From: Tsegai Emmanuel (emmanuelt40@gmail.com)
Date: Sat Jun 12 2010 - 11:18:11 EDT
Security and Africa's First World Cup
June 12, 2010 | 0437 GMT
[image: Security and Africa's First World Cup]
Summary
Security is always a concern for organizers of the World Cup, and this
year’s upcoming tournament in South Africa — the first World Cup on the
continent — is no exception. Envisioning a range of threats from terrorism
to petty crime, tournament organizers are trying to beef up security in nine
cities that will serve as venues for the games. Less than a month before the
tournament begins, STRATFOR thought it time to look at how real those
threats are and how security preparations are shaping up.
Analysis
In June and July, South Africa will host the first World Cup tournament ever
held in Africa. The first game of the tournament will be June 11 in
Johannesburg, where the finals are scheduled to be held July 11. The World
Cup draws hordes of spectators, sponsors and dignitaries, including this
year, perhaps, U.S. President Barack Obama, who has expressed an interest in
attending should the U.S. team proceed to the finals.
Security is always a concern for World Cup organizers, and this year’s
tournament — the largest sporting event ever hosted on African soil — raises
concerns about South Africa’s ability to provide a secure environment for
the month-long event. While terrorism is high on the list of organizers’
concerns, the security issue that will affect the most people will likely be
violent crime, which has grown endemic in South Africa over the past two
decades.
[image: Security and Africa's First World Cup]
(click here to enlarge image)
<http://web.stratfor.com/images/africa/map/South_Africa_World_Cup_800.jpg?fn=2216249229>
The South Africa World Cup Organizing Committee has designated nine cities
to host the soccer matches: Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg, Bloemfontein
(Mangaung in the local language), Pretoria (Tshwane), Rustenburg, Port
Elizabeth, Polokwane and Nelspruit. Semi-final matches will be played in
Cape Town and Durban, the third place match will be played in Port Elizabeth
and the finals will be played in Johannesburg.
In the run-up to the event, STRATFOR thought it appropriate to take a look
at the security environment in South Africa, evaluate specific threats and
offer guidance on how to avoid danger during the tournament.
Crime
Unlike terrorism, which tends to be driven by ideology, criminal activity is
driven by opportunity and the desire for quick
cash<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/organized_crime_south_africa?fn=2016249254>,
and both of those factors will be in abundance during the World Cup. To
mitigate against any conceivable security threat, an estimated 44,000
members of the South African Police Service (SAPS), the South African
National Defense Force (SANDF) and private security personnel will be
deployed at tournament venues, hotels where the teams will be staying and
anywhere considered a possible launching point for criminal or terrorist
acts (more on these deployments below in the section titled “Security
Preparations”). Many national teams will also have their own security
details. The U.S. team, for example, will be guarded by personnel from the
State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service (DSS).
Foreign governments also have been heavily involved in assisting South
African security officials with logistics and communications in preparation
for the tournament and will remain involved until it ends. The DSS has
extensive experience conducting security for large, high-profile events, and
there has been extensive coordination with the German authorities to learn
from their experiences hosting the last World Cup, which was held in 2006.
These measures will certainly go a long way toward securing the stadiums,
hotels and other World Cup venues, most of which are located in city
centers. But efforts to secure World Cup activities could displace criminal
attacks to more accessible targets outside this ring of security, to urban
and rural areas where the police presence will be weaker.
[image: Security and Africa's First World Cup]
Property crime is widespread in South Africa and found in every city
throughout the country. The country’s criminal elements tend to be organized
and efficient, with gangs often conducting practice runs and extensive
preoperational surveillance before hitting hardened targets such as armored
cash transporters and ATMs (sometimes using explosives and automatic
weapons). Organized-crime leaders are even known to specify high-demand
products for theft, including certain models of cars and cell phones and
other electronics. In the pursuit of cash or valuables, criminals are known
to use extreme violence against anyone attempting to stop them. While such
extreme measures would not likely be employed against unarmed civilians
during the World Cup, firearms, knives and other weapons are plentiful in
South Africa and are frequently used if a victim resists.
