webmaster
© Copyright DEHAI-Eritrea OnLine, 1993-2010
All rights reserved
From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Fri Jul 30 2010 - 10:33:31 EDT
Somalia: The Power Struggle at the A.U. Summit
By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
Jul 30, 2010 - 11:07:34 PM
The July 11 World Cup bombings in Kampala can be understood as a calculated
risk taken by Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen (H.S.M.), the transnational
revolutionary Islamist group that seeks to establish an emirate in Somalia,
and is fighting a war for control against the country’s internationally
recognized and ineffectual Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.), which
exists only by virtue of the protection offered by an African Union
peacekeeping mission (AMISOM). H.S.M.’s proximate war aim is to force the
Ugandan and Burundian contingents of AMISOM out of Somalia’s capital,
Mogadishu, at which point it would fill the power vacuum.
The decision by H.S.M. to make its first major strike outside Somalia was
fraught with risk. The attack would set off a panic reaction in Somalia’s
neighboring states, unleashing calls for an invasion of Somalia to knock out
H.S.M. or at least change AMISOM’s mandate from peacekeeping (defensive
response) to peace enforcement (pro-active response). Were either of those
to measures to eventuate, the balance of military power in southern and
central Somalia would be altered decisively against H.S.M. On the other
hand, were H.S.M.’s opponents – the international coalition of Western donor
powers led by Washington, Somalia’s neighboring states ranged in the
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (I.G.A.D.), the A.U., and the
T.F.G. – unable to reach consensus on a move to peace enforcement, H.S.M.
would have revealed and deepened weaknesses in its adversaries – splits,
tensions, conflicts, disaffection, and disillusionment – weakened will. The
July 11 bombings were another incident in H.S.M.’s “long war” – a challenge
to and a test of its opponents.
Somalia at the A.U. Summit
The test came two weeks after the bombings, at the A.U. summit, which was
held in Kampala from July 25-27, insuring that, although the theme of the
meeting was maternal and child health, the focus of attention would be on
what to do about H.S.M./Somalia.
The shock administered by H.S.M. precipitated a political force field among
its opponents. On one side was Uganda’s president, Yoweri Museveni, who
advocated “sweeping” terrorists off the continent, said that he wanted a
“license to kill,” and threatened that Uganda had the “right of
self-defense” to invade Somalia unilaterally. If nothing else, Museveni
wanted a beefed-up AMISOM with a peace-enforcement mandate.
Museveni’a reaction was intelligible; the bombings had damaged his domestic
position, had unleashed public anger and triggered calls for action, and had
awakened open opposition to Uganda’s participation in AMISOM in the
inter-party coalition that plans to oppose him in 2011 presidential
elections. He had every interest in sparking a juggernaut against H.S.M., or
at least in pushing for one.
Joining with Museveni were the I.G.A.D. states bordering Somalia – Ethiopia,
Kenya, and Djibouti – all of which are threatened by attacks from H.S.M. and
the possible emergence of a Salafist emirate in Somalia. In early July,
before the bombings, an I.G.A.D. summit had approved sending new troops to
bolster AMISOM. Through the run-up to the A.U. summit, I.G.A.D. reiterated
its calls for more contributions to AMISOM, a lifting of the 8100 cap on its
force level, and a peace-enforcement mandate for AMISOM, if the United
Nations Security Council (U.N.S.C.) would not approve a U.N. mission to
replace it.
On the other side of the force field, Washington had made it plain in the
period following the bombings that it approved of beefing up AMISOM, but not
on expanding its mandate. For Washington, the bombings were not a “game
shifter,” as Chatham House’s Sally Healy thought they might be, but an
embarrassment that had to be managed in such a way that the current U.S.
policy of procrastination would remain intact with as few concessions as
possible to the East African hawks. The U.N.’s secretary-general, Ban
Ki-moon, and his special representative to Somalia, Augustine Muhiga,
provided Washington and Western powers with cover.
Washington’s push back against Museveni and I.G.A.D. was a strong vector,
since the donor powers would have to finance any expanded AMISOM presence
and activities in Somalia.
