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From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Mon Dec 20 2010 - 13:43:54 EST
The United States and Africa Security Cooperation and the Africa Command
(AFRICOM)
by Boni Yao Gebe
December 20, 2010
Abstract
Post-Cold War United States-Africa security cooperation has been transformed
from the humanitarian efforts of President George Bush Sr. that ended with
the Somalia debacle in 1994, through the selective engagement policy of
President Bill Clinton that avoided the Rwandan civil conflict to what could
be viewed as a more structured relationship with clearly defined priorities
under President George Bush Jr. since the new millennium. This has been
amplified with the establishment of the Africa Command (AFRICOM) nearly
three years ago. Against the backdrop of the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks on the United States, different interpretations have been adduced
for these developments. Efforts towards building trusted allies towards
containing international terrorism, the quest for Africa's natural
resources, particularly oil in the Gulf of Guinea and the desire by the
United States to help transform Africa on a more sustained developmental
path have been assigned. The study appraises these perspectives, examines
the different nodes and forms of security cooperation between the United
States and Africa in the recent past and the motivating factors for the
establishment of the Africa Command (AFRICOM). It argues that the thrust of
United States interest in Africa is in conformity with classical realist
interpretation, thus a pursuit of her national interests within contemporary
geo-strategic calculations.
Introduction
United States security engagement in Africa, whether historical or
contemporary, could be viewed from a strictly strategic consideration, thus
intrinsically, the pursuit of its national interest on the continent and, by
extension, globally. For instance, during the Cold War, the United States
engaged herself in African affairs in the context of superpower rivalry. The
intense ideological competition between the then Soviet Union and the United
States shaped the policy choices and relations that the latter forged with
individual African governments. Indeed, some policy choices by the US within
the context of the Cold War generated antagonistic relations with the then
Soviet Union, manifested in the ideological and political entanglements in
the civil conflicts in Angola (support for Jonas Savimbi), the altercation
with governments in the Horn of Africa, particularly Somalia under Siad
Barre and Ethiopia under Mengistu Haile Mariam. There were other instances
that manifested in the uncanny support for military regimes on the continent
such as Liberia under President Samuel Doe and Mobutu Sese Seko of former
Zaire. Additionally was the obnoxious ideological stance on apartheid South
Africa under then President Ronald Reagan and his associate Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher, with the assertion that UN sponsored economic sanctions
would hurt the majority South African blacks the most, not excluding their
indifference to the apartheid regime holding on to Namibia, despite UN
resolutions on the issue. The period was thus counter-productive to Africa's
long-term interests and did not promote regional security in terms of laying
the foundations for political stability, peace and economic development.[1]
In a realistic sense though, the United States entered Africa during the
Cold War as a new actor pursuing her superpower ambitions on the continent,
since she had never "colonized" an African territory in its "Eurocentric"
manifestation. The exception was the historical example of American
nationals who, acting through the American Colonization Society (ACS),
secured land on the West Coast of Africa for the settlement of American
freed slaves in the 1820s under the presidency of James Monroe. Now Liberia,
the capital Monrovia was named reverently after the then president of the
United States. This realistically marked America's historical relations with
the continent; yet, she was quite hesitant to intervene forcefully in
Liberia during the civil war that engulfed Liberia in the 1990s.
United States' relations with her only African enclave therefore contrasted
sharply with those of the European powers which actually maintained
prolonged foothold on the continent. For instance, the benchmark of
Franco-African relations was the enactment of extensive strategic security
pacts, even after these colonies attained formal political independence. On
the other hand, Great Britain's security relations with its former colonies
took on a characteristically "manage your own affairs" approach. Of course,
this attitude did not rule out security assistance with various Anglophone
African countries through sponsorship and training programs for personnel in
the security services in prestigious institutions in Great Britain and
elsewhere. The other colonial powers such as Portugal unabashedly engaged
their former colonies, thus Mozambique, Angola, Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde
in armed struggles against the popular movement for political emancipation.
Belgium likewise adopted political intrigue and subterfuge in the
resource-rich Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) to overturn the
popular choice of the people for political leadership and economic
emancipation, resulting in the death of Patrice Lumumba in 1960. Similarly,
French military engagement in Algeria and the British outpost in Rhodesia
encountered prolonged armed resistance, signifying examples of the
unwillingness of the colonialists to vacate settler colonies on the
continent. Notwithstanding, African nationalism and political assertiveness
in various forms towards continental unity and economic emancipation became
the popular theme throughout the Cold War, though not without the
debilitating effects of superpower rivalry that often broke the front of its
leadership.
Emergent Interests of the United States
Following the demise of the Cold War in 1989, the aftermath which was
accompanied by a rather ill-defined engagement of the continent by
successive American governments, the sudden renewed interest by the United
States, particularly in the security sphere, had generated some scrutiny.
The records portray a prolonged lull following the withdrawal of her marine
corps from Mogadishu in 1994, and the apparent disengagement from Africa by
the Clinton Administration which was cleverly adumbrated in various policy
initiatives towards African governments and their military to assume
responsibility for African challenges directly, especially in the 1990s.
