webmaster
© Copyright DEHAI-Eritrea OnLine, 1993-2010
All rights reserved
From: Tsegai Emmanuel (emmanuelt40@gmail.com)
Date: Thu Dec 30 2010 - 09:27:39 EST
Southern Sudan's Referendum: Khartoum Changes its Tone
December 30, 2010 | 1223 GMT
Summary
The tone of the Sudanese government’s rhetoric concerning Southern Sudan’s
upcoming referendum has shifted, indicating that Khartoum has accepted the
eventuality of Southern Sudanese independence. Though most northerners do
not want the south to secede, the north has begun planning for southern
independence — and, despite many outsiders’ expectations, war is not
necessarily likely. Northern Sudanese opposition parties are using the
referendum as an opportunity to push for the formation of a new interim
government, a new constitution and for fresh elections, but the ruling party
intends to serve its full term and maintain control for years to come.
Analysis
Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party (NCP) has demonstrated a noticeable
shift in rhetoric over how it intends to react should Southern Sudan vote
for independence in a referendum scheduled for Jan. 9. No longer threatening
to force a delay to the vote, or even to refuse recognition of the results,
Khartoum now appears resigned to the inevitability of a new state arising in
the south. This does not mean that tensions between the north and south will
dissipate suddenly. The breakup of the country will not be smooth, and there
will likely be moments where it appears that war could erupt. But Khartoum
is not preparing for a fight as its first recourse; rather its focus will be
on achieving two main objectives in the months ahead: ensuring it obtains a
favorable new oil-revenue sharing agreement with the south, and staving off
a looming political crisis in what will remain of Sudan.
Voting in the referendum will occur from Jan. 9-15, but independence cannot
legally become official until July, when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement —
the document that ended the latest civil war (1983-2005) — expires. This is
also when Sudan’s interim constitution will have to be amended to account
for the departure of the south, assuming a majority of southerners vote to
secede. Between the referendum and July, the north and south will have to
come to terms on a new oil-revenue sharing agreement to replace the one that
has been in place since 2005, which gives Khartoum roughly half of all oil
revenues from crude pumped in Southern Sudan.
There is a natural inclination that the oil issue alone will lead to war if
Southern Sudan secedes, as most of Sudan’s oil comes from the south.
However, Sudan’s geography and the location of its oil infrastructure give
Khartoum enormous leverage. Southern Sudan is landlocked, and the only
export route for its crude oil is a pipeline network that goes through the
north. Discussions about building an alternative network through
Kenya<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100913_possible_kenyan_alternative_southern_sudanese_oil>have
yet to lead to anything tangible, and any real alternative is a
minimum
of three years off. The south certainly maintains the option of trying to
sabotage its own production should the north refuse to substantially
increase the share of oil revenue that goes to Juba, but this would hurt
them more than the north. Khartoum is aware of all of this.
<http://web.stratfor.com/images/africa/map/sudan_oilfields_800.jpg>
Politically speaking, southern secession has been more difficult for the
north to accept, as is the case whenever any country loses a significant
portion of its territory. Khartoum has repeatedly threatened
war<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100105_sudan_khartoum_threatens_peace>if
issues such as border demarcations, citizenship, international debt
obligations and the status of the Abyei
region<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101014_northern_sudanese_leaders_discuss_delaying_abyei_referendum>are
not settled before the referendum, and also sought to
find ways to delay the Southern Sudanese
vote<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101019_sudanese_efforts_delay_southern_independence>.
These issues remain unresolved, yet there are now signs from several leading
NCP figures that Khartoum has accepted that not only will the vote take
place on time, but also that Southern Sudan will break away:
- On Dec. 16, state-run media quoted presidential adviser and NCP Deputy
Chairman Nafie Ali Nafie as acknowledging “the failure of all the efforts to
maintain the unity of Sudan.” Nafie reportedly said, “We shall accept the
reality and must not deceive ourselves and stick to dreams.”
- Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Ahmed Karti said Dec. 23 that “even if
South Sudan votes for its independence in the referendum, we are interested
in creating two viable responsible states that would honor their
international obligations. We want cooperation to develop between them and
all of the issues to be resolved. We do not want any conflict to exist
between our two countries.”
- Sudanese President Omar al Bashir said Dec. 28 that he would be “the
first to recognize the south” if it chose independence, referring to
southerners repeatedly as brothers, and promising to help them “build their
state” regardless of the outcome of the referendum.
Bashir has also specifically addressed the oil issue. During a Dec. 19 rally
in al-Qadarif state, he said that Southern Sudan “is part of our body, but
(its secession) is not the end of the world.” He then reminded the crowd
that the Sudanese oil industry is still relatively new (Sudan only began
exporting crude in 1999), saying, “People said that the south’s oil will go,
[but] how many years has the south’s oil been there? Before the oil, were we
not living?” Furthermore, Bashir emphasized the potential for the north to
develop its own oil industry, which is currently thought to produce between
100,000-115,000 barrels per day (bpd) out of Sudan’s total estimated
production of 475,000-500,000 bpd. Playing up the potential for northern
Sudanese oil production<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101207_security_oil_production_and_possible_peace_sudan>
(Limited Open Access) has been a recent strategy of Khartoum’s to allay
public concerns that southern secession would lead to economic catastrophe
in Sudan.
The majority of Sudanese people do not want to see the south secede, though,
and so all of these statements are usually adjoined to criticism of foreign
influences for the south’s determination to leave (a “Zionist conspiracy” is
the most popular explanation).
The national elections held in Sudan last April left the NCP with a solid
mandate; it won just more than 72 percent of all the seats in the national
assembly, with 22.3 percent of the seats going to the south’s leading party,
the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). The SPLM’s seats would become
vacant if the independence referendum passes, and this essentially would
turn Sudan into a one-party state run by the NCP. Bashir’s party is thus
completely opposed to calls by northern opposition parties (most of whom
decided to boycott the April elections) to voluntarily concede its power by
forming a new transitional government that would craft a new constitution
before calling for fresh elections.
Bashir and his allies see such demands by Sadiq al-Mahdi’s National Umma
Party and Hassan al-Turabi’s Popular Congress Party as an invitation to
create an unnecessary risk to its political power. Al-Mahdi and al-Turabi,
on the other hand, feel that the south’s imminent exit from the government
of national unity will provide a rare opportunity to place significant
pressure upon the NCP. Both opposition party leaders know that once this
window closes, it will be extremely difficult to reopen. Thus, they
fervently are pushing the notion that southern secession — and the void it
will leave in the democratically elected government, not to mention the
problems that will arise with the interim constitution — will strip the NCP
of its political legitimacy. This, they argue, would require a
reorganization of Sudan’s political framework. Bashir is not budging,
however. He has vowed to merely amend (not discard) the interim constitution
so as to account for the south’s departure, and declared that he and the
rest of the government will remain in office for the remainder of their
five-year terms won in the recent elections. Anyone opposed to this, Bashir
said Dec. 28, can “lick his elbow.”
It is the fear that the opposition may seize on the NCP’s perceived weakness
in the wake of the referendum that explains Bashir’s recent pledge to
reinforce Sharia as the law of the land in Sudan after the south secedes,
with Islam as the national religion and Arabic as the national language.
Having lost the role of the protector of Sudan’s unity, the NCP is seeking
to return to its roots in a way, playing up its Islamist credentials as a
means of regaining whatever political legitimacy it risks losing with the
breakup of Sudan. While Khartoum has decided that going to war with the
south is not worth it (as long as the SPLM does not try to overstep its
bounds, say, in the oil-revenue talks, or by increasing its support for
Darfur rebels<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101210-darfur-and-push-southern-sudanese-independence>),
it will not be so compliant when it comes to how it intends to wield control
in what is left of Sudan.
----[This List to be used for Eritrea Related News Only]----