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COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION Council conclusions on the Horn of Africa
3124th FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting
Brussels, 14 November 2011
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The Council adopted the following conclusions:
1.��� �"Underlining the importance attached by the EU to its relations with the Horn of Africa, the Council has adopted today a Strategic Framework to g uide the EU�s engagement in the region. It welcomes the High Representative� s proposal to appoint an EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the Horn of Af rica, focusing in the first instance on Somalia, the regional dimension of t he conflict and piracy, and looks forward to the development of action plans to support implementation of the Strategic Framework.
�
2.��� �The EU�s long-term commitment to the Horn of Africa is rooted in the region�s geo-strategic importance, the EU�s desire to support the welfare of the people of the Horn and to help lift them from poverty into self-sustaini ng economic growth. Instability in the region poses a growing challenge not only to the security of its peoples but also to the rest of the world. Conti nued EU engagement will be in support of both regional efforts, including th rough the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and the Africa n Union (AU), and national efforts to achieve lasting peace, security and j ustice, good governance based on the democratic principles of inclusion, the rule of law and respect for human rights. The Strategic Framework also recog nises the need to protect European citizens from the threats that
emanate from some parts of the region, including terrorism, piracy and the p roliferation of the arms. It also identifies a number of common challenges such as climate change and migration.
�
3.��� �The EU remains deeply concerned about the humanitarian crisis affecti ng several countries in the Horn of Africa. Building on existing support pr ovided to date (over � 760 million), the EU will continue to provide neutral , impartial and independent humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populati ons and calls for increased assistance from and coordination of all donors. The Council calls on all parties to ensure safe and unhindered �access by hu manitarian actors
in accordance with international humanitarian principles.
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4.��� �The Council highlights the need to address the underlying causes of t he current humanitarian crisis in particular structural food insecurity, rec urrent drought and conflict. The EU will continue to support the countries of the region in strengthening their national capacities through disaster ri sk reduction strategies and long-term development cooperation programmes in the areas of drought-preparedness, agriculture, rural development and food s ecurity. The effectiveness of such support is, however, dependent upon local ownership and the political commitment of the countries of the region to put structural policies in place to support sustainable agricultural and livesto ck production, including cross-border movements, natural resource management , in particular water resources, as well as trade and regional integration.
�
5.��� �Piracy off the coast of Somalia continues to negatively impact on int ernational maritime security and regional and international economic activit ies. The Council remains committed to the commendable work of the EU naval c ounter-piracy operation, EUNAVFOR Atalanta, which provides protection to Wor ld Food Programme and AMISOM shipping, and
contributes to deterring piracy and protecting vulnerable shipping. The EU w ill advance work to enhance the capacity of Somalia and the wider Horn of Af rica region to fight piracy, including through further strengthening of mari time capacities as well as prosecution and detention capacities. The EU will continue to work towards the tracking of financial flows from piracy. The EU SR for the Horn of Africa will contribute to developing and implementing a c oherent, �effective and balanced EU approach to piracy, encompassing all st rands of EU action.
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6.��� �The Strategic Framework, in Annex, sets out the way in which the EU w ill pursue its strategic approach, working in partnership with the region it self and key international partners.
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A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR THE HORN OF AFRICA1 �
Executive Summary
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*A**NN**E**X*
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The political evolution of the Horn of Africa over the past 50 years has bee n unusually turbulent. The objective of the European Union is therefore to support the people of the region in achieving greater peace, stability, secu rity, prosperity and accountable government.
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The EU�s engagement in the Horn will be supportive of a regional and country -level environment conducive to peace, security and justice, of good governa nce based on the democratic principles of inclusion, the rule of law and re spect for human rights, and of socio-economic development based on the attai nment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) with due consideration to e quity, climate change and sustainable livelihoods.
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The EU�s interests in the Horn of Africa are defined by the region�s geo-str ategic importance, the EU�s historic engagement with the countries of the re gion, its desire to support the welfare of the people and help lift them fr om poverty into self-sustaining economic growth, and the need for the EU to protect its own citizens from the threats that emanate from some parts of t he region and address common challenges.
