From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Wed Nov 25 2009 - 06:19:16 EST
Somalia: The Political Structure of the T.F.G.'s and the Puntland State's
Disaccord
By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
Nov 25, 2009 - 1:48:32 PM
http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/uploads/2/farole178_edited-1.jpg
On November 21, Garowe Online posted Omar Farah's insightful analysis: "
<http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Opinion_20/Somalia_-_why_Somali
_Government_and_Puntland_State_of_Somalia_fail_to_agree.shtml> Somalia: Why
Somali Government and Puntland State of Somalia fail to agree?" Farah's
answers provide the foundation for a structural analysis of the state of
present relations between Somalia's internationally recognized Transitional
Federal Government (T.F.G.) and Puntland. The following analysis builds on
and shifts the emaphasis of Farah's, while remaining within the parameters
defined by his fundamentals.
Background
Farah's analysis addresses the results of the November 12 meeting in Nairobi
between Puntland's president, Abdirahman Mohamed Farole, and the T.F.G.'s
president, Sh. Sharif Sh. Ahmad, at which the latter refused to sign the
August 23 Galkayo agreement between Farole and the T.F.G.'s prime minister,
Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke.
The Galkayo agreement marked the high point for Puntland in its relations
with Sh. Sharif's administration; it affirmed Puntland's federal vision of
Somalia, provided for the T.F.G. to share international aid with Puntland
equitably, allowed Puntland to control foreign investment within its
territory, and awarded Puntland with the sites for a proposed anti-piracy
center and the convention that would draft a permanent constitution for
Somalia. The T.F.G. seemed to have paid Farole's price for his support of
the T.F.G.
Since the Galkayo agreement was signed by Farole and Sharmarke, relations
between Puntland and the T.F.G. have been strained to the point of the
November 12 rupture. In the interim, dissent to the agreement gained
momentum within the T.F.G. Somali media reported that a clique led by Deputy
Prime Minister and Finance Minister Sharif Hassan Sh. Adan had become
dominant over Sh. Sharif and had turned him against the agreement. Members
of the transitional parliament echoed those reports. The failure of Sh.
Sharif to endorse the agreement led to a reported split between the
president and the prime minister, awakening calls for one or the other to
resign or be removed. Early on the T.F.G.'s deputy prime minister and
fisheries minister, Abdirahim Ibbi, enginereed an agreement with Djibouti
for the establishment of an anti-piracy training base there, throwing into
question Puntland's claim to the anti-piracy center, which would be funded
by donor powers. Sharmarke insisted that the agreement was still in force
and would be implemented shortly.
Somali media reported that the split within the T.F.G. was occasioned by
resistance to the agreement from political leaders from the Hawiye clan
family who perceived that Puntland's strengthened position would benefit the
Darod clan family at their expense. Whether or not that is true, it is clear
that the Galkayo agreement gave Puntland a bigger share of the political and
financial pie, which would impact established interests in the T.F.G.,
whether political, business or clan, negatively, and would move those
interests to try to block the agreement.
As the T.F.G. fell into disarray over the Galkayo agreement, Farole bided
his time impatiently, progressively losing confidence in the T.F.G. as a
negotiating partner and becoming disillusioned with the process. At the
November 12 meeting, Farole, who had decided not to compromise on the
Galkayo agreement as signed, confronted Sh. Sharif, who refused to initial
the document. The promise of the Galkayo agreement for Puntland had
vanished.
Farah's Explanation
Farah's explanation of the rupture in Nairobi is presented in three
interconnected points: Sh. Sharif's "mentors" argued that any recognition of
regional authorities, such as Puntland, would degrade the legitimacy of the
T.F.G. in the eyes of the international community; the mentors favor a
centralized state that would preserve their positions and forestall the
threat to their power from self-determination in the regions; and the
imbalance of power between Puntland and the T.F.G. is so great that the
latter is too weak to negotiate credibly. As Farah puts it, Puntland's
interest in economic and social development contrasts starkly with the
T.F.G.'s daily fight to survive in a restricted area of Mogadishu.
Farah hits the mark in identifying the structural cause of the rupture in
Nairobi as an imbalance of power in favor of Puntland that causes it to be
unwilling to compromise on its conceptions of its vital interests when it is
engaged with a weak partner that has nothing to offer but access to the
coffers of donor powers, which the weaker partner is all the more jealous to
guard, because that is its only asset. For the T.F.G. factions, the
alternatives were to keep what they had or to bring Puntland onboard a
political process - at Puntland's price. For Puntland, the alternatives were
to insist on the favorable Galkayo agreement or to surrender their perceived
vital interests.
Where Farah's explanation needs a change of emphasis is in its focus on
Puntland's interest in equitable sharing of donor funds and programs. If the
gap between Puntland's interest in econnomic and social development, and the
T.F.G.'s interest in sheer survival was actually the structural divide, then
Farole might have made concessions to get his place at the trough. That he
refused to do so indicates a more paramount interest in maintaining
Puntland's status as a "state in Somalia," with a generous degree of
self-determination; it is self-governance that Farole would not sacrifice.
