Selam
If we connect the dots...it is not hard to see where the Djibouti-Eritrea issue began. It should be recalled that the Djiboutian leader was in Asmara during the signing of the Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese Eastern Front Rebels in October 2006. So what happened to turn him against Eritrea so quickly?
What did Ethiopia tell Djibouti to get Djibouti so upset with Eritrea?Reading through the cables from Djibouti and Ethiopia tell an amazing story of deceit and treachery...one that will need full exposure,,,but for now, these few cables tell a whole lot about Ethiopia's role in the Eritrea Djibouti issue.
>From reading the cables below, it is obvious that President Guelleh was only repeating what Ethiopia has told him to say. Eritreans already know Meles Zenawi's lingo, the following phrase used by Djiboutian President in one of the cables show that it is Meles Zenawi that has been yanking the Djibouti chain all along... Here are the phrases:
"…Ambassador
said that the U.S. continued to share the GODJ's concern about Eritrea acting
as an ongoing threat to Djibouti and a regional spoiler, and told Guelleh that
in looking forward to the imminent expiration of the five-week time period
given to Eritrea by the recent UN Security Council Resolution, the USG
would remain ready to work with the GODJ in finding an effective approach to
the border standoff. "Eritrea,"
Guelleh replied "will never listen to any resolution." Guelleh
suggested that a more effective negotiating lever would be for the U.S. to halt
theflow of the 2% tax levied on Diaspora Eritreans by the GOE, calling
these funds President Isaias' "only source of foreign exchange." "If
you suspend these funds for one month," Guelleh argued, it will "make
Eritrea
obey any resolution." Furthermore, Guelleh warned, Isaias was too much
under Libyan leader Al-Qadhafi's influence. Guelleh said that he was worried
about Isaias "sending weapons" throughout the region, to Chad,
Somalia, and other countries…(In a brief aside on Iran, Guelleh said that an
Iranian naval vessel in Eritrea's Assab harbor is being used to funnel support
to Shiite groups in Yemen.)…”
Djibouti, its government and people were played by Meles Zenawi and his ignominious cadres. It is no wonder then that an issue that had resolved itself according the French Foreign Ministry was fanned and escalated to this stage. It was the way Ethiopia planned it from the very beginning... and got IGAD, AU and the US UN Mission to advance its diabolic agenda against the people of Eritrea...
US' strategic interests are not served by "isolating" and "sanctioning" Eritrea, they only serve the minority regime's agendas. Sooner or later, the truth will prevail...
Sophie
Viewing cable 06ADDISABABA2526, ETHIOPIA: DEPUTY MINISTER TEKEDA TALKS SOMALIA,If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Reference IDCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin06ADDISABABA25262006-09-16 13:172011-08-30 01:44CONFIDENTIALEmbassy Addis AbabaVZCZCXRO5181
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #2526/01 2591317
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161317Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2484
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATEC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002526
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
AF FOR A/S FRAZER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MOPS AU ET ER SO
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: DEPUTY MINISTER TEKEDA TALKS SOMALIA,
REGIONAL ISSUES WITH DAS YAMAMOTO
Classified By: Charge Janet Wilgus for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Deputy Foreign Minister Tekeda Alemu told AF
DAS Yamamoto Sept. 16 that although the GOE does not see
increased risk of conflict with Eritrea, it nevertheless
would prefer a six-month extension of UNMEE. In Somalia, the
GOE now hopes only to contain the Council of Islamic Courts
(CIC) in Southern Somalia through an alliance with Somaliland
and Puntland, bolstered by the deployment of Ugandan forces
in IGASOM. Tekeda said that the GOE's major concern was that
tensions between Somaliland and Puntland could weaken the
alliance. The Deputy Minister remarked that the Puntland
government was strong because of its firm base of clan
loyalty. The Somali TFG, while more representative of
Somalia as a whole, was weakened precisely by its multi-clan
formula. Nonetheless, the GOE still regarded the Somalia's
transitional federal institutions and charter as the only
basis from which the international community could work. PM
Meles has provided assurances to Ugandan President Museveni
that Ethiopian troops would provide support to Uganda IGASOM
troops in case of emergency. Tekeda expressed concern about
increasing Eritrean influence over Djibouti as well as CIC
contacts with President Guelleh. He encouraged the USG to
speak frankly with Djibouti about the risks of its behavior,
and thanked Yamamoto for the USG's assistance in bolstering
Kenyan resolve in dealing with Somalia. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (U) AF DAS Don Yamamoto met with Deputy Foreign Minister
Tekeda Alemu Sept. 16. Charge Wilgus and Pol/Econ Counselor
joined Yamamoto, while Tekeda was accompanied by Director
General for Europe and the Americas Almaz Amaha and Deputy
Alayew Mamo.