In the last decade, however, American initiatives cut across diverse sectors
and issues, with a combination of policy instruments which have raised
eyebrows both within and outside the continent. Certainly, since September
11, 2001 one could decipher in this new dalliance emergent security concerns
and the decision to protect the US homeland as well as her assets and allies
around the world. An examination of her security strategies and relations
with Africa has, therefore, led to various interpretations as to how this
new phase of entrenched security cooperation can be characterized. The more
pronounced of these interpretations include an apparent deepening of
strategic partnership with African countries in the war against terrorism;
advancing her quest for newer sources of energy supply, particularly in the
Gulf of Guinea; and thirdly, making a stronger claim for the continent as a
result of economic competition by Asia countries (China, India and Japan)
and also from some of her Western allies within the European Union. The
veracity or otherwise of these claims or interpretations are explored in
this study.
The Concept and Practice of Security Cooperation
The idea and practice of security cooperation within the context of
international relations could mean several things. The practice of two or
more states entering a formal agreement to protect or defend their sovereign
existence or territorial space against an external actor is recognized as
collective defense arrangement or a security alliance for mutual cooperation
against outside attack. The historical examples of NATO and the now defunct
Warsaw Pact during the Cold War are demonstrative in this regard (Bennett,
1991: 132-33; 234-238). Thus in a defense alliance, an attack on one is an
attack on all members of the group in question and the appropriate response
to such an attack is not necessarily towards restoration of peace but war
against the enemy. On the other hand, under the practice of international
organizations such as the United Nations or regional groupings, the African
Union inclusive, member states are obliged to promote the collective
security of members in the event of aggression from within or external to
it, or situations that create conditions for international insecurity or
threat to the peace. Under such arrangements, peace must be viewed to be
indivisible and threats to the peace anywhere are viewed as a concern to all
the members of the international system (Bennett, 1991: 131; Roberts &
Kingsbury, 1993:1-62). A different interpretation, though not necessarily
outside the mandate of the UN system, is to perceive it as a political
edifice geared towards value allocation among several political actors
(Finkelstein, 1988: 1-40).
In the case of the United Nations as a security arrangement, there are
succinct provisions in the Charter for the promotion of international peace
and security as well as containment of international aggression against or
by member states. In the African setting, states have not made provisions,
whether at the bilateral or multilateral levels, that commit them to a
collective security alliance or defense, thus viewing an attack on one as an
attack on all. Existing security mechanisms rather portray an element of
sub-regional or regional conflict resolution strategies and policies with
structural imbalances though the current dynamics contain opportunities for
sustainability. The examples of the ECOMOG in West Africa under the auspices
of ECOWAS and similar stand-by force arrangements as mandated by the African
Union tend to shape the future direction of security on the continent. In
addition to these, all the other security arrangements with external actors,
particularly those that constitute the principal players in the region,
intervene on the basis of mutually beneficial political arrangements, often
resulting from colonial legacies and international political dynamics, for
instance, Cold War politics and post-Cold War systemic developments.
Turning to security discourse in contemporary international relations, it is
rather broad and encompasses activities and issues which are quite removed
from the traditional conception of security, thus state security or national
integrity. It includes broader and newer issues that relate to human
security, rule of law and democratic governance. In fact, security in its
contemporary application connotes the promotion of a secure political and
economic environment that accords dignity for the individual. The role of
the state is to ensure that security structures put premium on the needs,
safety and wellbeing of the people or the citizenry (Wohglemuth, Rothschild
et al, 1999). In accordance with this latest conception and, indeed
practice, it is quite clear that the United States has demonstrated
important interventions in the economic, social, political, institutional
and governance structures of African states, either bilaterally or
multilaterally.
Concrete examples in this regard include United States financial support for
developing countries in the areas of HIV/AIDS prevention, consisting of a
US$15 billion program that covered 12 African countries.[2] Another is the
program by the United States government towards the prevention of tropical
diseases in Africa with a US$350 million earmarked by President Bush on his
recent tour of the continent. It has also encouraged trade relations under
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of 1999;[3] and quite
recently, the inauguration of the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) to
boost economic development and overall national integration for the
countries concerned.[4]
The concern, however, in this study centers on the narrower interpretation
that explores the security commitments and interventions of the United
States in post-Cold War Africa and how it constitutes agenda setting for the
AFRICOM.
Objectives of Study and Scope
The work examines the character and structure of United States security
cooperation in Africa and how these impact on the sub-region's overall
development. It probes such issues as the reasons for United States security
cooperation, the benefits and the lessons learnt and what the new direction
should be in this relationship. In this regard, the work explores the
promotion of formal security arrangements by the United States in the areas
of military and defense commitments towards the enhancement of political
stability and the maintenance of an environment conducive to peaceful
coexistence in Africa.
