From: Tsegai Emmanuel (emmanuelt40@gmail.com)
Date: Mon Jul 05 2010 - 22:48:43 EDT
Somalia: A Shift Away from Support for President Ahmed
July 5, 2010 |
Summary
The last several months have seen Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) beset by infighting. The conflict has meant that President Sharif
Ahmed’s government has been unable to go on the offensive against Somali
jihadist group al Shabaab. It has also made the TFG’s foreign backers
reconsider whether Ahmed is someone they should continue to support.
Analysis
Somalia’s Western-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has been
wracked by infighting for the past several months, with President Sharif
Ahmed pitted against a pair of rival politicians and an Islamist militia.
This complex power struggle has prevented the already-weak Somali government
from even considering going on the offensive against Somali jihadist group
al Shabaab, and has resulted in an ongoing, low-intensity conflict in the
capital. The TFG’s foreign backers prop it up as a bulwark against jihadist
groups like al Shabaab<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/somalia_al_qaeda_and_al_shabaab?fn=9616648017>,
which could use Somalia’s ungoverned territory to train for and to
launch transnational
attacks<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100601_somalia_al_shabaab_transnational_threat?fn=3816648080>
.
While the TFG is able to perform this function (thanks in large part to an
African Union peacekeeping force), it is incapable of actually rolling back
the jihadists<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100208_somalia_imminent_offensive_against_al_shabaab?fn=2416648057>.
And Somalia’s power struggles have seen the government’s foreign backers
begin to shift their support away from Ahmed toward other proxies.
The TFG controls just a few square blocks along a coastal strip of Somalia’s
capital and largest city, Mogadishu. Were it not for the 6,000-plus African
Union peacekeeping force of Ugandan and Burundian soldiers across a few
bases in Mogadishu, al Shabaab almost certainly would overrun it. The AU
force lacks an offensive mandate, however, making it essentially a personal
protection force for TFG politicians. Referring to Ahmed’s administration as
“the Somali government” is thus something of an exaggeration, as it provides
little real governance in Mogadishu, and none in areas like the Somaliland
and Puntland, which effectively are independent entities.
Al Shabaab is the dominant power in much of northern Mogadishu, as well as
wide swathes of southern and central Somalia. The group made a big push to
take the capital when it paired up with Somali Islamist militia Hizbul Islam
in a coordinated offensive in May
2009<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090513_somalia_rebels_prepared_take_mogadishu?fn=3116648057>,
but the offensive failed, and the alliance
dissipated<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20091007_somalia_pact_between_jihadists?fn=9716648035>.
Since then, al Shabaab has grown stronger, while Hizbul Islam has almost
fallen apart<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100615_brief_somalias_hizbul_islam_continues_deteriorate?fn=1116648015>.
Unfortunately for the TFG, its armed forces are so
weak<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100405_somalia_tfgs_limitations?fn=1616648050>that
it has been powerless to take advantage of the rift between its two
main enemies, and the government controls a bit less territory today than it
did in May 2009.
The modest military aid the United
States<http://www.stratfor.com/sitrep/20100312_brief_us_says_it_wont_intervene_somalia?fn=7616648041>and
various European nations provide the TFG through its port at Mogadishu
is not enough to turn the tide, nor are the various military training
programs for Somali troops in Uganda, Kenya and Djibouti. A recent U.S.
media report that accused the TFG of employing child soldiers indicates
Ahmed may be having troubles fielding a capable fighting force, too.
One strategy for providing the TFG with more hardened fighters was to begin
negotiations with an Ethiopian-supported, central Somalia-based Islamist
militia known as Ahlu Sunnah Waljamaah (ASWJ). The idea was that ASWJ would
come to Mogadishu, push back against al Shabaab, and receive a handful of
TFG Cabinet posts in return. The deal formalizing this plan known as the Addis
Ababa agreement<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100315_somalia_tfg_makes_deal?fn=2116648092>was
signed in March. By early May, the first ASWJ military contingents had
begun fighting al
Shabaab<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100504_brief_somalias_ahul_sunnah_waljamaah_begins_offensive?fn=7016648095>units
in Mogadishu. The strategy would give Addis Ababa a larger say in the
Somali government, while Washington was pleased to have non-U.S. troops
spearhead the counterinsurgency campaign.
