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From: Biniam Tekle (biniamt@dehai.org)
Date: Wed Jul 06 2011 - 08:02:26 EDT
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/74498
The potential balkanisation of Sudan and the role of meddlers Yohannes
Woldemariam 2011-06-30, Issue 537
*There's clear consensus that defining and demarcating the border between
North and South Sudan is a necessary precondition for peace. But deploying
Ethiopian peace-keepers to Abyei is simply a 'band-aid' that 'would not help
peace and may even make things worse by intensifying regional rivalry,'
writes Yohannes Woldemariam, given the Ethiopian government's lack of
neutrality in Sudan.*
In this article, I want to address two issues: The potential balkanisation
of the Sudan and the proposed Ethiopian Peacekeeping role in Abyei.
I think there is a clear consensus that defining and demarcating the border
between North and South Sudan is one of the necessary preconditions for
peace. However, Sudan's troubles are numerous and peace remains elusive. The
proposal of an Ethiopian peacekeeping role in Abyei is a band-aid that would
not help peace and may even make things worse by intensifying regional
rivalry. The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), as
the government is known in Ethiopia, is not impartial and can never be a
neutral arbiter in Sudan. So how did Sudan reach the predicament it is in?
AN OVERVIEW BACKGROUND OF SUDAN
Sudan was colonised by Britain, with Egypt as a junior partner (1899-1956),
as one entity with separate local administrations. In some areas the British
established clear boundaries between communities while in others
pastoralists roamed from one area to another according to grazing needs and
seasonal changes. Prior to British colonialism, within Sudan as in many
parts of Africa, the functional equivalent of borders consisted of frontiers
among ethnic groups. A frontier, as opposed to a boundary line, is a zone of
less contact; a boundary marks a clear line over which a state exercises
sovereign power. The character of the modern state necessitates the
establishment of such clear-cut limits of its area of authority and
organisation.
Contemporary South Sudan is often superficially compared with Eritrea, which
separated from Ethiopia in 1993. The historical trajectory of Eritrea and
South Sudan differ in one important way. Whereas, Eritrea was an Italian
colony with a separate evolution from Ethiopia, Britain colonised South
Sudan as one entity historically contiguous with North Sudan. So, the
comparison that narrowly focuses on just the breakup of two modern African
states is simplistic as it fails to take into account how colonialism
redefined Africa.
Yet, even in those countries where the African state system and territorial
composition in the 19th and early 20th centuries were quite arbitrarily
defined during colonisation and transferred after decolonisation, we are
today witnessing an unprecedented crisis of state structures and authority,
contributing to the continuation of conflicts and wars. Indeed, these
inherited borders, consisting of diverse ethnicities, are at the root of the
crisis of the post-colonial African state, as is the case in North and South
Sudan.
'Balkanisation' is a term used to refer to ethnic conflict and fragmentation
within multiethnic states.[1] This term was coined at the end of the First
World War to describe the ethnic breakup of the Ottoman Empire, specifically
in the Balkans. The partition for which Southerners in a referendum did vote
overwhelmingly is to be formalised on 9 July 2011 between North and South
Sudan, making South Sudan the world's 193rd nation - and giving the world
the illusion of finality.
Yet the impending balkanisation between North and South Sudan is already
marred by violence in Abyei, whose fate was not addressed by the referendum.
At present both sides are making irredentist territorial claims backed by
violence. There are ethnic enclaves in the frontier areas of Abyei whose
national affiliations are ill-defined and/or overlap with territory claimed
by both sides. An urgent resolution of this border issue is of paramount
significance before it deteriorates from an already acute to chronic
instability between the two neighboring states.
Already, North Sudan contains seemingly intractable ethnic divisions and
potential flashpoints of cleavage like in Darfur, Blue Nile province, and
South Kordofan; additionally, the South has several ethnic militia groups
who refuse to surrender their arms to the central authority. South Kordofan
is north of what will soon be the international border where many pro-south
ethnic Christian Nubans reside:
They are now being targeted by the Omar Al Bashir regime in Khartoum because
they fought along with the South against the North during the civil war.
Since South Kordofan is where one fourth of the remaining oil wealth is
located, the area is fiercely contested and another site of struggle for
self-determination. It took Hollywood focus on Darfur to make it visible,
but South Kordofan is barely beginning to make it onto the radar of the
Western media. South Kordofan is now the latest victim of the mayhem
perpetrated by Khartoum.