The scope is limited to post-Cold War events and activities but reflective
of issues and developments that affect the continent of Africa and relevant
to its development. In a post-Cold War international environment, therefore,
the perceived visibility of the United States in African affairs has to be
measured against her overall national agenda, whether her presence is one of
altruistic internationalism or a pursuit of her own foreign policy agenda.
It can be argued that, to a very large extent, United States African
policies do not necessarily correspond to the continent's strategic or
security needs. They are usually tailored to respond to US security
calculations which often invariably are unable to tackle individual complex
situations. For instance, sub-Saharan Africa is normally treated en bloc in
United States strategic calculations, while seemingly benching North Africa
within the Middle East. By inference, sub-Saharan Africa is isolated by the
US for policy coordination and it is in this vein that United States
security cooperation must be analyzed. Again, the historical example of US
responses to political events in Somalia had repercussions for Rwanda and
inexorably, Liberia and the West African sub-region in the 1990s, for that
matter.
The study is premised on the argument that United States security
cooperation in Africa is guided by her national interest that seldom
coincides with the important needs and aspirations of African states. If
there are seeming convergences between US national interests and African
aspirations, these are coincidental and largely defined by the foreign
policy inclinations of the United States. To demonstrate the veracity of
this assumption, the study looks at three epochal global developments that
have shaped US interests or disinterest, as the case might be, in Africa.
* The ending of the Cold War and US commitments under a professed "new
international order" by former President George Bush, Sr.,
* International events since the September 11th, 2001 terrorist
attacks on the World Trade Centre and America's declared "War on Terror",
* The recent turbulence and instability in the global oil market and
the interest in West African (Gulf of Guinea) oilfields by the United
States.
The United States and Post-Cold War Policy
Former American President, George Bush Sr., heralded "internationalism" in
the immediate aftermath of the Cold War as the blueprint for the future.
Justifying his foreign policy direction after a prolonged struggle to
contain the Soviet Union, he was convinced that the United States would not
face military threats immediately from another superpower. Instability and
threats to international security would rather emerge from small or
middle-range powers as was soon demonstrated when Iraq invaded Kuwait in
1990. It was his conviction that under a "New World Order", rule of law must
supplant the rule of the jungle, in which nations recognize the shared
responsibility for freedom and justice and where the strong respect the
rights of the weak.[5] In the new international system, he proclaimed,
America had no alternative but to support the rule of law and to stand up to
aggression. He quickly added though that the "New World Order" could be
achieved only if the United States accepted the burden of leadership that
was indispensable to its realization. Whiles not guaranteeing an era of
perpetual peace after an era of Cold War stalemate within the United Nations
system, he yearned for enduring peace to be the mission for all
humankind.[6]
With the success from the Persian Gulf firmly rooted in the back of his
mind, George Bush was determined to replicate his resolve on the African
continent by launching "Operation Restore Hope", also known as Unified Task
Force (UNITAF) involving 25,000 troops drawn from 24 countries. The primary
objective under its mandate was to ensure security, relieve suffering
civilian populations and undertake other humanitarian activities. Alongside
the UN Mission in Somalia, UNOSOM II, it had the mandate to restore peace
through disarmament and work towards reconciliation among the warring
factions. The United States, however, had to hurriedly withdraw from Somalia
after the abortive yet fatal attempt to capture Somali Warlord General
Mohamed Farah Aideed. The encounter resulted in the death of 18 US troops
whose bodies were paraded on the streets of Mogadishu. This development also
led to the termination of the UNOSOM II in 1994.[7]
The relevance of the Somalia debacle for United States Africa policy was
that it constituted the barometer through which President Bush's successor,
President Bill Clinton viewed the continent to formulate his policy response
to other conflicts on the continent. It led to the adoption of Presidential
Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) of 1995 under which the United States would
not intervene directly or provide support to United Nations interventions,
unless the situations in question directly threaten US national
interests.[8] The assertive multilateralism that President Clinton brought
to office was very quickly replaced with selective engagement. In reality,
the pursuit of the national interest became the litmus test for all manner
of international engagements, even those that did not include military
deployments. The consequences for United States' Africa policy was the lack
of response to the Rwanda genocide and the complete lack of military
engagement in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, except for the multilateral
responses within the corridors of the United Nations and the few gestures of
support for the ECOMOG effort in the two West African countries.
