Selam all,
For sometime now we have been reading about "2000 Eritreans fighting alongside Islamists" and have wondered where that fictitious tale came from. Well, the cat has been let out of the bag. Here the Wikileak Cable in its entirely, it speaks volumes of Meles Zenawi's cadres...
Enjoy
Viewing cable 06ADDISABABA2910, ETHIOPIA: MFA EXPERT OFFERS THOUGHTS ON SOMALIAIf you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Reference IDCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin06ADDISABABA29102006-11-01 16:092011-08-30 01:44CONFIDENTIALEmbassy Addis AbabaVZCZCXRO6502
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #2910/01 3051609
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011609Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3096
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0641
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITYC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002910
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF DAS YAMAMOTO AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2016
TAGS: PREL MOPS PTER SO ET ER EG AU
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: MFA EXPERT OFFERS THOUGHTS ON SOMALIA
STRATEGY
REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 2872
¶B. ADDIS ABABA 2775
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES VICKI HUDDLESTON. REASON: 1.4 (D).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. The MFA's Somalia expert sees a "dangerous
situation" arising in the next two to three weeks if the
international community takes no concrete action to assist
Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in its
struggle against the extremist Council of Islamic Courts
(CIC). He estimated that roughly 1,000 Eritrean troops were
present in Somalia. The GOE's "Somalia-watcher" Fiseha
Shawel also reported that Kenyan President Kibaki recently
informed Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum that Kenya would
support Ethiopia in the event Ethiopia found it necessary to
take unilateral military action to counter the CIC. Ethiopia
assesses that the CIC threatens the stability of not only
southern Somalia but also of Puntland and Somaliland.
Puntland authorities, while strongly allied with the TFG and
Ethiopia, are reluctant to cooperate with Somaliland,
however. Fiseha was pessimistic about prospects for progress
in Khartoum talks between the CIC and TFG, since neither side
was serious about them, but hoped that an eventual
negotiation with Hawiye leaders could broaden the TFG's
appeal. Ethiopian military action appeared highly likely, he
thought, barring a significant change in the current
scenario. Fiseha appealed for stronger U.S. support for the
TFG, enhanced U.S. engagement with Eritrea and Djibouti, and,
at a minimum, U.S. leadership within the UN Security Council
to modify the existing arms embargo on Somalia. He argued
that while the TFG had performed poorly so far, it could make
progress in establishing real authority in Somalia if 1) the
CIC were "pushed back" to give the TFG room to operate; and
2) international assistance to--and diplomatic engagement
with--the TFG were increased. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (SBU) On October 31, Pol/Econ Counselor and Deputy met
with MFA Somalia-watcher Fiseha Shawel. Fiseha is an
informed observer on Ethio-Somali relations, and served as
one of several Ethiopian government delegates to the
2002-2004 Nairobi reconciliation talks which culminated in
the formation of Somalia's TFG. He has frequently been
tasked with explaining the Somalia situation in official
state media -- a rare distinction for a mid-level diplomat in
Ethiopia.
¶3. (C) Echoing statements made by senior Ethiopian officials
(ref A), Fiseha warned of a "dangerous situation" in the next
two to three weeks, as Eritrea reinforced its presence in
Somalia and continued to supply weapons to the extremist
Council of Islamic Courts (CIC). As the CIC's clear goal was
a greater Somalia ruled by Islamic Shariah law, the CIC
needed to be told that there could only be a negotiated
settlement, not a military solution, to its struggle against
Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Fiseha said.
Citing the CIC's links to Al-Qaida and other non-state
actors, Fiseha said a victory by the CIC would be "an
invitation to terrorists around the world." Fiseha noted
that Ethiopia shared common strategic interests with the
United States; if its redlines were approached, "Ethiopia
must react," he said. Ethiopian intelligence assessed that
Eritrea had approximately 1,000 troops in Somalia assisting
the CIC, and considered media reports of double that number
to be exaggerated, he said. At the same time, Eritrea's
embassy in Djibouti was recruiting Ethiopian opposition
members to go to Mogadishu.
¶4. (C) In addition to gaining strength in the south, the CIC
was clearly stating its interest in expanding to all of
Somalia, Fiseha said, thus threatening Puntland and
Somaliland. The CIC had a cell in Hargeisa, he said, from
where the CIC's third or fourth-highest ranking official
ADDIS ABAB 00002910 002 OF 003
hailed; CIC threats to Somaliland media and security forces
had led Somaliland to postpone an election of an influential
council of elders set for November. Despite the commencement
of Ethiopian Airlines flights to Hargeisa, and the
establishment of a diplomatic mission there, Ethiopia had no
immediate plans to upgrade relations with Somaliland, Fiseha
said. Indeed, diplomatic recognition of Somaliland under
current conditions could be counterproductive, he said, by
fueling criticism that Ethiopia sought the Balkanization of
Somalia. Ethiopia was urging Somaliland to work with
Puntland and the TFG to confront the CIC as a common enemy,
but Puntland was reluctant to cooperate with Somaliland.
Puntland Vice President Hassan Dahir Mahamud had called for
secessionist Somaliland to be conquered by force, Fiseha
observed. None of the Somali actors, including the CIC, had
any long-term vision, he added. (NOTE: Poloffs' October 31
meeting with Puntland VP Mahamud will be reported septel.
END NOTE.)
¶5. (C) Underscoring the dominance of clan politics, Fiseha
observed that Puntland's support for the TFG derived from TFG
President Abdullahi Yusuf's Darood roots in Puntland; the
challenge was how to integrate the CIC's Hawiye clan into the
TFG. The best approach would be for another Hawiye figure,
chosen by a representative meeting of clan leaders, to
replace Ali Mohammed Ghedi as TFG prime minister. Ghedi had
been able to offer little assistance to the TFG while it was
located in Ghedi's home town of Jowhar, Fiseha noted.
