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From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Mon Oct 25 2010 - 17:16:13 EDT
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/21/sudans_war_inside>
Sudan's War Inside
As pundits warn of a north-south Sudan scuffle, they might miss the real
brewing conflict: within Southern Sudan.
BY MAGGIE FICK | OCTOBER 25, 2010
BENTIU, Sudan-Gen. Gabriel Tanginye has a complicated relationship with his
home region of south Sudan. Born and raised there, he has spent much of his
life fighting for the country's north. And during a 21-year-long north-south
civil war, that meant Tanginye was fighting against his own regional kin.
It's a role he seemed to have no qualms in undertaking; in 2000, he hijacked
a U.N. plane to show his displeasure with the international body's
assistance to south Sudan's vice president. Today, he lives in the northern
capital of Khartoum, supporting his southern-based family from afar.
Recently however, Tanginye has been back in south Sudan trying to make
amends. With the looming January 2011 referendum, in which south Sudan is
likely to vote for independence from the north, Tanginye realized that his
future as a northern military commander may have a limited horizon. So when
the men now leading the Southern Sudanese government came calling,
Tanginye's calculation was simple: Take the hefty reward they offered him
for switching camps, rejoin the south, bring his 44,000-strong ethnic
militia with him, and express his solidarity with his former enemies ahead
of the crucial independence vote. Then after the ballot, reconsider his
options.
These days, South Sudan is full of men like Tanginye, strategically
positioning themselves for key roles in a new, independent nation. In fact,
a conference in the Southern capital of Juba earlier this month was meant to
take advantage of exactly that, "reconciling" the various Southern minority
tribe factions. At this point, there is little attention paid to how or why
those reconciliations are made; it's a matter of patching things up long
enough to ensure political and military support for independence from
Khartoum. The simple message: United we stand, divided we fall.
But in a fractured country, whose divisions are usually drawn between north
and south Sudan, or Khartoum and Darfur, it's easy to forget that there are
other, internal fault lines. In the south, huge fissures separate the
population along tribal, linguistic, and economic lines. Two decades of
civil war have made matters worse; guns and money bought alliances that have
sliced apart communities and families. In recent months, the international
community has been warning of a war in Sudan around the referendum --
between the north and south. But even if a new independent Southern Sudan
emerges without a shot being fired early next year, it may not be at peace.
The convenient reconciliations taking place today look frighteningly
ephemeral, which means that the coming war in Sudan might be within south
Sudan.
Many of those reconciliations took place last week, when the south's ruling
party brought together more than 20 registered opposition parties at a
conference aimed at building consensus on issues essential to the future of
the Southern Sudan. The most significant outcome of the five-day meeting was
a clear expression by the parties of their strong commitment to the January
2011 self-determination vote. Lam Akol, the leader of the breakaway Sudan
Peoples' Liberation Movement-Democratic Change faction, for example, ran
against Southern President Salva Kiir in the April elections, but he seemed
as committed as the next opposition member to southern secession. The
support of these key South Sudanese political players is critical for the
region's government, because these men could prove to be spoilers if not
appeased or convinced to get in line with the common agenda.
Already however, a number of signs suggest that the government's bold
attempt at political and military inclusivity won't last long. Many of the
now reconciled enemies of the Southern government happen to have significant
military forces under their command, leaving a huge margin for troublemaking
should alliances falter. And it's not hard to lure many of these leaders
away for a price: Since April, there have been three post-election
insurrections of note.
Take Tanginye's case, for example. Despite spending most of his life as a
bush fighter, Tanginye holds powerful cards in the Southern Sudanese
political arena -- and he knows it. When I met him in one of Southern
Sudan's provinces, Unity state, he was relaxing riverside near the regional
governor's mansion. He boasted of his force strength, emphasizing that his
tens of thousands of men are under the control of no army, and loyal to him
alone. "I own these guys, and they will do what I tell them to do," said
Tanginye. Stories are swirling around Bentiu, capital of Unity state, that
Tanginye will leave town with suitcases of cash and swaths of land to enrich
himself and his people -- simply for claiming that his men will fight for
the south if it comes to that. After the referendum, Tanginye may well find
a higher bidder for his loyalty and that of his militia. And there are many
men in south Sudan in the same position.
There are other reasons to think that an independent Southern Sudan will
struggle to achieve sustainable peace as well. Tribal loyalty bodes against
long-term reconciliation, and its role in politics should not be
underestimated. If the southern government is not carefully put together
after the referendum, including representatives of all Southern Sudan's more
than 40 tribes, it risks the wrath of an armed insurgency in one remote
corner or another. The marginal populations that wouldn't be represented
have in the past found other ways to make their voice heard -- taking up
arms in militias like Tanginye's.
Indeed, tribal discontent is already rearing its ugly head. The past year
has seen an uptick in armed cattle raiding and deadly intercommunal
violence, perhaps in anticipation of how unequally the benefits of peace may
be shared among ethnic groups. The southern army's attempts at disarming the
civilian population in the run-up to and aftermath of the April elections
illustrated how tribal tensions can be exacerbated by the composition of the
army itself; various minority groups suspect that they are targeted for
disarmament because of their tribe's relation with the majority groups
within the army.
Every possible destabilizing factor here is also magnified ten-fold simply
by the copious quantities of small arms swirling around. In Unity state, a
tank sits ominously outside the Unity state governor's mansion; the governor
himself is guarded by boyish looking soldiers who man anti-aircraft assault
weapons mounted on pickup trucks. Every sign indicates that the military
apparatus may be gearing up for an even bigger, internal fight.
To outside observers of Sudan, it is tempting to believe that an autonomous
south would mean an end to the country's long civil strife. But the war on
the horizon might not be the one that everyone is expecting.
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