What the United States decided to do in concrete terms was to develop the
capacities of the African military to undertake peace support operations
(SPOs). The channels for doing this was through bilateral agreements with
individual countries and then later with sub-regional and regional
institutions such as the ECOWAS and the African Union (then the OAU). At the
continental level, it commenced with the African Crisis Response Force
(ACRF), designed to capacitate African forces for rapid deployment in
conflict zones for the purpose of humanitarian intervention. The criticism
of the program as a knee-jerk approach to conflicts on the continent,
particularly after the events in Rwanda and the reluctance of African
countries to sign on to it led to the launching of a new initiative, the
African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI).[9]
The ACRI was meant as a training program for African contingents to
undertake peacekeeping roles on the continent. Sub-regional groupings such
as the ECOWAS, with its infantile experiences in Liberia and Sierra Leone,
were to benefit from this new arrangement. The glaring hindrance was the
fact that the dynamics of international conflicts had changed from
traditional inter-state conflicts to intra-state, and secondly, the newer
types of conflicts demanded peace enforcement action instead of just keeping
the peace. A number of countries from West Africa and elsewhere on the
continent benefited from the program, notably Senegal and Ghana, and also
Uganda and Tanzania. Though an estimated annual budget of US$15 million was
earmarked for the program, it faced some difficulties and challenges,
notably inadequate logistics and hardware, lack of support by the leading
regional powers for the program, Nigeria and South Africa in particular,
viewing it as an imposition from an external player, and that the program
completely lacked consultation in designing its content and purpose.[10]
Some of the beneficiaries included Ghanaian and Senegalese, Sudanese and
Tanzanian troops who had engagement with the ECOMOG in Liberia in 1997.
Again, perhaps due to the bottlenecks and reservations about the ACRF and
the ACRI, a new program was launched by the Bush Jr. administration in 2004,
the Africa Contingency Training Assistance (ACOTA). It operated on the basis
of bilateral agreements between the United States and recipient states, but
also for regional and sub-regional groupings. It brought innovations,
including training for offensive military operations, the provision of
weaponry for such operations and training modules and programs designed to
meet the specific tactical and operational needs of the recipient states.
The War against Terrorism and Africa
The events of September 11, 2001 certainly impacted on United States foreign
policy and had repercussions for Africa as well. The initial responses of
President Bush to questions about Africa's place in US foreign policy when
he assumed office lacked any coherence or strategic consideration about the
continent in his scheme of priorities. Very soon though, his government
realized that to win the war against terrorism, it had to engage more
countries and build on existing bilateral relations with friendly countries.
It led to the designation of a group of countries in Africa as "satellite"
or "anchor" states, notably Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya and Ethiopia. It
also led to the decision to assist and strengthen reforming states, and
finally to support credible sub-regional organizations that could help
address transnational threats on a sustained basis. The promotion of
democracy and good governance became the bridgehead in this endeavor and
sustained with financial support at both bilateral and multilateral levels.
For instance, the African Union, ECOWAS and IGAD (Inter-Governmental Agency
for Development), and other sub-regional groupings benefited from this
objective. It also came in the form of training and capacity-building,
bolstering planning element and peace support capabilities.[11]
The African Union has also benefited from these programs, especially with
the launching of the United States Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)
in 2005 which aimed at improving the supply of personnel for peace
operations worldwide with a target of 75,000 troops. The aim was to enable
states and regional organizations that benefit from the program to be
provided with technical assistance, training and material support towards
institutional knowledge. The beneficiaries of this program include the peace
operation Centres of Excellence: the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping
Training Centre in Ghana, the Peacekeeping School in Koulikoro, Mali, the
Peace Support Training Centre in Karen, Kenya and the African Stand-By Force
(ASF) of the African Union. In the case of ECOWAS operations in the
sub-region and the African Union Mission in Sudan, it included the provision
of logistical support by the United States through a private US firm,
Pacific Architects Engineers (PAE). It additionally deployed an Amphibious
Ready Group (ARG) in support of the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) in
2003, paving the way for the deployment of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
later the same year. United States assistance was also manifest in such
countries as Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire.[12]
In overall terms, United States' role and policy direction in Africa has
been driven by the realization that there is danger in standing aloof from
the failed or fragile states on the continent. It serves American national
interest, therefore, to assist in strengthening the fragile states, develop
local capacity to build porous borders, beef up law enforcement and
intelligence infrastructure in the fight against terrorism. It is on record
that under its counter-terrorism initiatives, the United States Special
Operations Forces in 2002 supplied weapons, vehicles and military training
to counter-terrorism teams in Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania. The United
States had also established a permanent military base in Djibouti for which
an amount of US$31 million was offered as development assistance. Similarly,
countries that are perceived to have supported the war against terrorism,
for instance, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan are aid beneficiaries in a
variety of ways.[13]
Another manifestation of the war against terrorism in United States policy
on the continent is that development aid in general increases or decreases
relative to her commitments in other regions around the globe. The war in
Iraq from 2003 meant that aid levels to Africa decreased but individual
countries received proportionate higher levels of military and financial
assistance depending on the country's efforts in assisting the US war
effort. For instance, Mali, Niger, Mauritania and Chad have all benefited
from the counter-terrorism assistance program under the US-European Command
with supply of weapons, vehicles and military training. There is also a
Department of Defense (Pentagon) program, "Operation Enduring Freedom -
Trans-Sahara" under which Nigeria, Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia had
benefited. There was a pledge of US$500 million mentioned by the former
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld on his visit to the sub-region in
2005, spread over seven years.
