From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Tue Jun 01 2010 - 08:43:45 EDT
Somalia: The Present Strategic Military Balance in Mogadishu [Intelligence
Brief]
31 May, 2010 - 1:37:16 PM
By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
A closed source provides intelligence, information, and strategic analysis
on the present balance of military forces in Mogadishu. The source concludes
that the successful offensive of the Islamist revolutionary group Harakat
Al-Shabaab Mujihideen (H.S.M.) in the northern districts of Bondhere and
Shibis on May 21 gave them an important strategic advantage and consequently
weakened the position of their adversaries - Somalia's internationally
recognized Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.), the African Union
peacekeeping force (AMISOM) on which the T.F.G. is dependent for its
existence, and the international coalition providing inadequate financial
and diplomatic support to the T.F.G., and restricting AMISOM's mandate. The
source's assessment of the new balance of forces leads to the possibility
that the international coalition's hand will be forced.
1. The Military Balance Shifts
The source reports that H.S.M.'s May 21 offensive gave them the "commanding
hill" in the north of Mogadishu, allowing them to overlook the entire
northern area of the city, including the seaport. As a result, H.S.M. is now
in the position to shell the seaport and render it inoperable.
Comment. The increased threat to the seaport, which is the major conduit for
military equipment and supplies for the T.F.G. and AMISOM, and sustains
Mogadishu's economic life, shifts the military balance between H.S.M. and
its opponents in the former's favor; it gives H.S.M. a new card to play.
Shelling the seaport to cripple its operations would have the cost for
H.S.M. of losing popular and business support; yet it would cut the supply
line of its military opposition. In addition, just the possibility that a
punishing shelling might be executed in an act of bravado or desperation
makes H.S.M. less easy to attack - it is like the North Korean artillery on
the South Korean border, a deterrent. Indeed, on May 21, H.S.M. did not only
capture territory; it attempted to shell ships in the port carrying weapons
and ammunition destined for AMISOM.
2. The Response to H.S.M.'s Offensive
H.S.M.'s May 21 offensive routed T.F.G. forces and came to within one-half
kilometer of the presidential palace. The collapse of the T.F.G. defenses
forced AMISOM armor into the streets to push H.S.M. back and fulfill its
limited United Nations mandate to protect key T.F.G. installations and
personnel. The source reports that AMISOM confined its response to driving
its armor up the main road north and then returning to its defensive
positions - a show of force. Restriction of its response to a show of force,
the source says, is based on AMISOM's fear that if its forces leave the main
roads and venture into the streets, they will face H.S.M.'s fighters firing
rocket-propelled grenades at their armor from behind.
3. Morale
Reflecting on the result of the success of H.S.M.'s May 21 offensive, the
source provides intelligence that morale has been falling among the forces
opposed to H.S.M. The morale of the Burundian contingent in AMISOM is
particularly low and the source reports a widespread judgment that Burundian
troops are selling their arms to Hizbul Islam (H.I.), the other major
Islamist revolutionary group opposing the T.F.G., AMISOM and the
international coalition. Ugandan troops, who are the other component of
AMISOM, have reached the conclusion that they will not be able to partner
successfully with T.F.G. forces and that the long promised T.F.G. offensive
against H.S.M. will not be mounted. As a result the Ugandan troops and
officers feel abandoned by the Ugandan government and chafe under the
restrictions of their narrow mandate.
The T.F.G.'s forces also suffer from morale problems. The source says that
despite claims that the T.F.G. has thousands of troops, it has, in reality,
1200 active forces, drawn from clan-warlord militias, who are not eager to
engage with H.S.M.
Reluctance to fight on the part of its forces, says the source, has
cancelled the T.F.G.'s advantage of having received more than 500 tons of
weapons from Washington, rather than the 40 tons that has been officially
announced. On the other side of the balance, the source says that
contributions to H.S.M. from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Kuwait, and
Saudi Arabia have fallen from $5 million per month to $3 million, putting a
crimp in the operational capacity of H.S.M. and allied foreign fighters from
Pakistan.
Comment. On balance, the strategic position of the coalition opposed to
H.S.M. is deteriorating. On May 26, T.F.G. forces backed by AMISOM launched
a counter-offensive aimed at H.S.M. bases in Shibis and were repulsed. The
source believes that the T.F.G. will not be able to retake the territory
that it lost on May 21.
Should H.S.M. play its card and shell the seaport, that would force the hand
of the donor-military powers in the international coalition - Washington and
Western European states. They would either have to cede southern and central
Somalia to H.S.M., or expand AMISOM's mandate or intervene directly
themselves. In the short run, a punishing shelling by H.S.M. is not likely;
its likelihood would rise if H.S.M. either perceived that it was embattled,
or felt confident that it was close to victory over its opponents and that
they had lost their resolve to resist.
At present, says the source, the donor-military powers have doubled down on
their rhetorical effort "to keep the T.F.G. myth going."
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science,
Purdue University in Chicago
<weinstem@purdue.edu">http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/weinstem@purdue.edu>
weinstem@purdue.edu
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