Date: Fri, 9 Dec 2011 23:57:00 +0100
Hegemonic agenda in the Horn of Africa
How Kenya's invasion of Somalia is a foreign project
Abdi Dirshe
2011-12-10, Issue <http://www.pambazuka.org/en/issue/562> 562
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The illegal invasion of Somalia exposes Kenya as a client state in the US
empire building agenda, argues Abdi Dirshe. While political elites benefit
from aid as a reward for their proxy status in the war against terrorism,
the people will pay dearly for it.
'For all students of human society, sympathy with the victims of historical
processes and skepticism about the victor's claims provide essential
safeguards against being taken in by the dominant mythology.' -Barrington
Moore
With much bravado and arrogance, Kenya declared invasion of Somalia on
October 18, 2011 in what it justifies as 'a hot pursuit of al-Shabaab'.
Several kidnappings of foreign tourists and several other shootings along
the Kenyan border with Somalia presumably by al-Shabab led to the decision
to engage full military invasion of Somalia to 'inflict trauma' on
al-Shabab, according to the Kenyan authorities. Kenya invokes Article 51 of
the UN Charter, which allows all countries to defend themselves against an
armed attack by another state. In this perspective, Kenya's claim of
pursuing a terrorist group contradicts the letter and the spirit of Article
51.
Kenya is not attacked by Somalia, so Article 51 can't be applied in this
situation as confirmed by the International Court of Justice 2005 Advisory
Opinion in the DRC v. Uganda Case (Democratic Republic of Congo V. Uganda,
2005 ICJ (Dec. 19)). Al-Shabab is erroneously used as a legitimating factor
for the invasion of Somalia without any legal basis. In this view, Kenyan
leadership could be charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity as a
result of civilian deaths caused by Kenyan military invasion. Moreover, this
action underscores the rapidly deteriorating international approach of the
Somali conflict and the intricate political choices Somalis have to make.
In this context, the presence of the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM) represents the collective choice of the African Union, EU, US, and
the UN with regards to the political crisis in Somalia and the war against
al-Shabab. Similarly, the Somali people have a shared resolve to defeat
al-Shabab but in the face of the Kenyan aggression against the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Somalia, all bets are off and we may see
renewed support for al-Shabab as happened during the Ethiopian invasion in
2006. However, it is pertinent to point out that the Kenyan invasion is ill
timed as it takes place while al-Shabab's leadership is in disarray as they
had suffered a deeply humiliating defeat in Mogadishu in the hands of the
African Union and Somali forces. The tide against al-Shabab is significantly
tied to the vast public support in Somalia for the defeat and elimination of
al-Shabab for its violence against the civilian populations.
Moreover, since the collapse of the central State of Somalia in 1991, the
Somali community in Kenya has been growing significantly and many Somalis
have established their businesses there, bringing a relatively cordial
relationship between the Kenyan and Somali people. For the political class
of Kenya to claim that they are invading Somalia to prevent kidnappings in
Kenya contradicts the interest of the two states and the action is
politically dangerous and costly in the long-term for both Kenya and
Somalia. At present, Somalia is facing haunting massive economic and
political crises in which many people are dying from hunger and many more
are displaced by endless wars. This invasion imposes new restrictions on the
movement of refugees who are fleeing from these multiple threats which, if
not eased immediately, may lead to significant loss of life. Similarly,
Kenya's confusion over its war aims emanates from, in part, the deep
divisions within the elites and the fact that key international actors have
divergent strategic objectives in the Horn of Africa that are designed to
control the political decision-making processes in these countries.
In this context, recent events in Kenya can only be explained in conjunction
with the broader globalisation agenda that informs particular foreign
policy. As Robinson (1996) explains, after the end of the Cold War 'diverse
forces battle to reshape political and economic structures as a new world
order emerges'. He argues that the focus increasingly shifted from 'power
concepts' to 'transnationalisation of civil society and of political
processes'. This means that new political and social relations are formed to
assist the emergence of a single global society in which no hostile or power
vacuums are acceptable like those in 'Somalia, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and the
former Libya' as disclosed by General Wesley Clark of the United States. In
this perspective, the invasion of Somalia by Kenya can only be understood
'as part of a broader process of the exercise of hegemony' where Kenya and
Somalia are less significant in the overall strategic objective.