In the South, the ethnic conflict between the Lou Nuer and the Shilluk, on
the one hand, and the Dinka on the other hand, is a major impediment to
peace. The Lou Nuer and the Shilluk see the southern government as pro
Dinka. Nuer, Shilluk, and Dinka are overly broad categories; each consists
of clusters of ethnicities. Part of the animosity among ethnic groups
reflects the divide and rule strategy of the North in pitting ethnicities
against one another during the long civil war.
But there is also a much longer history of interethnic conflict over cattle
or land in localised settings. In the post-independence era, competition
between ethnic groups for the best place in the sun promoted injustice and
violence. In the Sudanese equation, the Southerners have long stood out as
conspicuous losers. It is not surprising that they voted so overwhelmingly
(98.9 per cent) for an independent South Sudan. Yet the southerners
themselves are far from being cohesive, and the North is obviously fractured
and in danger of further disintegration.
Abyei lies along a migration route, where the Missiriya graze their animals.
The Missiriya are nomadic but are considered northerners. Traditionally they
negotiated grazing rights with the southern Ngok Dinka communities who live
primarily in Abyei. This competition for land and grazing rights will linger
regardless of where the boundaries are drawn. Unlike African borders,
European borders were resolved over hundreds of years through wars and
treaties. Borders continue to be adjusted; new states continue to appear
even in Europe.
There is nothing timeless about borders, especially those imposed on
Africans by the overarching power of Europeans in 1884 in Berlin, during
what is commonly referred to as 'the Scramble for Africa.' The Europeans
drew nation-state lines without any regard for language groups or ethnic
communities. These relatively recent colonial boundaries are at the root of
the numerous border disputes in Africa.
The predecessor of the African Union (AU), the Organization of African Unity
(OAU), adopted colonial boundaries as sacrosanct in order to discourage
balkanisation resulting from secessionist movements. Perhaps a
re-conceptualisation that scrutinises the failed assumption that nationalism
supersedes ethnic loyalties within a significant part of African states is
long overdue. Is the nation-state system a viable organising principle in
the African context? If not, what is the alternative?
Can 'federalism' help to keep secessionist tendencies at bay? If so, what
federal formula may work for African states plagued by ethnic insurgencies?
Sectarian division within states is unravelling many countries in Africa.
Fundamental questions must be asked in light of the real possibilities of
balkanisation of Libya, Ivory Coast, the Congo, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
Nigeria, etc., as well as of Sudan. Somalia in particular is one of the
worst examples of a fragmented region ruled by competing warlords.
THE FUTURE OF SOUTH SUDAN
The German political philosopher, Max Weber, famously defined the state as
'a human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of
physical force within a given territory.' North Sudan - along with the
emerging South Sudan and a few other states in Africa, where intra-state
wars are waged to legitimate the sectarian claims to statehood made by one
side or another across different centers of power organised by warring
ethnicities - would not qualify as states in Weber's definition. Molded out
of peripheral provinces of the Ottoman Empire, Sudan never really had a
strong national identity or anything that might pass for it.
In Sudan as in many African states, we have clusters of peoples with
separate ethnic, communal, and religious identities. The human and social
cement that creates and sustains identity still lies in the family, the
tribe, the sect, or religious confession, not in statehood or nationhood.
Allegiance to those of one's own kind is what counts. Village elders have
thus always had special status in traditional African communities.
South Sudan, one of the poorest countries in the world, is set to become an
independent state in a few weeks after over half a century of violence,
displacement and war. The North South war began in 1955, stopped in 1972,
only to flare up again in 1983. The civil war and famine claimed about two
million lives and displaced over four million people. But South Sudan's
problem is not over yet, and the challenge of building a viable state out of
the ruins of war is fraught with many difficulties.
The problem of South Sudan is not limited to the violence and duplicity of
the Islamist government in Khartoum. Indeed, rival militias, ethnic
entrepreneurs and warlords are also vying for the spoils of power. One hopes
that South Sudan succeeds against all odds and becomes a successful state.
Given the history of post-colonial Africa to date, the likelihood of success
hinges on visionary leadership which would benefit from intergenerational
wisdom, and an urgent creative compromise between ethnicities.
