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From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Fri Oct 01 2010 - 16:02:03 EDT
The SPLM moves on
The dynamics of the southern Sudanese referendum have turned out to be too
much about tribal politics and not enough about policies, warns Gamal
<mailto:gnkrumah@ahram.org.eg?subject=Region%20::%20The%20SPLM%20moves%20on>
Nkrumah
23 - 29 September 2010
_____
With less than 100 days to go before the referendum in Sudan to determine
whether southern Sudan should secede or remain an integral part of Sudan,
the country finds itself with little to celebrate. The political rift over
the referendum has sparked an unprecedented Sudanese soul-searching
exercise. The referendum itself threatens to be a damp squib.
The mood in the southern Sudanese capital Juba is anything but festive. The
atmosphere in Khartoum is equally sullen. The Sudanese people await the
results of the referendum with much trepidation.
Battle-weary from Africa's longest civil war, few Sudanese -- northerners
and southerners -- want a return to a state of war. Nowhere is the
soul-searching more on display than among the two ruling coalition party
partners -- the militant Islamist National Congress Party (NCP) and the
secularist Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). The former is northern
based and the latter is southern based. The SPLM, however, claims to have a
sizeable following in the north.
The two parties have settled on their curious campaign strategy vis-à-vis
the referendum. Neither is particularly interested in discussing the outcome
of the referendum since it is regarded as a forgone conclusion by the SPLM.
And, it is ominously viewed as a prelude to a bloodbath by the NCP.
Both sides conveniently forget that most probably a majority of the Sudanese
people, northerners and southerners, easterners and westerners, though
disappointed with the NCP's performance are equally disgusted with the SPLM
and the mainstream opposition parties. That is a bit surprising.
Both rely on worn-out sloganeering and ad hoc attacks. The SPLM sees its
strength in its tacit support for southern Sudanese national
self-determination. The NCP spontaneously gives its support for reactive
opposition to whatever the SPLM proposes.
Today, many Sudanese appear disillusioned with the status quo. In a further
sign of despondency, the NCP has threatened that secession of southern Sudan
will lead to a return to the battlefield to decide the fate of the country.
The SPLM counters that the NCP is killing the goose that lays the golden
eggs, the south where the vast majority of Sudan's commercial oil reserves
are located. The bulk of the southern Sudanese people seem to support the
SPLM's stance, and the NCP's response is muddled.
The NCP is not going to part easily with the country's newfound oil wealth.
However, the resulting battle over whether the south should stay in Sudan or
go its own way has also had the effect of unleashing a debate about whether
the north has the right to expropriate the south's oil.
The import and implication of southern Sudanese independence is looming
larger as Sudan's regional presence is enhanced. As southern Sudanese and
northern Sudanese relations become ever more fractious, so Arab-African
relations deteriorate further. A weak or divided Sudan will inevitably
produce a government that will be forced to make up policy on the hoof.
Though deep historical antagonisms remain between northern and southern
Sudan, there is a prevalent view that Sudan as a united and sovereign nation
will better withstand the challenges that it faces. If anything, far from
resenting a strong central government in Khartoum, there are indications
that the southern Sudanese people are probably frustrated at doing business
with a fractured opposition that heralds a here-today, gone-tomorrow
government.
The SPLM sees itself as playing a key role in nurturing multi-party
democracy in Sudan. What the southern Sudanese populace wants is a secular
state where their specific interests as ethnic and religious minorities are
upheld and guaranteed. In the past few weeks, relations between the NCP and
the SPLM have wobbled. First, the two parties got into a verbal jousting
match over the referendum. Then SPLM leader Sudan's First Vice-President
Silva Kiir mused on the injustice done his people both in the past and at
present. Finally, and most seriously, he recently declared that southerners
have no option but to secede.
This is an ironic outcome for the SPLM which came to power promising better
relations with Khartoum under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed
in January 2005 between the SPLM and the Sudanese government of President
Omar Hassan Al-Bashir. The CPA is now widely seen as a failure by a majority
of the southern Sudanese. They believe they have been duped into believing
that the Islamist NCP government was willing to accommodate the special
interests of non-Muslims and non-Arabs in Sudan.
The best thing Sudan's First Vice-President Kiir can do to mend fences with
the NCP stalwarts in Khartoum is develop a firm, but consistent line
concerning the referendum and stick around to implement it. There are
ominous signs of bloody power struggles simmering in southern Sudan. There
are clear signs of outside interference. Indeed, several senior officials of
the administration of US President Barack Obama have indicated that the NCP
and the SPLM must be prepared to make "difficult decisions".
The Obama administration has invited both parties to meet in Washington next
Saturday to discuss the political impasse in Sudan and the political future
of the country. The CPA helped create a crisis that is now bound to kill it.
A proper reincarnation of the CPA, an explicit and precise interpretation of
its terms should help ease tensions.
The correct response to the Sudanese political crisis is to address the
reasons behind the failure of the CPA. That means fixing the root problems
that force the southern Sudanese to opt for independence.
There is a lesson here. The referendum on southern Sudanese secession will
provide a key indication about the extent to which the Sudanese government
has lost support as a consequence of failing to resolve the pressing
problems facing southerners in Sudan. The southerners, after all, are not
wrong to defend their interests. If they cannot, what hope is there for
other marginalised groups in Sudan such as the westerners or the easterners
for that matter? However, none of this matters to the Sudanese people as the
stated reason for holding the referendum in the first place.
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