¶3. (C) DAS Yamamoto asked what the GOE hoped to see happen to
the mandate of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)
at the late September UN Security Council meeting on this
subject. Tekeda replied that although "it doesn't matter
much," the GOE would prefer to see a six-month rollover of
the mission in its current form. He denied that possible
armed conflict with the Council of Islamic Courts in Somalia
heightened the risk of an outbreak of hostilities with
Eritrea, arguing that the current balance of forces along the
Ethio-Eritrean border would continue to deter any attack by
Asmara.
¶4. (C) Tekeda also confirmed that the GOE would be
represented at the Sept. 18 UNSC session on Darfur by MFA
Director for African Affairs Amb. Sahliework. He noted that
he, PM Meles and Foreign Minister Seyoum would all be tied up
in annual party meetings during that period. Tekeda, who is
not officially a member of the ruling party, noted that he
had been invited for the first time to the Amhara National
Democratic Movement (ANDM) meeting. (NOTE: Meles and Seyoum
will be attending the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front
(TPFL) meeting at the same time. END NOTE.) The Deputy
Minister added that if Minister Seyoum travels to the UNGA at
all this year, it will be in late September.
¶5. (C) Tekeda implied that thanks to U.S. support for the
warlord alliance against terrorism in Mogadishu, the CIC was
ensconced as "part of the landscape" in Somalia. The most
the GOE could now hope for, he said, was to contain the CIC,
taking advantage of the CIC's narrow base in the Hawiye clan.
He claimed that most ordinary Somalis had evolved in their
attitudes and no longer felt enmity towards Ethiopia. He
pointed to relatively low turnout at CIC-organized rallies
against Ethiopian intervention in Somalia, as well as the
lack of problems encountered by Ethiopian troops who were now
conducting training of TFG and Puntland militia. Tekeda said
that the GOE could live with an "Islamic Republic of Somalia"
so long as it did not have broader regional ambitions. The
GOE's main objective was to sideline extremists in the CIC
like Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys.
¶6. (C) The Deputy Foreign Minister argued that deployment of
IGASOM in Somalia would show moderate forces within the CIC
that there was "another show in town" apart from extremists.
He claimed that Kenyan Foreign Minister Tuju had told the GOE
in Nairobi that during Tuju's separate meeting with Sheik
Sharif Ahmed, the latter eventually admitted that IGASOM
deployment would be valuable, but had no mandate to agree
with Kenya on this issue. Tekeda urged that the USG hold his
information extremely closely. Tekeda said the GOE
understood that there was no purely military solution to
Somalia, but argued that it was necessary to display strength
and credibility to bolster the position of moderates and
counter the intimidation of extremist elements.
¶7. (C) Tekeda maintained that Ugandan troops operating under
an IGASOM mandate would be able to manage the difficult
situation in Somalia -- with strong backing from Ethiopia.
Tekeda revealed that both he and PM Meles had provided
assurances to the Ugandan government during separate trips to
Kampala that Ethiopian troops would provide any support
necessary to Ugandan troops under pressure from CIC forces.
Ethiopian troops would be at the ready on the Ethiopian side
of the border to respond to any emergency. The recent
flare-up in tensions between Somaliland and Puntland
constituted the "weakest flank" of the alliance that the GOE
was constructing to counter the CIC, Tekeda said.
