Ethiopia: Meles rules from beyond the grave, but for how long?
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/author/ren%C3%A9-lefort> René Lefort
27, November 2012
The trade-off offered by authoritarianism to its client-constituents is
security and high growth rates. After Meles challenges may force change, or
build the case domestically for a new strong man.
Meles Zenawi, the former Prime Minister of Ethiopia, has been dead for
around three months. But the “Melesmania” personality cult, though discreet
in his lifetime, shows no sign of fading. From giant portraits in the
streets to stickers on the windscreens of almost any vehicle, a smiling
Meles is still everywhere.
The sudden death of Meles shook the whole of Ethiopia. The shock quickly
gave way to fear of an unknown and threatening future.
The regime did everything to exploit this fear for its own benefit. It has
issued continuous calls for the nation to unite around the memory of the
dead leader and, above all, around the project he designed and imposed with
an iron hand. The new Prime Minister, Hailemariam Selassie,
<
http://www.insideethiopia.net/,23-39-50/01-01-0001.htm> endlessly repeats
that he will pursue “Meles’s legacy without any change”. He has replaced not
a single cabinet minister. It could be said that the regime is running on
autopilot, with the Meles software driving the leadership computer. Plunged
into disarray, the governing team is hanging on to this software like a
lifebelt. Why?
The making of Melesmania
Until the crisis of 2001, the handful of leaders of the Tigrayan People’s
Liberation Front (TPLF), the dominant force in the Ethiopian People’s
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in power since 1991,
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/ren%C3%A9-lefort/ethiopia-meles-r
ules-from-beyond-grave-but-for-how-long#_ftn1> [1] worked in a remarkably
collective way. Within this group Meles was – and not always – the primus
inter pares, surrounded by strong, clever and articulate figures united by a
radical Marxism. The crisis culminated in the expulsion of most of these
figures, in a massive purge and finally in a threefold power shift.
The first shift saw Meles emerge as the unchallenged supremo, moving quickly
to clip the wings of the few leaders who seemed to be acquiring a solid
political base. He promoted only those whose loyalty he considered
unshakeable, whose positions depended entirely on his goodwill, people like
Hailemariam Dessalegn. Radiating outwards from a first circle of “advisers”,
almost all Tigrayan, all the lines of real power penetrated down to the base
of the State apparatus, whether federal or regional,
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/ren%C3%A9-lefort/ethiopia-meles-r
ules-from-beyond-grave-but-for-how-long#_ftn2> [2] to the Party and to
whole sectors of the economy.
Although the government reflected the country’s ethnic diversity, most
ministers had authority only in name. Parliament, as it had since 1991,
remained a rubberstamp chamber. No institution was able to escape this
dominance and achieve autonomy. Moreover, this personal power was also
intellectual. The one politically correct doctrine (“revolutionary
democracy” and the “developmental state”) was devised and imposed on the
country by Meles and Meles alone. This monopoly prevented the emergence of
any other body of ideas and, inevitably, of any alternative line of
thinking.
The army and security services were represented within this central
authority, which held sway over them. Later, although Meles Zenawi
maintained a grip on the security forces, the army gradually became
“bunkerized”, a sort of state within the State. Meles himself had to
acknowledge the autonomy of the military command, by agreeing a kind of
pact: I will grant you substantial autonomy, and in particular turn a blind
eye to your wheeling and dealing; you support me, especially since if I
fall, you fall with me. Hence, no doubt, the remarked upon reticence of the
army during the recent period of succession, as if it felt so powerful that
its fortress would remain impregnable, away from the turbulent currents
within the new governing team. Hence, also, the procedure followed in
announcing, on September 12, the appointment of 37 new generals – including
at least 23 from Tigray – a reminder that no one, not even Hailamariam
Dessalegn, can interfere in the affairs of the military.
The third change concerned the TPLF and, concomitantly, the EPRDF. It was
contradictory. On the one hand, the tentacles of the single party penetrate
to every level of the administration: it has consumed the State from the
inside. Its agenda takes absolute precedence. The TPLF holds the key
positions in the nationalised companies and the web of “private” firms that
in reality it controls, the so-called “parastatal companies”. Overall, this
structure accounts for two thirds of the modern economy, excluding
traditional agriculture. With its 5 million members – 300,000 in 2001 – the
Party controls and directs the population as never before, right down to the
smallest echelon of five or six households. On the other hand, the Party has
been marginalised as a political institution and therefore left lifeless, if
not brainless. The TPLF, not to mention the three other satellite parties,
were reduced to mere instruments for the exercise of Meles’ personal power,
an essential institution but nevertheless no more than an instrument.