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To achieve its objective of peace, stability, security, prosperity and accou ntable government, the EU
will
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1)��� �Assist all countries in the region to build robust and accountable po litical structures, including civil and civic institutions, allowing the pe ople of the Horn to express their legitimate political aspirations and ensur e that their basic human rights and freedoms are respected;
2)��� �Work with the countries of the region and with international organisa tions (especially the United Nations and African Union) to resolve current c onflicts, particularly in Somalia and Sudan, and avoid future potential conf licts between or within countries;
3)��� �Ensure that, until that is achieved, the insecurity in the region doe s not threaten the security of others beyond its borders, e.g. through pirac y, terrorism or irregular migration;2
4)��� �Support efforts to promote the economic growth of all countries and p eople in the region, to enable them to reduce poverty, increase prosperity a nd enjoy �not suffer from the benefits globalisation can bring;
5)��� �Support political and economic regional cooperation and bolster the r ole of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to tap into positive trends and developments across national borders;
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To enhance the coherence, quality, impact and visibility of the EU's multifa ceted action in the region, an EU Special Representative (EUSR), in close c onsultation with the EUSR for Sudan and South Sudan, will contribute to the EU's regional approach to the interrelated challenges facing the Horn.
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1������������ �For the purpose of this paper, the Horn of Africa is defined as the countries belonging to the Inter-Governmental Authority for Developme nt (IGAD) � Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda.
2�������� �Due to its proximity to the Horn, particular attention to Yemen i s due.
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�
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The Framework �proposes a number of ways the EU can pursue this strategic a pproach that will enable it to do so in partnership with the region itself a nd key partners. It identifies areas for action, but specific actions, in t he form of sub-strategies and action plans, will be subject to subsequent de cisions by the Commission, Council and Member States.
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The High Representative and the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EUSR, EU Delegations in the region, the European Commission and Member State s will work together to implement this Framework.
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A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR THE HORN OF AFRICA3 �
1.��� �Context and challenges
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The Horn of Africa is an area of great diversity. Many of its countries have been through or are currently experiencing periods of violent civil conflict , the legacy of which impacts directly on both politics and society. Despite its diversity, the problems of the region are inextricably intertwined � wha t happens in one country �can have a profound impact on the others, and the problems of one can often only be solved with the involvement of the others. There is therefore a logic to dealing with
the region as a whole.
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The EU recognises that to render its future engagement more effective it mus t pursue a comprehensive approach that will address the region's interlocked challenges outlined below. Through this approach, the EU will pay special at tention to root causes and drivers of conflict, and to lagging development.
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Unaccountable governance and/or corruption mixed with societal tensions or g rievance have been violently manifested in some parts of the Horn. In other s, the absence of the rule of law or an administrative vacuum has permitted e.g. piracy and terrorism to flourish in Somalia, and armed groups such as t he Lord�s Resistance Army (LRA) to subsist in remote border areas. The latter affect the local population, but the former have now reached a scale where t hey threaten international security and, directly, the interests of EU Membe r States.
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Inter-state rivalry, often over disputed borders, use of water resources or as a result of forced movements of people, also risks breaking into conflict between states as well as within them. The frozen border dispute between Eth iopia and Eritrea has a particular significance as it has influenced regiona l politics e.g. through proxy interventions in the Somali conflict.
�
Persistent poverty, often the result of conflict, destroys the stability on which economic growth and investment depend, has denied many of the people of the region the hope of the better future that they deserve.
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Climate change poses an additional challenge to all countries in the region. It exacerbates the pressures on scarce resources already stretched by popula tion growth, but the countries of the Horn have little direct control over it. The livelihoods of large numbers of people affected by extreme poverty a nd food insecurity in the Horn is made worse by erratic rainfall and crop yi elds, a mix of the effects of climate change and inadequate policy intervent ions.
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3�������� �For the purpose of this paper, the Horn of Africa is defined as t he countries belonging to the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development ( IGAD) � Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda.
�
�
Migration, resulting from dwindling resources, growing population pressure from high birth rates, and refugee flows in response to political unrest, as well as traditional nomadism across modern borders is a challenge strongly f elt in the region and beyond.
�
Small arms proliferation, resulting from conflicts within the region and bey ond makes previous disputes over resources (including cattle) more violent a nd more difficult to mediate by peaceful means.
�
The region lacks a regional organisation effective enough to mediate dispute s and foster cooperation. As a building block of the African Peace and Secur ity Architecture, the Inter- Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) h as been slowly building its capacity, but it must continue to develop the ca pacities of its Secretariat to resolve political problems and regional conf lict.