¶8. (C) Tekeda thanked DAS Yamamoto for the USG's role in
firming up Kenya's resolve to counter the CIC threat in
Somalia. Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia were now unified in
their commitment to support the TFG, he said. He indicated
that the government of Sudan probably did not truly support
IGASOM deployment, but did not dare go against the common
position of IGAD, which also had support from the
international community. DAS Yamamoto suggested to Tekeda
that Arab League support for the deployment would be very
helpful. Tekeda replied that Foreign Minister Seyoum could
use his good relationship with Egypt to push for at least
Egyptian acquiescence, if not outright support, for IGASOM.
¶9. (C) The Government of Djibouti's opposition to IGAD
actions in Somalia are the result of its fear of Eritrean
President Isaias, Tekeda said, as well as President Guelleh's
personal business interests with Eritrea. The Deputy Foreign
Minister speculated that the Djiboutian leadership was
worried that Eritrea would support Afari separatist
movements, as Isaias had done successfully in Sudan, if
Djibouti did not follow Eritrea's lead in Somalia. Tekeda
also told Yamamoto that Aweys and other CIC leaders had
stopped in Djibouti to meet with President Guelleh on their
way back from Libya the week before. Tekeda maintained that
the GOD was "on the wrong path," and added that Djibouti was
not strong enough to take Ethiopia's continued friendship and
forbearance for granted. He criticized President Guelleh's
recent visit to Tehran as well as his comments on a recent
BBC Somali Service broadcast, in which he had called on
Somalis to be vigilant in defense of their homeland against
the Ethiopian threat.
¶10. (C) Tekeda urged that the USG speak frankly with Djibouti
about its role in the region. He said that President Guelleh
would pay attention to U.S. concerns given the importance to
him of the U.S. military base in Djibouti. "He must be told
to choose" whose side he wanted to take. Tekeda also
encouraged DAS Yamamoto to increase engagement with
Somaliland leaders. He suggested that the GOE, USG and UK
consult on how to reduce tensions and increase cooperation
among the governments of Somaliland, Puntland and the TFG.
¶11. (C) Speaking broadly, Tekeda told Yamamoto that due to
developments in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, "there is a
perception (in the region) that the extremists are winning,
and that the Western World is facing a setback. This
ADDIS ABAB 00002526 003 OF 003
perception is emboldening extremists everywhere, including
President Isaias and the CIC." Tekeda argued that strong
action was need to brake this momentum and convince moderate
forces that they will receive international support against
extremists.
WILGUS
Viewing cable 08DJIBOUTI1032, DJIBOUTI: SENATOR FEINGOLD DISCUSSES REGION,If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Reference IDCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin08DJIBOUTI10322008-12-23 12:472011-08-30 01:44CONFIDENTIALEmbassy DjiboutiVZCZCXRO3484
RR RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDJ #1032/01 3581247
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 231247Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9841
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0296
RHMFISS/CJTF HOAC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DJIBOUTI 001032
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2018
TAGS: OREP PGOV PREL PHSA PTER PHUM EAID ECON KCOR
KWMN, ET, ER, SO, DJ
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI: SENATOR FEINGOLD DISCUSSES REGION,
SECURITY, AND GOOD GOVERNANCE WITH GODJ
Classified By: Amb. James C. Swan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. During a December 18-21 CODEL in Djibouti,
Senator Feingold discussed Djibouti, Somalia, and regional
concerns with top GODJ and Somalia officials. In meetings
with President Guelleh, Foreign Minister Youssouf, and
members of Djibouti's civil society, the Senator focused on
the strong U.S.-Djibouti partnership, domestic issues of
security, development, and good governance, and wider Horn of
Africa developments. In addition, the Senator held a series
of meetings in Djibouti on Somalia issues, including with the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for
the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), as well as with leaders
from Somaliland and representatives of Somalia civil society
and private sector (septel). END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) During separate meetings on December 20, Senator
Feingold thanked Djiboutian President Ismail Omar Guelleh and
Foreign Minister Mahamoud Ali Youssouf for Djibouti's strong
and "valuable" partnership with the U.S., and for hosting the
Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) at Camp
Lemonier. In response to the Senator's questions about how
ordinary Djiboutians viewed the U.S. and the U.S. presence in
Djibouti, Guelleh described the population as "friendly and
sympathetic" towards the United States. Both Guelleh and
Youssouf said that for the majority of Djiboutians,
CJTF-HOA's presence represented positive opportunities for
jobs, contracts, expanded contact with Americans, and
much-needed civil affairs projects such as wells and schools.
