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From: Tsegai Emmanuel (emmanuelt40@gmail.com)
Date: Thu Jul 29 2010 - 03:39:17 EDT
Somalia: An Impetus for an Insurgent Alliance?
July 28, 2010 | 1844 GMT
Summary
Two Somali warlords issued threats against the African Union (AU) Mission in
Somalia on July 28, the day after the AU summit ended with a pledge to send
4,000 additional troops to the peacekeeping force. The warlords are not
currently allied with al Shabaab, the jihadist group fighting against
Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu, but a strengthened
AU force as a common enemy could be the catalyst which brings these
insurgent movements together.
Analysis
The day after the African Union (AU) summit in Kampala, Uganda, closed with
a pledge to contribute an additional 4,000 soldiers to the AU Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping force, two Somali warlords issued threats
against AMISOM. Neither of the warlords — Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, founder
of Hizbul Islam, and former State Minister of Defense for Somalia’s
Western-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) Mohammed Yusuf Siyad,
also known as Indaade — is currently an ally of al Shabaab, but an
emboldened AMISOM serving as a common enemy could draw them all together.
Such an alliance — and the resulting intensification of fighting in Somalia
— could threaten the TFG’s existence, which AMISOM is mandated to protect.
This in turn would heighten pressure on the international community to
increase its efforts to combat al Shabaab and its allies.
AMISOM currently consists of roughly 6,200 Ugandan and Burundian troops
stationed solely in the TFG-controlled zones of southern Mogadishu, but after
the AU summit<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100727_somalia_aus_decision_peacekeepers?fn=5516812861>,
the force is expected to grow to more than 10,000. It remains to be seen
just how many of the promised troops will ever materialize (while Guinea and
Djibouti have pledged to send troops, and Uganda has said it is prepared to
send an additional 2,000 if no other East African nations step up, other
African nations — notably Nigeria — have had a pattern of pledging to send
help to Somalia but never delivering). However, the troop increase will
create the perception on the ground in Somalia that AMISOM is growing
bolder, even though the AU failed to amend the force’s mandate — a change
Uganda especially had been pushing for, so that AMISOM would have the legal
right to conduct more offensive maneuvers against al Shabaab. Even though
neither the United Nations nor the AU approved the request for an amended
mandate, a Ugandan military spokesman announced July 27 that Kampala’s
forces in AMISOM intend to operate more aggressively against the jihadist
group, giving its commanders on the ground the authority to preemptively
attack al Shabaab if they feel AMISOM is under threat of attack.
Al Shabaab should not be underestimated and should not be expected to simply
wait for new AU peacekeepers to arrive before it responds. The same goes for
the other insurgents who oppose the TFG (and, by default, its AMISOM
protection force). The most notable figure among this latter group is Aweys,
the founder of the now-weakened Hizbul
Islam<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100615_brief_somalias_hizbul_islam_continues_deteriorate?fn=7816812887>and
former
ally<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090513_somalia_rebels_prepared_take_mogadishu?fn=9016812881>of
al
Shabaab<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20091007_somalia_pact_between_jihadists?fn=4916812840>.
Aweys, a long-standing Somali Islamist nationalist warlord who once led the
Supreme Islamic Courts Council (SICC) that controlled Mogadishu and much of
southern and central Somalia in 2006, issued a call July 28 for all Somalis
to fight against AMISOM. This is not the first time that Aweys has issued
such a call, of course — AMISOM is as much his enemy as al Shabaab’s — but
the timing is noteworthy. Aweys might not command the same sort of authority
he once did, but some fighters are still loyal to him, and it is clear that
AMISOM serves as a common enemy for all the factions of Hizbul Islam and al
Shabaab. It is not yet clear whether Aweys is trying to regain the spotlight
by portraying himself as a defender of the Somali people against occupying
forces, or laying the groundwork for an eventual detente with al Shabaab.
But as al Shabaab perceives the threat of a growing AMISOM force, the
jihadist group could be taking a fresh look at the possibility of allying
with Aweys, whose fighters and nationalist credentials could be used to
sustain the jihadist insurgency in the face of increased AMISOM efforts
against it.
Another leading warlord who spoke out against the peacekeeping force,
Indaade, previously served as TFG state minister of defense but stepped down
in June<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100608_somali_defense_minister_steps_down?fn=9616812874>and
has kept a very low profile since. Indaade vowed to attack any
Ethiopian
troops that might be sent to reinforce AMISOM (a reflection of the long-held
animosity between Somalis and Ethiopians, which has certainly not abated in
the less than two years since the latter’s occupation of Somalia ended).
While the Ethiopian government has said nothing about sending troops back to
Somalia, Addis Ababa must be contemplating how it can best combat al Shabaab
— whether by sending its own peacekeepers, continuing its periodic
cross-border raids into Somalia designed to establish a de facto security
cordon between the two countries, or funneling additional arms and
intelligence to the pro-TFG Islamist militia Ahlu Sunnah Waljamaah. Half of
the 4,000 troops pledged to reinforce AMISOM are to come from member states
of the East African regional bloc Intergovernmental Authority on Development
(IGAD), and Ethiopia is a leading IGAD member. Furthermore, Ethiopia and
fellow IGAD member Kenya have the most at stake strategically when it comes
to Somalia’s stability, as Somalia borders both countries. Indaade is aware
of this and is therefore issuing his warning ahead of any Ethiopian moves.
Indaade, like nearly all Somali warlords, regularly shifts his loyalty
depending on the changing balance of power in the country. He has at
different times served as a leading figure in both the SICC and Hizbul
Islam, defecting from the latter group to the TFG in 2009. Indaade also has
been linked to al Shabaab in the past, with unconfirmed reports in October
2009 stating that he sold intelligence to the jihadist group which helped it
to carry out a dual vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack that
killed the then-deputy AMISOM commander inside TFG-controlled territory.
Indaade’s track record indicates that he is always amenable to cooperating
with any group that offers power or money, which al Shabaab is most likely
best able to provide.
There are not yet any concrete indications that either Aweys or Indaade has
reached out to al Shabaab in regards to establishing a formal alliance, but
the perception that AMISOM intends to grow bigger and bolder in its efforts
to help the TFG secure control of Mogadishu could prompt enemies of the
government to rally together. To be sure, al Shabaab is an intelligent
fighting force, and its leaders know what their strengths and weaknesses
are. They have lacked sufficient fighters to topple the TFG, and they will
likely issue a call for more foreign jihadists to join their ranks, using
their successful Kampala suicide
attacks<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100712_uganda_al_shabaabs_first_transnational_strike?fn=6816812828>as
a marketing tool. But foreign fighters cannot be expected to arrive
overnight.
In the meantime, reaching out to Somali warlords who have proven fighting
capabilities can boost al Shabaab’s forces and expand their support base to
include those Somalis who do not necessarily support a transnational
jihadist agenda but do find common ground with the fight against foreign
aggression. Only by forming alliances with other powerful actors would al
Shabaab be able to seriously threaten the TFG, as the balance of power
between the two sides has essentially been frozen since al Shabaab and
Hizbul Islam’s failed attempt to seize the capital in May 2009.
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