From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Wed Nov 11 2009 - 09:45:27 EST
Small War or Big Problem? Fighting on the Yemeni-Saudi Border
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By <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC10.php?CID=18> Simon
Henderson
November 11, 2009
Long-running tension between the government of Yemen and a rebellious clan
in a remote border area has the potential to erupt into a major regional
crisis, with media reports suggesting that the tension has the
characteristics of a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. On November
10, the Iranian foreign minister Manoucher Motaki warned against foreign
intervention, an apparent reference to Saudi Arabia. The prospect exists
that Yemen, already a haven for al-Qaeda elements, could become a failed
state. Handling this challenge looks to be an early test of the executive
competence of a new generation of Saudi leadership.
Government Offensive
The current fighting dates from this past August, when the government in
Sana started an offensive, code-named Operation Scorched Earth, against
fighters of the Houthi clan who were blockading roads in the mountainous
northwest of the country, near the border with Saudi Arabia. Sana regarded
these acts as a violation of a truce arranged last year. Combating the
rebels has been tough: some government forces have been taken prisoner, and
rebel video footage has shown destroyed Yemeni armor. Many refugees have
fled the area, and civilians have been among the casualties.
The Houthis, who take their name from the family of their leader, say they
want increased local autonomy and a greater role for their Zaydi version of
Islam, which is Shiite and typically regarded as moderate. The group has
close links to local Sunnis, who are in the majority. Indeed, President Ali
Saleh of Yemen is himself a Zaydi. Until the latest fighting, analysis based
on discussion of a Sunni-Shiite divide, often a useful way to understand
other parts of the Middle East, was usually inappropriate for Yemen. Now,
however, the fighting in northern Yemen has the makings of a proxy war, with
Iran (Shiite) supporting the Houthi rebels and Saudi Arabia (Sunni)
responding with support for President Saleh. The fighting between the
Houthis and government forces dates back to 2004 - 2005, and it continued
even after the rebel leader, Hussein al-Houthi, was killed. More fighting
broke out in 2007, but the new leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, a brother of
Hussein al-Houthi, accepted a ceasefire. Clashes erupted once again in early
2008 before Qatari diplomats could arrange a truce.
Although the Houthi forces lack aircraft and armored vehicles, they arguably
have a tactical advantage in the confrontation owing to their numbers and
training as well as their skillful use of land mines. Houthi websites show
rallies with high attendance, along with disciplined training sequences
reminiscent of Hizballah activities in Lebanon. Claims by the Sana
government of Iranian involvement are bolstered by the slogans posted on one
Houthi website: "Allah is great, death to America, death to Israel, curse
the Jews, and victory for Islam." Such language suggests aims that far
exceed a quest for local autonomy.
On November 4, the Saudi Air Force launched strikes using F-15 and Tornado
ground-attack aircraft against rebels who, according to Riyadh, had crossed
the border into Saudi Arabia and killed several Saudis. Media reports that
the Saudi aircraft had struck targets across the border in Yemen were denied
in both capitals. Then, on November 8, a Yemeni fighter crashed, an incident
that was attributed to mechanical problems by Sana officials but claimed by
rebels as a successful takedown by antiaircraft fire. The present story of
possible Iranian involvement goes back into late October, when Yemen seized
an Iranian ship loaded with weaponry that included antitank weapons. Adding
to the intrigue, the most recent video to appear on a Houthi website shows a
captured Saudi special forces soldier, seized Saudi arms and vehicles, and
what appears to be Saudi aircraft dropping white phosphorus on rebel
positions in the mountains.
Regional Implications
The crisis in Yemen could have serious consequences for Gulf security. The
most populous state in the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen is also the poorest --
as well as the poorest Arab country overall, as measured by gross domestic
product per capita. The African continent lies just eighteen miles away,
across the Bab al-Mandab Strait, through which more than three million
barrels of oil pass daily en route to Europe. And across the Gulf of Aden --
a present-day cauldron of piracy and the site of a 2002 al-Qaeda attack on
an oil tanker -- is the failed state of Somalia. Usama bin Laden's father
also hails from Yemen, where, according to Sana officials, thousands of
al-Qaeda fighters still find refuge. Although the country has existed in
some form for hundreds of years, its current configuration dates only to
1990, when North Yemen and South Yemen united. In 1994, the government
quashed a rebellion by southerners seeking independence, but resentment of
Sana's domination persists.