Most crime in South Africa takes place in underdeveloped and poorly policed
townships outside of the main city centers. However, criminals certainly do
not limit themselves to townships, and in order to pursue wealthier targets
they are known to attack in upscale neighborhoods and on downtown streets.
In 2007, the wife of prominent businessman and senior African National
Congress (ANC) politician Tokyo Sexwale was targeted in a carjacking in an
upscale, well-policed Johannesburg neighborhood. Three hijackers in a
vehicle cut off Judy Sexwale’s BMW in a parking lot, forced her from the car
and sped off in it, all in about 10 seconds. The incident occurred at 11
a.m., with numerous bystanders looking on. Carjackers do not discriminate
between white, black, foreigner or local; the trigger is the appearance of
wealth — mainly clothes, accoutrements and cars. Carjacking has become so
rampant in South Africa that many South Africans do not stop at stop signs
if they perceive any potential risk as they approach an intersection.
Suggesting an even greater threat than that posed by local street gangs and
criminals, STRATFOR sources say that criminals from Nigeria are planning to
travel to South Africa and take advantage of the throngs of tourists
attending World Cup events during the month-long tournament. Along with
Chinese and Russians, Nigerians are leading organized-crime figures in South
Africa, focusing on fraud and black-market activities. Driven by economic
desperation, Zimbabweans also present a significant, though less
sophisticated, criminal threat in South Africa. It is likely that migratory
criminals from other African countries will also prey upon World Cup
visitors, contributing to the prevailing threat. This criminal element will
include everything from the relatively harmless hawkers of African curios
who will be found outside every tournament venue and major hotel to
organized gangs that will surveil unsuspecting tourists and rob them when
the opportunities arise.
Not all criminal activity in South Africa involves property crime. Among all
the world’s countries, South Africa has the highest incidence of reported
rapes per capita. While rapists do not specifically target foreigners, gangs
often use the same level of speed and precision to identify and attack rape
victims as they do in conducting carjackings. Rape is also employed to
instill fear in victims, particularly white victims, during home invasions.
Because of the high level of police protection in the city centers during
the month-long World Cup, tourists should be relatively secure in these
areas, but the risk of being targeted by opportunistic rapists and other
criminals will increase in outlying areas. Finally, rape carries the
associated risk of contracting HIV/AIDS, since South Africa has a high
incidence of the disease (in 2008, approximately 11 percent of South
Africans had been diagnosed with HIV/AIDS).
When visiting South Africa during the World Cup, foreign travelers are
advised to be mindful of their surroundings and maintain situational
awareness at all times in public areas. Visitors should never expose
valuables, including wallets, jewelry, cell phones and cash, any longer than
necessary. And they should avoid traveling at night, especially into
townships and areas of South African cities that are outside of the more
secure and centralized soccer venues. Outlying areas will have scant police
protection, since most of the country’s security apparatus will be focused
on the World Cup. No matter where they are, foreign visitors are encouraged
to travel in large groups (three or more people), since in South Africa, as
elsewhere, there is generally more safety in numbers.
The Jihadist Threat
Despite thinly veiled threats from regional jihadist
groups<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100408_brief_aqim_threatens_world_cup_tournament_south_africa?fn=6016249277>,
none of the major groups (either global or regional) possess the capability
or the strategic intent to carry out a spectacular attack against a World
Cup venue. The core al Qaeda group — Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and
their closest confidants — has not demonstrated an ability to strike outside
of South Asia for years. While the jihadist desire remains strong to strike
at high-profile international targets, militant groups often come to the
conclusion that striking local and regional targets where their capabilities
are more established provides a better chance for success. Pulling off an
attack in an entirely novel theater (where jihadists do not control the
territory<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100324_jihadism_and_importance_place?fn=4516249226>)
against a lesser known target requires months of planning, training and
coordination, along with substantial resources. The devolution of al
Qaeda<http://www.stratfor.com/themes/al_qaeda?fn=8116249281>through
military and covert operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan has
severely hampered if not disabled al Qaeda prime, which is not likely
capable of assembling and projecting sufficient force to South Africa this
summer to affect the World Cup.
