From: Freweini Abraham (freweini@emabassyeritrea.org)
Date: Wed Aug 03 2011 - 20:12:58 EDT
Permanent
Mission of Eritrea to the United Nations, New York
Preliminary Remarks
by
Mr.
Yemane Ghebreab
Political
Adviser to the President of the State of Eritrea
Before the
United
Nations Security Council Committee
Pursuant
to resolution 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009)
Concerning
Somalia and Eritrea
On the
Report of the Somalia/Eritrea
Monitoring Group
22
July 2011
New
York
Eritrea's
Preliminary Response
to the Somalia
Eritrea Monitoring Group Report
Let me take this
opportunity to express my delegation's appreciation
to you as Chairman of the Security Council Committee, pursuant to resolutions
751 (1992) and 1907 (2009), and through you to the members of the Committee,
for arranging the informal
consultations.
It must be acknowledged
that despite its strong reservations on the whole affair, Eritrea has fully
cooperated with the Somalia Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) in the discharge of
its mandate.
The SEMG visited Eritrea
twice and there was also a third informal discussion held in Europe. Eritrea
also responded to the SEMG's written queries. Eritrea finds that the substance
and tenor of the SEMG's report do not reflect those discussions and is hugely disappointed.
In contrast the SEMG has received a ringing endorsement from Ethiopia, which is
vociferously calling for an extension of the Group's mandate and tightening of
the sanctions regime against Eritrea.
Eritrea is also dismayed
by the fact that the contents of the SEMG's report were presented by a high-level
international civil servant to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development
(IGAD) Summit held in Addis Ababa. The selective presentation was used
inappropriately to sway the opinions of the IGAD leaders, who subsequently
called for additional sanctions against Eritrea.
At this time the
Eritrean delegation can only register a preliminary, but factual, response as
Eritrea was not given a copy of the SEMG's report despite a written formal
request. The Eritrean delegation has been briefed and allowed some access to
the report, but due to the limited time allotted, and the inability to contact
relevant authorities in Eritrea for comments and verifications on the various
allegations contained in the SEMG's report, the delegation is unable to give a full response.
Eritrea, therefore, once
again requests of this Sanctions Committee for a copy of the report and
adequate time to present a definitive reply with supporting documents. This is
only fair as Eritrea cannot be judged on the basis of a document that is not in
its possession and without the opportunity to properly defend itself.
Eritrea's Overview
of SEMG Report
The Report can be
divided into three parts: I) background information and analysis; II) the main
body of the report with specific accusations; and III) recommendations.
Eritrea's overview of
the Report can be distilled into the following points:-
á
The
background (contextual) section of the Report is replete with sweeping
statements about the policies, practices and institutions of the Eritrean government
as well as gross accusations that are not borne out by either the reality on
the ground or the main body of the Report. A casual reading of the Report can
easily lead to misleading perceptions and erroneous conclusions, while a
careful reading reveals that the Report is tall on accusations and short on
tangible evidence.
á
The
accusations against Eritrea in the main body of the Report generally fall into
two categories. 1) allegations that are narrated in great detail creating wrong
impressions, but with the SEMG then admitting that the allegations are not
backed by conclusive evidence; and 2) allegations of events and actions that
took place prior to 23 December 2009, the cutoff date for any determination of
Eritrea's compliance with Resolution 1907.
á
There
is no conclusive evidence in the Report of any Eritrean violations in regard to
Somalia and Djibouti, as well as the arms embargo on Eritrea. These are highly
significant as they were accusations of Eritrean wrong doings in regards to
Somalia (particularly support to Al Shabab) and Djibouti that was the basis for
the imposition of sanctions on Eritrea. Fairness would require an
acknowledgement of this fact and a decision to lift the sanctions against
Eritrea.
á
The
centerpiece accusation against Eritrea, the basis for calls for additional
sanctions, is the sensationalized allegation of a plot to bomb Addis Ababa
during the African Union Summit in January 2011. Here it is pertinent to point
out that the goal post in accusations against Eritrea has shifted from Somalia
and Djibouti to Ethiopia, which is the culprit, accuser and source of all
"evidence" at the same time. Additionally, Eritrea would have no interest in
disrupting a Summit of the African Union, when it had just reopened its mission
in Addis Ababa and was participating in the Summit for the first time after a
long absence. Nor is it reckless or stupid to contemplate such a hideous
attack. More crucially, Eritrea can prove definitely and conclusively that it
is not guilty of masterminding and directing the said plot. (We will present
our preliminary response to this allegation as follows)
I. Eritrea's
Remarks on the SEMG's Contextual Analysis
Domestic Eritrean
situation:
The report lacks any
sense of balance and projects an extremely negative portrait of Eritrea at
variance with the reality. As
Eritrea informed the Security Council during the informal interactive dialogue
on 19 July 2011, Eritrea is focused on development, making it the country's paramount
priority.
