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From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Wed Jul 28 2010 - 17:54:01 EDT
Al-Shabaab
Author:
Stephanie Hanson
Updated: July 28, 2010
* Introduction
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/18650/alshabaab.html?breadcrumb=%2Fissue%2F#
p1>
* Leadership
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/18650/alshabaab.html?breadcrumb=%2Fissue%2F#
p2> and Divisions
* Tactics
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/18650/alshabaab.html?breadcrumb=%2Fissue%2F#
p3> and Motivations
* Links
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/18650/alshabaab.html?breadcrumb=%2Fissue%2F#
p4> to al-Qaeda
* Future
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/18650/alshabaab.html?breadcrumb=%2Fissue%2F#
p5> of the Organization
_____
Introduction
Al-Shabaab (aka the Harakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin, al-Shabab, Al-Shabaab,
the Youth, Mujahidin al-Shabaab Movement, Mujahideen Youth Movement,
Mujahidin Youth Movement), is an Islamic organization that controls much of
southern Somalia, excluding the capital, Mogadishu. It has waged an
insurgency against Somalia's transitional government and its Ethiopian
supporters since 2006. Originally the militant wing of the Islamic Courts
Union, the group that controlled Somalia prior to the country's invasion by
Ethiopian forces, al-Shabaab leaders have claimed affiliation with al-Qaeda
since 2007. Though most analysts believe al-Shabaab's organizational links
to al-Qaeda are weak, in February 2008 the United States added the group to
its list of foreign terrorist organizations. Al-Shabaab's strength has
growth since then, but many experts say the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces
from Somalia in January 2009 could diminish the group's basis for popular
support. In what marked the group's first major attack outside of Somalia,
al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/13/world/africa/13uganda.html> twin bombings
that killed more than seventy people in Kampala, Uganda (NYT) during the
World Cup final on July 11, 2010.
Leadership and Divisions
Al-Shabaab is nominally led by Sheikh Mohamed Mukhtar Abdirahman "Abu
Zubeyr," though experts say a core group of senior leaders guide its
actions. The group is divided into three geographical units: Bay and Bokool
regions, led by Mukhtar Roobow "Abu Mansur," the group's spokesman;
south-central Somalia and Mogadishu; and Puntland and Somaliland. A fourth
unit, which controls the Juba Valley, is led by Hassan Abdillahi Hersi
"Turki," who is not considered to be a member of al-Shabaab, but is closely
aligned with it. These regional units "appear to operate independently of
one another, and there is often evidence of friction between them," says a
December 2008 UN Monitoring Group report.
Estimates of al-Shabaab's size vary, but analysts generally agree that the
group contains several thousand fighters, many of whom are from the Hawiye
clan. The group has been able to expand its footprint in Somalia with
relatively small numbers for two reasons: Somalia hasn't had a central
government since 1991; and many of the clan warlords that filled the power
vacuum have proven willing to cooperate with al-Shabaab, at least in
Somalia's south. Al-Shabaab has engaged in forced recruitment among Somalis,
so it's unclear how many members of the group truly believe the
organization's ideology. Experts say the number of rank-and-file members is
less important than the number of hardcore ideological believers, which
could range between three hundred and eight hundred individuals.
Foreign fighters have traveled to Somalia to fight with al-Shabaab, as have
Somalis from the United Kingdom and the United States. "We have seen an
increasing number of individuals here in the United States become
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-assistant-president-home
land-security-and-counterterrorism-john-brennan-csi> captivated by extremist
ideologies or causes," said White House national security adviser John
Brennan in a May 2010 speech, noting, among others, five Somali-Americans
that left Minnesota to fight in Somalia. U.S.-born Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki
joined al-Shabaab in 2007 and has become the
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/magazine/31Jihadist-t.html> recognizable
face of the group (NYT), starring in propaganda videos that have helped
recruit hundreds of foreign fighters, according to intelligence officials.
In June 2010,
<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2010/0607/New-Jersey-men-
arrested-at-JFK-on-way-to-join-Al-Shabab-in-Somalia> two U.S. citizens from
New Jersey (CSMonitor) were arrested at New York's JFK Airport after
allegations that they planned to travel to Somalia to join al-Shabaab. The
arrests came amid a growing trend in which radicalized Americans have become
involved in terrorism-related activities.