Meanwhile, al Qaeda’s more capable and active regional nodes such as al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP)<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090902_aqap_paradigm_shifts_and_lessons_learned?fn=8616249287>,
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM)<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090624_algeria_taking_pulse_aqim?fn=5416249248>(to
which a specific threat against the World Cup was attributed in April
that ultimately proved hollow), the Islamic State of
Iraq<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100428_jihadists_iraq_down_count?fn=3616249293>(ISI)
and the Somalia-based jihadist group al Shabaab are focused on their
own objectives back home. Of these groups, AQAP is the only one that has
demonstrated the ability to strike outside of its region, since it was
behind the Christmas Day attempt to bring down Northwest Airlines
Flight 253<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20091228_us_yemen_lessons_failed_airliner_bombing?fn=5016249258>.
While the attempt was unsuccessful, its masterminds are believed to be still
at large in Yemen. Still, the attempt did alert U.S. counterterrorism
authorities to the threat posed by AQAP. The United States has deployed
assets to Yemen to disrupt the group’s capability to carry out further
attacks, making it more difficult for AQAP to operate without U.S.
authorities (who are working closely with South African officials in
providing security for the World Cup) knowing about it.
The other three primary al Qaeda franchise groups, AQIM, the ISI and al
Shabaab, have demonstrated no ability to strike outside of their regions.
AQIM’s current struggle is primarily against the Algerian government, and
the group’s target set is limited, for the most part, to Algerian military
and police forces. AQIM also has claimed responsibility for minor attacks
and abductions in Mauritania, Mali and
Niger<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090624_mauritania_al_qaeda_video_and_follow_hit?fn=8816249254>.
While two members of the ISI have recently been arrested in Iraq on
suspicions of plotting an attack during the World Cup, those reports have
not been substantiated as a serious threat — or even one that involved South
Africa<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100517_iraq_alleged_world_cup_plotters_arrested?fn=4016249222>.
The ISI also has not shown an interest in striking outside of its region and
considering that it is currently fighting the U.S.-backed Iraqi government,
now is not an opportune time for the group to stage an attack on another
continent. South Africa is more than 8,000 kilometers (5,000 miles) away
from northern Africa and the Middle East, putting a substantial distance
between these groups and the World Cup.
Similarly, al Shabaab is consumed with a three-front war against the
Western-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of
Somalia<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100414_somalia_wait_continues_mogadishu?fn=6816249212>,
African Union forces<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20091203_somalia_suicide_blasts_and_untoppled_government?fn=7616249239>and
various Somali militias. The militant group is currently focused on
toppling the TFG, not waging transnational
jihad<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100121_somali_al_shabaab_threatens_kenya?fn=6616249271>by
attacking the World Cup. The primary advantage of attacking the
tournament would be the publicity it would bring, but this is something al
Shabaab does not necessarily want right now. The group is challenged enough
as it is by forces on the ground supporting the TFG and does not need to
provide another reason for regional and global security forces to
intervene<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100309_somalia_ahmed_welcomes_us_air_support?fn=8716249235>on
the TFG’s behalf.
Lone Wolves and Grassroots Jihadists
Threats from grassroots
jihadists<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20091104_counterterrorism_shifting_who_how?fn=7816249223>and
lone
wolves<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090603_lone_wolf_lessons?fn=5116249295>are
much less predictable than threats from the al Qaeda core or its
franchises. Whereas jihadist groups are bright blips on the radar of
intelligence agencies around the world, lone wolves operate under the radar,
often unbeknownst to any security or intelligence agency. They maintain
anonymity by operating without the help of others and even without telling
others, which means they are far more difficult to detect. They are also not
limited to any geographical region. Grassroots terrorists, on the other
hand, may work in groups, but these groups are small cells unaffiliated with
known and monitored jihadist entities and are virtually invisible. In both
cases, however, the lack of support networks typically limits their
capability, and thus the damage they can cause. The low profile of lone
wolves and grassroots jihadists generally means they lack experienced
bombmakers, operatives and strategists, and their attacks typically come
across as amateurish. Nevertheless, given the global attention to South
Africa during the World Cup, it would not take a large attack to attract
worldwide media coverage.