The A.U. was at the center of the force field, pressed by Museveni and
I.G.A.D. to adopt mandate expansion, which would have to be approved by the
U.N.S.C., and counter-pressured by the U.N. and donor powers to reject it.
The unfolding power struggle and the pressures on the A.U. were revealed by
A.U. peace and security commissioner, Ramtane Lamamra, on July 20, as the
run-up to the summit began. Lamamra announced that if the donor powers,
particularly Washington, provided sufficient logistical support, an
additional two thousand troops would bolster AMISOM by mid-September,
bringing the force to its U.N.-authorized limit of eight thousand. Lamamra
said that the summit would consider removing the cap on forces and bringing
it up to the twenty thousand requested by I.G.A.D., and allowing states
bordering Somalia, which are now banned from military activity there, to
participate in the mission. Most significantly, Lamamra did not come out in
favor of mandate expansion, instead offering that with proper equipment,
mobilization, other assets, and “enablers,” AMISOM’s current mandate could
cover “the legitimate right of self-defense” and allow AMISOM “to engage in
some very bold actions aimed at pre-empting the actions of the terrorists
and insurgents;” that is, keep the mandate as is, but alter the “rules of
engagement.”
The A.U.’s equivocal position was clarified by the vice president of the
A.U. Commission, Erasutus Mwencha, in an interview with Uganda’s New Vision
newspaper. Responding to criticism that, except for Uganda and Burundi, A.U.
states had not contributed to AMISOM, Mwencha said that the A.U. could “send
twenty thousand troops today” if the donor powers provided financial and
logistical support, and opined that the donors’ reluctance to commit was due
to the fact that they had not yet felt H.S.M.’s “pinch.” Mwencha added that
the donors had only become interested in Somalia after piracy had erupted
off that country’s coast.
On July 23, the chair of the A.U. Commission, Jean Ping, announced that
Guinea-Conakry, which has been suspended by the A.U. following a 2008
military coup, had pledged a battalion to AMISOM. He repeated Mwencha’s
criticism of the donors, saying that the U.N.S.C. was “ignoring Somalia” and
had the obligation to send a peacekeeping force of its own to replace
AMISOM. Ping reiterated the charge that the “international community” was
“preoccupied with piracy.” He noted that AMISOM needed tactical helicopters
and that its forces needed a pay raise. Finally, Ping urged the U.N.S.C. to
allow states bordering Somalia to participate in AMISOM.
As Ping attempted to excuse the A.U. and confront the donors rhetorically,
Great Britain’s minister for Africa, Henry Bellingham, expressed support for
lifting the cap on AMISOM’s force level, but rejected the call for an
expanded mandate, which, he said, could “backfire” by impeding “political
progress in Somalia;” that is, it would dash any hopes held by the donors
that H.S.M. could be split, thereby isolating its transnational wing.
On the same day, All Africa published an interview with Bellingham’s U.S.
counterpart, Under Secretary of State for Africa Johnnie Carson, who avoided
the issue of AMISOM and concentrated on exhorting the T.F.G., which is
confined to an enclave in Mogadishu protected by AMISOM, “to do more” –
provide services to the population, work toward stability, be more
inclusive, and bring in more groups opposed to H.S.M.
The thrust of the East African hawks reached its high point when A.U.
foreign ministers met in preparation for the summit. Kenya’s East African
newspaper reported agreement that AMISOM’s mandate be expanded to peace
enforcement, and on the need for “regional military action” against H.S.M.,
although a rift had developed between Kenya, which wanted the forces of the
East African Standby Brigade to compose the mission, and Uganda, which
wanted to rely on its forces and an expanded mandate; others favored
pressing the U.N. to send a mission. Ping announced that the A.U.’s Peace
and Security Commission was “already planning the next phase in the
deployment of AMISOM in terms of the enlarged mandate, increased troop
strength and appropriate equipment.”
When the summit opened on July 25, A.U. chairman, Binju Wa Mutharika, the
president of Malawi, did not announce a commitment to AMISOM. A U.S. State
Department official told the East African that “it might be premature to
start translating these attacks [the World Cup bombings] into an increase”
in AMISOM’s strength. The counter-thrust had begun.
