From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Wed Jun 23 2010 - 09:08:51 EDT
Somalia: Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen Reactivates its Encirclement Strategy
23 Jun, 2010 - 12:56:06 AM
By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
>From the end of May through June, Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen (H.S.M.),
the transnationalist revolutionary Islamist movement that seeks to establish
an emirate in Somalia based on the implementation of Shari'a law, initiated
the penultimate stage of its strategy of encircling its adversaries -
Somalia's internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government
(T.F.G.) and the T.F.G.'s protectors, an African Union peacekeeping mission
(AMISOM) - that H.S.M. has forced into a small enclave of the country's
capital Mogadishu.
The new stage of H.S.M.'s strategy is aimed at consolidating the armed
opposition to the T.F.G., AMISOM, and other anti-Islamist forces by
eliminating its major competitor within the Islamist opposition, the
nationalist Hizbul Islam (H.I.). Having earlier displaced H.I. from
Somalia's southern Jubba regions, H.S.M. moved in June to remove H.I. from
all the areas of southern and central Somalia in which the two groups have
divided or shared control.
H.S.M.'s consolidation move is familiar to students of revolutionary
coalitions: at a certain juncture, the dominant actor in the coalition
judges that it is powerful enough to eliminate its collaborators-competitors
so that it can gain an open field for establishing administrations in the
areas that it dominates and coordinating efforts to mount operations against
its major opponents. When a single faction takes control of a revolutionary
coalition, it is a sign that its leaders perceive that their power has been
enhanced to the point at which their faction stands to gain more by going it
alone than by cooperating and sharing power. If it is successful,
consolidation serves as a prelude to an offensive by the revolutionaries
against their adversaries.
The Encirclement Strategy Ratchets Up
H.S.M.'s turn against H.I. was preceded by H.S.M.'s May 21 offensive in
Mogadishu, in which it succeeded in taking control of districts formerly
held by the T.F.G. that abut the core T.F.G. installations, notably the
presidential palace, Villa Somalia. Having advanced to within half a
kilometer of Villa Somalia, H.S.M. was met by a counter-attack spearheaded
by AMISOM armor. The results of the counter-offensive were not reported in
open sources; a closed source reports that it was only partially successful,
with H.S.M. retaining its hold over the Karaan district and most of the
Abdul-aziz, Shibis and Bondhere districts. AMISOM-T.F.G. forces were able to
retake the coastal road in Abdul-aziz up to the Lido traffic circle,
relieving some pressure on Villa Somalia.
Having shrunk the T.F.G.'s perimeter and having withstood the
counter-offensive, H.S.M. was in the position to judge that it was not
immediately vulnerable in Mogadishu and could move to the next stage of its
encirclement strategy, eliminating H.I.
The most notable success of H.S.M.'s consolidation move came on June 12 when
it ousted H.I. from Beledweyne, the capital of the strategic west-central
Hiiraan region that controls vital transportation routes. Having once been
the dominant actor in Hiiraan, H.I. had come to depend increasingly on
H.S.M. as both factions faced military pressure from Ethiopian-backed
militias led by former T.F.G.
politicians. By mid-June, the balance of power in Hiiraan had shifted so
much in favor of H.S.M. that H.I. withdrew peacefully from the eastern half
of Beledweyne where key government and security facilities are located. On
June 14, AllPuntland reported that a faction within H.I. was holding talks
with H.S.M. in Beledweyne aimed at merging H.I. into H.S.M. On the same day
Raxanreeb reported that the ousted H.I. governor of Hiiraan, Sh. Shuriye
Farah Sabriye, had denied that his group had merged with H.S.M., claiming
that his administration was still intact and that only one of his officials
had joined H.S.M.
On June 15, Somaliweyn reported that a ceremony sealing the merger of H.S.M.
and H.I. had been held in Beledweyne, quoting H.I. official Sh. Abuldkadir
Haji Ahmed as saying, "Unity is certain to arouse strength." Somaliweyn
commented that there were no expectations that H.I. would attempt to
reinforce and contest H.S.M.'s takeover.
On June 17, it became clear that H.I.'s position in Hiiraan had evaporated.
Sh. Sabriye announced that his administration and forces had withdrawn from
Beledweyne "under intense pressure" and were now based in Mogadishu. The
head of H.I., Sh. Hassan Dahir Aweys, was reported to be meeting with his
commanders and key supporters in H.I.'s stronghold in Elasha Biyaha outside
Mogadishu on how to oppose H.S.M. Aweys announced publically that the
defectors to H.S.M. in Hiiraan did not represent H.I. and that efforts by
H.S.M. to encourage defections were impeding attempts to integrate the
Islamist forces. Aweys said that H.I. was continuing to consult with H.S.M.
on removing AMISOM from Somalia. On June 20, Aweys spoke again, stating that
H.I. would only unite with H.S.M. through negotiations. He added that H.S.M.
"wants more than it deserves." A closed source reports that the transfer of
control in Beledweyne was facilitated by paying an H.I. commander in the
city $300,000 to change sides.
Emboldened by its success in Hiiraan, H.S.M. quickly moved to tighten its
noose around H.I., which Garoweonline observed had become an "empty shell."
On June 19, H.S.M. was reported to have taken control from H.I. of the
police station in Mogadishu's northern Yaqshid district. On June 22, further
fighting over the police station was reported, in which at least ten
fighters from both sides were killed and H.S.M. prevailed.