�
The result of these challenges has been a chronic �instability in some parts of the region � especially Somalia, but also Sudan, South Sudan and parts of other states. As elsewhere in Africa, this has reflected weak or ineffective state institutions, and the absence or weakness of the rule of law, making i t hard to combat organised crime, terrorism and armed groups. The lack of em ployment opportunities for young people as a consequence �of continuing conf lict and poverty can encourage radicalisation or mobilisation by political f orces that find it convenient to blame external targets for internal woes. O r it can lead simply to criminal activity, such as piracy, on a scale that t hreatens economic activity not just in the region but world-wide.
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The striking experience of the neighbouring countries in North Africa and t he Arabian Peninsula highlights the need for a valid opposition as a necessa ry outlet for the expression of diverse political views and the settling of differences of opinion. These events could bear a political impact on the Ho rn itself or on regional cooperation. The EU will engage in supporting peace ful and prosperous relations for the mutual benefit of countries in the broa der Horn region. As this analysis indicates, the challenges of development are closely linked to those of security, and of finding a political structur e that is both robust and representative. Circumstances need to be taken int o account. Given the scale of the EU�s engagement in the region, in terms of development assistance, trade and links between our peoples, the EU will e nsure continuity and coherence of the different strands of its policies, thr ough more effective engagement. The volatile situation on the ground merits flexibility and the ability to rapidly adapt the EU�s approach and instrumen ts.
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2.��� �EU Engagement
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The EU is heavily engaged in the region, with involvement focused around fi ve main areas: the development partnership, the political dialogue, the re sponse to crises, the management of crises and the trade relationship.
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The institutional foundation of the EU�s relationship with most countries of the region is the
Cotonou Agreement. �This provides for:
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a)����� �a development partnership with financial support through the Europe an Development Fund (EDF) for the individual countries in the form of nation al and regional financial allocations. The 10th EDF, currently under impleme ntation, provides �a total of �2 billion through bilateral support to the Ho rn countries4�and through �a share of �645 million available to four regiona l organisations including IGAD5 for regional projects. National indicative p rogrammes are negotiated with each individual country and include support to rural development and agriculture, infrastructure, governance, education, no n-state actors, trade, private sector development and macro-economic support . Implementation challenges include governance issues (e.g. corruption), abs orption capacity constraints related to the co-management of funds, state fr agility and constraints on the operation of civil society;
�
b)��� �political dialogue not only with the countries of the Horn but also w ith the region
(IGAD).
�
EU development assistance has been linked strongly to the MDGs and implement ed in accordance with the Aid Effectiveness provisions adopted in the Paris Declaration of 2005 and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008).
�
Trade relations between IGAD countries and the EU are governed mainly by the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) provisions of Everything But Arms wh ich provides duty free access to EU markets for almost all products from Lea st Developed Countries (i.e. all but Kenya). The EU negotiates Economic Part nership Agreements (EPAs) with the IGAD countries6�through the East African Community (EAC)7 and Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA).
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Political dialogue is provided for in Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement, but the EU�s political engagement with countries of the Horn goes further th an formal dialogue, as foreseen elsewhere in the Agreement. In Somalia, the EU has firmly guided the Somaliland region towards a sounder democratic pro cess, while in South Central Somalia, the EU has played a key role in encour aging a path towards constitutional rule. The EU has regularly provided support to the electoral processes in countries of the Horn, through assista nce to Electoral Commissions, and through Election Observation Missions, as well as providing technical and training support to the institutional framew ork of the state � courts, justice, administration, financial management and governance. The need to bolster the rule of law, a long term objective of t he Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), is a
key element of political dialogue with the region and this concern also unde rpins the recognition in the Cotonou Agreement that the International Crimin al Court (ICC) is an integral part of the international framework for buildi ng peace and justice. The EU firmly believes that the ICC has an integral p art to play in encouraging international norms of behaviour in conflict and a key role in encouraging conflict avoidance.
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4������������ �Sudan is not eligible for 10th EDF funding but benefits
from �150
million de-committed 9th EDF funds (Council decision 2010/406/EU of 12 July
2010). While Somalia is not a signatory of the Cotonou Agreement, it is elig
ible for 10th EDF funding with the European Commission fulfilling the functi
on of National Authorising Officer �for the country.
5�������� �The others are COMESA, �EAC and the IOC.
6�������� �Except for Somalia.
7�������� �Kenya and Uganda are members.
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In humanitarian response the EU is providing needs based humanitarian assist ance to the people suffering from drought and conflict, including internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, fully in line with the humanitarian p rinciples of neutrality, impartiality and independence. The scale of humanit arian assistance is currently running at over � 760 million for the region a s a whole.
