From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Sun Jul 12 2009 - 04:51:26 EDT
Somalia, outside the Violence Box
Op-Ed
Abukar Arman
July 12, 2009
Whether in Somalia or elsewhere, any attempt to tame religious extremism
with violence leads to costly tragedies and disenchantments. Anyone who
doubts this ought to simply evaluate the miserable results of the global war
on terrorism.
The Somali political problem is escalating into a new phase of violent
struggle. Unless the current momentum is significantly slowed, a longer
lasting, much bloodier sectarian war is bound to replace the existing one.
Thus a non-violent paradigm for solving problems is direly needed, one that
constructs effective collaboration between multiple organizations.
The Islamist group that led a successful insurgency campaign and ended the
Ethiopian occupation has primarily split into two factions, one that is now
part of the unity government and another that is sworn to oppose it to the
end. And in recent months, in what is clearly a politically driven campaign
to decapitate the unity government, the opposition faction made of al-Shabab
and Hizbul Islam, an entity I refer to as the neo-Islamists, has carried out
strings of violent attacks, high-profile assassinations and suicide bombings
in various parts of the country. Few have openly challenged their
self-righteous claim to be fighting a just, religious war. Indeed, even
fewer have challenged the religious justification they employ in defending
their deadly campaign. Instead, the unity government, in what seems like a
reactionary move, has opted to follow the ill-advised strategy of its
predecessor-the former T.F.G.-by responding to violence with equally
indiscriminate violence without any regard for the helpless civilians.
According to the latest Foreign Policy magazine, "a recent report by West
Point's Combating Terrorism Center revealed that Osama bin Laden's outfit
had an awful experience trying to operate out of Somalia, for all the same
reasons that international peacekeepers found Somalia unmanageable in the
1990's: terrible infrastructure, excessive violence and criminality, and few
basic services, among other factors. In short, Somalia was too failed even
for al Qaeda."
In spite of this, the theatrical blame game continues in full force. And the
hyperbole of the two actors currently competing for power is already setting
off alarm bells as well as setting the stage for ramifications that could
outlast any future peace reconciliations. The neo-Islamists accuse the unity
government of being a foreign agent installed in power by the U.N. and the
West and believe they are religiously ordained to end that foreign
domination. The unity government, on its part, accuses the neo-Islamists of
being agents of al-Qaida and foreign terrorists who want to launch
transnational terror campaigns from lawless Somalia.
The latter accusation has only worked to lionize the neo-Islamists to
legendary status. They rapidly developed a reputation as brainwashed "global
jihadists" with whom resistance is futile. As anecdotal stories go, they
routinely enter villages or towns and demand that youth fight on their side
or that their families pay into the war chest. In an oral culture where
scrutiny is irrelevant and facts and fiction often conflate, this kind of
reputation is more potent than any army. So it should surprise no one that
the neo-Islamists are rapidly spreading their sphere of influence and now
control much wider territories than the unity government.
However, the current coalition of neo-Islamists is not monolithic and should
not be treated as such. Among them are political pragmatists such as Sheikh
Hassan Dahir Awes who, at least at this juncture, is driven by
existentialist motives. These individuals are influential stakeholders who
led the insurgency and who could not partake in post-occupation power
sharing mainly because they are on a U.S. terrorist watch list and are
wanted dead or alive.
Not all the neo-Islamists are emotionally-driven jihadists whose ultimate
goal is to be killed on the battlefield. They make rational decisions when
they deem it necessary. Why else would they tactically retreat when they
were facing annihilation between the Ethiopian land invasion and American
aerial bombardment in late 2006 and early 2007? If their ultimate goal is
engaging the enemy face-to-face and attaining martyrdom through that
process, why would many of them hide their identities by covering their
faces?
So, it is not implausible that these rational survivalist individuals could
sign a deal that would ensure them positions and take them off that
controversial list that has mainly worked to further radicalize many
individuals and groups around the world.
Granted, the unity government has been in dialogue with these individuals.
But the unity government, more specifically the Transitional Parliament, has
resorted to what many consider a haphazard call for help as President
Ahmed's office continued their behind-the-scenes negotiation with key
figures of the neo-Islamists.
In a statement that not only offended the supporters of the unity government
but also worked to further radicalize the neo-Islamists, Speaker of the
Parliament Sheikh Aden Mohamed Nur did the unthinkable. He called on
Somalia's neighboring states, among which are the very Ethiopian troops
whose oppressive occupation ended only a few months earlier. "We ask
neighboring countries-including Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Yemen-to send
troops to Somalia within 24 hours," Nur said.
And while there are some parliament members known for decency and high
integrity, by and large, that institution has earned a profound reputation
for corruption. It is infested with pro-Ethiopia demagogues who could care
less about the well being of their people and the interest of their nation.
So what is the alternative to violence?
Aside from refraining to rush into an artificial collective reconciliation
process, there should be an attempt made to restore confidence and change
people's defeated psyche by providing them (including the armed ones) the
essentials that they immediately need, such as food and medicine, and also
facilitating a more peaceful understanding of religion.
Instead of sending more weapons to Somalia, as the Obama administration did
recently, imagine a two-track benevolent campaign launched concurrently to
positively impact hearts and minds.
Operation 3.5: A two-year goodwill campaign whose primary objective is to
save the 3.5 million Somalis on the verge of starvation by flooding the
country with food and medicine. The unity government, assisted by a
commission appointed by the donor countries, could set up a sound,
transparent checks and balances process. Instead of contracting the big name
international NGOs, many of whom have already taken an antagonistic position
against the neo-Islamists, to contract faith-based NGOs such as Islamic
Relief, Life, Somali Relief Fund, Mercy International, and the
Somali-operated America Relief Agency for the Horn of Africa -to distribute
the food and medicine. The African peacekeepers-A.M.I.S.O.M.-could provide
the security necessary to operate the distribution stations in strategic
places.
Done right, the credibility that this kind of operation would likely earn
the unity government, the donor nations, A.M.I.S.O.M., etc. is beyond
measure. More importantly, this seemingly grandiose humanitarian endeavor
could cost a fraction of the billions of dollars spent on Somalia since
1991.
Operation Middle Ground (Deen Al Wasata): The primary objective of this
campaign would be to cultivate an environment conducive to the discovery,
teaching and reinforcement of the right teachings of Islam described in the
Quran itself as "the middle ground religion," particularly in areas of peace
and coexistence, of freedom of religion and choice. The unity government
could solicit Muslim scholars, mosques, schools, Islamic courts and dugsis
(madrasas) to teach how forcing religion upon people negates the teachings
of Islam.
The survival of the unity government and indeed the restoration of peace and
order depend on the support of the masses. That is what helped the Islamic
Courts Union defeat the warlords, and that is what helped the insurgency end
the brutal two-year Ethiopian occupation. But for the people to support the
government, the government must first support the people.
http://www.worldpress.org/images/spacer.gif
Abukar Arman is writer who lives in Ohio. His articles and analysis are
widely published.
----[This List to be used for Eritrea Related News Only]----