Implications for the Saudis
Historically, Saudi Arabia is cautious as regards involvement in Yemeni
affairs. During the Yemeni civil war in the 1960s, the Saudis supported the
royalist side, while Egypt, using chemical weapons, backed the ultimately
victorious republican forces. Decades later, when President Saleh backed
Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the kingdom expelled several
hundred thousand Yemenis, until then a key part of its labor force. The
border between the two countries has also been in question, with the Yemenis
previously making claims to the kingdom's southern provinces. While that
issue has now apparently been resolved, Riyadh sometimes mishandles the
local population, the majority of whom are Zaydis (as are Yemenis across the
border) and Ismailis. Both groups are subject to discrimination by the Saudi
(Wahhabi) religious police. In early 2001, the Saudi authorities temporarily
lost control of the provincial capital of Najran after the religious police
cracked down on local groups.
In the current crisis, the Saudi council of ministers has pledged "zero
tolerance for intruders," an apparent reference to Houthi rebels.
Interestingly, King Abdullah has effectively delegated management to the
next generation of princes. Prince Khaled bin Sultan, assistant defense
minister and the son of ailing Crown Prince Sultan, visited troops at the
border on November 8 and declared a "killing zone" stretching six miles into
Saudi territory. Another key figure is Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, the
counterterrorism chief, who had a narrow escape in late August when an
al-Qaeda fighter who had arrived from Yemen blew himself apart while
supposedly surrendering. Also involved are Abdullah's son Prince Mishal bin
Abdullah, who was appointed governor of Najran earlier this year, and the
king's nephew Prince Mishal bin Miteb, who replaced his aging father as
local government minister just last week. A particular challenge is that the
kingdom feels obliged, despite the border tension, to allow Yemeni pilgrims
to visit the holy city of Mecca during the current Hajj season. On November
8, Prince Mishal bin Abdullah instructed officials to keep border crossing
points open.
U.S. Policy
For Washington, the border tension compounds an already complicated
relationship. Ever since the USS Cole was blown up in Aden harbor by
al-Qaeda in 2000, the United States has felt that Yemen has not acted
strongly enough against al-Qaeda fighters. Even imprisoned fighters have
often been released or apparently allowed to escape. This scenario
complicates the Obama administration's efforts to close the Guantanamo Bay
detention center, where Yemenis form the largest residual national
contingent. U.S. efforts to persuade President Saleh to allow these
detainees to be sent to Saudi rehabilitation programs -- because Washington
does not trust Yemen to look after the detainees sufficiently -- have failed
so far. On the other hand, Washington has worked successfully with Sana to
arrange for the emigration of members of Yemen's remaining Jewish community,
which has been targeted by both the Houthis and al-Qaeda. The State
Department has aired its view that the conflict between the Houthis and the
Yemeni central government will not be resolved through military means. But,
for their part, Yemeni officials warn privately that the state could be
threatened if Sana is not helped with military supplies and given latitude
to pursue its military campaign. On the diplomatic front, Sana hopes that it
can sort out its relations with Iran while, for now, simply asking the
Houthis, estimated at between 6,000 and 7,000 armed men, to give up their
military positions. Sana fears that the Houthis -- encouraged by Tehran --
aim to undermine U.S. and Saudi interests in its corner of the Arabian
Peninsula. Such a view will be tested during the coming winter months,
which, in Yemen's mountains, unlike much of the rest of the world, are the
best time for fighting.
Simon Henderson is the Baker fellow and director of the
<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateI02.php?SID=23&newActiveSubNav=G
ulf%20and%20Energy%20Policy%20Program&activeSubNavLink=templateI02.php%3FSID
%3D23&newActiveNav=researchPrograms> Gulf and Energy Policy program at the
Washington Institute.
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