Youssouf was also quick to add that the GODJ and the
Djiboutian population appreciated not just CJTF-HOA's civil
affairs projects, but all USG support towards meeting
Djibouti's "development challenges," notably successful USAID
programming. Both Guelleh and Youssouf said that many
Djiboutians, especially those from the educated elite, had
disagreed with some recent U.S. foreign policy decisions,
notably in Iraq. However, Youssouf characterized these
policy disagreements as a "political circus debate," noting
that the general popular sentiment was that the U.S. presence
in Djibouti brought with it substantial benefits for the
country and its population.
¶3. (C) Senator Feingold addressed the ongoing
Eritrea-Djibouti border dispute, and offered his sympathy for
the loss of Djiboutian forces during fighting in June.
President Guelleh told the Senator that while he was eager to
see a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) on
the dispute, he was unsure of how much such an UNCSR would
truly "constrain" Eritrea, which he said was "still
occupying" Djiboutian territory. Guelleh told the Senator
that there had previously been "good relations" between
Djibouti and Eritrea, and said that he attributed the June
flare-up at the border to three factors: 1) Eritrea's
misguided perception that the U.S. military presence in
Djibouti threatened Eritrea; 2) Eritrean concerns that
Djibouti's helpful involvement in orchestrating Djibouti
Process talks between Somalia's Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of
Somalia (ARS) was harmful to Eritrean interests; and 3)
Economic rivalry linked to the announcement of an ambitious
project to build a bridge between Djibouti and Yemen, to
include construction of a new economic hub city at the
bridge's terminus in Djibouti in the vicinity of Moulhoule,
near the Djibouti-Eritrea border.
¶4. (C) Similarly, ForMin Youssouf agreed that Eritrea might
have been motivated by jealousy over the Port of Djibouti's
economic success as Ethiopia's main lifeline to the sea, a
false fear that the U.S. was using Djibouti as a "Trojan
horse" to conspire with Ethiopia against Eritrea, and a
desire to thwart the TFG-ARS Djibouti Process. Youssouf told
the Senator that Eritrea needed to accept the idea of "status
quo ante," withdraw from the border area, and open a dialogue
with Djibouti--either directly, or through a third party.
However, Youssouf noted that when the disagreement first
surfaced, Eritrea had quickly rebuffed Djibouti's initial
attempts to resolve it through dialogue. On the question of
the over 73 Eritrean defectors/deserters now in Djiboutian
DJIBOUTI 00001032 002 OF 004 custody, Youssouf indicated that the GODJ did not/not plan to return them to Eritrean control. "These people are asylum seekers," he said. "How can we return them when we know they will be killed?" In contrast, he added, Eritrea has denied the existence of any Djiboutian prisoners of war, and has refused access to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
¶5. (C) Noting the Senator's planned meetings on Somalia,
Guelleh said that he thought the international community was
"close to finding a lasting solution for Somalia" through the
Djibouti Process, and stressed the need for a continued
strong USG commitment--including potential support for state
building, security forces, and civil society in Somalia--to
avoid another devolution into fighting. The Senator assured
Guelleh that he would work to garner additional moral and
material support from the USG, and said that he planned to
engage with President-Elect Obama's team on this issue.
¶6. (C) Senator Feingold and ForMin Youssouf also discussed
Somalia issues at some length. Youssouf called the latest
political developments "very disturbing," and criticized TFG
President Yusuf for "creating more confusion in the political
process" through his dispute with TFG PM Nur Adde. The GODJ
had met with Prime Minister Nur Adde the previous day, and
with President Yusuf last week, ForMin Youssouf said, and had
felt that President Yusuf's message had been simply, "it's
me--or chaos in Somalia." ForMin Youssouf told the Senator
that the goal would now be to "contain" Yusuf from becoming
an "obstacle," and correctly predicted that the emergency
December 21 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
ministerial would turn Kenya's bilateral decision to impose
sanctions on President Yusuf into a collective IGAD action.