This extreme concentration of multifarious powers in the hands of Meles
Zenawi is one of the darkest aspects of his legacy: his death leaves a
profound and multifaceted vacuum. Conversely, however, it also opens up an
exceptional opportunity for change. First, politics and power, like nature,
abhor a vacuum. Second, the Meles “model” is running out of steam. It will
inevitably have to be refashioned.
Challenging the regime to change
Contestation from the Muslim opposition poses the most immediate challenge,
perhaps the most serious for the regime since 1991. In order to counter what
it sees as the rise of radical Islam, it is
<
http://www.ethiopianreview.com/content/42432> seeking to impose a
“moderate” but completely marginal Islamic doctrine and to back its
affiliates within the Islamic Affairs Supreme Council. Thirty-five percent
of the population is officially Muslim
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/ren%C3%A9-lefort/ethiopia-meles-r
ules-from-beyond-grave-but-for-how-long#_ftn3> [3] – the real figure is
probably higher – along with around half of the Oromos, who also have strong
aspirations to autonomy. Muslims, the vast majority of whom reject extremism
of any kind, are calling – peacefully – for nothing more than the right to
decide their religious affairs for themselves. The government is responding
by
<
http://www.ethioherald.com/2012/11/02/ethiopia-muslims-rally-on-fridays-as-
tension-rises-ktvl/> repression. The stakes are huge: protest continues; so
far, the government has never been ready to lose control of a large “civil
society” organisation.
For a whole section of opinion, in particular within the diaspora, the major
challenge that the regime will need to tackle and which will inevitably
demand change is
<
http://www.currentanalyst.com/index.php/security-assessment/179-meles-zenaw
i-and-the-ethiopian-state> “the widespread democratic aspiration of
Ethiopians”. But the scope and nature of this aspiration is open to
question. The traditional and historical culture, which permeates the
overwhelming majority of Ethiopian society, is still hierarchical and
authoritarian. It is in perfect harmony with the “communist engineering”
that moulded the TPLF from its inception and still shapes the ruling power.
With very few exceptions, the demand for a “strong leader”, who guarantees
“peace and security”, is a national constant. Weak leadership opens the door
to power struggles, which inevitably leads to “disorder” and the suffering
that arises from it. Even the emerging middle class, usually seen as the
spearhead of opposition to authoritarian regimes, largely shares this view.
Whatever its criticisms of the regime, it desires stability above all. It
largely believes that the country is too divided to undergo profound change
without the risk of tragic turmoil.
Nevertheless, the aspiration for change is undeniable, though within certain
limits. These relate first to inflation, which in September hit a peak of
40% overall, and 50% for food.
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/ren%C3%A9-lefort/ethiopia-meles-r
ules-from-beyond-grave-but-for-how-long#_ftn4> [4] More profoundly, in this
urban middle class and in the emerging group of “kulaks” in the countryside,
this aspiration centres around what might be called personal professional
empowerment, in other words: “let us go about our business as we want”,
without the constant intervention and intrusion of the authorities, without
having to swear fealty to the Party, without arbitrariness exacerbated by
erratic and opaque regulations.
However, this change is not simply a matter of aspiration. Although the
“developmental state”, in its current form, has brought remarkable progress,
it has reached its limits. The first question concerns the reality of its
achievements, notably the famous “double digit growth” since 2004, which the
authorities constantly extol.
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/ren%C3%A9-lefort/ethiopia-meles-r
ules-from-beyond-grave-but-for-how-long#_ftn5> [5] In fact, this figure is
the product of a vicious circle. The government sets absurdly ambitious
targets. The work of every public servant is assessed against those targets.
Their careers depend on it. And of course, they claim to have achieved them.
Then the targets are raised again. Once again, they claim to have met them.
The lie becomes institutionalised. The gap between basic national realities
and the image that the authorities perceive and communicate, from summit to
base, has become so great that it could be said that Ethiopia has turn out
to be not so much a Potemkin village, as a Potemkin country. Sooner or
later, the authorities will have to deal with the shockwave that results
when the truth inevitably comes out.
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/ren%C3%A9-lefort/ethiopia-meles-r
ules-from-beyond-grave-but-for-how-long#_ftn6> [6]
Another shock will arise from the unsustainability of the funding of the
developmental state. The government will no longer be able to invest enough
to maintain growth at the same high levels as in recent years, unless it
continues to print money, further fuelling inflation, or alternatively runs
a continuing trade deficit, exacerbating its foreign currency crisis. But
apart from stability, high growth is all the regime can offer in return for
its authoritarianism. This is particularly true for the middle classes,
which the regime wants as its constituency.