This analysis seeks to discover the intricate emerging political class in
East Africa and their participation in reshaping this region as part of the
broader hegemonic agenda. Moreover, this analysis intends to explore crucial
policy options for Kenya and Somalia to prevent extensive bloodshed in their
pursuit of internal security and economic progress. In conclusion, I'll
present a compelling argument that presents alternative policy options in
support of a lasting political solution in Somalia, which doesn't threaten
continued regional stability and also leads to regional security
cooperation.
WRONG WAR STRATEGY
Kenya fails to consistently clarify the goals of its military adventure in
Somalia. The Guardian (Nov. 8, 2011) reports that this invasion was planned
long before with military advice from Western states. 'Several sources
agree, however, that the Kenyan intervention plan was discussed and decided
in 2010, then finalised with input from western partners, including the US
and to a lesser extent France. Nairobi seems to have seized on kidnappings
of foreign nationals by Somali groups on Kenyan territory as an excuse to
launch an operation ready and waiting.' The rationale behind the Kenyan
invasion of Somalia is to control parts of Somalia for political and
economic motives. More importantly though, it is part of the broader US
strategy to presumably 'promote stability and prevail over extremism' in
this region in its war on terrorism and to bring the countries in the region
under its political domain. In this view, for the US war has been
strategically essential for the promotion of these ideals.
The current aggression against the Somali state is promoted by the US and
Kenya as a limited security measure. However, this war is seriously flawed
as its objectives may lead to a greater humanitarian disaster in Somalia and
will surely spur new tensions between the Somali and Kenyan people. As
Stoessinger (2011) puts it, war is a manifestation of organised insanity and
sickness. In this context, those who wage war insanely believe that it would
lead to successful resolution. This notion, Stoessinger advises, goes
against the reality of war as he illustrates that 'no nation that began a
major war in this century emerged a winner'. In this context, Hitler of
Germany, Saddam Hussein of Iraq and Milosevic of former Yugoslavia are all
examples of aggressions that failed to achieve their objectives.
Inadvertently, Kenya has succumbed to this temptation and has become fully
merged with the US cause and accepts the conceptualization of US security
framework.
In this perspective, Kenya has joined the US in its treatment of
international law as what Bobbitt calls as 'an inconvenient obstacle' to be
cast aside to pursue its state interest as it violates Article 2 (4) of the
United Nations Charter and gravely misrepresents Article 51 in its claim to
have the right to invade Somalia according to this article. From the US
security perspective, Somalia poses a great challenge as it is considered to
host multiple threats to US interest including a political vacuum that
offers bases for terrorism and piracy that threatens international trade.
Moreover, the Somali people have endured continued violence internally and
suffered from complex political crises owing to external interference and
military interventions for two decades. As a result, Somalia has become the
object of contradictory international policy instruments; all seeking to,
simultaneously, resolve humanitarian, political, social, economic, and
security issues.
In this effort, the US has effectively enlisted the support of the countries
surrounding Somalia to assist the US policy towards Somalia. These are
Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti where the US has been building military bases
such as Manda Bay in Kenya, Camp Lemonier in Djibouti and the remote
southern Ethiopia airfield in Arba Minch where Reaper drones are flown to
attack targets in Southern Somalia at present. In this context, the mission
to deal with the 'Somalia problem' as the State Department describes it has
created a joint battle by all government agencies in these countries,
military and non-military actors. As the US government increased its Foreign
Military Financing program (FMF), the countries surrounding Somalia have
also received large military financial assistance as part of
counterterrorism funding according to the US Defence Department.