Noting that this was a "critical time" for IGAD countries,
Youssouf also said that despite some past disagreements over
Somalia policy, Djibouti and Ethiopia were now generally in
"100%" agreement on foreign policy issues.
¶7. (C) On the GODJ's role in the Djibouti Process, Youssouf
said that Djibouti's majority ethnic Somali population gave
the GODJ insight into inter-Somalia politics, while
Djibouti's small, unthreatening size led many to consider the
GODJ as "more neutral" than other parties. Currently,
Youssouf said, the GODJ was trying to "sensitize the
international community" on the urgent need to bolster Somali
security forces on the ground to avoid a potential security
vacuum in the wake of an Ethiopian withdrawal. Youssouf said
that he thought Somali security forces would be able to
control the security situation, but only if Ethiopia withdrew
in an "organized way." In addition, Youssouf said, the
international community might not be responding as easily as
might be desired, perhaps because of perception that the
political process was not moving forward as quickly as it
should.
¶8. (C) In discussing President Yusuf, President Guelleh told
the Senator that he was concerned that Yusuf might "create a
new secession of the Puntland region." Responding to the
Senator's question about Djibouti's relationship with
Somaliland, Guelleh said that although Djiboutians and
Somalilanders were "part of the same family" and Somaliland
had consistently pressed Djibouti to be the first to
recognize Somaliland as an independent state, he had "told
them many times that it would be very difficult to defend the
idea of an independent Somaliland within the African Union
(AU) or the UN." President Guelleh also noted the potential
incompatibility of a fragmented Somalia with Djibouti's
vision of greater regional integration. Still, Guelleh told
the Senator, recognition remained a "sensitive question," as
Somalilanders "cannot imagine any other solution." When
asked by the Senator why Djibouti had such strong
reservations about Somaliland independence, ForMin Youssouf
said that despite warming Djibouti-Somaliland trade
relations, regional experience had led the GODJ to believe
that a "balkanized" Somalia could provoke instability, and
retard efforts to deepen regional economic cooperation.
DJIBOUTI 00001032 003 OF 004
¶9. (C) Senator Feingold asked President Guelleh and ForMin
Youssouf to comment on what they perceived as the most
important threats to security in the region. On terrorist
threats, President Guelleh said that radicalism had been
brought to the region by Saudi and Sudanese elements, and
that Somali culture was traditionally hostile to suicide
bombings and extremist influences. ForMin Youssouf also
characterized terrorism in Somalia as "circumstantial," and
said that Al-Shabaab was simply "surfing a wave" of
opportunity created by the Ethiopian presence. Nevertheless,
Youssouf agreed with the Senator that "desperation" could
lead people to use terrorist tactics, and said that Djibouti
had strengthened its security posture following the October
terrorist attacks in Somaliland and Puntland.
¶10. (C) On the ongoing threat of piracy off the coast of
Somalia, Guelleh told the Senator that he appreciated
continued high level dialogue with the USG on the issue, and
also welcomed recent greater engagement from the European
Union. ForMin Youssouf emphasized the impossibility of
decoupling piracy from the instability on land in Somalia.
"Chaos," he said, "can lead to all kinds of anachronistic
phenomena, such as piracy or even slavery." Most of the
pirates, Youssouf said, were drawn from former naval forces,
with some converted fishermen thrown in, and had "nothing to
do with Al-Shabaab."
¶11. (C) During his visit, Senator Feingold discussed issues
of good governance, transparency, and human rights with
President Guelleh, Foreign Minister Youssouf, and members of
civil society:
---POLITICAL SPACE: President Guelleh told the Senator that the opposition had "systematically refused to participate in any election" for some time. However, Guelleh also explained that his own ruling coalition, the Union for a Presidential Majority (UMP), already represented an alliance of several parties, including former rebel and opposition leaders. The existence of this strong coalition, Guelleh said, weakened the remaining opposition.
