingdom against Scottish secessionists.
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Received on Sat Mar 24 2012 - 22:25:56 EDT