POTENTIAL PITFALL: THE OIL CURSE
With South Sudan choosing to strike out on its own, it will retain more than
three-quarters of Sudan's hydrocarbon reserves. Currently, the Islamist
government in Khartoum earns US$9.8 billion dollars annually in oil
exports.[2] The potential loss of a large part of this export revenue will
deal a serious blow to the Northern Islamist government, which is already
causing it to lash out in desperation. Khartoum allowed the referendum of
the South to take place for lack of viable options. Al Bashir was fighting
two civil wars, one in the south and the other in the west, in Darfur.
In Darfur the Sudanese state could use a divide-and-rule strategy by arming
the Janjaweed militias; the South didn't allow for such a scenario.
Additionally, Al Bashir is facing prosecution at the International Criminal
Court (ICC). Al Bashir may have hoped for the withdrawal of this prosecution
in return for his acceptance of the referendum verdict. It was an unpopular,
forced acceptance born out of the weakness of the Islamic government in
Khartoum. The outcome of the referendum will alter not only the map of the
country but also the regional geopolitical balance of power.
Resources will shift from the Islamist regime in Khartoum to South Sudan,
which has close ties with the West. South Sudan is clearly oil-rich, ranked
third in production in sub-Saharan Africa after Nigeria and Angola,
pro-American, and is a focus of American evangelists, petroleum companies
and geopolitical strategists. According to the IMF, North Sudan will lose 75
per cent of its oil revenues. Sudan's debt was US$36.8 billion by December
2010.[3] The North insists that it needs to share the debt payment with the
South, but the South has so far resisted.
However, South Sudan still needs the North for at least one practical
purpose: South Sudan is landlocked, and the pipelines, refineries and
storage facilities required in transporting exportable oil run through the
North, with sea access in Port Sudan. One must not forget that Omar Al
Bashir still has this important card to play. He can deny South Sudan the
transportation link for exporting its oil. There is no easy alternative
route for South Sudan to export its oil. It may take up to four years to
build the infrastructure necessary to utilise the port of Mombasa in Kenya.
For peace to prevail, South and North Sudan must not only resolve the Abyei
stalemate but also the oil-revenue-sharing problem in order to learn to deal
with one another as good neighbors. These two countries are bound by
geography; they have few options but to cooperate.
Oil is significantly responsible for destroying the social fabric which has
held communities together. Countries like Sudan demonstrate how natural
resources such as oil have become a curse rather than a blessing. Despite
lucrative earnings from oil, most people continue to live in abject poverty;
violence is exacerbated by greed, while the few become obscenely wealthy. A
rush for riches has crushed traditional economic activities, causing the
deterioration of living conditions and turning former subsistence farmers
into landless laborers. Sudan's oil is also polluting the water that
communities need to sustain life. Sign of Hope, a German human rights
organisation, tested the water quality in areas surrounding the oil fields
and found it to be heavily contaminated.
At least 300,000 people may be affected from drinking this contaminated
water. It is also feared that 'there could be environmental implications for
the nearby Sudd Swamp, one of the world's largest wetlands formed by the
White Nile.'[4] Biodiversity in the Sudd Swamp is already endangered by the
controversial Jonglei canal project designed to increase water flow to
northern Sudan and Egypt, while drying up the southern swamps, with possible
devastating impact to the rich flora and fauna and the livelihood of local
communities in the South. Environmental costs are passed on to local
communities who benefit little from the oil wealth.
Oil-producing states make up a growing number of the world's conflict-ridden
countries. In 2008, they were the sites of a third of the world's civil
wars, up from one-fifth in 1992. It is commonly acknowledged that oil breeds
conflict between countries, but the more widespread problem is that it
breeds conflict within them.[5] Furthermore, cynical outside forces protect
and enable dictators. China threatened to veto a 2004 UN Security Council
resolution against Sudan in order to protect its own oil interests.[6] China
built the pipelines and storage facilities in Sudan and has put its thirst
for natural resources and energy ahead of human rights considerations.
China imports 50 to 60 per cent of Sudan's oil, accounting for about 7 per
cent of total imports. The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) holds
a 40 per cent interest in Sudanese oil, Malaysia holds 30 per cent and India
holds 25 per cent. Rent-seeking from oil enables autocracies by eliminating
dependence on tax revenues from citizens, which can force accountability.
South Sudan earns 98 per cent of its revenue from oil and easily can
degenerate into autocracy if there is no proper mechanism to prevent growing
corruption and misuse of money obtained from oil sales.