--PRESS FREEDOM: In response to the Senator's concerns about the paucity of independent press outlets in Djibouti, Guelleh responded that Djibouti was a small oral society which valued "free speech more than free writing" and preferred to exercise "liberty of expression" through debates in coffee shops rather than through formal news sources. Guelleh also said that the main factor inhibiting the growth of independent press was the absence of a lucrative advertising and distribution base.
--HUMAN RIGHTS AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS: President Guelleh described traditional "tolerance" as Djibouti's greatest asset, pointing out that there were no political detainees, no death penalty in use, and no religious persecution. President Guelleh also underscored the GODJ's current fo7Q$XQ;Wm56*QY] s involvement in political and economic life, noting that he felt the "Arab world is suffering from the lack of women's participation."
--CORRUPTION: Senator Feingold asked President Guelleh how the GODJ was tackling issues of corruption. While noting that bribery was not traditionally accepted in nomadic Djiboutian culture, Guelleh said that addressing corruption remained a top priority for his government. If not aggressively deterred, Guelleh said, corruption could become a "gangrene" that might deter foreign direct investment.
--NO THIRD TERM: When asked by the Senator if he were considering amending Djibouti's constitution to run for third term in office, President Guelleh said that he was "not thinking about it myself." He told the Senator that he agreed with the principle of a two-term limit, remarking that "what a politician can contribute to the population in twelve years of efforts is more than enough--after that it will become routine"
DJIBOUTI 00001032 004 OF 004 --CIVIL SOCIETY ROUNDTABLE: Senator Feingold's questions engendered a lively debate among diverse participants at a December 21 roundtable on Civil Society, Good Governance, and the Private Sector. Issues discussed included press freedom, advancement of women, judicial independence, opposition participation, perceptions of the U.S., and human rights. Most participants supported the GODJ's perspective on freedom of the press and civil society.
¶12. (U) Local press enthusiastically covered Senator
Feingold's meetings with GODJ and Somalia officials.
Photographs and stories on the Senator's meetings nearly
filled the first three pages of the December 22 edition of
"La Nation," the national French language newspaper, and
coverage of the Senator's meeting with President Guelleh ran
as the lead item in Radio Television Djibouti's nightly news
broadcast December 20.
¶13. (C) Senior GODJ officials were keen to meet with the
Chairman of the Africa Subcommittee, and Senator Feingold's
visit allowed both for a frank exchange of views with the
GODJ on regional issues, and a prime opportunity to deepen
discussions on domestic questions of good governance.
¶14. (U) Senator Feingold cleared this cable.
SWAN
Viewing cable 08PARIS908, SOMALIA/DJIBOUTI: MFA DAS PROVIDES OVERVIEW ONIf you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Reference IDCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin08PARIS9082008-05-12 11:452011-08-30 01:44CONFIDENTIALEmbassy ParisVZCZCXRO1702
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHFR #0908/01 1331145
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121145Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2997
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/CJTF HOA PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITYC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000908
SIPDIS
EUCOM PLEASE PASS AFRICOM
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV PINR DJ SO FR
SUBJECT: SOMALIA/DJIBOUTI: MFA DAS PROVIDES OVERVIEW ON
MAY 7
REF: A. MAY 6 PARIS POINTS
¶B. PARIS 861
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d
).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: MFA DAS-equivalent Helene Le Gal on May 7
provided succinct overviews of Somalia and Djibouti. On
Somalia, she said that the draft UNSC anti-piracy resolution
was running into opposition and that it might be best first
to adopt the UK's separate draft resolution, covering broader
Somali issues, and then work for adoption of the anti-piracy
resolution. France-Somalia relations had become closer as a
result of successful joint action against Somali hijackers of
the French vessel "Le Ponant." Nevertheless, the French are
reluctant to provide the type of military assistance Somalia
had requested during President Yusuf's recently concluded
visit. On Djibouti, Le Gal said the GOF continued to advise
Djibouti not to make an international case of Eritrea's
recent border incursion into Djibouti. END SUMMARY.