Eritrea-Ethiopia relations:
While the SEMG
recognizes the vital relevance and crucial role of this issue in regards to
Eritrea, it does not give it the consideration that it deserves.
It acknowledges that
Ethiopia is actively working to destabilize Eritrea and mentions "Ethiopia's support
of armed opposition groups", but it again fails to give it due weight.
In fact, Ethiopia has
repeatedly carried out armed incursions, sabotage and other terrorist
operations against Eritrea, targeting the mining sector in particular. There
have been over 30 operations in the past two years alone, including one against
headquarters of a Chinese mining company.
Ethiopia has also been hosting for almost 11 years now - and this is
flouted with audacity - an assortment of 16 subversive and terrorist "Eritrean"
groups, including the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement, to promote its publicly
pronounced agenda of destabilizing Eritrea.
The SEMG Report glosses
over these facts as well as the repeated public threats made by Ethiopia on so
many occasions. Indeed, Ethiopia
has informed visiting Security Council members that Ethiopia's official policy
is the removal of the Eritrean Government.
Significant
ramifications of the relationship between the two countries:
¤
Two
wars, a 30 year one which claimed the lives of 65,000 martyrs; a second one
which exacted a human toll of 20,000 lives. These human losses are huge for a small country with a small
population;
¤
Ethiopia
continues to occupy huge and sensitive chunks of sovereign Eritrean
territories; and
¤
Ethiopia
has made clear its intention to take military measures to overthrow the
Eritrean Government.
Today Ethiopia is
seeking economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation to hamstring and pre-empt
Eritrea's serious efforts to reach out and contribute to enduring regional
stability and harmony.
Eritrea's regional role:
Once again the SEMG
chooses to ignore Eritrea's constructive regional role, including its widely
acknowledged contribution to peace in Sudan, unwittingly revealing its biases.
II. Eritrea's
Preliminary Reply to SEMG Accusations
1. Support to armed
groups involved in violence, destabilization and terrorism
The SEMG begins
treatment of the subject by identifying officers it considers key in the
direction and conduct of Eritrea's external intelligence operations. It names
seven persons, most of whom are officers of the defense forces, with no links
to external intelligence.
For instance, the SEMG
mentions Colonel Gemachew Ayana, who is not even Eritrean. Colonel Gemachew
Ayana is an Ethiopian citizen and was a member of the Ethiopian Defense Forces.
He was commander of a Mechanized Division of the Ethiopian army until 2003 when
he was accused, like dozens of other Oromo military officers, of clandestine
involvement with the opposition Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and relieved of
his post. Some three years later he joined the OLF. Given that these are easily
verifiable facts, it is puzzling why the SEMG claimed in its report that he is
an Eritrean officer in external intelligence. As we shall see Gemachew is accused
of playing a key role in the alleged plot to bomb Addis Ababa. A statement by Col.
Gemechew is attached an annex to this preliminary remarks.
2. Training
facilities
Eritrea's military
facilities and their locations is not a secret. Contrary to what the SEMG
report states, Eritrea's National Security Agency does not undertake
military training. Most importantly, much of the information contained in the
SEMG's report predates Resolution 1907 and is, therefore, irrelevant.
3. Assistance to armed
groups alleged to be in violation of 1907
Djibouti
Although the report
presents two allegations of what it calls "Eritrean support of limited scale,"
its sources are dubious to say the least. A "former FRUD commander", detained
by the Djibouti government, can hardly be expected to be a credible source.
Although the detainee claimed that Eritrea provided "food, medicines and
treatment for wounded fighters," he denied receiving any weaponry or military
equipment. He said that FRUD uniforms, arms and ammunition were purchased from
Yemen. This contradicts claims by Djibouti authorities that the detainee had
admitted that Eritrea provided arms. In addition, this SMEG allegation relates
to the period prior to December 2009, as the latest claim of any Eritrean
involvement was October 2009.
There is only one other
allegation in the report, which claims that in February 2011, the Djibouti
military seized 50 kgs of explosives hidden in a cave. The SEMG said that the
explosives were of Soviet era manufacture and that it "has been unable to trace
their place of origin or chain of custody". Since there was no allegation of
any Eritrean involvement, why mention this under Eritrea's alleged violations?
It is clear that there
is no evidence of Eritrean violation of 1907 in regard to Djibouti.
