Recently, the port of Assab has assumed a central position in the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict. What is the reason for this?

During the past few months, there has been a spate of articles on the issue of Assab in connection with the forthcoming peaceful settlement of the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict on the basis of the OAU Framework Agreement. Now it seems to me that this Framework Agreement, which Ethiopia has repeatedly claimed to have accepted without any reservations or
preconditions, has suddenly become anathema and it seems that it would want to replace it by another agreement which in its view will be more favourable to its governmentís ambitions, regardless of the provisions of the OAU documents and existing international law and practice. What we are noticing now is the effort to subvert and overthrow accepted diplomatic
conventions, legal instruments, the provisions of the United Nations charters and other valid international agreements in order to suit the ambitions of the present government of Ethiopia.

Now, the question is whether or not the Assab issue (i.e. Ethiopiaís ownership of Assab at the expense of Eritrea) is going to be a paramount issue in the discussions. The issue is being raised by Ethiopian intellectuals of all stripes - from revolutionaries to feudal lords - to put pressure on the international community on behalf of the Ethiopian Government. I say this because they seem to be parroting the same phrases, and rehashing the same arguments with little or no imagination at all. Some of them write better than others and some others are more honest and more blunt than others are. Yet, the bottom line in all the presentations is that Ethiopia will have to have Assab to preserve its "national interest", including security and economic interest or else there will be no peace in the Horn of Africa, let alone peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Let us examine the issues. Ethiopia is not the only landlocked country in the world. There are almost 40 landlocked countries in all continents including Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa. Some of these are even landlocked countries with landlocked neighbours. Ethiopia at least has five of its neighbours, namely Eritrea, the Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya and Somalia through which it can have access to the sea. But none of the other ports are being mentioned as detrimental to the national security or the economic welfare of the Ethiopian people. Ethiopia is not the only country in Africa that is landlocked. Mali, Uganda, Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Lesotho among others are landlocked. While some, especially those that are landlocked states with landlocked neighbours, have no alternative routes to the sea, Ethiopia has. The fact is Ethiopia does not wish to accept this condition or to act within an international system of laws and procedures relative to landlocked and semi-landlocked states. It refuses to accept that it must, like all other landlocked countries, accept this condition and live at peace with its neighbours. This is the crux of the problem.

This monumental folly stems from the TPLF programme of 1976. Therefore, it would wish to go to war, annex a neighbourís territory and to violate the UN and OAU charters as well as several international instruments to satisfy its leadersí ambitions. Ethiopian intellectuals are telling the world that unless Ethiopia gets Assab, no agreement will have any relevance. International customary law and practice will have no validity or meaning unless Ethiopia gets Assab. To do that, they would have to truncate an independent state which is a member of the United Nations, the OAU and the international community.

Ethiopian intellectuals argue that Ethiopia has a "non-negotiable" right to a presence in the seacoast to defend and safeguard its territorial national integrity. Is it true?

No, it is not true. It is true that all countries have an unequivocal right to defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Yet, access to the sea is not, and has never been, a sine-qua-non to such a right. If it were so, it can be said that over 15 members of the OAU and over 40 members of the UN which are not benefiting from such a right would have to have an equal and similar right. Consequently, they must, as it is being argued in the case of Ethiopia, by all means fair and foul, acquire a presence in a seacoast even if they have to violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their neighbours and even if they have to flout all the hollowed principles of the UN, the OAU and the NAM.

It must also be remembered that Ethiopia has existed without any seaport for more than a hundred years. Yet, Ethiopia has existed as an independent state for more than three thousand years by some Ethiopian accounts or 100 years by other "equally Ethiopian" accounts. It is also not true, that possession of a seaport will bolster a countryís defence against aggression. In fact, the opposite may be true.

It is also extremely important to remember that when external aggression and occupation had taken place in Ethiopia, it had occurred, for the most part, with the encouragement and active collaboration of Ethiopian leaders. A few examples will suffice. Was it not Kassa Miratch of Tigray (later Yohannes IV) who assisted Napier in the penetration of the Abyssinian hinterland and the defeat of Tewodros for a few thousand firearms? Was it not the same man who, according to the well-known Ethiopian historian, Tekletsadik Mekuria, invited the British to divide with him, and to thus establish a colonial foothold in the Bogos, Habab and Mensa regions of Eritrea? The Amharic rendition is so colorful that it must be quoted: "I
shall not yield them (i.e. the territories) to the infidels (i.e. the Turks and the Egyptians) but I shall not be averse to the idea of dividing them with the British crown "in order to eat them" (bibelaw altelam). Was it the patriotic duty of Menellik, as Professor Afewerk Ghebreyessus would have us believe, to betray Yohannes and to plot with the Egyptians? Is not Ethiopia the only African country, which participated in the scramble of Africa as it, is attested by various pronouncements of its leaders and the colonial treaties they have signed with the European powers of the day? Does not Mersie-Hazen Weldekirkos, in his preface to the 1966 edition of Tsehafe Tezaz Ghebreselassieís chronicles of Menellikís reign, inform us that Menellik, by his victory at Adwa, ensured the creation of Ethiopiaís international borders? Is it not now a matter of historical record that Halileselassie had in fact requested the British government to make Ethiopia a British protectorate and, upon rejection, proposed to none other than Signor Mussolini himself that he would readily turn his country into an Italian protectorate if he and his descendants were to remain titular heads and ? of course- for a sum. The history of Ethiopia in the last two hundred years is in fact a history of greed, treachery and collaboration with external powers. So much so, that Ethiopian historians, like the venerable Tekletsadik Mekuria, were constrained to regularly apologize for, and to rationalize the follies of Ethiopiaís historical luminaries. Thus, when Menellik requested the Italians "to control Asmara and its environs" in order "to deny the Tigrayan Shiftas access to the Italian Consul in Massawa and not to allow them to purchase arms" until such time that his personal envoy arrived in Italy to discuss "what is dear to my heart", Tekletsadik, in embarrassment rationalized it as a clever maneuver to deny Ras Mengesha and his followers access to foreign arms. Afewerk Ghbereyessus is a lot more blunt. He defends Menellikís repeated treason and collaboration with Egypt as a morally upright expedient to assert his Solomonic right to the throne.