Other Terrorist Threats
While the actions of lone wolves and grassroots jihadists are difficult to
predict and cannot be ruled out, there are no major political conflicts in
South Africa at the moment that might induce a terrorist act. Nor is there
any recent history of terrorism in South Africa. That, along with the
general trend in grassroots attacks, suggests that any ideologically
motivated terrorist attack in South Africa during the World Cup would likely
— if successful at all — be small and unsophisticated.
Of course, jihadists by no means have a monopoly on the tactic of terrorism.
Any individual or group can attempt to affect political change through
violence against the public. And the World Cup certainly offers an extremely
public forum for a group or individual to air their grievances against the
South African government, or any of the other 31 countries represented by
the qualifying teams. Reasons for terror attacks can be as provocative as
ethnic disputes, as mundane as personal financial problems or as
unpredictable as mental illness.
Although terrorism is not common in modern-day South Africa, there has been
a trace of such activity in its recent history. During apartheid, the ANC —
the current ruling party — was considered a terrorist group by the South
African government because it was opposed to white rule and expressed its
opposition through violence. On the far right, the white supremacist group
Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) committed violent acts against black
South Africans and staged protests against the government during the final
days of apartheid. The AWB has not carried out violent attacks in decades,
but its leader, Eugene Terre Blanche, was
murdered<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100409_brief_awb_leader_buried_south_africa?fn=5116249229>by
two black farmhands April 3. AWB leaders continue to leave violence as
an
option, at least rhetorically, but in more than 20 years they have shown no
appetite for violent retaliation. While it is highly unlikely that the AWB
would sanction an attack, underlying racial sentiments could still provoke a
grassroots or lone-wolf attack (the consequences of which we have outlined
above). As far as the AWB is concerned, the group is a known entity and
would have a difficult time launching an attack without the authorities
finding out about it during the planning process.
There are other right-wing extremists in South Africa not affiliated with
the AWB, and in April South African police arrested suspects and seized
explosives<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100430_brief_stolen_explosives_recovered_south_africa?fn=5016249272>from
a residence in south Johannesburg linked to right-wing activities. The
arrests served a positive purpose for the government in showing that blacks
are not the only ones who commit violent acts in South Africa, and
government officials were quick to say that Pretoria does not foresee a
significant threat from right-wing groups during the World Cup.
South Africa did spawn one militant Islamist group, People Against
Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), which detonated almost 200 improvised
explosive devices between 1996 and 2000, largely targeting government
buildings (such as police stations), gay night clubs and synagogues in the
Cape Flats area east of Cape Town. Their largest attack occurred in 1998
against a Planet Hollywood restaurant (one person was killed and the
restaurant was closed). PAGAD was not technically a jihadist group, since it
did not want to overthrow the South African government. Its intent was to
attack targets that it believed oppressed Muslim customs in the country.
PAGAD’s leader and several members were sentenced to prison terms in 2002,
and there has been very little activity by the group since. While PAGAD
still has a small number of supporters in the Cape Flats area of Cape Town
and still condones violence, there are no indications that it, or any other
grassroots jihadist group in South Africa, is planning to carry out an
attack during the World Cup.
A recent incident in Angola during that country’s hosting of the African Cup
of Nations soccer tournament raised questions about the possibility of a
similar domestic terrorist threat in South Africa. In January, the Togo
soccer team participating in the tournament in Angola’s Cabinda province was
attacked by members of the rebel group Front for the Liberation of the
Enclave of Cabinda
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100113_angola_assertive_stand_after_rebel_strike?fn=1016249275>(FLEC).