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Crisis response and management has been the fastest growing area of EU engag ement. �It is conducted through the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP ), through the Instrument for Stability (IfS) for e.g. negotiations, mediati on efforts, strengthening of rule of law, direct support to referenda, deliv ery of peace dividends, and in support of RECs' own crisis response and mana gement capacities to make the African Peace and Security Architecture effect ive.
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This is the case in *Somalia* at present. In addition to humanitarian suppor t from ECHO, the EU provides funding for the Transitional Federal Instituti ons through cooperation activities in the governance sector managed by the UN and civil society, for the African Union (AU) mission (AMISOM) through the African Peace Facility, and carries out two CSDP military actions � naval op eration ATALANTA which contributes to containing piracy in the Western India n Ocean and the EU Training Mission (EUTM Somalia) in Uganda which supports the training of Somali National Security Forces in partnership with Uganda a nd the US.
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Similarly, in *Sudan and South Sudan*, the EU has been providing �relief sup port, �as well as accompanying the political process that gave rise to the C omprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Sudan and South Sudan in particular has been working in support of the imple mentation of the CPA and for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Darfur. The EU has provided financial support through the African Peace Facility to the AU Military Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and it also contributed to security and stabilisation in Darfur through its CSDP operation, EUFOR Tchad/RCA8. In South Sudan has become independent, the EU is mobilising its resources in co mmon, and in cooperation with other key donors, to ensure that international support is as coherent and effective in supporting the new state as possible .
�
To complement and support counter-piracy operations, the EU agreed the trans
fer of suspected pirates captured by operation Atalanta with third states
(Kenya, Seychelles and, since 16 July 2011, Mauritius). The EU provides
support through its IfS to prosecution, court, police and prison
services in the three countries. The High Representative sought to promote o wnership and fair burden sharing within the region itself and was pivotal in brokering an East and Southern Africa/Indian Ocean (ESA/IO) regional strateg y for maritime security and against piracy, agreed in Mauritius in October 2010. Support to maritime security is also provided through the EDF.
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In countering terrorism, the EU is actively engaged in dialogue with key par tners and is involved
in setting up a multilateral Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) that incl udes a Horn of Africa working group.9
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Cooperation with the Horn countries to address the adverse effects of climat e change has taken place in the framework of the JAES (partnership 6) through �a continued political dialogue and exchange on tangible measures of adaptat ion and mitigation.
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8������������ �Running from January 2008 to March 2009 in Eastern Chad and N orth Eastern Central
African�Republic.
9�������� �The EU co-chairs this working group.
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In response to migration, the EU provides support to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)'s Regional Protection Programme (RPP) in Kenya, Djibouti and Yemen. The RPP aims to strengthen the protection and enh ance assistance to refugee and asylum seekers, as well as providing border s ecurity and protection from trafficking. Significant EU support is also
provided to Dadaab in Kenya, the largest refugee camp in the world.10�The EU also holds a dialogue with the region to step up cooperation on migration, i n the framework of article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement.
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The EU launched the Horn of Africa Initiative (HoAI) in 2007 to foster regio nal cooperation by assisting the countries of the Horn in working together t o jointly address their common
development challenges that are at the root of many conflicts. In its first phase, the HoAI consists of inter-connectivity infrastructure programmes in energy, transport and water resource management.
�
Building on this engagement and exploiting the opportunities provided for w ith the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the appointment of a High Rep resentative for Foreign and Security Policy and the establishment of the Eur opean External Action Service (EEAS), the EU aims to become both more visibl e and more effective through �a comprehensive approach towards the Horn that will bring together all EU policy strands.
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3.��� �Future directions
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The EU will seek to make its engagement in the Horn more effective through c onsistent, coherent and complementary use of its instruments, reinforcement of its political coordination, and by focusing more clearly on the underlyin g challenges of the region. Guided by the overarching objectives of the 2003 European Security Strategy and its implementation report, the eight partner ships of the JAES and the 2009 EU Policy on the Horn of Africa, the EU's re sponse will be underpinned by the principles of regional ownership and mutua l responsibility, and of supporting the added value of regional cooperation for peaceful coexistence, conflict prevention and resolution and economic in tegration for country level growth.
