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From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Fri Aug 06 2010 - 10:41:26 EDT
Somalia: After the Kampala Bombings, the Endgame in Mogadishu [Intelligence
Brief]
By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
Aug 6, 2010 - 2:25:06 PM
A closed source, who has proven to be reliable and is on the ground in
Somalia, reports on the current balance of power in Mogadishu between the
revolutionary Islamist movement Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen (H.S.M.),
which holds most of the city and surrounds its adversaries, and Somalia's
internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) and the
African Union peacekeeping mission (AMISOM) that provides for the T.F.G.'s
essential protection.
The bottom line of the source's intelligence is that in the month following
the July 11 World Cup bombings in Kampala, for which H.S.M. has taken
responsibility, the Islamists have improved their position in relation to
their opponents in Mogadishu.
The strategic intention of H.S.M. in executing the bombings has been a
matter of speculation among analysts, journalists, and officials of the
governments and international organizations backing AMISOM and the T.F.G. -
Western donor powers led by Washington and the United Nations and African
Union. H.S.M. has characterized the bombings as revenge for AMISOM shelling
of civilian areas of Mogadishu and as a warning to Uganda and Burundi, whose
forces are the only participants in AMISOM, that they should withdraw from
Mogadishu, and to other African states that they should not contribute
troops to the mission. Western analysts and Washington have called the
bombings an act of desperation by H.S.M., which they claim is divided and
has lost popular support. Prof. Kenneth Menkhaus has argued that H.S.M. was
probably attempting to re-ignite support by regionalizing its war and
mobilizing Somali nationalism. Both Menkhaus and Rashid Abdi of the
International Crisis Group contend that the bombings will work to cut off
financial support to H.S.M. from the Somali Diaspora.
The source provides an explanation for the bombings that is at variance with
both H.S.M.'s accounts and Western speculation. According to the source, the
bombings were aimed at mobilizing support from the transnational Salafist
revolutionary movement; that is, a show by H.S.M. that it is a powerful
presence and, therefore, is worth being funded. The source reports that
H.S.M.'s propaganda of the deed has been effective: more funds are flowing
into Mogadishu for H.S.M.'s operations. The source is not sure, however,
that the flow will continue.
The claim that H.S.M.'s resources are increasing runs counter to ubiquitous
reports that the Islamists are financially strapped. In a news-feature
published on August 4, Kenya's Star newspaper reported that H.S.M. was
suffering a "financial squeeze" resulting from the withdrawal of World Food
Program aid from the areas it controls, making it impossible for H.S.M. to
tax food convoys. The Star also reported that funds from the Diaspora were
drying up, quoting an interview with Rashid Abdi, who emphasized a drop in
support from the Diaspora in the U.S. According to the Star, H.S.M. is
currently dependent on revenues from the ports that it controls and
"extortion" payments from businessmen.
The source also challenges reports in the East African press, especially
Uganda's government-owned New Vision, and statements by AMISOM spokesman
Maj. Barigye Ba-Hoku, that AMISOM forces have made strategic gains on the
ground in areas surrounding key T.F.G. installations, particularly the
presidential palace. According to the source, AMISOM has not retaken ground
lost in previous H.S.M. offensives and, indeed, "continues to inexorably
lose ground." The source observes that a projected increase of AMISOM's
forces from the current six thousand to ten thousand will only serve to
protect AMISOM from being overrun by H.S.M.
Confirming reports in international, regional, and local Somali media, the
source observes that Mogadishu's population has been disaffected from
AMISOM, due to the latter's decision to respond to H.S.M. attacks by heavily
shelling the city's neighborhoods. Keeping count one night, the source
tallied at least 150 artillery rounds. The source judges that most of
Mogadishu's residents would prefer AMISOM to remain in the city to prevent a
complete H.S.M. takeover, but that the people's patience has worn thin.
The most devastating of the source's observations concerns the non-viability
of the T.F.G., a judgment that is shared by a consensus of Western and
Somali analysts. The source, however, goes further than the analyst
community, asserting that the T.F.G. has given up and has entered a phase in
which its officials are "looting whatever they can." The source reports that
T.F.G. officials are threatening local leaders with being branded as
supporters of H.S.M. if they do not cooperate in diverting resources to
them. Non-governmental organizations, says the source, have also become
targets of T.F.G. predation.
Taken together, H.S.M.'s enhanced resources, AMISOM's inability to gain
ground and the disaffection created by its use of artillery, and the
T.F.G.'s implosion have resulted in a re-calculation of interests by
Mogadishu's sub-clan leaders, who have become convinced that the donor
powers will not change their current policy of maintaining the status quo.
Barring an implemented policy shift by the donors, the sub-clan leaders feel
pressured to go over to H.S.M. or at least to adopt a stance of benevolent
neutrality towards the Islamists. A change in sub-clan positions in favor of
H.S.M. is geared to a time frame ending in January 2011, when the T.F.G.'s
mandate officially expires. If donor policy does not change by the end of
October 2010, says the source, the tilt towards H.S.M. will begin.
If the source's intelligence, observations, and judgments are accurate,
correct, and sober, then the conclusions are clear: the T.F.G. is a wasted
and toxic asset for the donor powers; AMISOM, saddled with a peacekeeping
(defensive) rather than a peace-enforcement (proactive) mandate, is in an
increasingly untenable position; and the donor powers' disposition to
procrastinate has become starkly self-defeating - leaving H.S.M with greater
advantage than it had before the World Cup bombings. The foregoing means
that the endgame in Mogadishu has begun.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science,
Purdue University in Chicago weinstem@purdue.edu
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