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From: Merhawie (merhawie@gmail.com)
Date: Thu Jul 28 2011 - 13:39:41 EDT
http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2011/07/26/catastrophe-in-the-horn-causes-and-responses/
Catastrophe
in the Horn: Causes and
Responses<http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2011/07/26/catastrophe-in-the-horn-causes-and-responses/>
Posted on Tuesday, July 26, 2011
by *Stewart M. Patrick*
<http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2011/07/26/catastrophe-in-the-horn-causes-and-responses/kenya/>
Newly arrived Somali refugees sit in the open as they await medical
examinations for their children at the Dadaab refugee camp, near the
Kenya-Somalia border (STR New/ Courtesy Reuters).
The area straddling Somalia, Ethiopia and northern Kenya, has been dubbed
the “triangle of
death<http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2011/07/20/138535552/triangle-of-death-in-horn-of-africa-famine-grips-southern-somalia>”
as theworst drought in more than fifty
years<http://blogs.voanews.com/breaking-news/2011/07/20/un-declares-famine-in-two-somalia-regions/>
grips
the area. An estimated thirty percent of children are malnourished, many
arriving in refugee camps so
“emaciated<http://www.uspolicy.be/headline/testimony-subcommittee-terrorism-nonproliferation-and-trade-hearing-somalia-assessing-conse>
and
with skin lesions so deep that you could see their bones showing in their
skulls and arms.” According to
testimony<http://www.uspolicy.be/headline/testimony-subcommittee-terrorism-nonproliferation-and-trade-hearing-somalia-assessing-conse>
by
State Department official Reuben Brigety, acute malnutrition has reached 50%
and 40%, respectively, in Ethiopia and Kenya—far above the 15% threshold for
an international humanitarian emergency.
The causes of this emergency are complex, and the international effort to
address the situation is well-intentioned, but the crisis demands a broader
and dramatic reaction, which sadly, remains improbable.
Somalis have not been governed by a central government since 1991, which has
aggravated a number of the famine’s contributing
factors<http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2011/07/25/f-famine-somalia-analysis.html>
beyond
the oft-cited violent conflict and drought. Over the last year, fuel and
food price increases have surpassed 300 percent in the Somali capital.
Regional deforestation has devastated traditional ecosystems, eliminating
trees, grazing land, and water and rendering the tri-nation area “more or
less dry.” Much of the productive farmland has been leased to China, Saudi
Arabia, and India, so desperately needed food has been exported to foreign
markets. Finally, local farmers lack machinery and fertilizer, leading to
low agricultural outputs and the absence of food reserves to sustain people
during droughts or other shocks.
On Monday, the U.N. World Food Program (WFP) announced a
plan<http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/WFP-to-Begin-Food-Airlift-to-Horn-of-Africa-126161578.html>
to
airlift food aid into Somalia, and the United Nations has raised $1 billion
to address the issue. While this may temporarily stem the number of deaths,
it is unlikely to address the economic and climatological forces underlying
the disaster.
Furthermore, foreign food aid itself—while life-saving—risks exacerbating
the underlying problem.
As my colleague Laurie Garrett
explained<http://www.cfr.org/foreign-aid/food-failures-futures/p16289>
in
2009,
“79 percent of all food aid last year from wealthy countries was delivered
in the form of domestically produced surplus crops, shipped via rich-country
transport mechanisms…Upwards of 40 percent of all food aid spending last
year was eaten up by shipping and distribution costs… Hundreds of foreign
aid organizations—in the UN system, bilateral government programs, and
NGOs—have tried for decades to improve agricultural production inside poor
countries… Shipping food, grown by subsidized farmers toiling inside rich
countries, distorts local markets not only inside famine-affected countries,
but across entire regions…The longer-term impact of donated food, then, is
to destroy all positive market incentives for local farmers.”
Speaking before the U.S. House Committee on
Agriculture<http://www.usaid.gov/press/speeches/2011/ty110713.html>,
Nancy Lindborg, the assistant administrator for democracy, conflict, and
humanitarian assistance of the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) echoed these concerns. She described how the “multiple legislative
mandates” tied to U.S. food aid “create a number of operational difficulties
and hinder the effectiveness.” For instance, 75 percent of aid commodities
must be “processed, fortified or bagged,” forcing USAID to “make less than
optimal product selections.”
Counterterrorist concerns have also complicated and slowed the U.S.
response. In recent years the United States has cut humanitarian aid to
Somalia, on the grounds that that al-Shabaab, the militant Islamist group
that controls much of the south, will divert assistance to its own profit.
For its part, Al Shabaab
denies<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/somalia/8655351/Famine-Al-Shabaab-backtracks-on-promise-to-allow-foreign-aid-workers-back-into-the-country.html>that
Somalia is suffering from a famine and continues to prohibit UNICEF and WFP
from operating in the country. Despite earlier promises of
access<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/somalia/8655351/Famine-Al-Shabaab-backtracks-on-promise-to-allow-foreign-aid-workers-back-into-the-country.html>,
it now declares that only the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies may
remain.
The upshot? “More than 3.5 million Somalis, the vast majority of them in the
insurgent-held areas, may starve to death,” according
to<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14283502> Somali
Foreign Minister Mohamed Ibrahim.
Can anything be done to improve humanitarian access? Joel Charny of
InterAction, an alliance of U.S. relief organizations, thinks so, but only
if the United States shows greater flexibility. He
emphasizes<http://www.npr.org/2011/07/22/138596343/terrorists-u-s-policy-hinder-famine-aid-to-somalia>
that
U.S. sanctions and legal issues unnecessarily complicate the delivery of
aid:
“Al-Shabaab has made life very difficult for our [humanitarian aid]
community in South Central [Somalia], but it’s not across the board and it’s
something that we can negotiate on a case-by-case basis…. The approach of
the U.S. government, up to now, has been so absolutist. They’re basically
saying that the diversion of almost, literally, a cup of rice constitutes
grounds to more of less shut down an entire aid program for hundreds of
thousands of vulnerable people.”
Even if aid organizations could penetrate the areas held by al-Shabaab, food
aid alone will not eliminate the underlying causes of the crisis mentioned
above. Barring the construction of a well-functioning state by internal
forces—which sadly appears unlikely given the past twenty years—addressing
the underlying causes would require long-term strategy from the
international community. The 9,200-strong African Union peacekeeping force
currently restricted to Mogadishu will not be able to provide political
stability, and UN member states, including the United States show little
appetite for a robust mission in the region. Still, the international
community has the power to tailor food aid that doesn’t disrupt local
economies and increases agricultural productivity so farmers can save
surpluses, through support for technological improvement like irrigation
systems.
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