Ethiopia
As mentioned above, the
centerpiece of the SEMG's (and Ethiopia's) accusations that Eritrea is engaged
in terrorist plots and acts of regional destabilization is the alleged plot to
bomb Addis Ababa during the AU Summit in January 2011. The SEMG claims that
"although ostensibly an OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) operation", that it was
conceived, planned and directed by Eritrean NSA. It concludes that the
"operation was effectively an Eritrean intelligence activity falsely flagged as
an OLF initiative."
The operation is
described in a dramatic thriller fashion over several pages of confusing and
contradictory narrative, one full of holes. If it is given the opportunity,
Eritrea will present a detailed expose that will prove conclusively that the
SEMG accusation of Eritrea is utterly unfounded. As to the alleged role of the
OLF, the organization can speak for itself.
In this preliminary
response, Eritrea presents the following facts and pieces of evidence that
underscore that the SEMG's accusations are not based on solid and conclusive
evidence.
The source for the
information and "evidence" that underpin the accusation are highly suspicious
and not credible.
The SEMG admits that its only sources for its allegations are Ethiopian
security authorities and alleged perpetrators detained by Ethiopian security.
It is obvious that an Ethiopian government that is hostile to Eritrea and
actively campaigning for additional sanctions has the desire and the means to
tamper with, embellish, distort, even fabricate pieces of evidence. It is also clear that any testimony by
detainees in the hands of a government that is well known for routinely
resorting to torture cannot contradict the official Ethiopian government
version as this would lead to severe consequences for the detainees.
An additional fact that
severely tests the credibility of the testimony of the detainees is their claim
that the person who allegedly played the central role, Colonel Gemachew Ayana,
is an official in Eritrean intelligence and not an OLF official, as we have
seen above. If the informants actually played the roles ascribed to them in the
narrative of the alleged plot, there is no conceivable reason that they would
not know Gemachew was in fact an OLF official. If they knew and deliberately
misled the SEMG (to give the benefit of the doubt to the SEMG) into thinking
that he was an officer in Eritrean intelligence, then they must have been
coached by their handlers with the express purpose of implicating Eritrea.
The SEMG claim that
Eritrean officers played the central role in the plot is plain wrong and
contradicted by its own narrative. To justify its premise that the attempted
bombing of Addis Ababa was an Eritrean operation, the SEMG states that only one
OLF detainee, the "team leader Omar Idris Mohamed appears to have been in
regular contact with the OLF leadership. All other teams' members were isolated
from OLF structures from the moment of recruitment and received training and
orders direct from Eritrean officers."
It adds that according
to Omar (the team leader) "only OLF Chairman Dawud Ibsa was aware of the
existence of the special operation and its objective, but does not appear to
have exercised any command or control over its actions."
According to the narrative
in the SEMG report, however, and again we are by no means lending any credence
to the allegations- it is OLF's officials who allegedly played the key role.
This is what the
narrative says. Back in 2008, "an OLF associate in Kenya put the leader of team 1,
Fekadu, in contact with an Eritrean Colonel named Gemachew Ayana." (As
previously stated, Gemachew is in
fact an OLF official and not an Eritrean.) Gemachew also approached Omar Idriss
Mohammed the overall team leader, who says "that he was contacted in
August-September 2009 by OLF Chairman Dawud Ibsa and informed that he would be
given a secret assignment." In March 2010, Gemachew "instructed Fekadu and his
team to return to Addis Ababa." Fekadu "remained in contact with Gemachew with
phone records indicating at least 27 conversations." Gemachew also arranged for
"money transfers to team members in Addis Ababa." According to Omar, it was
Gemachew that "gave team members the equipment and explosives that would be
used in the operation." Again, Gemachew "provided final instructions and
explosives." In early January, Omar "requested additional funds from
Gemachew." In the last week
of January, "with time running out, Omar felt the need to consult with
Gemachew, phone records appear to indicate that they made contact a total of 39
times, mainly initiated by Gemachew."
There is some mention of
Eritreans in the narrative, but in a limited and secondary role, again based on
suspicious testimony from detainees.
Even if we allow the
narrative is in fact true- and Eritrea believes it isn't- it is abundantly
clear that the alleged attempt was from start to finish an OLF effort.
There are other major
problems with the narrative.
It states
categorically that the operation did not target the African Union leaders, but
then claims that one of the targets was the Sheraton Hotel where most of the
leaders were staying.
The report states that a
sniper rifle, which allegedly in the possession of one member of the team was
sold to Eritrea by Romania as corroborated by the Romanian Government. We will
seek to get back to the Sanctions Committee with information on the veracity of
this claim. But even if we assume that it is of Eritrean source, this still
does not show conclusively when and how the rifle ended up in the hands of the
Ethiopian government. On the other hand, the report does not provide any
evidence at all that the essential equipment, the explosives, that were going
to be used in the alleged plot were sourced from Eritrea.