THE ETHIOPIAN FACTOR
Ethiopia is jockeying to take advantage of the violence in Abeyei by
offering 'peacekeeping' forces, which Hilary Clinton has already endorsed
and perhaps even very strongly recommended. It was reported, 'US Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton ... endorsed the idea of a peacekeeping force in
Sudan's disputed Abyei region and encouraged both sides to take up an
Ethiopian offer of troops.'[9] This proposal is alarming since it will
surely complicate matters even more and must be discouraged by those who
seek peace for Sudan and the region.
Ethiopia's motives are undoubtedly complex. The record of Ethiopian
involvement in neighbouring Somalia can serve as a useful lesson. Ethiopian
intervention in Somalia is one of the reasons for the increased violence and
the dysfunctional state of affairs in that country. Efforts by neighboring
countries ostensibly to 'prevent' terrorism there only generated more
terrorism and violence, famine and displacement of hundreds of thousands of
people in Somalia. (For more on this, see: 'Somalia: Al-Shabab, extremism
and US allies').
The West's selective condemnation of dictators only complicates things for
Africans and peaceful resolution of their conflicts. Overlapping convulsions
of ethnic and state-sponsored massacre have been occurring against the
Anuaks, in Oromia and the Ogaden within Ethiopia, without a word of
acknowledgement from Washington. Successive American administrations protest
with righteous indignation regarding atrocities in Sudan; nevertheless,
massacres of farmers and civilians in Ethiopia have been unfolding without a
murmur of complaint.
AN AFRICAN SOLUTION FOR SUDAN
The eagerness of Zenawi to involve himself in South Sudan, as well as the
quick endorsement by Hilary Clinton, can be seen as a scramble for oil by a
trusted client of the West to control this vital resource. Ethiopia has more
practical reasons for wanting to lead a 'peacekeeping' mission in Sudan. The
US cuts Ethiopia a lot of slack. It is able to get away with bogus
elections. It is the largest recipient of aid in sub-Saharan Africa, and it
is able to ignore an international ruling with impunity.
The irony of utilising Ethiopia as a peacekeeper in the border conflict in
Sudan must not be lost. Ethiopia itself is in violation of an (ICJ) ruling
which requires it to demarcate its border with Eritrea. Ethiopia is sitting
in its own Abyei, a border region called Badme, which the ICJ determined to
be an Eritrean territory. As the Arab Spring has demonstrated, those who
hoped that Barack Obama might hold all dictators accountable equally now
know that their hopes were misplaced.
Nile politics is another reason for Ethiopia to want a foothold in Southern
Sudan. There is a clear convergence of interests between Ethiopia and South
Sudan on this issue. The ousting of Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak and the
impending secession of South Sudan will strengthen the case of the upstream
nations. Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi signed an
agreement which attempts to alter the water-sharing treaties on the Nile
River. In 1929 during British rule over Sudan and Egypt, the British
government ensured 100 per cent rights of Nile water for Egypt and Sudan.
The 1929 agreement signed between British government and its colony Egypt
forbade upstream nations from reducing the water of the Nile flowing into
Egypt. The treaty stated that 'without the consent of the Egyptian
government, no irrigation or hydroelectric work can be established on the
tributaries of the Nile.' The 1959 Nile Water Treaty not only maintained
Egypt and Sudan's 100 per cent rights over usage but also inserted their
veto powers over any development in the Nile by the upstream countries.
At a time when the destructive effect of big dams is well documented,
Ethiopia is building mega dams without any environmental and social impact
assessment. Lori Pottinger of the International Rivers writes: 'Ethiopia is
fast becoming Africa's poster child for bad-dam development.'[10] Zenawi has
built five dams during the last decade and plans to sell electric power to
Sudan in exchange for oil imports. Dam projects are also a way to mobilise
support for the EPRDF and to drum up Ethiopian nationalism in an effort to
distract Ethiopians from organizing resistance akin to the Arab Spring. The
political impact of building these dams, not only in Ethiopia but also in
Uganda, is creating regional tension with Egypt.
It is widely believed that the sustainable policy for Ethiopia would mean
learning from Kenya, for example, and harness its rich geothermal potential.
