January-March 2000 Press Release

1. USAID Pledges Humanitarian Assistance to Eritrea (March 24, 2000)
   
2. Meles Regime: Seeking Credit Out of Duplicity (March 23, 2000)
   
3. Statement of the Cabinet of Ministers on the Peace Process (March 21, 2000)
   
4. Djibouti's Decision to Restore Diplomatic Ties (March 13, 2000)
   
5. OAU Special Envoy Leaves Asmara: Efforts To Continue (March 3, 2000)
   
6. TPLF Will Not Heed Soft Talk But It Will Wobble Under Meaningful Pressure (January 11, 2000)

USAID Pledges Humanitarian Assistance to Eritrea
March 24, 2000

President Isaias Afwerki received today, Friday, 24 March, Mr. Hugh Parmer, Assistant Administrator of US Agency for International Development (AID), who is on a tour of the Horn of Africa region to assess humanitarian needs resulting from drought and conflict.

Mr. Parmer told President Isaias that, from his visits to camps of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Eritrea, he was "highly impressed by the excellent job that the Government of Eritrea has accomplished with meager resources to alleviate the humanitarian needs of those affected by war." As a result, there was no "humanitarian crisis in the camps although the situation remained precarious requiring an assured flow of relief assistance." US AID was consequently pledging 40,000 metric tonnes of food aid and 1.8 million US dollars of assistance in non-food items.

President Isaias expressed Eritrea's appreciation for the humanitarian mission undertaken by Mr. Parmer to the region and thanked him for the pledges of assistance to Eritrea made on the occasion of his visit. President Isaias further expressed the hope that US AID cooperation will remain at the requisite levels which had not, unfortunately, been the case in the past two years.

Mr. Parmer inquired whether Eritrea would allow the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Ethiopia through the port of Assab in view of the grave famine situation looming over the drought-stricken southern parts of the country and relative geographic proximity of the port of Assab. President Isaias assured Mr. Parmer that Eritrea would not, in principle, object to the proposal because of its moral obligation to assist in the international relief efforts to prevent a human catastrophe. This would however require an appropriate arrangement by the international community in a situation of a simmering conflict. Eritrea would further request clear guarantees that the humanitarian assistance reaches the intended beneficiaries and is not, otherwise, diverted by the regime for its war purposes.

Mr. Parker arrived in Eritrea on Wednesday, 22 March. He visited camps for displaced persons in southern Eritrea and met with the Commissioner of ERREC and other government officials.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Asmara, 24 March 2000

Meles Regime: Seeking Credit Out of Duplicity
March 23, 2000

It is common knowledge now that the TPLF has rejected the Technical Arrangements after seven months of delay. Repeated clarifications by the OAU to its endless "queries" since last September; "persuasive diplomacy" by Washington; and "adequate time for internal consultations" that the OAU and its partners granted the TPLF in the hope of "softening" its intransigence have all been to no avail.

In the rather gloomy words of a senior OAU official, the OAU is today proposing proximity talks because it has "run out of steam in its efforts to remove the big stone" put in the way by the Meles regime.

The truth is the OAU finds itself in a bind. The original preference of the OAU and its partners after the Algiers Summit in July last year was precisely the convening of these proximity talks. Indeed, the purpose of the first visit of the OAU special envoy, Ahmed Ouyahia, (and US envoy Anthony Lake) to the region in late July was to invite both parties to Algiers for an official signature of the two basic documents (the Framework Agreement and the Modalities of Implementation) on the basis of which "both parties would engage in proximity talks to iron out details of implementation."

Eritrea accepted the proposal since this was consistent with, and provided for, by operative paragraph 9 a) and b) of the Framework Agreement. But Meles harped on a lame excuse pleading to Ouyahia that Ethiopia wanted to see the details of implementation first to overcome a "psychological problem because it did not trust Eritrea." He further asked that these "Technical Arrangements" be worked out by the OAU and its partners for presentation to both sides as "final and non-amendable."

"Decide and catch us" were his exact words, arguing that "Eritrea's real acceptance of the two documents will be tested when confronted with the Technical Arrangements."

These ground rules--which were acceptable to Eritrea--were accordingly embodied in the OAU's public documents: 1) the preamble to the Technical Arrangements reads:

"Recalling the acceptance by the Parties that any interpretation of the OAU Framework Agreement and the Modalities is the sole responsibility of the OAU and its Current Chairman"; 2) the conclusion in the OAU Clarifications reads: "The OAU salutes the understanding reached by the personal envoy of the current Chairman with His Excellency the President of the State of Eritrea and His Excellency the Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, respectively, that the document containing the Technical Arrangements is not open to amendment."