This is all the more significant because in the last generation the land has
reached saturation point. Smallholder agriculture (employing four fifths of
the workforce) is absolutely unable to absorb the 2 to 2.5 million young
people who enter the labour market every year. Only massive private
investment, mainly from abroad, can take up the slack.
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/ren%C3%A9-lefort/ethiopia-meles-r
ules-from-beyond-grave-but-for-how-long#_ftn7> [7] However, this investment
is slow to come because the Ethiopian-style developmental state distorts and
inhibits normal market mechanisms too much for investors to be able to enjoy
the entrepreneurial freedom they find elsewhere.
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/ren%C3%A9-lefort/ethiopia-meles-r
ules-from-beyond-grave-but-for-how-long#_ftn8> [8]
Finally, the future of the Ethiopian-style developmental state is
interlocked with the “national question”, whether in regard to the
unresolved legacy of the conquest and submission of the borders of the
Abyssinian empire at the turn of the 20th century, or to the unequal
distribution of powers and assets in favour of the Tigrayans. The Ogaden
National Liberation Front continues its armed struggle. The Oromo Liberation
Front, although militarily a spent force, retains a large following.
After long containment, centrifugal forces are intensifying. The Oromo and
Amhara elites in particular want a fairer balance. Two recent examples give
a flavour of the tensions. The Oromo party does not want the chairman that
the leadership wants to impose on it, but cannot impose the chairman that it
wants. This deadlock was unthinkable when it was under Meles’ orders.
Regions are beginning to demand a more tangible application of the federal
system, in other words the beginnings of genuine autonomy, starting with…
Tigray. However, in its current form, the ultra-centralism of the interwoven
developmental state and revolutionary democracy is incompatible with
authentic federalism.
To reshape either would threaten the very essence of power in Ethiopia, and
its immemorial imperative: to control. This entails maintaining a constant
and intrusive hold over the whole of society, with a single, ultimate and
supreme goal: to retain power.
End of the "Meles line"? Four scenarios
However, the writing is on the wall. The “Meles line” will not always have
an answer for everything. Forthcoming events will demand change, even the
partial rejection of that line. An accumulation of tensions and conflicts,
kept in check by Meles’ iron grip, will inevitably emerge. The floodgates
are beginning to open. Never before, for example, has a major newspaper,
whose survival depends on continuous self-censorship, dared to go so far in
its criticism of the EPRDF. Beginning with a statement of fact – that the
Front does not have “a popular base and support” – The Reporter then
<
http://thereporterethiopia.com/Editorial/cleaning-up-house-critical-for-epr
df.html> calls on the party “to clean up its house” because “it is riddled
with corruption from top to bottom!”. A change of direction and a
reshuffling of the cards seem inevitable. In my view, there are four
possible ways these changes could go.
In one scenario, the current leaders, who largely equate to the dominant
oligarchy, cling to their positions and privileges. Economic, social and
political tensions rise. They respond with more repression, for which all
the necessary instruments are in place. However, this does seem a likely
scenario. According to confidences shared with people close to them, most
are convinced that Meles’ death signals the end of an era and that the
status quo is untenable.
A second possibility that cannot be completely ruled out, despite the leaden
weight that bears down on society and the intense fear it arouses, is a
popular, spontaneous and unforeseeable explosion, triggered by a minor
incident, spreading like wildfire, fuelled by social and, in particular,
ethnic tensions. The regime would spare no effort to suppress it, but
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/ren%C3%A9-lefort/beka-enough-will-ethiopia-be-
next> could ultimately be overwhelmed by events.
In the developmental state, government revenues are certainly centralised at
the top, but then largely redistributed to implement a long-term development
plan, although this redistribution is becoming increasingly limited as
corruption rises. Meles was the final guarantor of this redistributive
process. Who, what political force, what counterbalancing element could
protect Ethiopia from the predatory evolution observed in so many developing
countries, in particular those where a “revolutionary elite” holds all the
levers of power (in black Africa, for example, Angola or Mozambique)? In
this third scenario, these revenues would continue to be centralised but
would remain mostly with the central oligarchy, the residue being
redistributed through a structure of cronyism. Growth could continue at a
sufficient level for the oligarchic regime to survive, but “development”
would fall by the wayside.