Armed with AK-47s, a small number of FLEC fighters, who are opposed to the
Angolan government’s presence in the oil-rich province, shot at the bus
carrying the Togo soccer team as it was traveling to a game, injuring
several team members and killing two. Angola’s security environment is much
less stable than that of South Africa, where no rebel groups on the order of
FLEC operate. South Africa also does not have nearly the same level of
volatility in its political conflicts as Angola, where disagreements can
quickly become violent.
Security Preparations
For the duration of the World Cup tournament, the South African Police
Service and the South African National Defense Force will deploy forces to
the streets, air and sea to protect against threats to tournament venues.
Most of the measures (such as naval patrols off the coast and overflights of
fighter jets) are in light of the jihadist threat, which, while unlikely to
materialize in an attack, is still seen as a looming worst-case scenario.
Private security firms have been contracted by the tournament organizing
committee to provide security around and inside the soccer stadiums.
Participating teams and attending dignitaries (including visiting heads of
state) will likely have security escorts that will include protective
motorcades so as not to require closing off streets. Teams will have both
primary and alternate travel routes, along with designated safe areas in the
event of an incident and stationary protective teams at their hotels.
Uniformed and plainclothes security officers will likely be stationed along
travel routes between team accommodation sites and the playing venues. As a
result of these precautions taken by the participating teams, along with the
overall security umbrella provided by the South African government, the
“window of opportunity” to attack a World Cup team will be very small. As a
byproduct of these measures, potential attacks will likely be diverted to
more accessible soft targets, which could be unsuspecting tourists or
bystanders, especially in areas from which police have been pulled to beef
up security at tournament venues.
South African security agencies do have recent experience safeguarding large
sporting events like the World Cup. In June 2009, South Africa hosted the
Confederation Cup, an international soccer tournament that gathered eight
teams in four different stadiums around the country for two weeks without
incident. This time around, South African officials are making even more
extensive preparations to secure tournament venues, and remaining concerns
largely involve the execution of the security plan in the event of an
incident.
The federal police and military units to be deployed and the outline of this
year’s World Cup security umbrella include the following:
- South African air force (SAAF) Gripen fighter jets (currently South
Africa has about six operational out of 12 delivered from an order of 26),
which will enforce no-fly zones above World Cup venues. The aircraft will
rotate to different air force bases depending on threat levels determined
for each game.
- Other SAAF and army aircraft such as smaller Hawk fighter jets,
transport planes and helicopters will be mobilized for other duties,
including logistics.
- South African navy ships will be deployed, including patrol corvettes
that will be stationed as command platforms in the harbors at Cape Town,
Durban and Port Elizabeth to provide additional radar and anti-aircraft
coverage.
- Naval submarines, minesweepers and other vessels will be deployed to
provide supplemental coverage.
- Military and police explosive ordinance disposal teams, including
sniffer dogs, will be present at all stadiums.
- The SAPS Special Task Force, the police force’s specialized
counterterrorism team, will be on standby for rapid response to any crisis
situation in the country from its national base in Pretoria.
- Special weapons and tactics (“SWAT”) teams will be mobilized from
city-based police force detachments.
- A national-level joint operations “fusion center” will be maintained in
Pretoria, while each province hosting a World Cup venue will have a
provincial-level command post.
- There are no designated demonstration areas for protesters, and no
protests will be permitted at World Cup venues or fan parks adjacent to the
venues.
- For access to VIP sections at the stadiums, there will likely be
credential controls in place, including portable fingerprint scanners.
- Game attendees will be inspected by metal detectors and hand wands, and
all vehicles arriving at the stadiums will be searched.
- While there are no “official” hotels for the visiting teams, there has
been communication between World Cup security officials and management at
the high-end hotels likely to accommodate teams and dignitaries.
- Uniformed and plainclothed police officers will be present at
high-profile and popular venues such as Nelson Mandela Square in
Johannesburg, the Victoria and Alfred (V&A) Waterfront in Cape Town and the
Gateway in Durban, all of which are likely to receive large numbers of World
Cup visitors.
