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> Wikileaks shows Meles' contempt for the South Sudanese and his
backstabbing of Al-Bashir
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2055c660d27d998caf736#p204545> Postby
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sid=77fd71b7ce22055c660d27d998caf736> revelations »
Apr 18, 2012 6:33 am
SUBJECT: MELES ON SUDAN: ICC AND U.S. ENGAGEMENT Classified By: Ambassador
Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY
-------
1. (S/NF) In a January 30 meeting, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles told
Acting AF Assistant Secretary Phil Carter and AF/SPG Director Tim Shortley
that with the expected ICC indictment of Sudanese President Bashir either 1)
someone within Khartoum would take advantage of the move to attempt to
remove Bashir, or 2) such an attempt will either fail or be aborted. While
Meles gave the chances of success for option 1 as nearly zero due to the
close knit ties among senior National Congress Party (NCP) officials, he
argued that the result would leave the Bashir government a "wounded animal"
that is more desperate. Meles argued that to the NCP leadership, their
approach is "perfectly rational." He explained that the Government of Sudan
(GoS) thought it had moved left bad relations with the U.S. behind when they
signed the Naivasha Agreements, only to, in their view, have the USG move
the goal posts As a result, Meles suggested that the NCP believes that the
"U.S. will get them one way or the other" and if they see their options as
either "to die today or die tomorrow, they will chose to employ delaying
mechanisms allowing them to die tomorrow." As such, they have no need to
resolve problems with the South because it will bring no benefit to them.
Facing such calculus, Meles analyzed the GoS approach as to 1) postpone a
vote on the South, 2) buy time in Darfur, and 3) "hope for a miracle in
2011." Meles suggested that if he were the U.S., he would either 1) remove
the NCP regime or, if that weren't an option, 2) make clear to the GoS that
the U.S. is not out to get it and explicitly lay out what is expected of the
GoS on Darfur and the South to avoid continued challenges.
End Summary.
DESTABILIZING EFFECTS OF ICC INDICTMENT
---------------------------------------
2. (C) Prime Minister Meles told Acting A/S Carter that the International
Criminal Court (ICC)
indictment of Sudanese President Bashir could provide a signal to someone in
Khartoum to attempt to remove Bashir through a coup. Although noting that he
has been hearing many rumors of such desires from within Khartoum, Meles
said that he did not give too much credence to most of these, but
highlighted the implications that such rumors have for the climate in
Khartoum. Still, Meles argued that such an option, if attempted, would
likely have a 100 percent chance of failing due to the close connections and
mutual support for one another among senior NCP officials which would
suppress any coup attempt. If Bashir remains in power, either because no
such coup attempt is made or an attempt fails, the indictment will leave the
Bashir regime a wounded animal that is more desperate than ever.
THE PERSPECTIVE FROM KHARTOUM
-----------------------------
3. (C) While acknowledging Carter's point that Khartoum's actions seem to
undermine their own long-term interests, Meles argued that from their own
perspective, the NCP's actions are perfectly rational. While the "Islamic
agenda" may have motivated the regime ten years ago, today they are
interested only in money and power, Meles posited. While the GoS thought
that they had moved away from a climate of bad relations with Washington
when they signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Naivasha, they
perceive the United States as having shifted the goal posts on them since.
As a result, Meles argued that the GoS believes that "the U.S. will get them
one way or the other," and from that perspective, they are already in a
corner. Believing they will lose, they perceive no benefit to them of
resolving the problems of South Sudan. Instead, Meles argued that the NCP's
strategy is to postpone a vote on the South, buy time on Darfur, and "hope
for a miracle" in 2011. Seeing the U.S. position leaving them with the
options of either "to die today or die tomorrow, they will chose to employ
delaying mechanisms allowing them to die tomorrow." ¶4. (C) Meles was
explicit that the GoS does not trust the United States, but acknowledged
that "to some extent they are ADDIS ABAB 00000259 002 OF 002 immune to" a
rational discussion with clear benchmarks that allow them an out. Still,
Meles claimed that the GoS has suggested that if they get a way out, they
may take it. While acknowledging that the GoS "may try to string (the U.S.)
along," Meles argued that the real issue is whether there is a possibility
of U.S.-NCP negotiations. If that is an option, Meles advised, it could lead
to rational discussions. ETHIOPIA'S
ADVICE FOR MOVING FORWARD
------------------------------------
5. (S/NF) Meles offered that if he were the United States, he would look at
two options. First, which he clearly conveyed as the preferred choice, would
be to "remove the Bashir regime." Acknowledging that such an option was
unlikely, Meles advocated for making a clear representation to the GoS that
the United States is not/not "out to get them" and laying out clear
benchmarks of actions expected of the GoS on both Darfur and South Sudan
that would be necessary to "avoid continued challenges" with the U.S. Meles
concluded the discussion by highlighting that "they don't trust the Obama
Administration," and "they trust the Obama Administration less than the Bush
Administration," and with a clear reference to U.S. Ambassador to the UN
Susan Rice and former Senior NSC Director for Africa Gayle Smith
"...especially some friends of mine."
YAMAMOTO
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Received on Thu Apr 19 2012 - 11:05:59 EDT