The SEMG bases much
of its claims on an "OLF contact list in Asmara" but it then admits that this
key piece of evidence is an outdated one from 2006. Realizing it is on
untenable grounds, it flimsily tries to justify itself by claiming that unnamed former OLF members
(defectors) had told it that the list is currently valid, forgetting that
testimony of defectors, now collaborating with the Ethiopian government cannot
be regarded as credible sources.
This account belies the
claim that the alleged Addis Ababa operation was conceived, planned and
directed by Eritrea. It also shows that there is no incontrovertible evidence
of Eritrean involvement, even the limited role that remains once we take into
the account that the alleged key actors, those who allegedly had the command
and control were non-Eritreans. If given the time, Eritrea wishes to provide
crucial extra information pertaining to this sensationalized accusation, which
reminds of an earlier accusation by the Monitoring Group that Eritrea had 2000
soldiers in Somalia, with detailed information on when and how they arrived and
where in what numbers they were deployed. This showpiece of an earlier report,
which proved to have been totally groundless, was used at the time to build a
case for sanctions against Eritrea.
Somalia
Given that the
allegations of Eritrea's military support to Al-Shabab has been the central
concern of the Security Council and the main impetus behind the imposition of
sanctions under 1907, it is remarkable that SEMG Report confirms that Eritrea is not in
violation of 1907 in regards to military support to Al-Shabab or any armed
group in Somalia. It mentions claims from unidentified sources of Eritrean arms
shipments to Kismayo (in fact Ethiopia had publicly made those accusations),
but states categorically that it "could not independently verify the reports."
Regarding financial
support, the SEMG states that it has documentary evidence of Eritrean payments
to individuals linked to Al-Shabab, but admits that these relate only to 1998. It
mentions allegations that financing continues, one source claiming to the tune
of US$ 80,000 per month, but does not present a shred of evidence.
Sudan
The SEMG Report
acknowledges that it is not possible to conclude that Eritrea has provided
direct military assistance to groups engaged in the destabilization of South
Sudan in violation of 1907.
4. Violation of arms
embargo
The SEMG speaks about
reports and circumstantial evidence of Eritrean arms procurement, but does not
claim it has evidence beyond reasonable doubt. It also states that it has not
been able to determine whether any government is directly involved in any
deliberate violation of the arms embargo in regard to Eritrea.
The SEMG Report mentions
allegations it received that an Eritrean military officer is involved in arms
smuggling from Eritrea to Sudan. It does not provide any proof of the
allegations and in any case they relate to pre-resolution1907 period.
5. Financing in support
of violations of resolution 1907
The SEMGR devotes a lot
of space to allegations that there may be covert financial activities in
support of armed embargo violations. It goes into detail into what it considers
are sources of revenue for the Eritrean government with particular emphasis to
contributions from the Eritrean Diaspora as well as the mining sector. It is sad that it repeats accusations,
(from suspicious sources, including individuals with personal agendas) without
providing any evidence that insinuate that Eritrean community members and
business people are involved in illegal activities. These allegations are simply
defamatory and tarnish the reputations of these individuals, who are also
citizens of the countries they reside in, as well as their families and
businesses.
The report also steps on
a legal minefield by suggesting that contributions by the Eritrean Diaspora are
illegal and violate the Vienna Conventions. Since the SEMG did not conclusively
establish violation of the arms embargo, the discussion of the possible source
of its financing can only be hypothetical. It seems the whole exercise is meant
to give a fig leaf to calls for economic sanctions on Eritrea.
III. Eritrea's
Response to the Recommendations of the SEMG
The recommendations of
the SEMG to impose additional sanctions against Eritrea fly against the content
and evidence presented in the main body of its own report. As we have seen
Eritrea is in compliance with resolution 1907 in regards to Somalia, Djibouti
and the arms embargo. We have also shown that the accusation that Eritrea
masterminded and attempted the bombing plot on Addis Ababa is not supported by
solid evidence. This being the
case, fairness and justice demand that the sanctions on Eritrea be lifted
immediately, not to speak of additional sanctions. Justice and fairness would
also require that measures be taken against the Ethiopian government as the
SEMG has stated categorically that Ethiopia is "in violation of the general and
complete arms embargo" on Somalia. It is highly significant that the SEMG
inexplicably fails to make any recommendations in regard to Ethiopia's violations
of relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, including 1907.
Conclusion
Eritrea concludes its
preliminary submission by requesting once again the opportunity to present a
comprehensive and definitive response after receiving and reviewing the SEMG
report. Clearly there is no emergency that would justify a hasty, unfair and
dangerous decision against Eritrea, for the second time in only 18 months.
I thank you Mr.
Chairman.
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