From: wolda002@umn.edu
Date: Wed Nov 11 2009 - 00:25:11 EST
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=4583
Russia-Saudi Relations: The Kingdom and the Bear
Saurav Jha | 09 Nov 2009
Saudi Arabia's possible purchase of at least $2 billion of Russian military
equipment has the potential to be the most significant Russian arms deal in
the Middle East since the Soviet Union transferred SA-2s to Nasser's Egypt.
By all indications, it seems that the two countries have reached an
agreement for the arms transfer, after a two-year negotiation period. The
deal may be part of a larger process that leads to a significant
realignment in the external relations of both parties.
The arms transfer agreement, which covers a broad spectrum of weapons, is
guided by the agreement on cooperation in military technology that was
initiated during a visit of Russia's then-President Vladimir Putin to
Riyadh in 2007, and later signed by the two countries in 2008. According to
Russian sources, Saudi Arabia may purchase up to 150 helicopters (30 Mi-35
attack helicopters and 120 Mi-17 transport helicopters), more than 150
T-90S tanks, around 250 BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and
"several dozen" air defense systems (including possibly the S-400 Triumf).
Contracts for the sales of the helicopters, tanks and IFVs -- worth a
combined $2 billion -- seem imminent, with more negotiations required on
the air defense systems. In all, the Saudi market may absorb up to $7
billion worth of Russian equipment in the future.
The precise timing for the deal seems to have been guided by the worsening
Iran nuclear crisis and the increasing enmity between the Iranians and the
Saudis. The Saudi defense requirements also come at a time when Russian
newspapers are awash with reports of the monetary loss -- in the
billion-dollar range -- that Moscow must incur on the sale of S-300 air
defense systems to Iran. That deal has been stalled due to pressure from
Washington and Tel Aviv. Clearly, handsome compensation seems to be in the
pipeline from Saudi quarters.
Beyond the Iranian angle lies the Saudi need to diversify its sources of
military equipment and thereby raise its bargaining power as a buyer. With
the deal, Russia has beaten out the French, who have fallen out of favor
lately with the Saudi establishment, especially since King Abdullah has
been directly overseeing weapons procurement. The French practice of
bundling additional weapons not sought by the buyer in a consolidated
package has irked the Saudis. The turn to Russia effectively thwarts French
pressure to buy weapons that the Saudis do not need, allowing them to focus
on those that they do.
Saudi Arabia also seems to have responded favorably to Russian feelers with
respect to coordinating production and pricing on the international oil
market. These two countries lead the world in oil exports and have huge
reserves of gas as well. In the future, the Saudis may provide a bridge for
the Russians to OPEC.
>From the Kremlin's point of view this deal represents an immense leg up for
the Russian military-industrial complex, and a possible inroads with a
country known to have access to key U.S. and European defense technology.
Also, beating out the French in the defense realm might give Moscow a leg
up in the nuclear sweepstakes as well, given that Riyadh seems set to debut
nuclear energy in the kingdom.
There might also be an Indian role somewhere in all of this. India has in
the past served as a parts supplier and maintenance station for Russian
hardware operated by countries in its neighborhood. In fact, this
arrangement is a key aspect of the Indo-Russian defense partnership and has
served to advance Russian hardware sales. The purchase by Malaysia of Su-30
MKMs, which resemble the Indian Su-30 MKI, is a case in point. It is
conceivable that given the recent upturn in Indo-Saudi relations, the
latter may also look towards India for keeping future Russian origin
weapons up to speed. India may also help the Saudis in setting up
Russian-origin nuclear reactors.
Indo-Saudi ties have experienced a drastic improvement since King
Abdullah's visit to India in 2006. On the other hand, India and Iran have
been steadily drifting apart, ever since India's anti-Iran vote at the IAEA
in 2007 and amid differences over the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline. Iran's
increasingly bellicose statements on Israel and its Holocaust denial have
made the relationship a difficult one for India. Israel, after all, is a
"special" supplier of strategic technologies to India, and New Delhi cannot
afford to jeopardize this relationship. Moreover, another nuclear-armed
nation in the vicinity is hardly in India's interests.
Saudi Arabia can offer many of the same benefits to India that Iran can,
and seems to have managed its relationship with Israel decently in the
recent past. Indeed, Saudi Arabia has emerged as the single largest source
of Indian petroleum imports and may become a key recipient of Indian IT
exports in the future.
Russian policy may also be headed in a similar direction. A nuclear Iran
armed with intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of targeting
Moscow is more a long-term threat than opportunity for Russia. Moreover,
Iran serves as a competitor for Caspian oil as well as for influence in the
Caucasus and Central Asia.
The Kremlin is also increasingly taking Israeli sensitivities into account.
One of the main reasons for this is that a lot of Russian equipment can be
made "hotter" through the replacement of Russian electronics and sensors
with those from Israel. Indeed, Indian military imports from Russia
increasingly contain India-specific Israeli inputs. Years of operating
captured Arab-owned Soviet equipment has given Israel an amazing niche
capability to integrate its own technology with Russian military
architecture. Russia also wants to import some Israeli technologies for its
own use, especially those that would help Russia counter asymmetric
threats.
Irrespective of whether the Obama administration succeeds in bringing Iran
around, it is clear that both Washington's partners and rivals are hedging
against Iran's uncertain trajectory. In fact, in the event of a U.S.-Iran
rapprochement, Riyadh and Moscow may find themselves even more irresistibly
drawn towards each other.
Saurav Jha studied economics at Presidency College, Calcutta, and
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He writes and researches on global
energy issues and clean energy development in Asia. His first book for
Harper Collins India, "The Upside Down Book of Nuclear Power," is scheduled
for publication in January 2010. He also works as an independent consultant
in the energy sector in India. He can be reached at sjha1618@gmail.com.
Photo: Vladimir Putin of Russia and King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud in
Saudia Arabia, 2007 (Kremlin photo licensed under Attribution 3.0 Unported
License).
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