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In implementing future action, the EU will draw on its array of means: devel opment cooperation through the European Development Fund (EDF) and Member St ates� bilateral programmes, through joint programming in the Horn countries where appropriate, relevant EU budget lines, trade instruments, conflict pre vention and crisis response, including the CSDP, diplomacy, EU Special Repre sentatives (EUSRs), cooperation and dialogue through the Cotonou Agreement. An EUSR for the Horn of Africa will contribute to the enhanced coherence, qu ality, impact and visibility of the EU's action in the region, working in cl ose consultation with the EUSR for Sudan and South Sudan, as well as with re gional and international partners on issues with broader regional implicati ons.
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The EU will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerab le populations in accordance with humanitarian principles.
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In view of the large Horn diaspora living in Europe, its significant economi c role in the flow of capital into the region, but also its socio-political links with the region, the EU will seek to involve the diaspora, where possi ble, as a potential positive resource in achieving its objective.
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The EU acknowledges that there are risk factors which may affect its future action or even impede the achievement of its objective, namely renewed conf lict; drought and humanitarian disaster; and a deterioration of governance.
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10������ �Currently hosts 440,000 refugees.
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To address interlocked challenges and to achieve the objective of peace, sec urity, development and accountable government in the Horn, the EU will work in the following areas:
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1)����� �Democratic and accountable state structures
The development of democratic processes and institutions that contribute to human security and empowerment will be supported through:
���� �promoting respect for constitutional norms, the rule of law, human rig hts, and gender equality through cooperation and dialogue with Horn partners ;
���� �support to security sector reform and the establishment of civilian ov ersight bodies for accountable security institutions in the Horn countries;
���� �implementing the EU human rights policy in the region;
���� �monitoring the follow-up of Electoral Observation Mission (EOM) recomm endations and providing support for their implementation where relevant;
���� �drawing and regularly reviewing Governance Action Plans of Country Str ategies that support the essential elements of the Cotonou Partnership Agree ment;
���� �combating corruption by supporting public finance management reforms;
���� �reinforcing political dialogue at country and regional level, and cont inuing to raise issues of human rights, including wherever appropriate, extr a-judicial killings, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, and the fight agains t impunity;
���� �supporting an independent civil society that is able to express social agendas.
�
2)����� �Peace, security, conflict prevention and resolution
Insecurity in the region and threats to peace stemming from violent conflict in Somalia, conflict in parts of Sudan, including Darfur, and in South Suda n, and latent conflict between countries such as Ethiopia and Eritrea or, ev en, within countries often due to a culture of impunity, or to ethnic, clan or regional grievance and/or access to power require:
���� �working with the region itself and with international partners to tack le the underlying causes of conflict;
���� �support to local, regional or international mediation efforts to resol ve ongoing conflicts, particularly in Somalia and Sudan;
���� �assisting the establishment of the security in Somalia and South Sudan ;
���� �continued support to the implementation of the Djibouti Peace Agreeme nt and its post- transition arrangements, including of the roadmap agreed by key Somali leaders in Mogadishu in September 2011, to build legitimate, repr esentative and credible Somali institutions;
���� �working with partners to create peaceful good neighbourly relations in support of the
AU Border Programme;
���� �encouraging cooperation between Ethiopia and Eritrea and supporting t he full implementation of the Algiers Agreement;
���� �monitoring arms smuggling in the region, particularly into Somalia, S udan and South, and supporting the UN arms embargo monitoring group on Eritr ea and Somalia in line with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2002;
���� �fighting small arms accumulation through support to the Nairobi-based Regional Centre on Small Arms, and promoting coordinated arms control and ma nagement programmes for nomadic tribes across borders;
���� �promoting inter-ethnic understanding and/or reconciliation;
���� �combating impunity through support to transitional justice instituti ons and civil society organisations;
���� �promoting the participation of women in peace processes and mediation efforts, contributing to the implementation of UNSCR �1325 on women, peace a nd security and of UNSCR 1820 in addressing conflict-related sexual violence .
