From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Fri Aug 07 2009 - 09:23:24 EDT
U.S. Policy Shift Needed in the Horn of Africa
Author:
<http://www.cfr.org/bios/14483/bronwyn_e_bruton.html> Bronwyn E. Bruton,
International Affairs Fellow in Residence
August 7, 2009
FULLNAMEOFINTERVIEWEEU.S. strategic interests in the Horn of Africa center
on preventing Somalia from becoming a safe haven for al-Qaeda or other
transnational jihadist groups. In pursuing its counterterror strategy, the
United States has found common cause with Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government
has long feared the renewal of Somali irredentist claims on its eastern
border, or that a powerful Islamist movement may stoke unrest among its own
large Muslim population, and feels beset both by a powerful indigenous
separatist movement in its Ogaden region and an unresolved border dispute
with its northern neighbor, Eritrea.
But the Ethiopian government's behavior in recent years, both domestically
and in bordering states, poses mounting difficulties for the United States
and its long-term goals in the region. Washington must be prepared to press
its partner to alter its strong-handed approach to political dissent and
counterterrorism or consider ending the relationship.
Ethiopia has struggled with internal reforms since the collapse of the
communist Derg regime in 1991. The country's economy has grown, but attempts
to institutionalize a system of multiparty democracy have stumbled.
In 2005, Ethiopia held largely free and fair democratic elections. Prior to
the polls, there was an unprecedented opening of political space. Opposition
political parties were able to hold rallies, the press was able to publish
critical political analysis, and international and local civil society
organizations assisted in election monitoring. But the government's
tentative efforts to increase political space were not rewarded: After a
series of irregularities in the vote closing and tallying processes were
discovered, a variety of political parties contested the election results.
The Ethiopian government declared a state of emergency and responded
brutally to a series of apparently peaceful protests. The country was
plunged into a period of violent civil disturbance, during which the
Ethiopian government detained thousands of protestors and arrested hundreds
of opposition figures, including arguably nonpolitical actors from civil
society and the press. Many of these emergency measures have been
institutionalized, resulting in legislation that has criminalized social
advocacy by "foreigners" (including Ethiopian civil society organizations
that receive foreign charitable funds), and imposed harsh criminal penalties
on broadly defined "terrorist" acts, including disruptive public protests.
Impact on U.S. Policy Objectives
For the United States, cooperation with an authoritarian Ethiopia presents
looming challenges to U.S. policy objectives. First, the Ethiopian
government's attempts to minimize political competition in the run-up to the
2010 elections are likely to fan ethnic tensions in the country. The
government's ruling party, the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic
Front (EPRDF), is perceived by many Ethiopians to be dominated by a single
minority ethnic faction, the Tigre, and its consolidation of political power
may be read as an assault on the majority ethnic Amharic and Oromo
populations. Public dissatisfaction with the government is high in the wake
of the 2005 elections and a violent explosion is not out of the question.
Second, Ethiopia's conflicts with Eritrea and Somalia, and with the powerful
separatist movement in the Ogaden, have a jihadist impact. While the
U.S.-Ethiopia alliance has had short-term tactical advantages, it may be
undermining broader US counterterror goals.
Arguably, U.S. reliance on Ethiopian military might and intelligence has
served to exacerbate instability in Somalia. Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia,
and the extended presence of Ethiopian troops in Mogadishu, instead of
quelling conflict, has triggered a local backlash that has served as a
rallying point for local extremists. It was the development of a complex
insurgency against the Ethiopian occupation that effectively catapulted a
fringe jihadist youth militia, the
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/18650/alshabaab.html> Shabaab, to power.
International jihadists have now capitalized on the local insurgency, and on
U.S. support of the Ethiopian invasion, as an opportunity to globalize
Somalia's conflict. The presence of foreign expertise, fighters, and funding
has helped to tip the balance of power in favor of Somalia's extremist
groups. Additionally, there is growing concern that the conflict in the
Ogaden may give birth to indigenous jihadist movements.
While the U.S.-Ethiopia alliance has had short-term tactical advantages, it
may be undermining broader U.S. counterterror goals.
Anti-American sentiment in Somalia is pervasive, and stems in large part
from U.S. complicity with the Ethiopian invasion and reported Ethiopian
human rights abuses in Somalia. Ethiopia has also reportedly engaged in
human rights abuses within its Ogaden region, which borders Somalia, where
the government is engaged in a counterinsurgency effort against an ethnic
Somali separatist movement. Though Ethiopia has denied these charges, human
rights organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch, have documented atrocities committed by both sides in that conflict.
The U.S. decision to withdraw its military personnel from the Ogaden in
April 2006, and the subsequent failure of the international community to
seek accountability for these atrocities, has cemented a widespread public
perception in Ethiopia and Somalia that the United States is willing to turn
a blind eye on human rights abuses in exchange for cooperation in the
counterterror effort.
Further complicating U.S. efforts to bolster Somalia's central government is
the unresolved border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Eritrea
complains that Ethiopia has refused to honor the ruling of an independent
border commission on the demarcation of the common boundary and has demanded
intervention from the international community. Ethiopia charges that Eritrea
has retaliated by funneling weapons and funding to radical groups in
Somalia, some of which oppose Ethiopian forces there. Eritrea has denied
these charges, and some specific accusations leveled by the United Nations
and the African Union against Eritrea have been disproven. The demand for
sanctions on Eritrea is nevertheless growing, and comments by U.S. Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton on a visit to Kenya on Aug. 6, in which she linked
Eritrea to Somali militants suggests efforts by the Obama administration to
engage in a constructive political dialogue with Asmara may be dimming.