In the fourth scenario, this party/state control would be relaxed, obviously
not to the point of genuine democratisation, but through some liberalisation
in the economic sphere. More or less the Chinese “model”. Circumstances and
events favour this scenario. Meles’ death has led to a fragmentation of
power centres, which are weakly structured and cancel each other out,
because none at this stage is in a position to take a lead. For example, no
agreement could be reached on filling the only vacant cabinet post, that of
Minister of Foreign Affairs. And for weeks no one was able to force Azeb
Mesfin, wife of the late prime minister, to leave the National Palace, where
she no longer had any reason to remain.
Contest at the top
The TPLF’s current leadership no longer has the intellectual capacity or
sufficiently strong personalities to become what historically it was, at
least in the short term: the epicentre of power, exercising full political
hegemony. It has also been weakened by its many divisions. Divisions between
“hardliners”, holding fast to their historic dominance, and “moderates”, for
whom a relaxation is unavoidable; between Tigreans in Tigray and those
outside; between generations, the “old timers” and the “fortysomethings”.
The former include many who, sidelined by Meles in the name of generational
change, want to get back into the game. However, they are old, and even in
many cases physically enfeebled. The second group, recently promoted by
Meles, and much less political than technocratic, individualistic,
opportunistic and even – according to their detractors – cynical, have no
intention of giving ground.
Two major factions can also be identified: one that the major losers of 2001
want to build (including Siye Abraha and Gebru Asrat,
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/ren%C3%A9-lefort/ethiopia-meles-r
ules-from-beyond-grave-but-for-how-long#_ftn9> [9] who are still very
popular with rank-and-file members of the Front), the other centred around
its patriarch, Shebat Nega, a master schemer and long-time mentor of Meles
before the latter marginalised him.
And finally, there is the enigma Azeb Mesfin. Fiery and unpredictable, she
was the main troublemaker in the succession process, the leading figure in
the minority that opposed the appointment of Hailemariam Dessalegn. She
holds a strong hand, including an intimate understanding of the strengths
and weaknesses of all the players, close links with the security services,
leadership of the TPLF’s economic conglomerate and supporters amongst cadres
of the Front, those who would have the most to lose if the cards were
reshuffled.
A few other names stand out from the pack. The intelligent and highly
respected Arkebe Enquay won more votes than Meles at the 2008 TPLF
conference, but lost out in 2010. Debretsion Gebremichael is seen as the
Front’s rising star. This young engineering graduate, a senior figure in the
security services, has a reputation as a hardliner. His sudden promotion to
number two in the Front is all the more significant in that the titular
number one, Abay Wolde, is widely perceived as something of a cipher. And
then finally, there are a pair of Amhara party bosses, Addissu Leguesse, its
former chairman, and the ever-present Berket Simon, who was also very close
to Meles.
However, understanding the game being played out at the top is exceptionally
difficult, and not only because of the wall of secrecy around it. A
political analysis provides only a small part of the picture. Much more
important now are each player’s economic positions – since most of the
leaders also have their own businesses – the very close family ties within
the Tigrayan elite, geographical origins, personal friendships and enmities.
The web these form is virtually impossible to untangle.
Nonetheless, three dominant poles seem to be emerging: the brainless but
still tentacular TPLF, and the security services with their osmotic
relations with certain leaders of the Front; the army, closely intertwined
with the TPLF, though more ethnically than institutionally; and finally, the
new Prime Minister.
Hailemarian Dessalegn has taken great care to
<
http://article.wn.com/view/2012/09/21/Ethiopias_Hailemariam_Desalegn_sworn_
in_as_prime_minister/> stress his desire “to work on the basis of collective
leadership”. In fact, within the small fringe of public opinion that has a
view on the matter, he is seen almost unanimously as a transitional prime
minister, a sort of regent accountable to what might be described as a
“regency committee” comprising, according to sources, four to six members,
all from the old guard and all but one from Tigray. The view is that
Hailemariam’s interim mandate will end once the TPLF has finally designated
the real successor. For the Front’s supremacy is still perceived as
irrevocable and the history of Ethiopia as immutable: “collective
leaderships” are temporary and unfailingly end with the ascent of a new
“strong leader”.
A renewal of the authoritarian compact?
At 47, Dessalegn has stated that he wants to remain in post at least until
the 2015 selections, and even that he may seek re-election. He is said to be
intelligent, open, unshakeable in his principles, possessed of great natural
authority. He appears as a Meles clone in terms of policy. But no one knows
if he would be able to go his own way, develop his own doctrine, be his own
man. He belongs to none of the three big ethnic groups. He is a Protestant.