Kenya has, for example, received an increase of 'roughly 15 times its
previous value' for its cooperation, and its military receives free
education at military academies in the US, making sure that Kenyan forces
become more effective in combat missions in Somalia. Kenya has been a key US
military partner and major military assistance recipient since the 1998 twin
bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The formation of military and
intelligence cooperation with the countries surrounding Somalia makes US
operation in Somalia relatively inexpensive and obscures its military
footprints while it guarantees unsurpassed military presence in the Horn of
Africa. However, according to the Arms Trade Resource Center, this means
that more violence is likely to engulf the countries involved. Countries
that have received weapons and military training during the Cold War from
the US have 'experienced violent conflict and, in fact, many of the top US
arms clients of the Cold War - Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and Zaire (now the
DRC) - have turned out to be the top basket cases of the 1990s in terms of
violence, instability and economic collapse.' The Cato Institute presents a
more 'disconcerting' picture as it draws our attention to a study conducted
by the US Army's Strategic Studies Institute (2008) in which it asserts that
'a well-trained and armed (African) force of elite soldiers' trained by US
military become a threat to their own countries as soon as the 'US withdraws
(financial) support for its SSR programs and funding.'
While the Cold War strategy was to defeat communism and propping up
repressive governments was a small price to pay in the minds of policy
makers, it is becoming awfully clear that, while the objective now is to
secure democracy and good governance, Africa is in repression and human
rights violations abound. Military assistance in Africa has a predictable
outcome, according to Arms Trade Resource Center. 'Often, the US offered
weapons and military assistance to repressive governments with one hand
while raising the other in the name of securing democracy and promoting
stability. Inevitably, somewhere down the line the regime collapses, and US
policy makers are left struggling to re-write their lines. Once a new
government takes power, the cycle re-emerges with the same old offers of US
military training to help secure democracy.'
>From this perspective, the US military assistance will likely result in the
disintegration of the current establishments in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti
and the likelihood of civil war increases. Moreover, Kenya's invasion of
Somalia underlines a growing concern that this military escapade is likely
to lead to the radicalization of the Somali people and a bloody blowback as
a consequence. There are growing tensions already in Nairobi and other
cities in Kenya. The US State Department is warning its citizens to be alert
in that part of the world.
SECURING PEACE AT HOME
Today the discourse on human security revolves around two perceived threats.
>From the Western perspective, the usual suspects are in the developing world
and view threats by non-state actors such terrorist organisations, piracy,
migration, and transnational organized crime demand strong 'military,
economic and political intervention (Duffield and Waddel 2006). In contrast,
there are those who advocate that security be linked to global economic
justice and hold the view that 'freedom from fear and violence' will not be
achieved as long as the gap between poor and rich is growing. Similarly,
following the tragic 11 September 2001 attacks, many scholars and US
officials have encouraged increased development assistance to the developing
world as they concluded that there was a strong connection between poverty
and terrorism (Laura Tyson 2001).
Others (Kreuger and Maleckova, 2003) have suggested that terrorism is 'a
response to political conditions and long-standing feelings of indignity and
frustration.' This means that political persecution and lack of freedom in
the hands of dictators and puppets lead to anger, dissent, rebellion and
sometimes terrorism. Since its independence in 1963, Kenya has maintained
close relations with the Western world and had been impacted by the growing
economic globalisation and political liberalisation agenda. Due to donor
conditions, Kenya has adopted many of the international organizations'
development schemes to deal with its human security needs. These included a
range of international projects including food security, HIV, corruption,
organised crime, conflict management and host of other schemes. However,
Brown (2003) argues that 'donor-sponsored political liberalisation
indirectly resulted in the rise of 'ethnic clashes' in Kenya.
In addition, Brown asserts that the Kenyan state has not only failed to
provide security to its people, it has actively participated and sometimes
'instigated much of the violence in the country. Ethnic clashes have spiked
since 1990 and 'resulted in the deaths and displacement of thousands of
people.' On August 7, 1998 the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam
were bombed by al-Qaeda terrorist group. Following the attack, Kenya has
been officially added to the US Anti-terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program
(Whitaker 2008), making Kenya a partner in the struggle against terrorism.
The purpose was to assist Kenya with its domestic security threats but
everything changed after 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks inside the
United States. Kenya has become a key African ally in the war on terror. The
Bush Administration's 2002 security strategy characterised Kenya as an
'anchor for regional engagement' (New York Times, 20 September 2002).
