webmaster
© Copyright DEHAI-Eritrea OnLine, 1993-2010
All rights reserved
From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Wed Jul 21 2010 - 18:29:36 EDT
Somalia: Washington’s Response to the Kampala Bombings - Continued
Procrastination
By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
22 Jul, 2010 - 2:35:24 AM
Analysis of Washington’s statements following the July 11 World Cup bombings
in Kampala leads to the conclusion that the United States is determined to
persist in its interminable procrastination over what to do about Somalia.
Washington’s inability to form a coherent policy towards Somalia has
undermined its interests in the Horn of Africa, allowing a civil war to
deepen in Somalia to the point at which Washington’s adversary, the
revolutionary Islamist Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen (H.S.M.), calculated
that it was in its interest to strike directly at Uganda, one of the
contributors to the African Union peacekeeping mission in Mogadishu
(AMISOM). For Washington, the Kampala bombings were an embarrassment, not
the crisis and shock that they were in East Africa. The bombings simply
showed more slippage in Somalia; Washington had no intentions of getting
decisively involved in Somalia – it faced a public relations problem of how
to appear to be playing while remaining on the sidelines conducting its
permanent policy review that never seems to end.
The Development of Washington’s Response
Washington’s first response to the bombings came from Under-Secretary of
State for Africa Johnnie Carson, who is the point man for Somalia policy.
Carson denounced H.S.M., which he likened to a “localized cancer” that had
“metastasized into a regional crisis … that has bled across borders and is
now infecting the international community.” Let us note that Carson is
demonizing H.S.M. here and depersonalizing them by calling them a disease.
This is not the language of the diplomat but of the rabble rouser. It was
simply politically necessary for Washington to express outrage.
Nonetheless, at the same time that Carson was throwing raw meat to the
crowd, State Department spokesman Philip Crowley told reporters that he
could not talk about any plans that Washington might have for responding to
the bombings, adding that H.S.M. is “an outgrowth of other issues” –
refugees, the illegal arms trade and piracy.
The most comprehensive statements on Washington’s Somalia policy came on
July 14 in a briefing for reporters on “Al Shabaab Terrorist Group”
conducted by “senior officials” and posted in full by Washington. A close
reading of the briefing follows.
In the introductory remarks, a senior official (Johnnie Carson?) took a
nuanced view of H.S.M., saying that it had a “dual persona;” most members of
H.S.M. are nationalist and a minority is transnationalist with ties to
Al-Qaeda. So much for the metastasizing cancer metaphor.
In responding to the question of what the United States is doing, a senior
official cited having listed an H.S.M. commander as a terrorist and having
frozen the assets of an H.S.M. financier under Executive Order 13536. More
generally, the official said that Washington would “use the tools available
to support international efforts to weaken this group [H.S.M.].” In
particular, Washington would continue to support AMISOM with training and
supplies, and assist internally displaced persons. How to cope with the
spillover of H.S.M. would be “something that we are going to work with very
closely with regional governments to counter.” To put it simply, Washington
was not going to assume a leadership role.
When asked whether there had been a policy shift in light of the bombings,
an official said that Washington would “take a look and see what it is that
we need to do as a result of those attacks.” As to whether the bombing
showed a “trend” in H.S.M.’s behavior, the official said that “this is
something that our government is going to be looking very closely at and
working with governments in the region on.” The official’s remarks not only
indicate that Washington remains committed to procrastination, but that it
had not formulated a contingency plan for responding to a major H.S.M.
attack in the region.
Despite warnings by H.S.M. that it would attack AMISOM contributors at home,
and despite Kenyan Foreign Minister Moses Wetang’ula’s claim that Nairobi
had shared intelligence with Washington on H.S.M.’s plans to strike East
Africa, and had asked for Washington’s help, the official said that “there
was no forewarning or reports that these attacks were going to be taking
place in Kampala.” Perhaps there were no forewarnings of the specific
attacks – what fighter tells their opponent about their specific plans? –
and no reporting (H.SM. had succeeded in keeping its plans secret). Yet the
warnings of attacks were loud and clear; they apparently were not taken
seriously and, as a consequence, the bombings caught Washington flatfooted.
That the attacks supposedly came out of the blue also shows intelligence
failure. The official admitted that H.S.M. was “making good on its threats
to carry out attacks.”
As for the goals of U.S. policy in Somalia, an official said that they were
to build up the capacities of AMISOM as well as the T.F.G. [Somalia’s
Transitional Federal Government], which is exactly what Washington has been
doing half heartedly throughout its exercise in procrastination. Any grander
aim “is going to take years to address because the problems that affect the
country are systemic, structural.” That is an admission that Washington has
no policy, that is, no mediation between vision and tactics, no plan of
action.
On the ground, an official said, Washington was working with the T.F.G. and
AMISOM “to broaden the area of Mogadishu” controlled by the T.F.G. with the
essential protection of AMISOM. That is also current U.S. tactics and marks
no change.´
At its end, the briefing circled back to its beginning, with an official
opining that H.S.M.’s power has been overrated – “it’s just operating in a
place where normal structures are so very broken.” The official expressed
concern about H.S.M. in the sense that Washington would be concerned about
any group that had “Al Qaeda elements sprinkled within it.” Is H.S.M. a
metastasizing cancer or an ice-cream sundae sprinkled with al-Qaeda chips?