Some experts say there are deep divisions within al-Shabaab. In a
<http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/somalia-after-ethiopian-occupatio
n-first-steps-end-conflict-and-combat-extremism> February 2009 report for
the Enough Project, Somalia expert Ken Menkhaus writes that, "The al-Shabaab
faces multiple internal divisions--over clan, leadership, tactics, and
ideology--which a new unity government can exploit to convince parts of the
al-Shabaab to abandon the movement and gradually outmaneuver, marginalize,
and defeat the core hardliners." Each unit of al-Shabaab is led by
individuals who must combine their ideological aims with pragmatic
considerations of different clan-based agendas. It's important to "focus on
what they do, not what they say," writes Menkhaus.
<http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/cherlist/marchal.php> Roland Marchal,
senior research fellow of the National Center for Scientific Research in
Paris, says that reports of increasing divisions within al-Shabaab are
overstated. They are "based on the assumption that they were once united,"
he notes. However, he says the organization must decide "to what extent they
want to accommodate the Somali society and to what extent they want to keep
the ideology they have developed."
Tactics and Motivations
Al-Shabaab's tactics have evolved over time. When it began its insurgency in
late 2006, it used classic guerrilla tactics--suicide bombings, shootings,
and targeted assassinations--to oppose the Somali government and what it
perceives as its allies, from aid groups to the Ethiopian military to
African Union peacekeepers. Much of the violence was concentrated in
Mogadishu; battles between the Ethiopian military and al-Shabaab in August
2007 caused roughly four hundred thousand people to flee the city.
In 2008, al-Shabaab began to reach out to the Somali public with a series of
town visits. A December 2008
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/147-som
alia-to-move-beyond-the-failed-state.aspx> International Crisis Group report
describes these outings as "well choreographed, with clerics addressing
public rallies and holding talks with local clan elders." Al-Shabaab would
hand out food and money to the poor, give criminals quick trials with
"mobile sharia courts," and attempt to settle local disputes. As the group
sought to take control of towns in southern Somalia, it began to use
political strategies as well. Before a particular town was captured,
insurgents had meetings with local clan leaders to convince them that their
intentions were good. By February 2009, al-Shabaab controlled most of
southern Somalia, as depicted in
<http://www.longwarjournal.org/maps/somalia/Somalia_redmap-02022009-norm.jpg
> this map by the Long War Journal. However, the group continued to launch
suicide attacks. In February 2009, al-Shabaab killed eleven Burundian
soldiers in the deadliest attack on AU peacekeepers since their deployment
and engaged in heavy fighting that killed at least fifteen people in
Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab carried out twin bombings in Uganda--another country
participating in Somalia peacekeeping efforts--in July 2010. The attacks
point to an internationalization of al-Shabaab's terrorist activities, which
could
<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/07/why-al-shabaab-wou
ld-attack-in-uganda/59551/> destabilize East Africa (Atlantic) and unleash
repercussions abroad.
Experts say al-Shabaab's methods and ideologies aren't necessarily
consistent with one another. According to Marchal of the National Center for
Scientific Research in Paris, "al-Shabaab has tried to evolve from a group
that has a purely militaristic approach to a group that pretends to rule and
wage jihad at the same time." On the one hand, the group espouses a strict
form of Islam, Salafi/Wahhabism, and websites for the group claim to be
waging jihad against infidels. On the other hand, al-Shabaab has extended
its political power in southern Somalia through pragmatic means, not
radicalism. It has imposed
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/19155/sharia_and_militancy.html> sharia law
in some of the towns it controls, such as Baidoa, but "imposing the
puritanical brand of Islam it espouses . . . would quickly alienate many
Somalis," says the International Crisis Group report.
Links to al-Qaeda
When the United States placed al-Shabaab on its list of foreign terrorist
organizations in February 2008, it claimed the group has an allegiance with
al-Qaeda. Specifically, it said that senior al-Shabaab leaders
<http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html> trained in Afghanistan
with al-Qaeda. Experts say there are links between individual al-Shabaab
leaders and individual members of al-Qaeda, but any organizational linkage
between the two groups is weak, if it exists at all (many experts note that
al-Qaeda operates in a disaggregated manner--so linking self-proclaimed
members of al-Shabaab to self-proclaimed members of al-Qaeda would not
necessarily indicate that the two groups are coordinating with one another
in a systemic way). There is evidence that foreign fighters have trained
al-Shabaab members on the use of weapons and how to construct roadside
bombs. But Marchal says many of these foreign fighters are not part of
al-Qaeda.