But many Kenyans remain sceptical about the outcome of the war on terror and
blame the US for the increasing terrorism in Kenya. Whitaker (2008) asserts
that many in Kenya believe that they are victims of America's
counter-terrorism policy. Kenya has a large Muslim population which is an
integral part of the Kenyan society and since the onset of the war on
terror, tensions between the Muslims and non-Muslims are on the rise.
Similarly, Lind & Howell (2010) conclude that many Kenyans believe that
their leaders are 'forced to cooperate'. The invasion of Somalia by Kenya
raises important questions. Given that Kenya has serious security
shortcomings, how can invading Somalia help the domestic security vacuum in
Kenya? The Economist (10 August 2002) has concluded that crime rates in
Nairobi are 'worse than in notoriously dangerous central Johannesburg'.
CONCLUSION
The current invasion of Kenya is of great concern from security perspective
for both Somalia and Kenya, but even more so for Somalia in particular as
this spurs 'a devolutionary cycle', to borrow Dr. Weinstein's insightful
analysis with regards to this unending crises in Somalia, whereby external
forces with divergent and sometimes convergent interests re-escalate the
crises in Somalia whenever a solution is feasible and nearer. This illegal
Kenyan invasion reignites al-Shabab's resolve and gives respite to the
losing al-Shabab as the wider Somali public grows more cynical with unending
foreign intervention.
With respect to the legality of the invasion, it is obvious that the
justification given for the invasion of Somalia speaks volumes of the
unspeakable misconduct of the Kenyan regime. In its pursuit of terrorist
forces in Somalia, Kenya fails to apply 'right reasons' under international
law with regard to the exercise of 'the right to self-defense' by
misrepresenting Article 51 of the UN Charter and criminally using
disproportional force in its attacks of civilian populations and
non-military facilities inside Somalia. The Article 51 of the UN Charter is
not open-ended and allows states to fend off an imminent military invasion
with consultation and guidance of the Security Council. This means that
there must be practical grounds to engage in military battle but only for
defensive principles, and only when you are in pursuit of enemy combatant.
Moreover, there must be an exit schedule under international law.
With this illegal invasion Kenya has used its military muscle to invade
another sovereign nation and is inside Somalia more than a month after its
forces crossed in; that is not pursuit of al-Shabab but an illegal invasion
of killing and maiming innocent civilians inside Somalia and the silence of
the international community gives a tacit support for the invasion which
equally amounts to violations against innocent civilians and is as guilty as
Kenya. Cahill (1996) referring to the former UN Under-Secretary-General for
Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Eliasson, writes that, 'prevention of conflicts is
a moral imperative in today's world . it is a political necessity for the
credibility of international cooperation, in particular for the UN.' Given
that the UN through its UNPOS in Kenya is witnessing all of this but failing
to condemn, the credibility of the world community is undermined and the
Somali people are rightly becoming more resistant to any international
solution.
Moreover, it is important to look at the invasion through the lens of empire
building agenda, as the USA uses Kenya as one of its client states in the
war against terrorism - in essence the US is coercing Kenya for its global
agenda just as it is using other draconian states and dictators as clients
in its fight against terrorism. Kenyan, Ethiopian, and Djiboutian political
class benefit from aid flows as a reward for their proxy status in the war
against terrorism and their allegiance to Washington. However, the people in
the Horn of Africa will pay a hefty price as increased military assistance
and militarisation of the region will lead to greater instability and civil
strife.
Stability in the region can be achieved through a genuine peace building
initiative in Somalia in which the Somali people are assisted to pursue a
restoration of law and order, a free society characterised by independent
media and judiciary and a government accountable to its citizens. Al-Shabab
is no match to a Somali people united for the common good, but this
potential is weakened by the constant external interventions that continue
to recreate and strengthen groups like al-Shabab and the warlords who
continually pose an existential threat to the Somali State. In contrast, a
strong democratic Somali tate poses no threat to international security and
stability.
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