The official’s rhetoric diminishes H.S.M.’s stature and threat, which makes
it possible for Washington to justify its procrastination.
With Washington’s own dual persona in place, it was time for U.S. President
Barack Obama to weigh in. In his interview with the South African
Broadcasting Corporation on July 15, Obama would somehow have to reconcile
the duality, speak from one of the poles, or speak from both; he chose the
latter. Beginning with the raw meat, Obama said that Washington would
“redouble” its efforts in Somalia, adding that “what we know is that if
al-Shabaab takes more and more control within Somalia, that it is going to
be exporting violence the way it just did in Somalia” – a declaration of a
“trend.” Then he drew back and entered the caveat that fighting H.S.M. was
not something that Washington “should do alone;” rather, Washington would
cooperate with the African Union through AMISOM on “working the T.F.G. to
try to stabilize the situation.” Obama had wedged together Johnnie Carson’s
initial statement and the “official” background briefing – much bark and
little bite.
The same day, State Department spokesman Crowley emphasized the continuation
of support for AMISOM and said that Washington would extend it if Uganda
deployed, as its president, Yowaheri Museveni, said that it would, two
thousand more troops to the mission. Museveni’s pledge, however, was
premised on an expansion of AMISOM’s mandate by the United Nations Security
Council from peacekeeping to peace enforcing.
Also on July 15, Washington posted on America.gov an official interview with
the State Department’s Counterterrorism Coordinator Daniel Benjamin who
continued the Obama administration’s effort to downplay H.S.M. Benjamin said
that Washington “would have to consider” if H.S.M. had reached a new level
of capability. As for H.S.M.’s links to al-Qaeda, Benjamin urged caution.
Although H.S.M. “has some indirect links to the transnational terrorist
group al Quaida,” those ties have to be “examined with great care:” some of
H.S.M.’s leaders have pledged loyalty to al-Qaeda, and al-Qaeda “has been in
touch with al-Shabaab from time to time,” and its operatives have trained
some H.S.M. “individuals.” Benjamin concluded, however, that “we certainly
do not see these groups as having merged or being unitary in any way.” There
is no firm link “just yet.” That would be one more reason for keeping the
procrastination going and tempering any response.
On July 19, the development of Washington’s position reached an intelligible
conclusion (probably provisional) in a press briefing by a “U.S. official”
in London who unveiled a new strategy of trying to “divide the insurgents,”
thereby splitting their dual persona. In the Reuters report of the briefing,
the official quickly backtracked, admitting that “we know nothing that
galvanizes Somalis like an outside influence.” Indeed, if Washington were to
do “something in an imprudent manner,” it would unite the insurgents.
Rather than being a new strategy, dividing H.S.M is a gesture of impotence.
The official added that there was “vigorous discussion” going on among
Somalia’s African “allies” about expanding AMISOM’s mandate to peace
enforcement, leaving a crack in the door open for a more vigorous response,
depending upon what the regional states and organizations come up with.
Again, Washington would not take a leadership role.
On July 19, the commander of the U.S. Africa Command (Africom), Gen. William
Ward, addressed the Center for Strategic and International Studies, saying
that military assistance to AMISOM could include additional equipment,
training, logistical support and information-sharing. Ward insisted that
the promised boost in support for AMISOM was not a result of the Kampala
bombings: “We were already looking at how can we be more robust in helping
[AMISOM contributors].” Ward ruled out U.S. employment of drone aircraft to
support AMISOM for the present. Reuters reported that a “U.S.
counterterrorism official” had not ruled out U.S. military operations
against H.S.M. and had added that connections between H.S.M. and al-Qaeda
were close: “It’s hard to figure out in some cases where one group ends and
the other begins…That’s why it’s critical that we take aggressive action to
thwart them.” The official insisted: “Our efforts are aggressive and have
intensified.” Did the counterterrorism official’s statements indicate a
shift in U.S. policy, a dispute over policy between the State Department and
the Defense Department and /or other security agencies, or inflated
rhetoric? Did they indicate that Washington was no longer interested in
dividing H.S.M.? They are at least an indication of confusion in Washington.
Conclusion
The preceding analysis of Washington’s strategic response to the Kampala
bombings indicates that the attacks were not, at least for Washington, a
“game shifter,” as Chatham House analyst Sally Healy thought they would be
when she spoke to the U.S. military newspaper Stars and Stripes. Richard
Downie of the Center for Strategic and International Studies came closer to
the truth when he told the same publication: “I don’t really see what the
United States can do. There aren’t any attractive options.”
What would make Washington assume leadership or, as analyst Bronwyn Bruton
persuasively argues, “constructively disengage?” That is a question for
readers to answer.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science,
Purdue University in Chicago weinstem@purdue.edu
----[This List to be used for Eritrea Related News Only]----