In view of these facts, it is evident that the OAU and its partners have been compelled today to chew their own words due to the intransigence of the TPLF regime.

Whether this approach is judicious; whether appeasement will advance the search for peace is another matter which we will leave aside for the moment. The indelible truth is that the OAU peace process is in jeopardy due to the TPLF's duplicity and lack of genuine commitment to peace. In the event, the TPLF can hardly claim credit for "accepting proximity talks" today, which has essentially turned the clock back by seven months.

In the same vein, the TPLF seeks to claim the moral high ground by portraying Eritrea as the "aggressor party." Again, the facts establish otherwise. Among other things, the TPLF:

• used force in July 1997 to occupy sovereign Eritrean territory and to impose an illegal administration;

• published a map in October 1997 incorporating large areas of sovereign Eritrean territory in violation of international law;

• provoked the clashes in May 1998 by unleashing an attack against Eritrean units in the Badme area;

• declared total war against Eritrea on May 12, 1998;

• launched the first air strike of the war against Eritrea's capital on June 5, 1998, and also violated the US-brokered moratorium on February 6, 1999, when it launched the second wave of its massive offensives;

• resorted to ethnic deportation to expel over 70,000 ethnic Eritreans by expropriating their property.

Statement of the Cabinet of Ministers on the Peace Process
March 21, 2000

The Cabinet of Ministers released a statement on the current status of the OAU peace plan following a meeting it held in Asmara yesterday, March 20, 2000.

Regarding the peace process for the border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the Cabinet noted that the Eritrean Government has accepted without equivocation and from the outset, the OAU peace plan. In this spirit, Eritrea has been cooperating unreservedly for its implementation. On the contrary, the TPLF regime has now formally rejected the Technical Arrangements, which were submitted by the OAU as a non-amendable document. The TPLF's intransigence has thus rendered fruitless the tireless efforts exerted by the OAU and its partners for the last seven months.

Although the peace process has reached a deadlock due to the TPLF's obstruction of the plan, the Cabinet of Ministers expressed Eritrea's readiness to cooperate in ongoing efforts in view of the OAU decision to continue its work. In order to insure the success of the new round of efforts the Cabinet of Ministers said that:

1. The OAU should officially announce that the Technical Arrangements, which had been submitted as non-amendable, are now open for discussion by both sides since the TPLF has rejected the original document.

2. Accordingly, the Government of Eritrea accepts, in principle, the convention of proximity talks between the two parties. However, in order for the talks to be serious and productive, the specific issues for discussion as well as the format modalities of the discussion must be fully clarified in advance.

Djibouti's Decision to Restore Diplomatic Ties
March 13, 2000

The Eritrean government welcomes with satisfaction the press release issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Djibouti on March 11 announcing its decision to resume diplomatic ties with the State of Eritrea.

The Eritrean government, which has always attached great importance to the cultivation of warm and good neighborly relations between the brotherly peoples of the two sisterly countries, is prepared on its part to normalize the restore diplomatic ties with the Republic of Djibouti.

On this occasion, the government of Eritrea expresses its deep gratitude and appreciation to the Leader of the Revolution of the Libyan Jamahiria Colonel Muamar El Gadafi and other friendly governments which have exerted efforts towards the realization of this objective.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Asmara, 13 March 2000

OAU Special Envoy Leaves Asmara: Efforts To Continue
March 3, 2000

The special envoy of the current chairman of the Organization of African Unity, Ahmed Ouyahia, left Asmara today after talks with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and officials of the Eritrean government. Former US National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, who is working in close partnership with the OAU, was also here for talks with the president.

The OAU envoy informed Eritrea that, after six months of efforts by the organization and its partners in the peace process, Ethiopia has not yet accepted the Technical Arrangements, a key component of the OAU peace package. This despite the fact that Ethiopia, as Eritrea, had given its prior consent to the OAU that the Technical Arrangements were "not open to amendment."

Mr. Ouyahia informed Eritrea that the OAU would continue its search for peace. He said that he was confident that Eritrea, which had formally accepted all three components of the peace plan presented to it by the OAU, would continue to cooperate with the organization's endeavors.

President Isaias told Mr. Ouyahia that Eritrea has been patiently waiting for the implementation of the OAU peace plan. He assured the OAU envoy that, despite the obstacle created by Ethiopia's rejection of the Technical Arrangements, Eritrea was committed to peace and would continue to cooperate with the OAU.