No doubt, the colonial era treaties which give Egypt lopsided hegemony over
the Nile need to change. But politically motivated projects that destroy the
ecology of the Nile watershed by treating it as a mere pipeline that
discharges water will exacerbate instability and regional tension. The Nile
is a complex integrated watershed, and protecting it requires
environmentally responsible cooperation by the riparian countries. Mega dam
projects are proven environmental hazards in Egypt and Sudan, and there is
no reason to believe otherwise in Ethiopia. (Refer to Lori Pottinger's work,
for an excellent analysis on the disastrous impacts of dams for hydro
power.[11])
The president of the Earth Policy Institute, Lester E Brown, writes:
'In Ethiopia, a Saudi firm has leased 25,000 acres to grow rice, with the
option of expanding... [T]hese land grabs shrink the food supply in
famine-prone African nations and anger local farmers, who see their
governments selling their ancestral lands to foreigners. They also pose a
grave threat to Africa's newest democracy: Egypt. As Egypt tries to fashion
a functioning democracy after President Hosni Mubarak's departure, land
grabs to the south are threatening its ability to put bread on the table
because all of Egypt's grain is either imported or produced with water from
the Nile River, which flows north through Ethiopia and Sudan before reaching
Egypt. (Since rainfall in Egypt is negligible to nonexistent, its
agriculture is totally dependent on the Nile.) Unfortunately for Egypt, two
of the favorite targets for land acquisitions are Ethiopia and Sudan.[12]
Land grabs by rich investors and countries should be banned because they
harm the environment, small farmers and pastoralists, and dismantle
traditional communities. This policy of land grab causes food insecurities
by taking away productive and valuable land from the farmers and
pastoralists.
In November 2010, Zenawi accused Cairo, without providing evidence, of
seeking to destabilise Ethiopia by supporting several groups of rebels
opposed to his regime and added that 'Egypt couldn't win a war with Ethiopia
over the Nile'.[13] Despite such confrontational and adventurous policies,
Zenawi's significance for the US may have grown, due to the uncertainty of
the times, the loss of a reliable client in Hosni Mubarek, and the chaos in
Yemen. Egypt under Mubarek has been the cornerstone of America's policy in
the Middle East for three decades. Notwithstanding the official lip service
to democracy promotion, there is more continuity with previous
administrations than change in Obama's policies.
According to leaked information from WikiLeaks, former assistant secretary
of state for Africa, Dr Jendayi Frazer, twisted Zenawi's arm to intervene in
Somalia. According to the same source, Zenawi had no intention of invading
Somalia before he was coerced to do so by Dr Frazer.[14] Zenawi seems ready
to shortchange Ethiopia and Africa on request from US officials. For
example, during the climate conference in Copenhagen, US undersecretary of
state, Ms Otero, 'urged Meles to sign the Copenhagen accord on climate
change...Meles responded that [Ethiopia] supported the accord in Copenhagen
and would support it at the AU [African Union] Summit.'[15] With this record
of acquiescence, it is reasonable to assume Zenawi's motive for intervention
in Sudan is suspect.
Lamenting the betrayal of Africa by Zenawi, the author of 'The Shock
Doctrine', Naomi Klein, wrote:
'On the ninth day of the Copenhagen climate summit, Africa was sacrificed.
The position of the G-77 negotiating bloc, including African states, had
been clear: A 2 degree Celsius increase in average global temperatures
translates into a 3-3.5 degree increase in Africa. That means, according to
the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance, "an additional 55 million people
could be at risk from hunger" and "water stress could affect between 350 and
600 million more people." Archbishop Desmond Tutu puts the stakes like this:
"We are facing impending disaster on a monstrous scale ... A global goal of
about 2 degrees C is to condemn Africa to incineration and no modern
development." And yet that is precisely what Ethiopia's prime minister,
Meles Zenawi, proposed to do when he stopped off in Paris on his way to
Copenhagen: Standing with President Nicolas Sarkozy, and claiming to speak
on behalf of all of Africa (he is the head of the African
climate-negotiating group), he unveiled a plan that includes the dreaded 2
degree increase and offers developing countries just $10 billion a year to
help pay for everything climate related, from sea walls to malaria treatment
to fighting deforestation.'[16]
Notwithstanding his early background as a liberation fighter of Marxist
persuasion, once in power Zenawi had been a darling of the Western counties
and all too willing to appease and accommodate his Western benefactors, at
the expense of Ethiopians and Africans. Manipulating the UN system, certain
client states, and African regional organisations, the West has undertaken
peace enforcement operations such as the one proposed for Sudan. With the
expansion of the UN global role in peacekeeping after the Cold War, the
scope of peacekeeping operations became more ambitious, and the traditional
requirements of impartiality were abandoned. UN forces could now be
empowered to impose 'peace' on warring parties and, if necessary, to take
sides in a conflict.