Political Instability
The ANC is entrenched as the ruling party of the South African government.
In the short term, the ANC does not face any threat to its political
hegemony from a rival political party. Whatever instability the government
does face stems from within its ruling alliance, which, along with the ANC,
consists of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the
South African Communist Party. COSATU’s approximately 2 million members are
capable of mobilizing strikes and protests on a city and national basis, and
are usually motivated by pay and cost-of-living concerns. Protests are not
usually violent, but if any do occur during the World Cup, foreign visitors
are advised to steer clear of them. Some COSATU members, notably the
National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa, have threatened to strike
during the tournament, but the ANC government is almost certain to put
intense pressure on all labor groups to help ensure a strike- and
protest-free World Cup.
Miscellaneous Threats
Privately operated medical facilities in South Africa are well equipped for
all levels of medical care, and foreign visitors should choose private over
public (government-operated) health-care facilities in South Africa. Private
medical services can also stabilize a patient and facilitate a medical
evacuation to another country (such as the United Kingdom or the United
States) should the need or preference arise.
Should a catastrophic event occur in a South African city during the World
Cup, both private and public medical services would be heavily taxed if not
overloaded. Although provisions will be in place for such a contingency, a
mass-casualty event would degrade the availability and quality of care on
the scene, and conventional means of medical evacuation may not be
immediately available. Indeed, South African health officials have publicly
expressed their concerns about the medical system’s state of readiness for
the enormous influx of World Cup attendees (organizers estimate as many as
300,000), some of whom will need medical attention at some point during
their stay.
Even without a catastrophic event, South Africa’s transportation
infrastructure will likely be stressed to capacity. There is a robust
domestic private-airline sector, private nationwide bus network and many
private car-rental companies, and these providers may be stretched to meet
the needs of 300,000 foreign visitors.
Hotels in South Africa that host World Cup teams will have extra security
personnel assigned to them, though mainly to protect the teams. Hotels in
South Africa are otherwise on their own as far as implementing security
precautions<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090901_security_militant_threat_hotels?fn=8616249272>,
and travelers should not assume that hotels in which they find themselves
have extensive security plans in place.
South Africa’s airline industry maintains a level of security sufficient for
direct flights operating to and from the country to be certified by the U.S.
Federal Aviation Administration, and airport security will certainly be
heightened during the tournament. The South African government also
purchased body scanners following the attempted bombing by a Nigerian
national of a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on
Christmas Day in 2009. Despite these safeguards, however, South Africa has
not implemented airport security standards as stringent as those used in the
United States. That is not to say there is any intentional negligence, but
there are weaknesses to be exploited in the system, should an attacker
desire to do so.
Finally, “hooliganism,” a security threat endemic to large soccer matches
and tournaments anywhere passions run high, will be present in South Africa.
Hooliganism is the popular term for the phenomenon in which mobs of soccer
fans engage in violent and destructive behavior, often under the influence
of alcohol or drugs. However, South Africans themselves are not known for
hooliganism, which tends to be more common in Europe. The fact that this
year’s World Cup will be so far removed from Europe will reduce the risk of
hooliganism considerably, and the large security force on hand will likely
prevent any violent activity from getting very far out of hand. South
African authorities are also working with European governments to blacklist
identified hooligans and ban them from traveling to South Africa for the
tournament.
While crime will likely have the most visible affect on the World Cup games,
South African authorities are preparing for the worst. Hosting an event like
the World Cup is an extraordinary challenge for any country, especially one
without a wealth of experience at it. In such cases, it is the unexpected
and unintended that usually cause the most disruption. However, South Africa
is not alone in preparing for the event. The International Federation of
Football Associations (FIFA), Germany, the United States and other countries
have provided financial and professional assistance. For the most part,
events like the World Cup and the Olympics — despite daunting challenges —
typically transpire rather smoothly, and South Africa is certainly hoping
that it does not buck the trend.
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