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From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Mon Oct 11 2010 - 17:43:27 EDT
Somalia: The Potato and the Technical: Decisive elements in combat
Oct 11, 2010 - 9:48:51 AM
by Frans Barnard**
The recent (27/09/10) helicopter attack in Merka in which a meeting of
senior Al Shabaab leaders was targeted has brought fresh focus to the
ongoing debate about a possible merger between Shabaab and Hisbul Islamiya.
This discussion is neither new nor surprising. Given the recent expenditure
of materiel in the Ramadan push by Shabaab and Hisbul against the TFG/AMISOM
in Mogadishu, a merger makes sense - at a superficial level.
As always in anything to do with Somalia, the superficial needs to be
treated like a lion - no matter how much you may think you understand the
behaviour and actions, just when you do, it turns and savages the best
thought through analysis.
While Shabaab is having it's own internal debate, primarily between the
two "camps" headed respectively by Emir Axmed Abdi Godane (Isaak) and Sheekh
Mukhtaar Robow (Rahanwein), Shabaab is also in ongoing negotiations with
Hisbul. Paralleling this process is the internal struggle within the TFG
between the President Sharif and the now ex Prime Minister Sharmake.
All of this comes at a time when after months of stalemate, all actors -
internal, regional and international - are doing their best to regroup. In
considering this time of rethinking, reorganization and regrouping, it is
perhaps useful to attempt an examination of just one element in an effort to
understand the complexity of these processes and the inherent danger in
simplistic thinking.
In reading the excellent book "Collapse" by Jared Diamond, this writer was
particularly struck by Diamond's comments on how the introduction of the
potato to New Zealand Maoris led to an unprecedented period of conflict,
which turned previous patterns of inter-tribal conflict upside down. The
simple potato achieved this by virtue of being a vegetable that had a longer
shelf life than the native sweet potato. This meant the tribe who first
secured potatoes was quite simply able to stay in the field longer and
consequently conquer more territory.
In considering this, I have been fascinated by the ongoing reporting of
negotiations between Al Shabaab and Hisbul Islamiya and am indebted to some
very well situated Somalis who have shared their thoughts and observations.
A review of most English language media articles and the analysis done on
this subject, usually focus on the ideological divides and the more prosaic
issues of name and hierarchy.
Within Shabaab the belief that ideologically very little differentiates
between the TFG and HI creates a real block. Given the well-documented
mentoring relationship that was enjoyed between Sheekh Xasan Daahir Aweys
(Habargidir) and Sheekh Shariif Sheekh Axmed (Abgal) this is not surprising.
The divide also focuses on internal stressors that have escalated in the
light of the Ramadan Offensive.
For many within Shabab, it is felt that forces from Bay and Bakool loyal to
Mukhtar Robow have paid a significantly higher price in the number of
casualties incurred. This is then further aggravated by financial pressures;
financiers in Bay and Bakool believe they have contributed the lion's share
of operational funding. This issue is amplified by reports indicating that
Godane has appointed a cousin of his to be responsible for Shabaab fund
raising. There is also the belief that the Government of Kenya's financial
crackdowns and the recent peace agreements in Ethiopia with Ogadeni
supported groups, like Itihad, might divert finances to support clan
interests such lobbying for the possible appointment of an Ogadeni Prime
Minister to replace Sharmake, an action which would further undermine
Shabaab's financial liquidity.
Each of these stressors is further situated within a complex of clan
dynamics. With Al Shabaab being strongly represented both geographically and
numerically in South Somalia, Godane who hails from Somaliland has been
repeatedly accused of "loading" the leadership of Shabaab with his kinsmen.
Given his lack of physical clan support in South Central Somalia it is not
surprising that leadership friction exists. That this has exacerbated
difficulties between Godane and Robow has been made manifestly evident since
the "interrupted" leadership summit in Merka with accusations being leveled
by both actors against each other. Interestingly Godane even granted Time an
interview - which some observers believe was a strategic decision to
reinforce his leadership position.
This fear of commanders who come from the major Somali clans of senior
Shabaab commanders from minority clans, has arguably had more to do with the
present configuration of foreign fighters supporting Godane that ideology.
The priority for Shabaab commanders who come from the minority clans and
their foreign fighters is to ensure that commanders such as Robow from the
major clans do not set the agenda. This is largely driven by a fear of clan
influence and clan priorities.
Currently within Shabaab leading commanders are from Isaak,
Galjacel,Bade-Adde, and other minority clans within the Hawiye and the
Darood; in traditional Somali fashion this leads to a fear of large clan
domination.
Beyond the inner Shabaab positioning, the concept of a merged Shabaab and
Hisbul Islamiya also leads to a concern beyond ideology. Godane is
considered to be very concerned about a dilution of his authority if he has
to share power with Sheekh Xasan Daahir Aweys (Habargidir). On the Hisbul
side of the equation we come to the equivalent of the potato in New Zealand
- the single factor issue that can change the face of a conflict. Confirmed
reports indicate that Hisbul do not own their Technicals, these fighting
vehicles made famous in the movie Blackhawk Down, are owned by Somali
businessmen. It is these wealthy and influential businessmen who are the
critical block in the merger discussions. Before any merger can occur, they
will want to have a clear understanding of how they will retain ownership of
their assets, or be appropriately compensated for them.
So a potato made the difference in Maori tribal conflict between1818 and
1833, and the ownership of Technicals could do the same in Somalia 2010.
* *Frans Barnard has worked in the humanitarian field in regions of Somalia
since 2007. He can be reached by E-mail: frans.barnard@gmail.com
<http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Features_34/frans.barnard@gmail
.com>
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