The strongest tie between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda seems to be ideological.
In September 2008, a senior al-Shabaab leader released a video in which he
<http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/09/shabab_reaches_out_t.php>
pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden and called for Muslim youth to come to
Somalia. In February 2009, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's second-in-command,
<http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/02/zawahiri_praises_sha.php>
released a video that began by praising al-Shabaab's seizure of the Somali
town of Baidoa. The group will "engage in Jihad against the American-made
government in the same way they engaged in Jihad against the Ethiopians and
the warlords before them," Zawahiri said. Though al-Qaeda appears to support
al-Shabaab's jihad, it's unclear whether al-Shabaab has ambitions beyond
Somalia. According to a report by Chris Harnisch of the American Enterprise
Institute, the group's "rhetoric and behavior" have shifted over the past
two years, "reflecting an eagerness to
<http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/pdf_upload/analysis/CTP_
Terror_Threat_From_Somalia_Shabaab_Internationalization.pdf> strike
internationally (PDF)."
Future of the Organization
The withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia in January 2009 removed the
group's principal adversary. Yet al-Shabaab continues to launch suicide
attacks against African Union peacekeepers in Somalia that often result in
civilian casualties. As evidenced in the July 2010 Uganda bombings, the
group has also directly targeted civilians in what may have been a
<http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-07-15/somalia-s-al-shabaab-says-attac
k-start-of-retaliatory-campaign.html> retaliatory attack (Bloomberg) against
Uganda for sending its troops on peacekeeping operations to Somalia. The FBI
and U.S. Department of Homeland Security have warned that al-Shabaab's
actions in Uganda could signal the group's capability of launching a
successful attack
<http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5i9gwkZskpxIpvimVtqYZtoBpt
LeAD9GUFUDG1> beyond Africa, and even in the United States (AP). Some
experts see early signs of public opinion turning against al-Shabaab. First,
clan-based militias have started to oppose al-Shabaab. In January 2009,
militias repelled al-Shabaab's attempts to assert control in the central
Somalia area of Galgadud. "There is a mobilization of various groupings of
orthodox Sunni Muslims all over Somalia to form a broad front" against
al-Shabaab, the International Crisis Group's Somalia observer
<http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-02-18-voa45.cfm> told Voice of America
in February 2009.
Looking ahead, there are several measures that will indicate al-Shabaab's
level of strength and internal coherence: first, whether the group is able
to maintain its territorial control
<http://www.criticalthreats.org/gulf-aden-security-review/gulf-aden-security
-review-june-29-2010> over parts of Mogadishu and how far it can expand this
control in Somalia; second, whether Somalia's business community decides to
support the group; third, whether the Somali diaspora continues to fund
al-Shabaab through the hawala money transfer system (it is not clear how
much money al-Shabaab currently receives from the diaspora or other
sources). Finally, analysts are closely watching the extent to which the
Somali government, led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, negotiates with
al-Shabaab.
Experts strongly caution that there is little the United States can do to
weaken al-Shabaab. The United States has launched air strikes to target
high-level members of al-Shabaab it believes have links to al-Qaeda. In
April 2010, President Barack Obama issued an
<http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/pdf/2010-8878.pdf> executive order (PDF)
aimed at blocking the finances of al-Shabaab's leaders and those who are
contributing to the conflict in Somalia. Following the Uganda bombings, the
Obama administration also indicated that it would boost its efforts against
al-Shabaab, most likely in the form of
<http://www.ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp?idnews=52159> increased assistance
(IPS) to the African Union Mission in Somalia, which plans to send two
thousand additional troops to the country, as well as to the Western-backed
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/12475/somalias_transitional_government.html>
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu.
But experts say these activities have only increased popular support for
al-Shabaab. In a <http://www.cfr.org/publication/21421/somalia.html> March
2010 CFR report, Bronwyn E. Bruton argues that "the open blessing of the TFG
by the United States and other Western countries has perversely served to
isolate the government and, at the same time, to propel cooperation among
previously fractured and quarrelsome extremist groups." She proposes a
"constructive disengagement" policy that recognizes al-Shabaab's Islamist
rule in Somalia as long as it does not engage in regional violence or
terrorism.
-- Michal Toiba contributed to this report.
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