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From: Biniam Tekle (biniamt@dehai.org)
Date: Thu Jul 28 2011 - 08:50:59 EDT
http://www.newint.org/blog/2011/07/27/somalia-famine-politics-aid/
How foreign policy blunders helped create the famine in Somalia
Posted by Mark Bradbury <http://www.newint.org/contributors/mark-bradbury/>
Famine has returned to Somalia, and so has the US military. This is no
natural disaster. Just as the US sent its first drones to Somalia, targeting
leaders of the militant Islamist group al-Shabaab, tens of thousands of
Somalis were crossing into Kenya, fleeing a catastrophic drought and
conflict.
While US drones were able to find their targets in Somalia with pinpoint
accuracy, humanitarian agencies have had less luck. They have experienced a
catastrophic decline in access that has destroyed their ability to assist
and protect civilians. The families crossing into Kenya are escaping from a
severe drought but they are also fleeing a war.
This is a conflict between the internationally sponsored Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) and a militant Islamic movement al-Shabaab, which
is listed as a terrorist organization. The political use of aid by the
warring parties has eroded the humanitarian space that agencies need to
operate safely and securely.
Back in the 1990s, the international community mounted an unprecedented
armed humanitarian intervention in the face of a famine that followed the
collapse of the Somali state. Today it is different. For the past two years
only a handful of foreign aid agencies have been able to work in the country
because Somalia has become one of the most dangerous places in the world for
aid workers.
International strategic interest in Somalia waned with the humbling of
USforces when US Blackhawk helicopters were shot down in Mogadishu.
This was
compounded by the failure of the UN mission to end the conflict and restore
a functioning state.
The 9/11 attacks on America revived international interest. Somalia was now
viewed through a new prism, as a failed state and a potential haven for
al-Qaeda. In addition, the presence of Islamic jihadist groups catapulted
Somalia into the global war on terror. Suddenly the restoration of a central
government was a key strategy.
But the authority of the internationally backed Transitional Federal
Government was challenged in 2006 when a confederation of Islamic courts
took control of Mogadishu and much of south central Somalia. Within six
months, Ethiopia had intervened militarily, backed by US airstrikes. The
courts were ousted from Mogadishu and the transitional government installed
with an African Union peacekeeping force (AMISOM) deployed to protect it.
Since then there has been an inexorable rise in the humanitarian crisis in
Somalia. The policy to restore internal order to Somalia has had the
opposite effect. The Ethiopian occupation fuelled support for the
increasingly militant al-Shabaab that emerged from the ruins of the Islamic
courts. The fighting in Mogadishu has killed over 18,000 civilians,
displaced up to 1 million people, and caused tens of thousands to flee the
country.
The ability of international agencies to respond to the humanitarian
catastrophe has declined in inverse proportion to needs. Their neutrality
was compromised by international support for the TFG that included the
provision of weapons and training of its security forces, the assassination
of al-Shabaab leadership and overt attempts to deploy aid in support of the
TFG.
Violence against aid workers increased. Al-Shabaab accused aid agencies of
being western spies. Some were expelled while others found their work
restricted through taxation and other demands. Other aid agencies have
fallen foul of US domestic antiterrorism legislation that places strict
conditionalities on assistance.
The World Food Programme suspended its operations in Somalia in December
2009 when the UN estimated 3.2 million people were in need of food aid.
Their largest donor, the US government, had suspended funding out of concern
that the aid was benefiting al-Shabaab; they faced unacceptable attacks and
demands on their staff and expulsion by al-Shabaab. Good harvests in 2010
off-set the immediate impact of the loss of food aid. But by early 2011,
following another failure of rains, the UN monitoring systems were reporting
alarming levels of malnutrition and increasing numbers of families from
Somalia seeking refuge in Kenya.
The famine declared in Somalia by the UN on 20 July 2011 is not simply a
consequence of drought, but the result of war, international policy and
climatic conditions.
The international community became a belligerent in the war and gave primacy
to security interests over human need and protection. By using aid to
further their political and security agendas, foreign donors lost sight of the
principles that guide humanitarian
assistance<http://www.newint.org/blog/2011/07/27/somalia-famine-politics-aid/www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org>.They
have yet to face up to the harm they have been doing in Somalia.
*Mark Bradbury is Director of the Rift Valley
Institute<http://www.riftvalley.net/>Horn of Africa Course
.*
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