The confrontation between I.G.A.D. and the donors transpired in a
hastily-called, closed-door “mini-summit” of I.G.A.D. on the sidelines of
the A.U. summit that was attended by the presidents of Ethiopia, Uganda,
Kenya, Djibouti, Tanzania, and Somalia, and by representatives from the
U.S., France, Great Britain, European Union, and U.N. Museveni called for
rejecting the “new form of colonialism through terrorism” represented by
H.S.M., which he said should be “shifted out of Africa.” According to an
exclusive report in Uganda’s Observer newspaper, Museveni pushed for an
“all-out offensive” against H.S.M. and was strongly supported by Djibouti’s
president, Ismael Omar Guelleh. Both leaders reportedly pressed Carson, with
Museveni saying: “These people have brought terrorism to our doors. We need
to flush them out.” Carson reportedly replied that “the Somalia situation
needed to be handled cautiously lest it explodes,” noting that even after a
recent surge of twenty thousand new U.S. forces in Afghanistan, that country
still remains “volatile.”
After the meeting, Carson said that there was a need for more AMISOM troops
on the ground and that Washington would aid those forces “as we supply the
present force.” Refusing to speak for Washington, Carson instead reported
that the U.N. secretary-general’s representative to Somalia, Augustine
Muhiga, had opposed a mandate expansion for AMISOM, arguing that the present
mandate permitted AMISOM forces to “act in a more responsible and robust
fashion.” The head of the E.U. delegation, Amb. Vincent de Vischer,
acknowledged calls for more action from the East Africans, promising that
financial assistance would materialize soon, but adding that the only
results of the meeting had been “an agreement in principle” to raise
salaries of AMISOM troops from U.S.$500 per month to $800.
Uganda’s Monitor newspaper reported that the counter-thrust of the donors
had been met with anger from the East African leaders. Museveni, leaving
behind Uganda’s foreign minister, Sam Kutesa, walked out of the meeting
early, along with Ethiopia’s prime minister, Meles Zenawi, and Tanzania’s
president, Jakaya Kikiweti. All of them refused to comment on the meeting. A
source from Uganda’s cabinet told the Monitor: “Unfortunately, while
Washington has deep pockets, they are failing to commit in definite terms.”
Ugandan government spokesman, Fred Opolot, noted that many countries had
extended condolences over the bombings, but were not “committing to do
more.” He added that Uganda had been counting on Washington to take the lead
and encourage other countries to support a more robust approach.
Insight into I.G.A.D.’s negotiating position at the mini-summit was provided
by Uganda’s permanent secretary of the Foreign Ministry, James Mugume, who
told Agence France Presse that there was a “realization that chapter seven
[a U.N. peace enforcement mandate] is difficult;” thus I.G.A.D. would have
settled for “6 ½,” an “adjustment in the rules of engagement.” Even that
proved to be impossible, leaving Ugandan military spokesman, Lt.-Col. Felix
Kulaligye, to say:”Where there is a realization that you are about to be
attacked, you are mandated to attack.” That is the interpretation that
AMISOM had consistently given of its mandate – well before the summit –
except when it was pushing to have it expanded.
On July 29, Uganda’s Eye newspaper published an exclusive report quoting an
officer of Uganda’s military who said that failure to expand the mandate was
“a big set back for the forces on the ground,” and a diplomatic source who
declared: “You can’t insist on increasing the forces that are going to stand
and wait to be attacked in order to respond.” Confirmation that the rules of
engagement had not changed appreciably was provided by AMISOM spokesman,
Maj. Barigye Ba-Hoku, who told Voice of America that higher force levels
would serve as a “platform” for reconciliation among Somalia’s domestic
factions, adding that the mandate should be re-examined.
On July 27, when the summit ended, the A.U.’s inability to mediate between
the East Africans and the donors, and its implosion on the question of
Somalia became evident when, in his closing speech, Mutharika called for
international cooperation on Somalia and said that the AMISOM mandate had
not been debated.