With a shift from economic to political emphasis, the structural imbalance
is between Puntland's functioning government (although it is currently under
domestic and foreign pressures) and the T.F.G.'s notional government, which
is a figment of international recognition guarded by African Union tanks.
Farole is a president; Sh. Sharif is a captive. Farole feels that receiving
aid vouchers from the T.F.G. is not worth sacrificing self-determination;
Sh. Sharif does not want to share power in a federation of regional states,
which is Farole's demand. Farah recognizes this scenario in the first point
of his explanation, when he says that Sh. Sharif's "mentors" were concerned
that recognition of regional authorities would degrade the legitimacy of the
T.F.G. in the eyes of the international community. The mentors, indeed, were
correct; it was a power struggle and the T.F.G. was fighting above its
weight. If the T.F.G. has only external powers to thank for its existence,
Puntland has only its political organization to count on, and that is
currently under stress as external pressures and threats trigger reactions
against Farole's administration domestically. Protecting the status of the
Puntland state trumps economic and social development.
The Rupture in Nairobi
Evidence that the structural gap is political is provided by Somali media
sources reporting on the Nairobi talks.
On November 11, the two sides agreed to form a committee to "harmonize" the
Galkayo agreement, but, on November 12, the talks collapsed when Farole
demanded that Puntland be recognized as a state, not a semi-autonomous
region, and accused the T.F.G. of failing to abide by the Transitional
Federal Constitution on the matter of federalism.
According to a November 15 report on the AllPuntland webite, which provides
a dramatic narrative, Sh. Sharif was accompanied at the November 12 meeting
by Hassan who was supposed to have worked on implementing the agreement, but
had not done so, and who said that certain issues pertaining to the
agreement were not up for discussion, notably the sovereignty of the T.F.G.
over all post-independence Somalia. Hassan was reported to have said that
Puntland is a regional administration that cannot negotiate with the T.F.G.
as an equal, and that the T.F.G. does not need Puntland's help in
implementing a federal system. Sh. Sharif is reported to have said that the
T.F.G. is a legitimate government and would not negotiate with anyone on the
restoration of security in Somalia. Farole reportedly responded that
Puntland would not negotiate on the development of the state's
administration. The meeting ended when the Puntland delegation walked out.
It is worth noting that the two sides reportedly agreed on Puntland's access
to donor powers and Puntland's right to enter development and security
agreements with external powers and companies independent of the T.F.G.
The deeper structural explanation for the failure of the Puntland State and
the T.F.G. to agree is the power struggle over the nature of the state, the
most fundamental political conflict that carries along with it all the
interests that would be advantaged or disadvantaged according to its
results.
Aftermath
On November 19, having returned to Puntland's capital, Garowe, Farole held a
press conference in which he said that his meeting with Sh. Sharif had been
"very nice indeed," but that they had "misunderstandings" about the Galkayo
agreement, which Farole said, had not been implemented by the T.F.G. and was
not a good agreement anyway. On November 20, Sh. Sharif held a press
conference in Nairobi, at which he expressed regret at "misunderstandings"
and confirmed that his meeting with Farole had yielded "no results."
On November 20, the effects of the Nairobi rupture on Puntland's grand
strategy began to surface when Farole gave an interview to the BBC in which
he announced that Puntland intended to host leaders from the southern and
central regions of Somalia who wanted to form regional authorities, faulting
Sh. Sharif for failing to initiate that process. Farole made it clear that
his disagreement with Sh. Sharif centered on the formation of regional
governments, leaving "the door open for consultation" in the future.
Farole's plan for regional authorities that would be formed independently of
the T.F.G. has, for the moment, made the rupture in Nairobi complete.
The rupture in Nairobi leaves the T.F.G. weaker than ever, having lost
potential support, and Puntland more isolated internationally. Farole, who
had placed hope in the West and had thought that he could win a favorable
deal from the T.F.G., now knows that he is on his own, which is why he has
proposed by-passing the T.F.G. in the creation of a federal state that would
change the present T.F.G. beyond recognition and short-circuit the donor
powers' strategy of backing the T.F.G.
It is too early to tell how serious Farole is about his plan - whether it is
a warning or a commitment - and whether he will have any takers for it in
the southern and central regions. What it does indicate is that Farole
reached the end of the rope tying him to the T.F.G. and that he has undone
the knot. He has decided that the T.F.G. is not for the time being a
negotiating partner and that the preservation of the state structure of
Puntland is the vital interst above all others. Whether Farole is
sacrificing other interests to the degree that he will subvert the vital
interest through relative international isolation remains to be seen.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political
Science, Purdue University <mailto:weinstem@purdue.edu> weinstem@purdue.edu
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