Still, in furtherance of American national interest, countries which refused
to sign on to the Non-Surrender Agreement (Article 98) as a waiver under the
American Service Members Protection Act (ASPA) of 2002, exempting US
nationals on their soil from prosecution by the ICC, are cut off from
military assistance. This provision extends to all state parties to the
International Criminal Court (ICC) and thus signatories to the Rome Statute.
While Ghana, for instance, continues to enjoy its military assistance from
the US for granting the waiver, other countries such as Benin, Mali and
Niger in the West African sub-region and Namibia, Lesotho, South Africa,
Kenya and Central African Republic were suspended for their refusal to
comply with the waiver.[14]
The United States and Africa Command
Another important milestone in United States' Africa policy is the
establishment of an Africa Command (AFRICOM), following the recommendation
by former US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld in 2007 to that effect.
The intention was that a new command headquartered in Africa should
coordinate all US military and security interests on the continent. As the
report indicated, the new command "would strengthen our security cooperation
with Africa and create opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our
partners in Africa. Africa Command will enhance our efforts to bring peace
and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of
development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in
Africa."[15] The creation of AFRICOM meant that the overall military
engagement and responsibility for Africa is removed from the European
Command (EUCOM) based in Stuggart, Germany which has responsibility for 42
African countries. The United States Central Command (CENTCOM), based in
Tampa, Florida was responsible for eight African countries, namely Djibouti,
Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Seychelles, Somali and Sudan. The
Hawaii-based United States Pacific Command (PACOM) had responsibility for
Comoros, Mauritius and Madagascar.[16]
According to calculations by the then Bush administration, a single command
centre with responsibility for Africa meant that initiatives would be
streamlined, while giving opportunity to the United States to assess
accurately the effectiveness of its programs. Apart from the fact that
Africa is placed under a unified command to respond to the security and
strategic interests of the US, it would seem that the real motive for the
establishment of AFRICOM is not necessarily to satisfy the needs of the
continent but rather, the realization that "Africa holds growing
geo-strategic importance and is high priority to this administration."[17]
AFRICOM was to be in place by 30 September, 2008 by which date it had
already become operational. With regard to the location of the headquarters
in Africa, several countries came up for mention, with initially Algeria,
Ghana, Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Djibouti, and Ethiopia on the list. The
opposition and controversy surrounding the establishment of AFRICOM among
the African elite had led to disinterest in the project with only President
Johnson-Sirleaf of Liberia signaling Liberia's availability to host it when
President Bush visited that country in 2008.
All the virtues and attributes of AFRICOM not withstanding, there had been a
seeming lack of clarity in the true intention behind the establishment of
the Command. The AFRICOM structurally is almost everything, except as an
instrument of war. Understandably, it is functionally designed to work in
concert with African partners to create a more stable security environment
for political and economic growth. It is to build partnerships with African
governments; support US government agencies operating in the continent;
conduct region-wide security operations across the continent; increase the
counter-terrorism skills of partner nations; enhance humanitarian
assistance, including disaster management and response; promote respect for
human rights; provide support for African regional organizations and conduct
military support operations if necessary.[18]
Comments by officials of the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (ACSS),
Washington DC, during interactions with the Ghana Chapter of the (ACSS) in
Accra, would seem to suggest that AFRICOM may not be headquartered in a
single African country. There would be a head office in the United States
headed by a military commander while operating staff would be spread around
selected zones across the continent.[19] In his own submission in Accra
during his tour of the continent, President Bush Jr. seemed to have
confirmed this latter position when he condescended that to think that one
African country was going to host it was "bullony".[20] There was, however,
no doubt about the intentions of the Bush administration to place AFRICOM on
a solid foundation, if initial estimates of the Command's 2007 cost of
operations which was placed in the region of US$50 million was anything to
go by.
While the policy pronouncements that underpin AFRICOM portend good
intentions on the part of the United States to bring Africa to the forefront
of its foreign policy and security commitments, the whole effort raised
doubts about the supposed partnership inherent in it. Firstly, the United
States was not convincing about enhancing efforts at bringing peace and
security to 'the people of Africa' and promoting the 'common' goals of
development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth when Africans
or their representatives, whether at the level of governments or civil
society groups and organizations, were not properly consulted on this grand
project initially. Secondly, it was unclear whether Africa needed a security
edifice in the form of a military command just because it falls within the
traditional hegemonic tradition and practice of the US to establish command
structures around the world. Thirdly, was the issue of prioritization of the
areas and sectors that required external intervention and support. Perhaps,
an appropriate framework would have been to engage African representation in
the discussions for a mutually beneficial framework around policy issues,
strategies, vision and mission, and benchmarks. As events later unfolded,
global security calculations, dictated by geo-strategic considerations
seemed to have shaped the structures and even the perceived benefits to the
continent and these were obviously predetermined.
