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From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Wed Aug 18 2010 - 05:55:23 EDT
Somalia: Frozen Warfare in Mogadishu [Intelligence Brief #2]
By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
Aug 18, 2010 - 4:44:53 AM
An independent source on the ground in Mogadishu confirms and expands on the
intelligence on the balance of power in the city provided by the source for
this writer's "Intelligence Brief" posted on Garoweonline on August 5. Based
on observations made outside the enclave in Mogadishu controlled by
Somalia's internationally-recognized Transitional Federal Government
(T.F.G.), which is protected by an African Union peacekeeping mission
(AMISOM), the source concludes that the revolutionary Islamist movement
Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen (H.S.M.), which seeks to displace the T.F.G.
and AMISOM, remains dominant, whereas its adversaries remain militarily
ineffective.
Specifically the source reports that AMISOM forces frequently fire on the
T.F.G. soldiers who accompany them and have a "complete unwillingness" to
dismount from their armored personnel carriers, insuring their "fundamental
failure" at a military level. The source adds that militias controlled by
the faction of the Sufi Islamist movement Ahlu Sunna wal-Jama'a (A.S.W.J.)
that is partially aligned with the T.F.G. against H.S.M. have only between
250 and 300 fighters, and three battlewagons on the ground.
Context
Fitting the source's intelligence into its present context shows that it is
part of a larger picture in which stasis has gripped the power configuration
in Mogadishu.
The source's report is complemented by an article for Keymedia.net by Seeko,
datelined Mogadishu, and posted on the Suna Times website on August 15.
According to Seeko, T.F.G. forces often leave their bases in the morning to
conduct operations, sometimes capture positions from H.S.M., and then
withdraw to their bases at mid-day (in order to chew the mildly narcotic
khat leaf), at which time H.S.M. returns. Seeko repeats the frequent
reports that unpaid T.F.G. soldiers and police are demoralized, often fight
with each other, and rob civilians in order to support themselves and their
families.
>From early through mid-August, the military balance in Mogadishu has been
frozen, with no major actions reported in open sources, despite threats from
H.S.M. and its loose ally Hizbul Islam (H.I.) to mount offensives. On August
4, two civilians were killed and fifteen wounded in artillery shelling of
Bakara Market. The T.F.G.'s minister of rehabilitation and social affairs,
Mohammad Umar Dalha, blamed AMISOM for the shelling, adding that the force
should not "massacre people" by responding to rifle fire with artillery
shells; instead, said Dalha, AMISOM should take the fight to its
adversaries, reinforcing the source's observations. Dalha concluded by
saying that the August 4 shelling of Bakara had not been in response to any
fighting. AMISOM denied shelling civilians.
On August 10, a mortar exchange occurred in the Dharkenley district when
AMISOM established a new base there in an area in which T.F.G. forces
already were positioned. Five people were killed and fifteen wounded in
shelling that hit Bakara Market. The spokesman for the faction of Hawiye
clan elders that does not support H.S.M., Ahmed Diriye, accused the T.F.G.
and AMISOM of raiding and shelling civilian areas, and said that they will
be held accountable for their actions. The establishment of the new AMISOM
base was the only reported repositioning of forces during the first half of
August.
On August 15, AMISOM's spokesman, Maj. Barigye Ba-Hoku, said that the
mission had intelligence that H.S.M. and H.I. were preparing new forces for
attacks on AMISOM bases. He vowed that AMISOM would defend its bases and
T.F.G. positions, and warned civilians to remove themselves from potential
battle zones as soon as possible. Ba-Hoku added that the new AMISOM base in
Dharkenley was the first initiative in a plan to "set up bases anywhere"
that AMISOM forces "think it is dangerous for their security."
The relative lack of military engagements in Mogadishu through mid-August
might signify, as Ba-Hoku says, a temporary suspension of fighting as the
Islamists regroup. In addition, AMISOM is likely to be waiting for the
arrival of an additional two thousand reinforcements to the mission that
were promised at an African Union summit in July, before it or the T.F.G.
initiates any action. AMISOM and the T.F.G. are also unlikely to mount
operations during the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan, since the T.F.G. has
denounced warnings by the Islamists that they will go on the offensive
during the holy month as a religious duty to wage jihad.