More importantly, on June 20, H.I. was reported to have deployed forces in
areas surrounding Elasha Biyaha; H.I. was reported to have sent in
reinforcements to protect its stronghold. On the same day, an H.I.
commander in the Lower Shabelle region to the south of Mogadishu, Sh.
Mohamed Ibrahim, announced that his forces had merged with H.S.M.,
explaining that H.S.M. was "active" and H.I. was "passive" in the struggle
against the T.F.G. and AMISOM. Radio Gaalkacyo reported that H.I. fighters
in Lower Shabelle's Wanlaweyne district had defected to H.S.M.
On June 20, H.S.M. extended its pressure on H.I. to the west-central Bay
region, with H.S.M. leader Sh. Muktar Osman Abu Muslim ordering the H.I.
administration in the town of Burhakaba to merge with H.S.M., adding that if
H.I. refused, it would be given time to vacate the town. H.I.'s district
officer in Burhakaba, Sh. Hajir, said that his administration and forces
would be "the last to leave" H.I.
On June 20, the T.F.G.'s deputy prime minister, Prof Abdirahman Haji Aden
Ibbi, told the T.F.G.'s Radio Mogadishu that the T.F.G. had been holding
talks for "several weeks" with H.I. on the latter's incorporation into the
T.F.G. Garoweonline reported that it was not clear which factions of the
T.F.G. and H.I. were involved in the talks, and that some members of the
H.I. delegation had walked out of them "for unclear reasons." The report
indicated that one of the reasons why H.S.M. had moved so quickly against
H.I. was to prevent the handover of territories controlled by H.I. to the
T.F.G. if the talks led to H.I.'s incorporation into the T.F.G. On June 22,
Xinhua reported that Ibbi's announcement of T.F.G.-H.I. negotiations had
been confirmed by Abdelrasak Qaylow, the spokesman for the T.F.G.'s ministry
of information. A closed source reported on June 22 that the negotiators for
H.I. come from the "lower ranks" of the group and from clan supporters who
despise H.S.M. The source expects that if H.I. disintegrates, most of its
fighters will surrender to H.S.M.
Underscoring the rapid deterioration of H.I.'s position, Raxanreeb reported
on June 22 that Sh. Aweys was seeking political asylum in the Arab world
after the consultations with his top leaders in Elasha Biyaha led to the
judgment that he should leave Somalia for security reasons.
Implications
It is too early to tell whether H.S.M.'s consolidation move will meet with
success, although it is clear that its power advantage over H.I. gives it
momentum. H.S.M. is also, by all appearances, pursuing a calculated and
coherent strategy of avoiding armed confrontation with H.I. in favor of
persuading and inducing local and regional H.I. forces to merge with it.
Striving for consolidation, H.S.M. does not want to fight an internecine war
that would damage its Islamist credentials, at least temporarily weaken its
position in relation to the coalition of forces opposing it, and deprive it
of the H.I. forces that it wants to win over. If possible, H.S.M. will stick
to intimidating H.I., unless H.I. agrees to incorporation in the T.F.G.
If H.S.M. fails to implement the present phase of its encirclement strategy
successfully, it will suffer a significant setback and lose a measure of
credibility. H.S.M.'s strategy is a calculated risk.
If, as is more likely, the consolidation move is successful, H.S.M. will
emerge stronger and will focus its attention on its major adversaries,
attempting to break the stalemate between the armed Islamists and their
opponents that has existed throughout 2010. H.S.M. is likely to move first
against the Ahlu Sunna wal-Jama'a movement (A.S.W.J.) that controls much of
the central Galgadud region and has deployed forces in Mogadishu. If H.S.M.
manages to prevail against A.S.W.J. in Galgadud, it will have completed the
encirclement of the T.F.G. and AMISOM in Mogadishu and eliminated opposition
elsewhere in Somalia's southern and central regions. Whether completion of
the encirclement would force the hands of external powers such as Ethiopia,
the United States and Western European states and constrain them to mount
robust military action against H.S.M. remains to be seen. That would be the
ultimate risk for H.S.M. in implementing the final phase of its strategy -
strangling AMISOM in Mogadishu and thereby convincing the mission's
contributors Uganda and Burundi to pull out, leaving the T.F.G. without
protection.
H.S.M. has erred before through excess, most notably by declaring jihad
against Ethiopia when it was part of the Islamic Courts movement, thereby
bringing about the Ethiopian occupation of southern and central Somalia in
December, 2006. H.S.M.'s current behavior indicates that it has not
succumbed to zealotry and has learned its lesson. H.S.M. is aware that its
adversaries are weak and divided (T.F.G.), under-resourced and working under
a restricted mandate (AMISOM), and reluctant to take decisive action
(Western powers and Ethiopia, although the latter is the most likely to move
if it receives Western backing). Absorbing the shell of H.I. would not
appreciably enhance the T.F.G.'s power and would cause further divisions in
it, complicating an unconsummated power-sharing deal with A.S.W.J. and
adding more conflicts over positions and representation.
For the moment, the success of H.S.M.'s encirclement strategy depends on
removing H.I. from Elasha Biyaha and the Afgoe district directly south of
Mogadishu. Should H.I. collapse, the nationalist-Islamist bridge between
transnational revolutionary Islamism and the international globalist
coalition propping up the T.F.G. and funding AMISOM will have been
destroyed, and the conflicts in southern and central Somalia will have been
starkly polarized.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science,
Purdue University in Chicago weinstem@purdue.edu
<weinstem@purdue.edu">http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/weinstem@purdue.edu>
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