Perceptively, there were efforts by some regional actors to thwart any
attempt by the United States to develop any more military bases on the
continent, particularly the Gulf of Guinea (Sao Tome-Principe has been the
more attractive to the European Central Command) since these might play into
the long-term intentions, if any, behind the AFRICOM. Some of these
intentions might be to use AFRICOM to protect United States interests,
including the fight against terrorism, contain foreign competition,
particularly the growing influence of China on the continent, to canvas and
protect vital resources, especially meeting its energy needs, to support her
allies and partners vital to accomplishing its national interests across the
region and beyond.
According to statements by the US Commander of AFRICOM, General William E.
Ward before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 9, 2010 in
Washington DC, priorities of the Obama Administration as spelt out during
his visit to Ghana in July 2009 would determine the long-term objectives of
AFRICOM. These include supporting strong and sustainable democracies and
good governance; fostering sustained economic growth and development;
increasing access to quality health and education; and helping to prevent,
mitigate and resolve armed conflict. These priorities would be achieved, he
emphasized, through sustained security engagement with African militaries.
US programs and activities would therefore be geared toward supporting her
national interests while also ensuring that four defense-oriented goals
expressed by African governments and their people are pursued. These consist
of building capable and accountable military forces that can perform
professionally and with integrity; that these forces are supported and
sustained by effective, legitimate, and professional security institutions;
that they have the capability to exercise their means both nationally and
regionally to dissuade, deter and defeat transnational threats; and finally
that they have the capacity to increase their support towards international
peacekeeping efforts.
The AFRICOM Commander, then went on to outline purposes that underpin the
programs and activities that the Command would undertake namely: building
the capacity of partner conventional forces; supporting capacity building of
partner security forces; building the capacity of partner enabling forces;
fostering strategic relationships; conducting defense sector reforms;
fostering regional cooperation, situational awareness and
interoperationability; countering transnational and extremist threats;
contributing to stability in current zones of conflict and addressing
conditions that contribute to instability. Indeed, these are laudable
commitments that if developed and sustained would transform the continent's
security environment and ensure peace and development for all African
societies.
The initial hurdles and controversies that have made these pronouncements
unattractive to most African governments and civil society groups were
largely due to lack of consultation and agreement on the elements for
building Africa's security architecture. Currently, serious consultations
are ongoing with the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies at the National
Defense University, Washington DC and the leadership of AFRICOM on one hand,
and African governments, representatives of civil society groups,
think-tanks and other interest groups on the continent. As at July 2010,
four of such consultations had been held, the most recent one having been
held in Dakar Senegal. The expectation is that the areas of disagreement and
suspicion would fade off as more of such interactions take place so that
policy coordination among and between the US Department of Defense, the
leadership of AFRICOM, African governments and civil society groups would
yield common grounds for long-term projections to be made.
US Energy Needs and the West Africa Oil Market
Reports over the past few years indicate that parts of Africa, particularly
the West African sub-region is emerging as a world-class oil producer and as
such has become a strategic concern for the United States in particular and
also for the European Union. Estimates of oil reserves in the Gulf of Guinea
put it at between 20 billion and 30 billion barrels.[21] This represents the
single largest bloc of crude oil deposits in sub-Saharan Africa and is
well-placed to supply oil to the United States and Europe. The largest
deposits in the sub-region include those of Nigeria and Angola but also
Equitoral Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome-Principe and Ghana. Based on rough
estimates, Nigeria will earn about US$110 billion by 2010, Angola (US$43
billion) and Equatorial Guinea (US$10).[22] By 2015, the region will be
supplying 25 per cent of the oil needs of the United States (to be increased
to 30 per cent), surpassing the volume imported from the Persian Gulf.[23]
Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole currently provides the United States with 16
per cent of its oil needs.[24] According to some estimates, the reality of
oil reserves in the region, coupled with the region's fisheries and rich
offshore gas meant it can compete with other regions, if not surpass the
quantities in the Persian Gulf.[25] The fact remains though that in terms of
global reserves, Saudi Arabia stands sky high with its oil reserves
estimated at 264.2 billion barrels.
>From 2002, there had been concerted efforts to provide the necessary
security for the Gulf of Guinea. The Gulf of Guinea comprises the sea area
enclosed between the coastal states from Senegal to Angola and includes also
Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Congo, Congo DR, Gabon and Angola. Both at
bilateral and multilateral levels, the United States, Britain and France
have individually and collectively intensified their efforts for greater
military assistance. The sub-regional grouping, the ECOMOG had earlier
received US$5.3 million worth of satellite equipment from the United States
and Europe to build a communication system.[26] It is in the interest of the
United States to secure all vital sea routes for international trade and
commerce, including the Gulf of Guinea. Studies indicate that the United
States has shown increasing interest in maritime security in the Gulf of
Guinea and has organized a security mechanism in that regard. Two
sub-regional maritime security initiatives have been formulated with
security implications for the sub-region. These consist of the United
States-Gulf of Guinea Coastal Security Initiative (US-GoG Security
Initiative) and the Gulf of Guinea Coast Guard Program pioneered by the
Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA Coast Guard
Program). It is on record that none of the two initiatives have been
formulated on an ECOWAS agenda or do they have any synergy that will revolve
around the sub-region's security needs.