The Technical Arrangements were presented to the two parties at the beginning of August 1999. Eritrea promptly accepted the plan on the basis of the understanding that this was a "take it or leave it document," while Ethiopia has now finally rejected it after stalling for more than six months.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Asmara, 3 March 2000

Ethiopia's Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin has resorted to his usual armor of lies and invective in his response to the article by US Rep. Benjamin Gilman. Gilman's article appeared in the Washington Post on 3 January 2000.

Rather than informing his readers of his government's stance on peace, the Foreign Minister heaps insults on the congressman and fabricates facts to portray Eritrea as an "aggressor" and "rogue" nation. One would have expected the Foreign Minister to wise up and begin talking sense to his international audience after a series of strident speeches at the United Nations, the OAU and other forums in recent months. Unfortunately, his stock in trade does not appear to allow intelligent discourse and we are compelled, as usual, to respond to his lies so as to set the record straight.

1. The Foreign Minister claims that Eritrea is "training and arming terrorist groups in Somalia including Al-Ittahad, an extremist terrorist group supported by Bin Laden." The motive behind this cheap lie is transparent. The TPLF regime apparently wants to endear itself to Washington, thus this preposterous lie. Eritrea's impeccable track record against fundamentalism and extremism is otherwise well known. Indeed, Eritrea has stood at the forefront in the collective regional and international endeavors at containing fundamentalism because it is keenly aware of the immense havoc that this malaise would wreck on the social fabric of our multi-religious and multi-ethnic communities. Ethiopia too was, until recently, party to this alliance, joining Uganda and Eritrea in the informal group of frontline states against fundamentalism. Obsession with its war of aggression against Eritrea has however made it drift and lose sight of the grave strategic menace, impelling it to forge dangerous alliances with extremist groups. For the past eighteen months, the TPLF regime has been flirting with the NIF in Khartoum and propping up "Eritrean Jihad" terrorist groups. Moreover, Sheikh Al-Amoudi, the TPLF's main financier who owns large monopolistic enterprises in Ethiopia through "joint venture" arrangements with that group, is reported to have solid "links with Bin Laden providing the latter more than three million USD in protection money." (USA Today, 29 October 1999) It is thus the TPLF regime which is today deeply embroiled with fundamentalist and extremist groups.

2. The dispute between Eritrea and Yemen on the sovereignty of some islands in the Red Sea was resolved in a highly civilized and legal manner through recourse to international arbitration. Title to these islands which the Arbitration Court found to be "indeterminate until recently" has not only been settled legally, but the maritime boundary between the two sisterly countries has been delimited smoothly. Both countries have acted with utmost responsibility during the arbitration process and today they enjoy the warmest of bilateral ties. They have recently reaffirmed the prior commitments that they made to abide by the verdicts of the Tribunal. Hence, if anything, the civilized manner in which this dispute was resolved is a big lesson that TPLF leaders should learn from as they fight, right and left, with their neighbors.

   As far as Eritrea's problem with the Sudan is concerned, the cause was briefly mentioned above. More pointedly these days, as Khartoum appears engaged in an internal process to revise the fundamentalist policy that it has been pursuing for the last ten years, President Bashir has publicly acknowledged that "relations with Eritrea deteriorated largely due to the policies of the dual leadership in Khartoum."

3. The TPLF regime is perhaps the only country in the continent that has willfully violated the fundamental principle of the sanctity of colonial boundaries when it unilaterally drew a new map of Tigray incorporating large tracts of sovereign Eritrean territory in 1997. This violation of international law, which was accompanied by intermittent acts of aggression to create facts on the ground, was the cause that triggered the conflict. The TPLF's recalcitrance towards independent investigation--embodied in the OAU peace package--emanates from this fact. Moreover, the TPLF is guilty of gross violation of human rights that borders on ethnic cleansing. It has expelled, in the most inhumane manner, close to 70,000 ethnic Eritreans for no reason other than their ethnicity. This is unprecedented in our region. The TPLF has also violated the Vienna Conventions to break into the residence of the Eritrean ambassador to the OAU. The TPLF thus has no business preaching to others the virtues of international law.

4. Finally, it must be recognized that the TPLF's problem is not with the Technical Arrangements but with the notion of peace itself. The truth is that the TPLF has never accepted in good faith the various peace packages in the past. If the TPLF announced its acceptance of the US-Rwanda recommendations, this was only with a view of gaining diplomatic mileage at the time. Why else would it bomb Asmara on 5 June 1998, only hours after Eritrea expressed certain reservations on an "incomplete process"?

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Asmara, 11 January 2000