SOMALIA
¶3. (C) Le Gal acknowledged that the recent piracy incident
involving the French vessel "Le Ponant" had brought Somalia
and France closer together. During Yusuf's visit, both sides
reiterated their appreciation of the other's cooperation
during the hijacking incident. Yusuf reassured the French
that Somalia had absolutely no problem with France's
prosecuting the six pirates in France. Le Gal confirmed that
France had agreed to double food aid to Somalia, to 7 million
euro.
¶4. (C) Le Gal confirmed as well that the GOF had refused a
Somali request that French troops stationed in Djibouti be
deployed to Somalia to help provide security. She said that
Yusuf had made another request for French help in training
Somali security forces that the French had to turn down, at
least for now. Le Gal said that the French responded
negatively but did not completely close the door -- "we said
'perhaps not now, let us think about it and see how things
go.'" Le Gal explained that France would have to consider
carefully any form of military or para-military assistance to
Somalia. She said that Somalia needed to carry out security
sector reform of its own. French training could not take
place in Somalia, given the lack of infrastructure,
functioning institutions, and overall instability. Le Gal
said that France could not provide training to anything that
smacked of being a "militia." Yusuf had asked that France
help train Somalia's Coast Guard, but Le Gal said that the
GOF had information indicating that the Coast Guard, or at
least some elements of it, were in league with the region's
pirates. It would be easier to work with the police, Le Gal
noted. In any case, the French would sit on these requests
for now but would consider changes in circumstances that
would make these training possibilities more feasible.
DJIBOUTI
PARIS 00000908 002 OF 002 Djiboutian territory. Le Gal took the same position she had on May 2 (ref B) -- that Djibouti should back off, respect the fact that Eritrea had withdrawn, and not aggressively pursue its claim of having been wronged. Djibouti had taken the case to the UNSC, AU, and Arab League. Le Gal said that in her view, the AU and Arab League responses had been perfunctory -- the AU informed both sides that they could present their cases, and the Arab League indicated it would consider sending a mission to the region. Le Gal said the Djiboutians had been phoning her "three times a day" and that her message to them was to avoid raising tensions in the region over an incident that had resolved itself peacefully. She repeated that, while Ethiopia's border dispute with Eritrea was long-standing, there appeared to be no historical basis for a border dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti, which was another reason that both sides should avoid turning this episode into a real problem.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
PEKALA
Viewing cable 09DJIBOUTI563, DJIBOUTIAN FM REPORTS IGAD SEEKS MORE AGGRESSIVE MANDATE FORIf you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Reference IDCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin09DJIBOUTI5632009-05-28 08:312011-08-30 01:44SECRETEmbassy DjiboutiVZCZCXRO4564
RR RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDJ #0563/01 1480830
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 280831Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0438
INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE
SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/CJTF HOA RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
¶1. (S) SUMMARY. According to Djiboutian Foreign Minister Mahmoud
Ali Youssouf, IGAD Foreign Ministers agree that the African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) requires a more robust mandate, with
Uganda urging the need to "review the rules of engagement ."
Youssouf also highlighted AMISOM's need for helicopters and armored
vehicles, to enable AMISOM to take more aggressive actions to
stabilize Mogadishu. All of Somalia's neighbors, except Eritrea,
agree on a common regional approach of supporting Somalia's
Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Youssouf said. In contrast,
Eritrea continues to serve as a regional spoiler: rejecting the
TFG's legitimacy, ignoring appeals from regional organizations to
vacate Djiboutian territory occupied since early 2008, and
reportedly infiltrating Eritrea-trained insurgents into northern
Djibouti. FM Youssouf said Djibouti welcomed the recent adoption
of UNSCR 1872, as well as the USG's positive response to Djibouti's
request for assistance in transporting Somali TFG forces to
Djibouti for training. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) In a May 27 meeting with Ambassador and DCM, Foreign
Minister Mahmoud Ali Youssouf said the GODJ welcomed the May 26
adoption of UNSCR 1872, as it reinforced previous statements
supporting the TFG from the African Union (AU) and IGAD. He noted,
however, President Guelleh's concern that UNSCR 1872 did not
explicitly identify the means by which the international community
was to support the TFG in the establishment of a National Security
Force and a Somali Force. If aid could not be given directly to
TFG forces, then perhaps AMISOM could serve as the medium, Youssouf
said.
