From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Wed Dec 09 2009 - 06:08:08 EST
Somalia: Al-Shabaab's Encirclement Strategy [Intelligence Brief]
Dec 9, 2009 - 1:58:54 PM
By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
A closed source in the Horn of Africa reports on al-Shabaab's strategy at
the current juncture of the conflicts in southern and central Somalia.
According to the source, Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen (H.S.M.) is preparing
to launch an offensive in the central regions to gain the kind of dominance
over them that it has achieved in the Jubba regions in the south over the
past month by displacing its former ally Hizbul Islam (H.I.). The source
reports that local observers and politicians had expected H.S.M. to carry
its fight against H.I. to Mogadishu next. The move to an encirclement
strategy, according to the source, would repeat what H.S.M. did in the Jubba
Valley by "creating safe areas on its flanks." H.S.M. would then turn to
Mogadishu.
Regarding the prospects for the success of H.S.M.'s strategy, the source
notes that the group will face strong opponents in the central regions
[presumably Ahlu Sunna wal-Jama'a in Galgadud and H.I. in Hiraan] and that
Ethiopia will likely intervene; but the source adds that, at the very least,
H.S.M. is likely to be able "to capture Hizbul Islam territories up to
Beledweyne.
Significance
The source's intelligence will be analyzed in terms of how it enlightens
H.S.M.'s overall strategy.
If the intelligence is accurate, then it reflects a set of judgments and
decisions by H.S.M. on how it can most effectively gain political dominance
in southern and central Somalia. The strategy of encircling Mogadishu,
rather than going for an immediate confrontation with H.I. there, indicates
patience and prudence on H.S.M.'s part, which in turn indicates that H.S.M.
is confident that it need not bring along the baggage of rivalrous allies as
it prepares for a stepped-up campaign against the African Union peacekeeping
mission (AMISOM) and forces of the Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.)
in Mogadishu. Phase One of H.S.M.'s overall campaign is to consolidate armed
opposition to AMISOM and the T.F.G. under its command. If it is successful,
H.S.M. will have placed itself as the only alternative to the T.F.G. in the
southern and central regions.
The intelligence casts doubt on frequent current claims by analysts and
officials supporting the T.F.G. that H.S.M. has lost popular legitimacy and
is weakening, and that its fight with H.I. indicates a collapse of the armed
opposition and, therefore, presents an opportunity for the T.F.G. to expand
its power in the regions, where it has no present control.
Conflict within an alliance can cut two ways. It can reflect disunity and
disaggregation in some cases, yet in others it indicates the achievement of
dominance by one faction over the others, leading to consolidation and,
consequently, to a stronger opposition than existed prior to internecine
strife.
As for loss of popular legitimacy, one must ask, as many Somali
intellectuals do: Why, if H.S.M. is so unpopular and is weakening, are there
not insurrections in the territories that it controls? Southern and central
Somalia is a country awash in arms. Sub-clans have not disappeared. H.S.M.
appears to be able to hold and administer territory, and could not do so
without some support and acquiescence among local populations.
Whether or not H.S.M. will be able to carry through successfully its
encirclement strategy remains unclear, with uncertainty residing in the
source's observation that H.S.M. faces "worthy opponents," yet itself is
formidable. What is apparent is that H.S.M. does not perceive itself as
weakening, but, rather, as strengthening to the point at which it is willing
to bid for monopoly over armed opposition. Is theirs a sober judgment?
H.S.M. has overreached before and has over-valued its power; yet it has also
had periods of success, starting in late 2007 when it adopted its first
strategy of encirclement that led to its current control over much of
southern and central Somalia. The encirclement strategy is more in line with
its sober than its intoxicated side. H.S.M. is taking a risk, but it appears
to be a well-calculated risk. The strategy does not appear to be a product
of desperation or a last-stand mentality, any more than it appears to be the
work of irrational exuberance.
The source's intelligence should be taken seriously, because, if it is
accurate, it indicates that H.S.M. is thinking strategically and is neither
over-valuing nor under-valuing its power. As the source puts it, "This is
the most logical maneuver before dealing with Hizbul Islam in Mogadishu."
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science,
Purdue University <mailto:weinstem@purdue.edu> weinstem@purdue.edu
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