The United State's Security Priorities
The role of the United States in the region's security architecture is
taking on a defining character and with clear-cut goals and objectives. The
United States has reached the realization that the region matters in
achieving its strategic interests. The assistance of African leaders and
governments in the war against terrorism and the preservation of the oil
sector to meet her future energy needs are typical examples. To accomplish
this task requires the creation of a stable political environment devoid of
civil conflict, threats to life and endemic political instability. A number
of policy recommendations and measures have indeed emerged from the American
foreign policy public that the US government apparently was accomplishing in
detail under the presidency of George W. Bush Jr. The obvious question is
whether President Barack Obama has an interest in revising these commitments
or even adding new ones. The currently existing ones consist of the
following, among others:
* The US government should place priority on fighting global terrorism
in Africa;
* The US should be prepared to intervene directly in Africa when her
vital interests are at stake;
* Assist African states with the specific military support they need
(air and naval transport, advanced intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance capabilities, communication gadgets and force protection
assets);
* Provide more military assistance to African democracies in peace
time;
* Support the establishment of an African intervention force;
* Establish an African Command subordinated to the Central Command
(CENTCOM);
* The United States should use her political leverage to structure
appropriate incentives (debt relief, infrastructure finance, trade) to
elicit transparency in governance, particularly the oil producing states
(Angola and Nigeria particularly came up for mention);
* The establishment of a Special Adviser to the US President and
Secretary of State for Africa Energy diplomacy with ambassadorial rank to
lead interagency policy (to build bridges through frequent interactions
among African heads of state and the US government);
* Regional support programs such as the Millennium Challenge Account
should be extended to all the oil-producing African countries and also AGOA
eligibility as a leverage for good governance, while insisting on
eligibility standards;
* Organize a bi-annual African Oil Producer's Summit to provide a
platform for governance issues and could be appended to G-8 Summit or an
AGOA Summit;
* The US should dramatically increase peacekeeping training and
international military education (IMET) support for nations that commit to
respect for human rights;
* The US should help establish and train an African maritime force to
protect offshore oil rigs, contingent on mandatory human rights training
(with added responsibility of policing borders, strengthen customs
enforcement, counter-narcotics efforts, counter-terrorism and piracy);
* Increase support for the development of civil society groups,
individuals and indigenous NGOs in energy-rich countries to monitor and
report on reforms and government commitment to transparency.[27]
The Obama administration has been in office for some time now and some of
these objectives and preoccupations seem to remain part of US-Africa
security cooperation. Obviously, the fundamental or core issues have not
changed; for instance, the search for energy supply from Africa and the
fight against international terrorism. AFRICOM has been established firmly
on the ground, even if the headquarters is located in the United States
itself. Certainly, the degree to which these issues continue to play in US
foreign policy choices and the consolidation of the structures on the ground
will make the difference.
Conclusion
The partnership of African governments in meeting United States security
needs in an environment permeated by international terrorism, the quest for
energy and the place of the Gulf of Guinea, especially the oil-producing
countries in US energy politics, are thus extremely important in these
calculations. There are indications that the US is determined to establish
friendly relations with African governments perceived to be supportive of
her strategic needs. Different forms of assistance, financial, military and
technical, had been offered and will continue to be channeled to individual
governments to make them reliable partners in this regard. Both at bilateral
and multilateral levels, a lot of diplomatic activity have gone on to
consolidate what can be perceived as mutually rewarding arrangements.
It, however, appears that US activities are in the main geared towards
fulfilling her national priorities and the region only comes in as a
strategic partner. It seems also that the United States is active in the
region only when it realized late in the day that the region provides a
critical element in achieving her national interests. The case could be made
that the United States would have been visibly absent from the African
region had it not been for the recent developments at the global and local
levels. The events of September 11, 2001 make international security a
concern for all humanity but can also be looked at as linked to US foreign
policy. The same events have led to the onslaught on perceived enemies of
the United States, principally, terrorist groups and cells around the world.
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are directly linked to the war against
terrorism. So far as threats to US security persist, questions relating to
safeguarding her national interest would take centre stage. Africa and the
rest of the world should necessarily and certainly come in to play roles
that complement the efforts of the United States and her coalition partners
to vanquish international terrorism.
On the other hand, Africa has its own problems to resolve. The ravaging
incidence of intra-state conflicts across the continent; poverty and
indebtedness; high rates of HIV/AIDS infections (the highest rate globally);
and the astronomical population growth rates (almost 900 million and
expected to rise to 1.2 billion by 2020.[28] These are issues that the US
has duly acknowledged and pledged time and again to assist in redressing. It
would appear as though such assistance comes through only when there is
guarantee that the recipient country is purportedly an ally in a common
cause with the United States. The examples cited in the study demonstrate
this anomaly in United States foreign policy, the avowed "carrot and stick"
approach to decision-making regarding the beneficiaries of her international
assistance programs.