�
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3)����� �Mitigation of the effects of insecurity in the region
Addressing the adverse effects of piracy through the range of relevant instr uments and of other forms of organised crime (e.g. trafficking of humans, weapons and drugs), of terrorism but also the effects of irregular migration � all offshoots of poverty and insecurity in the region � requires:
�
���� �support to the implementation of the Djibouti Code of Conduct;
���� �active support to regional maritime and judiciary capacity building;
���� �regional engagement and coordination with the International Maritime O rganisation
(IMO) to make operational the ESA/IO counter-piracy strategy and action pla
n;
���� �conclusion of transfer agreements with third countries willing to acce pt the transfer of piracy suspects captured by Operation Atalanta;
� ����contributing to the implementation of UNSCR 1976, particularly with a view to �finding a permanent �solution to the judicial treatment of piracy suspects and investigating the financial flows of piracy profits that will l ead to the identification of the instigators of piracy;
���� �coordinating with partners through the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum
(GCTF) on capacity building measures and counter-radicalisation in Somalia a
nd Yemen, and on regional counter-terrorism measures (law enforcement, rule
of law, criminal justice, counter-radicalisation and terrorist financing) in
Kenya and Uganda; developing the link between the external and internal aspe
cts of the EU's security in seeking to implement
its Internal Security Strategy, contributing to global security and promotin g the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
�
4)����� �Poverty reduction, economic growth and prosperity
Supporting better, transparent and accountable institutions, and the develop ment and implementation of suitable policies can benefit the Horn populati ons through:
���� �streamlining Commission-managed and Member States' country-level progr amming of aid;
���� �contributing to alternative livelihoods by job creation and education
(including of long- term refugees in camps);
���� �strengthening resilience to disasters, linking relief, rehabilitation and development
(LRRD) for a long-term perspective;
���� �integrating climate change into development strategies in sectors to support adaptation
� assistance and technical cooperation in food security, drought preparedne ss and water management, promotion of pastoral livelihood activities in the drylands, research in the development of drought resistant and high-yielding crops and livestock, support to appropriate renewable energy sources;
���� �mobilising new resources of financing and revenue (e.g. tax revenue sy stems) and public-private partnerships;
���� �supporting telecommunications/information technology; enhancing trade capacities and making trade conducive to overall development objectives.
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5)����� �Regional cooperation
An environment conducive to cooperation that can equally benefit from existi ng informal crossing of borders as from ethnic and cultural similarities is an important aspect of preventive diplomacy at the regional level. Seeking t o foster regional integration, integration of the region into the global ec onomy and regional cooperation to address common development constraints, t he EU will:
���� �coordinate national and regional dialogues across the Horn countries so that they are mutually reinforcing;
���� �work with IGAD, the Community for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 11 and
EAC to promote their initiative for a 'tripartite' political and trade integ ration process with the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and support regional integration and growth through EPAs;
���� �reinforce the RECs' institutional link with the AU and with the Easter n African Standby
Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM) for peace and security cooperation;
���� �co-host a donors'/investors' conference to implement HoAI interconnect ivity programmes, e.g. the Berbera Corridor;
���� �seek to expand the HoAI to other areas of cross-border cooperation (e. g. expanding IGAD�s Early Warning Mechanism from detecting cross-border past oralist conflicts to including counter-terrorism and trafficking);
���� �use the HoAI's regional water platform to promote cooperation in the m anagement of the Nile waters, and promote cooperation in hydropower investme nt and irrigation of the riparian countries;
���� �continue to assist IGAD's Secretariat perform its role in promoting re gional integration and development.
�
4. Partnerships
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The EU will pursue its objectives in the region through strengthening a seri es of existing partnerships and through building new partnerships
���� �with the countries of the region and civil society, through the Cot onou Agreement, trade, the CSDP and mediation, for the ownership, better und erstanding and sustainability of processes and developments in the region, but also with the countries of the Arabian peninsula, in particular Yemen wh ose proximity and historical ties with the Horn region mean that development s and challenges spill out across the Bab-el- Mandeb strait;
���� �with third countries in capacity building on the rule of law, criminal justice, counter- radicalisation, terrorist financing in the region and conf lict resolution;
���� �with regional and international organisations, especially the AU and t
he UN, but also with COMESA, EAC and IGAD on regional cooperation e.g. in t
rade, conflict prevention and other areas of mutual concern, the Nile Basin
Initiative Secretariat on resource management, and the League of Arab States
(LAS)12, with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund �plus the Afric
an Development Bank and NGOs on development and peacebuilding issues, with t
he IMO, the UN Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC), �the International Police
Organisation (INTERPOL), the European Police Office (EUROPOL), the UN Contac
t Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and, where appropriate, NATO on c
ounter-piracy and rule of law cooperation.
�
11���������� �All the Horn countries but Somalia are COMESA �members.
12������ �Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan are LAS members.
5. Monitoring and follow-up
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The implementation of our Strategic Framework should be the object of regula r review by the relevant Council bodies. Such a review will be initiated one year after the Framework �has been adopted through a report to be submitted to the PSC."
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