It is also possible that the lull in fighting signifies a deeper freeze,
with H.S.M. biding its time to see whether or not the two thousand
reinforcements to AMISOM arrive, and - if they do - to determine whether or
not it should recalibrate its strategy. AMISOM, in turn, was not given an
expanded mandate for peace enforcement at the A.U. summit and appears to
have settled into a mode of force protection and defense of T.F.G.
installations. It is most likely that even if AMISOM expands from its
present six thousand troops to eight thousand, the mission will maintain its
present defensive posture, prolonging the current stalemate.
As the frozen war in Mogadishu persisted, the top officials of the T.F.G.,
President Sh. Sharif Sh. Ahmad and Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali
Sharmarke, left the city for trips abroad to appeal for military aid from
donor powers and regional states. Indicating desperation at the donors'
inadequate support, despite their promised commitments and robust rhetoric,
Sh. Sharif told Uganda Pulse that the T.F.G. needs "foreign troops," because
H.S.M. is "more powerful than our forces or AMISOM." In Nairobi on August 7
for talks with the A.U. and U.N. on deployment of reinforcements to AMISOM,
Sharmarke said that success against H.S.M. depended on an expanded AMISOM
and on the willingness of the mission to take part in a major T.F.G.
offensive. On August 9, Sharmarke was in Mogadishu attempting to fend off a
confidence vote on his administration tabled by dissident parliamentarians.
Addressing parliament, he said that the major military problem faced by the
T.F.G. was the defection of its forces to H.S.M. Sharmarke then returned to
Nairobi to continue his meetings, arriving back in Mogadishu on August 15,
where he told reporters: "We want to talk to the International Community
about how to empower the government and AMISOM and to train the government
troops inside the country."
In an effort to demonstrate commitment to the T.F.G., the U.N.'s special
representative to Somalia, Augustine Mahiga, announced on August 9 that the
U.N. was building housing for some of its personnel at AMISOM's airport base
in Mogadishu so that they could relocate there within sixty days, "security
permitting." Mahiga added that the "small triangle" in Mogadishu that is
protected by AMISOM would be extended to allow "international groups" to
move into the city gradually. Mahiga concluded by hedging the U.N.'s
commitment: "For Mogadishu because of obvious security reasons, we are going
to take a much more cautious approach. But the decision to deploy has been
made."
The states bordering on Somalia, which feel increasingly threatened by
H.S.M. after it carried out bombings in Uganda, which along with Burundi
provides AMISOM with its present contingents, during the football World Cup
on July 11, have, like the T.F.G., been disappointed by the donors' response
to the situation in Somalia. After speaking with Mahiga on August 15,
Kenya's foreign minister, Moses Wetang'ula called for "stakeholders" to
formulate a "committed plan of action" to support the T.F.G. effectively,
and urged Mahiga to press upon the U.N. and international "partners" the
necessity of providing equipment and facilities to the T.F.G. and AMISOM.
After meeting with Sh. Sharif on the last leg of his support-raising tour,
Djibouti's president, Ismail Omar Guelleh, promised logistical and technical
assistance to the T.F.G.; Djibouti's official news agency, ADI, made no
mention of a battalion of reinforcements for AMISOM that had been promised
earlier. Ethiopia's prime minister, Meles Zenawi, underscored the sense of
crisis on August 11: "If the lives of AMISOM peacekeepers come under threat
and they ask for our support, we will not hesitate to send troops. This is
however a completely hypothetical case."
Conclusion
By placing the source's intelligence on AMISOM and A.S.W.J. in the context
of open-source reports, a picture emerges of an embattled T.F.G. and AMISOM,
both hobbled by inadequate support from the donor powers on which they
depend. Should this situation persist, the source's judgment that the T.F.G.
and AMISOM do not have the ability "to effectively prosecute" the war
against H.S.M. and H.I. appears to be warranted.
It is, of course, possible that AMISOM will be reinforced and adequately
supplied, and that it will move successfully to widen the perimeter of the
territory in which it protects the T.F.G. It is that possibility that
accounts for H.S.M.'s current wait-and-see posture. Within the next month or
two, it will become clearer whether or not the donor powers have the
political will to back up their robust rhetoric with a "committed plan of
action," which might shift the balance of power in Mogadishu in the favor of
their clients. If no such commitment is forthcoming from Washington and the
European powers, H.S.M. will reactivate its encirclement strategy against
the T.F.G. when it decides that the circumstances are propitious.
Until either the donor powers take the initiative or H.S.M. re-engages, the
frozen war will continue and Mogadishu will keep bleeding.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science,
Purdue University in Chicago weinstem@purdue.edu
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