Ping clarified that an expanded mandate would require new equipment, such as
helicopters, which were not “available.” Discussions on equipment with
Washington, London, and Paris were, he said, “promising.” The A.U. would
raise the pay of troops to U.S.$750 per month and there would be four
thousand new forces – two thousand from I.G.A.D. and the others from Guinea
and Djibouti, which had a battalion prepared, but could not deploy due to
the prohibition on intervention by states bordering Somalia. The rest of the
issues (including, presumably the participation of neighboring states in
AMISOM) would, Ping said, be taken up by the A.U.’s Peace and Security
Council and eventually by the U.N.S.C.
On July 27, at the daily U.S. State Department press briefing, spokesman
P.J. Crowley said that Washington would be “looking to” improve AMISOM’s
capabilities.
A Blow to Africa.
The power struggle between the I.G.A.D. states and the donor coalition led
by Washington placed the A.U. in a compromised position. The majority of
member states in an African region were calling for help in their efforts to
contain H.S.M., yet the donor coalition did not want escalation of the
military conflict in Somalia, because it might backfire into an H.S.M.
“recruitment boom,” would eliminate the possibility of splitting H.S.M., and
would cost money that might not gain any return. The A.U. and its member
states had every reason to back I.G.A.D., were it not for the fact that not
only is AMISOM dependent on donor financing, but African states in general
depend on aid from the donor coalition. Dependency is the obvious cause of
the A.U.’s implosion over Somalia. Whatever the A.U. and its members wanted,
the donors would only satisfy their interests if they were convergent with
their own.
Since the donors had long been in favor of an increase in AMISOM force
levels, they were willing to uncap the 8100 limit. How high it will go will
depend upon what the donors are willing to pay.
Everything else that was requested by I.G.A.D. – mandate expansion,
intervention by border states, and embargoes at H.S.M.-controlled airports
and seaports – would amount to escalation of the conflicts in Somalia, which
the donors did not desire. At the end, push came to shove on the question of
“6 ½.” The donor coalition accepted Muhiga’s formula of a “more responsible
and robust” interpretation of the existing mandate to acknowledge the right
of AMISOM to respond pre-emptively to direct threats on its positions; that
is, a doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense that, as mentioned above, AMISOM
has consistently held.
Donor acknowledgment of pre-emptive self-defense is the loose end left from
the A.U. summit. It is (intentionally?) vague and ambiguous, allowing for
everything from a broad interpretation that would sanction any aggressive
action under the pretext of self-defense to a narrow construction that would
only sanction pre-emption of an immediate threat. A repeat of the power
struggle at the mini-summit might take place over pre-emptive self-defense,
but it is likely that the donor powers would prevail; they hold the purse
strings, and things will remain the same as they have unless the donor
powers decide that a more “robust” approach is warranted. The remarks of the
Eye’s sources and Ba-Hoku’s statements to the Voice of America indicate that
AMISOM believes that its posture will remain defensive.
AMISOM does get more forces, which will either give it more protection and,
perhaps, allow it to expand its perimeter around T.F.G. installations; or
awaken resentment of the mission among Somalis and consequently increase
support for H.S.M. Should AMISOM move too aggressively in pre-emptive
self-defense and harm civilians, it will have eroded its position to a point
that it would approach being untenable. Pre-emptive self-defense, in short,
is hedged on every side.
H.S.M., which set off the rift in its opposition and the resulting power
struggle among the latter, made good on its calculated risk in executing the
World Cup bombings. H.S.M. made plain the lack of donor resolve, showed that
the donors would not honor African interests, and created resentment, all of
which tend to erode support for AMISOM in Africa. I.G.A.D. wanted to ride
the wave of sympathy, panic, and anger following the Kampala bombings to a
game-shifting change in Somalia; it found out that what plays in Kampala
leaves the donors unmoved. On July 26, speaking for H.S.M., Sh. Mohamed
Ibrahim Bilal commented that AMISOM was “an American project implemented
through the A.U.” Above all, the summit showed that the A.U. was powerless
to act on Somalia as an agent.
It is always possible that the donors will re-calculate their interests and
allow a war to be fought against H.S.M. with their support. At present,
there is no indication that they are moved to do so. As the donors see it, a
beefed-up AMISOM will be able to protect the T.F.G. without suffering undue
harm, allowing procrastination to continue.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science,
Purdue University in Chicago weinstem@purdue.edu
----[This List to be used for Eritrea Related News Only]----