The other concern is the lack of consultation in programs that are packaged
for the continent. Though the problems and conditions which warrant
intervention by our development partners are commonplace, it still would be
more appropriate to entreat the cooperation and participation of African
leaders and their people on such crucial decisions and policy frameworks.
The case of AFRICOM has made controversial headlines because there was an
apparent lack of adequate consultation, transparency, trust and mutual
understanding, particularly as the true intentions of the United States had
to be gleaned initially.
Lastly is the harnessing and development of the region's vast natural
resources. The potential that the region's energy resources hold for
economic growth and development are promising. It will take collaborative
effort from the leaders of the African region in association with
development partners such as the United States to harness such resources for
mutual gain. The tendency to invest in the exploitation of the sub-region's
resources that completely ignores the benefits for the people affects
relations and undermines trust. The cases of the Delta Region of Nigeria and
by extension, Sudan are concrete examples in this regard; thus efforts must
be made by the energy multinationals to invest not only in state security
but human security, the security of the people of the sub-region who are the
true owners of these resources. This certainly brings to the fore corporate
social responsibility (CSO) and civil society groups must support their
governments and be at the forefront of negotiations to make this a reality.
Recent exploration activities in the oil sector in Ghana and the underlying
issues of a legal framework, local content and appropriate formula for the
utilization of the oil revenue speaks eloquently in this regard.
The role of regional and sub-regional groupings as bridgeheads of
development, integration and security also become extremely important. The
African Union, ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC, as examples, should identify their
institutional relevance in the evolving security architecture. These
organizations must task themselves, and rightly so, with policy
coordination, leadership in negotiations and the prioritization of programs
that bring development and stability to the continent. In this regard, they
should liaise with African governments in providing a consultative forum, a
sounding board of a sort towards enhancing the true interests of the people
with important global actors such as the United States of America.
ENDNOTES
1 B. Y. Gebe, 'The Cold War Reconsidered: The Politics of Survival in
Africa.' In Adjibolosoo, Senyo & Ofori-Amoah, Benjamin (eds.), Addressing
Misconceptions about Africa's Development: Seeing Beyond the Veil.
(Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1998), pp. 174-190.
2 President George Bush Jr. for instance, in his January 2003 State of the
Union Address announced the President's Emergency Program for AIDS Relief
(PEPFAR) a five-year US$15 billion program, concentrated on assisting 12
African and 2 Caribbean countries.
3 Refer to the African Growth and Opportunity Act of 1999 signed into an Act
of Congress during the presidency of President Bill Clinton.
4 Ghana, for instance, received US$547 million from the United States for
utilization in the crucial sectors of rural development, agriculture
production, infrastructure provision, towards overall poverty reduction.
5 Address to the Joint Session of Congress after the Gulf War that removed
Iraq from Kuwait through the Grand Coalition.
6 Address to the Joint Session of Congress.
7 A. Sarjoh Bah & Kwesi Aning, United States Peace Operations Policy in
Africa: From ACRI to AFRICOM. International Peacekeeping, Vol. 15, No. 1,
February 2008, p. 119.
8 Ibid, p. 119.
9 Ibid, pp. 120-121.
10 Ibid, p. 121.
11 Ibid, p. 122.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid, p. 125.
14 Ibid, p. 122.
15 Quoted in Sarjoh & Aning, p. 126.
16 Ibid, p. 126.
17 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September,
2002.
18 Sarjoh and Aning, op. cit, p. 128.
19 This was revealed in a One-Day Conference on the AFRICOM project held at
Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre on 6th June 2008.
20 See Daily Graphic editions of 19-22 February, 2008 that covered the
entire visit of President Bush to Ghana.
21 Global Policy Forum, August 2, 2002. Cited in
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/oil/2002/0802>
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/oil/2002/0802mili.htm
22 PFC Energy, West Africa Petroleum Sector Oil Value Forecast and
Distribution. (Washington, D.C: PFC Energy, December 12, 2003). Cited in
David Goldwyn and Stephen Morrison, Promoting Transparency in the African
Oil Sector. (Washington, D.C: Centre for Strategic and International
Studies, 2004), p. 2.
23 James Jay Carafano and Nile Gardiner, "United States Military Assistance
for Africa: A Better Solution." In the Backgrounder, Number 1697, October
15, 2003, p. 2.
24 Carafano & Gardiner, United States Military Assistance for Africa,
Carafano, James J. & Gardiner, Nile, "United States Military Assistance for
Africa: A Better Solution." The Backgrounder, No. 1697, October 15, 2003, p.
2.
25 Issah Yakubu, The Oil Find and United States Interests in the Gulf of
Guinea - Cradle or Coffin of the Region? Daily Graphic, November 7, 2007.
26 Global Policy Forum, August 2, 2002.
27 Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Task Force Report
(March 2004) and recommendations in the Heritage Foundation, October 15,
2003.
28 United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects:
Population Database, 2003 at <http://esaun..org/unpp/>
http://esaun..org/unpp/.
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