These factors suggest that U.S. ability to influence events in Somalia will
depend in some measure on diplomatic efforts to resolve the border dispute
and to address Ethiopian human rights abuses. But perhaps even more
important than either is what the United States decides to do in response to
the shrinking democratic space in Ethiopia.
Obstacles to U.S. Action
The United States has been unwilling to overtly pressure Ethiopia to adopt
major democratic reforms for a number of reasons. Many experts and
policymakers already fear that the regime is vulnerable to collapse. Some
diplomats fear that aggressive--or even public--pressure on Ethiopia may
inadvertently undermine or destabilize the regime. The United States cannot
afford to unsettle a country that has served as a rock of stability in an
otherwise troubled region.
Another major hurdle for the United States is the lack of an international
consensus on one fundamental question: Is Ethiopia still a democratic
country, or is the regime of President Meles Zenawi regime headed towards
dictatorship? The perception that Ethiopia is a fundamentally democratic
country remains strong, particularly among European nations. The lack of any
consensus would require the United States to take a lead and potentially
isolated role in pressuring Ethiopia for reform.
Finally, U.S. efforts to promote democratic reform in Ethiopia are impeded
by a lack of willing partners on the ground. Democratic civil society groups
generally fear for their safety and are not willing to mobilize in a public
advocacy effort. This means that U.S. efforts to counteract repressive
measures by the government will not be supported--or legitimized--by a
corresponding local effort. International organizations that might have
engaged with opposition political voices have already been expelled from the
country.
Policy Recommendations
Change is needed to ensure the sustainability of the U.S.-Ethiopia
partnership and U.S. counterterrorism goals in the region at a time when
Somalia continues to flounder as a failed state. The United States should
consider adopting a more assertive approach that makes use of two primary
points of leverage:
First, the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) should refuse direct funding to the many known "GONGOS"
(governmental nongovernmental organizations) that pose as legitimate civil
society development organizations, but are in practice political and social
agents of the ruling party. The recognition of GONGOs as legitimate civil
society organizations abets the Ethiopian strategy of marginalizing
nongovernmental actors, and allows the government to continue a "business as
usual" approach to the delivery of international support.
Ethiopian certainty that U.S. aid is inviolate has allowed the Ethiopian
government to effectively tune out demands for reform. Ethiopian dependence
on U.S. assistance is a card that policymakers must learn to play to provoke
meaningful change.
Second, the United States should publicly express its concern over the
shrinking democratic space, the crisis in the Ogaden, and Ethiopia's refusal
to uphold the findings of the independent border commission. Ethiopian
officials are extremely sensitive to public opinion and likely to respond to
threats to their country's international standing and participation in
international fora such as the African Union and the United Nations.
Relations with Ethiopia are likely to become strained, and the United States
can expect, at least initially, to receive very limited support from its
European partner nations. These countries, including France, Germany and the
United Kingdom, lack the political leverage necessary to lead a collective
shift in donor policy and have been hesitant to alienate the Ethiopian
government. This reluctance may require a diplomatic version of the "good
cop/bad cop" approach, in which the United States agrees to take an
isolated, leadership role in demanding change, while European donor nations
persist in a strategy of quiet diplomacy. This has the advantage of ensuring
that some constructive dialogue will continue.
In a worst-case scenario, the United States may have to threaten to suspend
foreign and military aid to Ethiopia. U.S. humanitarian and development
assistance to Ethiopia was upwards of $650 million in 2008, and the U.S. has
contributed significant, though less transparent, financial and tactical
support to Ethiopia's attempts to modernize its armed forces. Such an action
has rightly been perceived as unthinkable in the past, as the cessation of
aid would certainly risk destabilizing the Ethiopian government and may
precipitate widespread public disorder. At the same time, Ethiopian
certainty that U.S. aid is inviolate has allowed the Ethiopian government to
effectively tune out demands for reform. Ethiopian dependence on U.S.
assistance is a card that policymakers must learn to play to provoke
meaningful change. This is another reason to consider developing a good
cop/bad cop arrangement with the European donors--if the United States is
forced to suspend aid, other donors may mitigate the shortfall while quietly
reinforcing demands for democratic reform.
The prospect of strained relations with Ethiopia at a time of regional
crisis is not desirable. If the United States ultimately wishes to sustain
its partnership with Ethiopia, however, inaction is the more dangerous
option. Democratic space in Ethiopia will continue to erode, while human
rights abuses in the Ogaden and ongoing Ethiopian military incursions in
Somalia will continue to stoke anti-American sentiment in the Horn. U.S.
efforts to mitigate the conflict in Somalia, and to support Somalia's
struggling Transitional Federal Government (TFG), will be fatally undermined
by this dynamic. The visible reentry of Ethiopian troops into Somalia
already threatens to extinguish the last embers of popular support for the
TFG, and may rekindle the insurgency dynamic that brought the Shabaab to
power throughout southern Somalia. At the same time, Ethiopian and Eritrean
intransigence over the border dispute will ensure a continued flow of arms
into the hands of various Somali factions.
The United States has recently taken positive steps to disaggregate its
Somalia policy from that of Ethiopia. These steps include diplomatic
outreach to Eritrea and public attempts to restrain Ethiopian military
action in response to the escalating violence in Mogadishu. These
constructive efforts need to be coupled with more assertive diplomacy in
Addis Ababa. Until Ethiopia becomes a credible democracy, the U.S.-Ethiopia
partnership will do more harm to U.S. regional standing than good.
----[This List to be used for Eritrea Related News Only]----