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[dehai-news] Qatar's Opportunity for Regional Influence

From: Tsegai Emmanuel <emmanuelt40_at_gmail.com_at_dehai.org>
Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2012 08:15:32 -0500

Qatar's Opportunity for Regional Influence

April 5, 2012 | 1243 GMT



KARIM JAAFAR/AFP/Getty Images


Summary

Qatar has long been among the most stable countries in the Middle
East, even amid the political upheaval that rocked many of its
neighbors over the past year. This stability, combined with Qatar's
natural gas wealth and status as the world's top liquefied natural gas
(LNG) exporter, has enabled Doha to pursue an assertive foreign policy
that belies the country's size. However, with many new LNG producers
expected to come on line in the next decade, Qatar will face increased
competition that will erode its current advantages, limiting its
opportunity to leverage its strengths into a position of lasting
influence in the region.

Qatar's Historical Role in the Gulf

Qatar occupies a strategically important position in the Persian Gulf.
A tiny peninsula jutting out from Saudi Arabia's eastern coast, the
territory that makes up modern-day Qatar has long served as a stop on
international trade routes for silk, pearls and now crude oil. Qatar's
arid climate and lack of domestically controlled fresh water resulted
in a small population that was one of the poorest in the world until
the development of the hydrocarbon industry. Even today, Qatar imports
about 90 percent of its food and only maintains about two days' supply
of water.

The al-Thani family, which has ruled Qatar since the country's
formation, was only able to secure Qatar's independence from the
occupying Ottoman Empire by signing a truce with the British in 1911.
After its relationship with the United Kingdom ended in 1971, Qatar
was again left without the means to defend itself from outside
aggression. Choosing not to enter into a confederation with the states
that made up the United Arab Emirates, Qatar became a founding member
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981. While the GCC ensured
that Qatar's Arab neighbors would recognize its sovereignty, the
arrangement continued Qatar's dependence on its larger and more
economically secure neighbors like Saudi Arabia and prevented Doha
from challenging Riyadh's positions.

Qatar's security is guaranteed through its partnership with the United
States, which has based its Central Command forces in Qatar since
2002. Like its arrangement with the British, the United States is a
distant foreign backer possessing a strong navy that can protect
Qatar's regional autonomy.

Shift in Relevance

Qatar's emergence as a significant regional actor has coincided with
the rule of the current emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, who
ousted his father in a bloodless palace coup in 1995. The following
years saw the establishment of government-owned Al Jazeera, steady
investment in LNG technology and an attempt to establish a Qatari
alternative to Saudi Arabia's more conservative ideological
leadership. Sheikh Hamad's ability to bring Qatar to the forefront of
regional and Arab foreign policy negotiations belies the fact that
Qatar lacks the large crude reserves, and thereby the massive cash
stockpile, of many Gulf states, a significant military, or even much
regional respect until recently. Bahrain and Oman notwithstanding,
Qatar is the smallest crude oil exporter of the GCC and also has the
smallest crude reserves.

Qatar's relatively quick rise to the top of global LNG exports only
occurred within the past five years, giving the state a source of
revenue not affected by Saudi competition. Though Saudi Arabia's
ability to increase its production and export of crude could make
Qatar's oil industry inconsequential, Qatar now outpaces Saudi Arabia
in natural gas production and is the global leader in LNG exports.

Qatar's gross domestic product (GDP) and government revenue have grown
in step with other regional hydrocarbon exporters during the past
decade, with exports accounting for 50 percent of GDP in 2011.
However, its smaller reserves of crude and the historically cheaper
price of natural gas compared to oil have meant that Qatar brings in
considerably less money in real terms than the majority of its
neighbors. Still, Qatar's 2010 GDP, about $127 billion, is a dramatic
increase from $17.5 billion in 2001, and this additional revenue has
provided the country with unexpected opportunities to expand its
influence.

Qatar's Tools for Action

Qatar's growing economic power has allowed the current emir to
cultivate an iconoclastic political identity for Qatar within the
region, especially as a leader in foreign policy issues. The regime
owns Al Jazeera, arguably the most respected media outlet in the
region and the one with the largest global audience. The importance of
Al Jazeera to Qatar's foreign policy ambitions cannot be overstated.
Qatar operates through relatively low-cost but high-profile foreign
policy moves that generate interest and receive significant coverage
in the media. This is no accident. Al Jazeera helped shape popular
opinion in the Arab world through its critical coverage of the Mubarak
regime in Egypt and the Gadhafi regime in Libya during the so-called
Arab Spring, which compelled countries like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and
others to send delegates to Doha to push for less negative coverage of
their sensitive political situations.

Increased financial independence also allows the regime to lend
backing to various players in the region, including financial
assistance for Libya's rebels and most likely Syria's rebels, hosting
the Taliban and Hamas regional offices, and offering energy aid to
Gaza. The relative calm and internal stability of Qatar's population
of about 1.7 million coupled with the less-conservative nature of the
regime has allowed Qatar to fill the void left by regional powers
preoccupied with internal unrest. Lacking the ethno-religious tensions
of some of its neighbors, Qatar has been able to move more boldly in
areas of foreign policy. This was most obvious during the past year,
when Qatar led the requests for foreign intervention in Libya and
Syria.

Qatar has also had better ties with Iran than the rest of the GCC
states have. Qatar does not have a significant fundamentalist
religious population within its borders that would violently reject
any involvement with Iran, and there is a long-standing yet relatively
minor Iranian cultural influence on the peninsula. Combined with the
fact that Qatar will never rise to the level of a regional hegemon
like Saudi Arabia, interactions with Iran will not play into a larger,
future conflict over regional dominance. On a more practical level,
Qatar's natural gas reserves in the North Field are operated jointly
as part of Iran's South Pars natural gas field.

Narrow Window of Opportunity

Qatar's current and future regional influence are strongly linked to
its natural gas sector. With dependence on oil viewed as a strategic
liability, Qatar's forward-looking investments in LNG production and
export technology give the country an advantage in an increasingly
popular energy commodity. Also, because it cannot be undermined in
price or supply guarantees by Saudi Arabia, Qatar's LNG exports have
given it considerable independence compared to its oil-dependent
neighbors who are more likely to fall in line with Saudi views on most
foreign policy issues.

Due to its significant LNG infrastructure investments and sizable
reserves, Qatar will continue to be a key supplier of LNG for roughly
the next 20 years. But with prices expected to peak within the next
three to five years, Qatar faces both a shrinking profit margin and a
more competitive market as regions such as North America are poised to
become exporters themselves. Qatar will continue its attempts to
mitigate some of these factors by encouraging its current customers to
sign larger, longer-term deals -- some up to 20 years -- in an effort
to lock in at current prices. Qatar reasonably has five to 10 years to
entrench its current regional position and increasing clout on foreign
policy issues.

With the ongoing unrest faced by Arab states, Qatar will have ample
opportunity to capitalize on the inability or unwillingness of its
neighbors to invest time and money needed to play a leadership role in
regional affairs. Because Qatar's military capabilities are weak and
its record of working with outside powers like the British and the
Americans is viewed with some suspicion, this role will likely take
the form of hosting regional discussions with often disparate
attendees and sometimes advocating policies well out of step with the
traditional Saudi-led conservative positions.

Despite its carefully constructed public image, Qatar lacks the tools
to change the trajectory for any state in the region but itself. The
closing window for economic independence means Qatar must condense the
equivalent of two- to three-decades' worth of regional foreign policy
involvement into only a few years to maximize its current opportunity
and secure a position of influence that outlasts its LNG dominance.


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Received on Fri Apr 06 2012 - 20:36:34 EDT
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