Token peacekeeping has all too often been used as a scapegoat for feckless
Western policymaking. This modus operandi needs to be questioned, given the
limited potential of African States to provide security even within their
own territories. The regional organisation known as the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD) is one such regional organisation that has
been used as a cover for dubious interventions in the Horn of Africa. IGAD
gave support to Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia on condition that
Ethiopia would quickly withdraw. That withdrawal only came about after two
years, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Somali civilians, the
plunging of Somalia into deeper chaos and famine, and only after Ethiopia
found itself in an untenable Vietnam-like quagmire.
CONCLUSION
Regional organisations and alliances in Africa do not have the practical
means to bring security to the continent. How can regional peacekeeping
forces coming from pseudo-democratic, dictatorial states bring the values of
respect for human rights and governance through the rule of law? Ideally,
outside powers without their own agenda must provide short-term stability
through infusions of security forces, training police, humanitarian relief,
and technical assistance to restore electricity, water, banking and payment
systems, etc.
South Sudan lacks meaningful infrastructure and paved roads are almost
nonexistent. South Sudan is in dire need of controlling its own territory
and gaining oversight of its natural resources. Effective collection of
revenue, adequate national infrastructure, and a capacity to govern and
maintain law and order, including respect for basic human rights, is
essential for the new South Sudan. Rival armed militias must come under a
centralised national command in order to nurture a sense of national
commonalities and establish peace.
Southern Sudan must also be spared from being a pawn of regional rivalries
by unscrupulous neighbors and non-neighbors such as Egypt, Ethiopia, China,
Malaysia, Japan, India and the United States, etc., who are primarily
self-interested. Egypt and Ethiopia are clearly selfishly competing for
influence and leverage in South Sudan. This dangerous dance can potentially
further destabilise South Sudan and North Sudan.
The future of North Sudan after partition could be potentially catastrophic.
Omar Al Bashir's position is already dangerously precarious after presiding
over the division of Sudan and losing billions of dollars in oil revenue.
Ethnic cleavages in Darfur, South Kordofan, the Blue Nile state, Kassala as
well as sharply contrasting attitudes toward Islamism are all minefields in
northern Sudanese politics. The North fears a domino effect in South
Kordofan and the Nuba Mountains where government troops are unleashing
terror, killing civilians and creating displacement to discourage a growing
quest for autonomy and self determination.[17]
The notion of 'African solutions to African problems' sounds appealing. But
the failure of the UN/AU peacekeeping force, backed by the UN, to provide
security in Darfur is a reason enough to pause and ask questions. One can
only conclude that the West is dealing with the problem superficially by
rendering marginal the status that sub-Saharan Africa occupies in world
politics. This myopic view underlies the logic behind the limited logistical
and financial support for Uganda and Ethiopia, to enforce this ineffectual
version of 'peacekeeping.' The African peacekeepers were presented as a
panacea in Darfur and Somalia, and it appears a similar unworkable pattern
may be replicated in North and South Sudan.
Given the weakness of many state structures across Africa, the pervasive
religious and civil violence, and the predatory nature of most African
governments, little faith can be placed in such 'peacekeeping' overtures.
Within the prevailing realities in Africa, the beautiful sounding shibboleth
of 'African Solutions to African Problems' is a convenient excuse for the
big powers to do little in solving African problems. 'Peacekeepers' are
casually introduced into situations, which require more than a token
presence of an outside force to achieve a meaningful resolution of conflict.
Christopher Clapham sums up the problem of peacekeeping in Africa as
follows:
'Peacekeepers in Africa have been plunged into the most intractable problems
in attempting to maintain some kind of order ... For them the relatively
straightforward tasks of merely policing agreements between states are not
an option. They have been called on .. .to intervene in vicious civil wars
and to negotiate and, if need be, to enforce peace settlements among
conflicting parties whose commitment to any peaceful resolution of conflicts
was often at best extremely uncertain, and at worst no more than a façade
behind which to prepare a resumption of hostilities.'[18]
These types of peacekeeping fiascoes were predictable. Where there is no
peace to keep, UN peacekeepers are seen as an occupying or hostile force, as
in Somalia. The so-called peacekeepers had themselves become players in the
conflict. The troops themselves were often confused about their missions. In
the aftermath of the Second World War, traditional peacekeeping was designed
to keep separate warring states after a cease fire.