¶6. (C) Peace talks in Khartoum between the CIC and the TFG
were unlikely to succeed, Fiseha said, because neither side
was currently taking them seriously. Within the TFG, Fiseha
said, there had been disagreement over who should represent
the TFG; ultimately, President Yusuf had overruled Prime
Minister Ghedi, and a TFG delegation was now in Khartoum.
However, both sides had established impractical
pre-conditions for the talks: the CIC called for Ethiopia's
withdrawal, while the TFG called for the CIC's withdrawal
from captured territories. Meanwhile, "the game Sudan is
playing in the Arab League" was not good for the region,
Fiseha added. Thus, with neither side interested in
dialogue, Somalia appeared to be poised for further armed
conflict, Fiseha said.
¶7. (C) Fiseha appealed for diplomatic support for the TFG.
While the TFG's performance had not met expectations so far,
international engagement with the TFG had been limited, he
added. The United States had spent USD 11 million on
supporting Somali warlords, he remarked; half that amount
would go far to support the TFG. The TFG needed concrete
assistance, not lip service, he said, to lead Somalia's
reconstruction and development. Financial support for paying
the salaries of civil servants and militia would be helpful,
he suggested, as would technical assistance and advisors.
Fiseha also recommended that the United States, the EU, and
others establish diplomatic missions in Somalia to signal
international support for the TFG (once the security
situation improved in Baidoa.) The TFG was not getting the
appropriate financial support now, he said, while Islamic
charities and extremist organizations were actively assisting
the CIC.
¶8. (C) Fiseha urged the United States to do more to galvanize
international support by underscoring the legitimacy of the
TFG and the necessity to support it as the only Somali
government seeking peace for the region. The USG could
engage the TFG more actively, in both Nairobi and Washington,
he added, providing it with encouragement and aid. Fiseha
also called for further U.S. engagement with Djibouti and
Eritrea to counter their "unhealthy alliance". Senior
Djibouti officials repeatedly asserted to Ethiopian
counterparts that the CIC was a force for peace, and posed no
ADDIS ABAB 00002910 003 OF 003 threat to Ethiopia, he said. Djibouti failed to realize that CIC success would threaten Djibouti's own existence, he explained, due to the Islamicists' expansionist agenda and interest in establishing a Greater Somalia.
¶9. (C) The TFG was unquestionably weak and divided, Fiseha
said, but it remained the best hope for restoring moderate,
effective governance in Somalia. TFG President Yusuf was the
only "statesman" currently on the scene who could transcend
Somalia's clan-based political allegiances. Fiseha argued
that while the TFG had performed poorly so far, it could make
progress in establishing real authority in Somalia if 1) the
CIC were "pushed back" to give the TFG room to operate; and
2) international assistance to--and diplomatic engagement
with--the TFG were increased. He also indicated that the GOE
would be willing to work closely with the international
community in persuading the TFG to make changes that would
increase its effectiveness. Fiseha bemoaned the fact that
few actors in Somalia seemed to have a long-term vision, but
then conceded that the CIC was probably an (unfortunate)
exception.
¶10. (C) Fiseha reported that during the week of Oct. 23, in a
meeting with visiting Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum in
Nairobi, Kenyan President Kibaki had pledged to support
unspecified military actions Ethiopia may take in Somalia.
According to Fiseha, Seyoum had underscored that Ethiopia may
have to act unilaterally, if no support for the TFG came from
the international community. Ethiopia was frustrated that
IGASOM had not yet been deployed and that no aid was being
given to the TFG, while "provocations" by the CIC continued
to build up, Fiseha said.
¶11. (C) Asked about further Ethiopian diplomatic initiatives
on Somalia in either IGAD or the African Union's Peace and
Security Council (AU PSC), Fiseha replied that the GOE was
"extremely satisfied" that the issue was now "out of the
hands" of the PSC. The PSC had approved an IGASOM deployment
plan and submitted it to the UN Security Council. While
Egypt had made its opposition to such a deployment known, it
had been outvoted by other PSC members such as Nigeria,
Mozambique, and Lesotho. Fiseha, who formerly served at
Ethiopia's embassy in Cairo, commented that tensions between
Egypt and Ethiopia over Nile water resources prompted Egypt
to try to weaken Ethiopia and to court Ethiopia's neighbors,
such as Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti.
¶12. (C) The GOE's Somalia expert--who appears to be a
professional diplomat rather than a ruling party
member--offers some interesting suggestions on a diplomatic
strategy for Somalia. The GOE might be in a position to
broker changes in the TFG to bring more widely-accepted
Hawiye leadership. Fiseha seemed to suggest that Ethiopia's
likely military intervention against the CIC--if
successful--might weaken the hold of radical leaders on the
CIC and pave the way for such a negotiation. In such a
scenario, international advice and assistance might also
enable the TFG to become more operationally effective than it
has been to date. Fiseha emphasized several times the strong
tendency of the Somalis to hitch their wagon to the apparent
winner; focused international engagement with the TFG,
combined with a military blow to the CIC, might create such a
dynamic. Fiseha's remarks also underscore Ethiopian
officials' growing belief that major, unilateral military
action in Somalia to counter the CIC threat may be
unavoidable given the international community's slow response
to requests to authorize and fund a peace support mission.
The GOE continues to hope that, at a minimum, the UNSC will
endorse a partial lifting of the current arms embargo on
Somalia. END COMMENT.
HUDDLESTON
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