The Addis Ababa agreement has yet to be fully implemented, however. While
Somali media reports claim ASWJ was promised five Cabinet posts under the
deal (STRATFOR sources report Ahmed promised them six), the TFG president
has clearly offered ASWJ fewer, with ASWJ leaders constantly complaining
that they are the only ones who have followed through on their end of the
deal. Giving ASWJ Cabinet posts would mean taking them away from other
entrenched interests in the government, which would create new enemies for
Ahmed among the rival clan-based politicians that Ahmed — and indeed, any
Somali leader — must appease to have any sense of unity in the government.
More important, Ahmed fears that granting ASWJ all the posts it was promised
might allow it to exceed his control, threatening his position.
ASWJ has on multiple occasions said it would pull out of its
agreement<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100511_somalia_longer_wait_government_offensive?fn=8916648092>with
the government due to Ahmed’s refusal to honor his promises, most
recently on July
1<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100701_brief_aswj_says_deal_somali_government_has_collapsed?fn=6916648054>.
So far, these threats have been negotiating tactics. But eventually, Ahmed
will have to decide whether to risk granting ASWJ the Cabinet posts, thereby
strengthening his forces against Al Shabaab, or refuse, which would risk
provoking the wrath not only of ASWJ, but of the Ethiopians and other
foreign backers, like Kenya and even the United States. This could lead to
Ahmed’s downfall the next time the East African regional body
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) chooses the Somali
president in August 2011. Both choices carry risks for Ahmed.
Addis Ababa reportedly is using Ahmed’s main secular rivals within the TFG,
Prime Minister Omar Sharmarke and Parliamentary Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh
Aden, to isolate him for his foot-dragging. STRATFOR sources report that
Ethiopia is doing so to pave the way for the installation of an ASWJ
contingent in Mogadishu, which would give it more influence over the TFG
through its proxy. Addis Ababa has no desire to reinsert troops deep into
the heart of Somalia as an occupying force as it did from late 2006 to early
2009. It remembers well how direct foreign intervention can trigger a
popular backlash among Somalis, something Islamists and jihadists can
exploit to rally their forces. The Ethiopians would much prefer to use a
proxy to shape events in Somalia rather than its own forces.
Ethiopia has not forgotten that Ahmed was only four years ago the political
leader of the Islamist group that gave birth to al Shabaab, the Supreme
Islamic Courts Council (SICC). The SICC occupation of Mogadishu in 2006 is
what spurred the Ethiopian
invasion<http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary_open_warfare_somalia?fn=2016648024>,
driving Ahmed into exile until early 2009. IGAD allowed Ahmed to return to
Somalia before his installation as TFG
president<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090202_somalia_moderate_islamist_takes_power_struggle_continues?fn=7416648030>,
where he was expected to use his Islamist credentials to broker some sort of
reconciliation among Somalis to isolate al Shabaab. Relations between
Ethiopia and the Ahmed-led TFG remain tense, as Somalia under Ahmed looks
similar to how it looked under his predecessor, Abdullahi
Yusuf<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081229_somalia_yusufs_resignation_and_possibility_peace_deal?fn=9016648040>.
A June 29 Somali media report about an IGAD delegation’s visit to Mogadishu
highlights these tensions. Ethiopian Gen. Gabre Heard, the same man who led
the Ethiopian invasion in 2006, led the delegation. A STRATFOR source says
Heard is a “household name” in Somalia, with a reputation for toughness.
(Heard reportedly slapped then-President Yusuf in the face — twice — during
a dispute in 2008.) Heard had reportedly made two recent trips to
Mogadishu<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100420_somalia_ethiopian_general_mogadishu?fn=1916648012>before
June 29, likely upon orders from Addis Ababa to promote ASWJ
interests. Gabre met with Sharmarke during this latest visit, but not with
Ahmed, a sign that the two are hostile to one another’s interests.
Ethiopia has a greater interest in nipping potential threats in Somalia in
the bud than any other foreign power, and can therefore be expected to
expend more energy on installing a friendly government. Ahmed’s refusal to
cooperate with Ethiopia’s proxy ASWJ seems to have convinced Addis Ababa
that the TFG is not such a friendly government.
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