REGIONAL LEADERS AGREE AMISOM REQUIRES MORE AGGRESSIVE MANDATE
¶3. (C) Youssouf highlighted the need to revise AMISOM's mandate to
allow it to take more aggressive actions to stabilize Mogadishu.
According to Youssouf, there had been consensus at the recently
concluded IGAD Ministerial to give AMISOM a more robust mandate,
with Ugandan Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa leading the call to
"review the rules of engagement." According to Youssouf, on May
25, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin had raised with Kenyan
Foreign Minister Moses Wetangula the need for a concerted approach
by IGAD members to the AU and to the UN Security Council, in
support of such measures, as well as the need to apply greater
pressure on Eritrea.
¶4. (S) AMISOM needed helicopters for better surveillance, as well
as armored vehicles, Youssouf said, noting that he had advised
Somali TFG President Sheikh Sharif (now en route to Tripoli) to
submit a formal written request to the UN, in order to help
identify the TFG's most urgent needs. Youssouf also noted that the
GODJ would seek reimbursement from the USG for two shipments of
unspecified weapons Djibouti had recently provided to the TFG.
Ambassador asked for a detailed list of the items, in order to
convey the request to the Department. The Minister stressed the
need to backfill the arms and ammunition quickly, in view of the
continued threat from Eritrea.
¶5. (C) Per guidance from AF, Ambassador informed FM Youssouf that
the USG would be able to support Djibouti's request for assistance
(refs A-B) to transport (via contract air) an initial contingent of
approximately two hundred Somali security forces to Djibouti for
training. Ambassador explained that the USG would need details of
the number, names, units, dates of travel, departure and arrival
locations, etc. The Embassy's Office of Security Cooperation (OSC)
chief will follow up with GODJ military to obtain this information.
ERITREAN-TRAINED FIGHTERS ALLEGEDLY INFILTRATE DJIBOUTI
¶6. (C) Djibouti remained concerned about illicit Eritrean arms
deliveries to insurgents in Somalia, Youssouf said, noting that
Eritrean President Isaias continued to reject recognition of the
TFG. Except for Eritrea, all the countries in the region were
united in seeking a common approach to support Somalia, Youssouf
said.
¶7. (S) Eritrea also continued to seek to destabilize Djibouti,
Youssouf said. He reported that Ethiopian FM Seyoum had informed
him on May 24 of Ethiopian intelligence that more than 200 rebel
fighters (presumably ethnic Afars), who had been trained in
DJIBOUTI 00000563 002 OF 002 Eritrea, had infiltrated Djibouti via Ras Doumeira-which has been occupied continuously by Eritrean troops since at least March 2008. Youssouf said Djibouti responded to the report by putting Djiboutian troops on alert, and activating additional forces along the border with Eritrea.
¶8. (C) Commenting on Eritrean President Isaias's numerous recent
appearances in international media (including Egyptian media, Al
Jazeera, and even Voice of America), Youssouf said Isaias continued
to deny any incursion into Djibouti. Instead, Isaias had asserted
that the border crisis was "fabricated", and had continued to defy
the AU, IGAD, and Arab League, calling such international
organizations "moribund."
¶9. (S) COMMENT. Djibouti's common borders with Somalia and
Eritrea, and its close ties to ethnic groups in both countries,
make these neighbors a key security concern for Djibouti. As the
host of IGAD's Secretariat, Djibouti actively supports IGAD and its
diplomatic efforts to bolster Somalia's TFG. Djibouti will soon
observe a national day of mourning (June 10), to commemorate the
one-year anniversary of the outbreak of armed hostilities with
Eritrea-and of Eritrea's continued military occupation of Ras
Doumeira. Despite the burden of defending its northern border,
Djibouti continues to use its modest means to provide material
support to the TFG. END COMMENT.
SWAN
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