This was the model applied in the Sinai after the 1956 Suez Crisis. In the
post-Cold War era, peacekeeping has come to be used as an ideological tool
to build nation states in the image of the West, according to liberal
internationalist values. This is 'a one size shoe fits all' approach which
does not take into consideration the uniquely complex challenges of South
Sudan.
Africa and South Sudan need to chart their own future by drawing from their
diverse patterns of conflict resolution and restoring the centrality of
respect for tradition and for the wisdom of elders. Africa needs to respect
the elders whose voices have been drowned out by other imposed cultural
patterns and ethnic entrepreneurs. Perhaps an Elders' Council modelled on
the Indigenous Peoples Council and composed of diverse ethnicities,
representing all those who have a stake in peace, needs to be created to
conduct dialogue.
The UN at its best has nobly cultivated such models of sovereignty and
autonomy and has empowered indigenous communities, and it can now continue
to do so in Africa. A centralised unitary governing system is by itself
largely unworkable for multiethnic societies like Southern Sudan; instead,
creative application of some form of federalism mixed with some form of
centralism maybe the way forward. The current arrangement may breed what
Alexis Tocqueville called the 'tyranny of the majority,' which might apply
(within the context of the issues I have addressed here) to the Dinka.
Tocqueville's argument was a brilliant warning, for it opened the way for a
new understanding of the potential for harm latent in an unqualified
commitment to majority rule and democracy.
The Southern Sudanese must try to work out their problems with the North,
and they must work to find some internal cohesion while allowing space for a
degree of autonomy among the Dinka, the Nuer and the Shilluk. It is a matter
of the survival of all; hence, northern stability is also in the interest of
South Sudan and vice-versa.
If peacekeepers are truly needed in Abyei as a stopgap measure, they should
then be sent from anywhere but the neighbouring countries. Perhaps South
Africa or Nigeria can lead the way as they are geographically more removed
and less likely to harbour ulterior agendas or to use South Sudan as a proxy
for self-serving dictators to expand their influence and divert attention
from their own domestic entanglements.
NOTES
[1] The New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy, 3rd ed. Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt Publishing Company, 2002, 16 June 2011
[2] Richard S. Williamson, Sudan on the Cusp, Current History, May 2011,
p.173
[3] Africa News, Sudan: IMF Says North Sudan Must Undertake Measures to
Avoid Post-Secession 'Shock', Sudan Tribune, April 19, 2011
[4] Peter Greste, Oil 'polluting South Sudan water,' BBC New,16 November
2009
[5] Michael L. Ross, Blood Barrels Subtitle: Why Oil Wealth Fuels Conflict,
Foreign Affairs, May 2008 - June 2008
[6] Silvia Spring, Curse of Friendship; Do China and India represent a new
kind of player in emerging markets? They say so. But outsiders doubt it.,
Newsweek, November 13, 2006
[7] Peter Lee, Chinese and U.S. interests converge on Sudan, Albuquerque
Express (adopted from Asia Times), 20th September, 2010
[8] Peter Lee, Chinese and U.S. interests converge on Sudan, Albuquerque
Express (adopted from Asia Times), 20th September, 2010
[9] Lachlan Carmichael, US backs Ethiopia peacekeepers in Abyei, AFP, June
13, 2011
[10] http://allafrica.com/stories/201106101005.html
[11] Ibid.
[12] Lester R. Brown, When the Nile Runs Dry, The New York Times, June 2,
2011
[13] UPI Energy, Ethiopia challenges Egypt over Nile water, December 8, 2010
[14] Rob Prince, WikiLeaks Reveals US Twisted Ethiopia's Arm to Invade
Somalia, Antiwar.com, December 14, 2010
[15] US embassy cables: US urges Ethiopia to back Copenhagen climate accord,
guardian.co.uk, 3 December 2010
[16] http://www.thenation.com/issue/january-4-2010
[17] Jeffrey Gettleman, Sudan Steps Up Furious Drive to Stop Rebels, New
York Times, June 21, 2011, p.1
[18] C Clapham, The United Nations and peacekeeping in Africa, in M Malan
(ed), Whither Peacekeeping in Africa?, ISS Monograph, 36, Institute for
Security Studies, Halfway House, April 1999, p. 32
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