No Ethiopian leader has ever had to overcome these two handicaps. Could
Medvedev step into Putin’s shoes?
His trump card is his twofold legitimacy. The first legitimacy he owes to
Meles. Even his putative rivals, particularly within the TPLF, cannot at
this stage contest this without undermining other aspects of the “great
leader’s” legacy. It is doubtful that they would do so as long as Meles’
long shadow lies across the political stage. In addition, it is this legacy
that continues to bind and guide the current leadership. And finally, it is
this that they need to use to legitimise the maintenance of their current
positions.
The second source of legitimacy is more deep-rooted and lasting. “The ruling
king is my king”, as the saying goes. The whole country is impregnated with
an ancestral sense of hierarchy, of submission to established authority. The
aspiration for an incontestable and uncontested leader is strong.
Hailemariam Dessalegn is now simultaneously executive leader and chair of
what is essentially the single party, and therefore, at least in name, also
heads the TPLF, the army and the security services. In this capacity, he has
his hands on virtually all the institutional levers of power. These levers
are not only intrinsic; their strength is also significantly increased by
this ancestral sense of hierarchy. Finally, he stands at the summit of the
infrastructure of absolute power passed on intact by Meles.
The forces facing him, for the moment at least, are disunited, scattered and
disparate. There is no tangible, structured counterforce, underpinned by a
strong base and possessing a strategy commensurate with the challenges. The
army is in its bunker, but there is no reason why he should not find the
same modus vivendi with it as Meles, especially as there is no sign of a
Bonaparte waiting in the wings.
Finally, Hailemariam Dessalegn has the time to patiently forge his own
position, if he has the capacity. There does not seem to be any single
figure strong enough to open hostilities in the near future, or adventurous
enough to take the country into the unknown.
_____
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/ren%C3%A9-lefort/ethiopia-meles-r
ules-from-beyond-grave-but-for-how-long#art1> [1] Its four components each
represents a major ethnic group: Tigrayan (6% of the population), Oromo
(37%), Amhara (23%) and the mosaic of Southern peoples (20%). The Tigrayan
People’s Liberation Front was the spearhead and major winner of the victory
over the Derg military junta in 1991.
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/ren%C3%A9-lefort/ethiopia-meles-r
ules-from-beyond-grave-but-for-how-long#art2> [2] Ethiopia is a federal
republic.
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/ren%C3%A9-lefort/ethiopia-meles-r
ules-from-beyond-grave-but-for-how-long#art3> [3] Compared with 41% Orthodox
Christians and 20% Protestants.
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/ren%C3%A9-lefort/ethiopia-meles-r
ules-from-beyond-grave-but-for-how-long#art4> [4] In a two-year period,
civil servants lost around half their purchasing power. Peasants, half of
whom are net buyers of food, often claim that “inflation is worse than
prison”.
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/ren%C3%A9-lefort/ethiopia-meles-r
ules-from-beyond-grave-but-for-how-long#art5> [5] Although, officially, the
annual growth rate has been more than 10% since 2004, in reality it has been
considerably less, probably some 6% to 7%. It continues to fall. “Even
before the onset of the 2008 crisis, Ethiopia’s economy was already slowing
down” (World Bank Report N°71884-ET, August 29, 2012).
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/ren%C3%A9-lefort/ethiopia-meles-r
ules-from-beyond-grave-but-for-how-long#art6> [6] International
organisations like the IMF, and large donor countries, have finally begun to
doubt the official statistics, including those for growth rate and
agricultural production. According to assessments by certain large
international development institutions, official grain production is
overstated by some 30%.
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/ren%C3%A9-lefort/ethiopia-meles-r
ules-from-beyond-grave-but-for-how-long#art7> [7] Foreign direct investment
is amongst the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa per head of population.
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/ren%C3%A9-lefort/ethiopia-meles-r
ules-from-beyond-grave-but-for-how-long#art8> [8] “Despite some positive
developments in industry and service sectors, Ethiopia has been a difficult
place to do business”, World Bank Report N°71884-ET, August 29, 2012.
<
http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/ren%C3%A9-lefort/ethiopia-meles-r
ules-from-beyond-grave-but-for-how-long#art9> [9] Siye Abraha was one of the
founders of the Front and its leading military figure. Gebru Asrat, a
historic leader of the TPLF, was the president of the Tigray region at the
time of his expulsion.
Received on Tue Nov 27 2012 - 17:42:23 EST