What about their claim that Ethiopia has commercial and economic interest in annexing Assab?

There are no countries which exist without commercial and economic interests. It is true that the sea is important in this regard. But again Ethiopia is not the only landlocked country. In fact, Ethiopia is one of the better-endowed landlocked countries because at least it has six alternative rotes to the sea. There are countries such as Uganda who have only one route to the sea, the Kenyan port of Mombassa, in which case it would be disadvantaged if it has problems with Kenya.

Ethiopia claims it has excellent relations with the rest of the countries in the Horn of Africa except Eritrea. Therefore, it would be absurd to claim that it would be economically and commercially threatened. In fact, it can even safely be claimed that Ethiopia is, for all practical purposes, a semi landlocked rather than a landlocked state in view of its close relations with Djibouti and its hitherto excellent relations with Eritrea. In any case, the Ethiopian Prime Minister as well as the foreign, trade and communications ministers have repeatedly declared that Assab is irrelevant to Ethiopian interests, that Assab has been and will revert to being a watering hole for Eritrean camels and that thanks to the excellent relations between Djibouti and Ethiopia as well as Ethiopiaís good relations with its other neighbours, Ethiopia would not be adversely affected by the desuetude of Assab. How is it then that Ethiopian economic and commercial interests would be negatively affected if it does not get its own port? There are only two conditions for a landlocked country to effectively promote its interests in the economic and commercial fields. The first is to have alternative routes. Ethiopia does have such facilities. Even more important is the need to have excellent relations with transit states. It is a matter of historical record that after Eritreaís independence - indeed even before the Referendum - Ethiopia had been using both Massawa and Assab effectively at even more concessionaire terms than any other arrangements it could get from any other country because of the bilateral agreement that they had before 1998.

There is also the protection provided by the Law of the Sea Convention and the rights and duties that are provided in part X of the Convention that deals with landlocked states. The existence of such laws provide the terms and conditions by which landlocked states and their coastal neighbours could and should operate. It is true that the landlocked states have rights
of access; but this does not mean that in order that the landlocked country should have access to the sea a coastal state should surrender part of its sovereign territory to assure transit. The Law of the Sea Convention too provides that the transit state must exercise full sovereignty over its territory. There is no provision in any of the international instruments concerning the transit of goods and people through ports that would allow change in the geographical conditions of either the landlocked or coastal states. This means that no country gets land and a presence in the sea coats at the expense of its neighbours. It means that a landlocked country should not try to be above the law or consider itself a special state.

But they also argue that Assab is the historical, natural and sole outlet of Ethiopia to the sea? How valid is this?

This is totally untrue. Throughout the history of the region, you will find that the natural outlet for Ethiopia was either Zeila in the east or Massawa in the north and at a later stage Djibouti and Berbera in the east. In fact, it is to be noted that, in spite of the urgings of the Italians to use Assab, Menellik had preferred to use Djibouti, Zeila and Berbera for the conduct of his trade with the world. The diplomatic correspondence of the times clearly indicate that Ethiopian foreign policy in fact focused on the attainment of Zeila rather than Assab. The writers of the times will tell you that Djibouti was the preferred port than Assab. A modern Ethiopian historian, Professor Bahru Zewde, in his book The History of Modern Ethiopia, also writes that "in terms of outlets, the Italo-Ethiopian conflict of the 1890s and then the amputation of the Mereb-Milash had given rise to the emergence of the French port of Djibouti as Ethiopia's main outlet to the sea. Djibouti's preeminence was attained at the expense of not only Massawa and Assab but also of Zeila and Berbera." Thus Assab was never a natural outlet to the sea.

He also writes that "Paradoxically Menellik, architect of the largest empire ever built in the Ethiopian region, presided over a series of events which barred it completely from the sea. His successors were forced to seek in vain accommodations in the adjacent colonial powers for an outlet to the sea. The British were approached for Zeila, the Italians for Assab and the French for a part of what is now Djibouti territory." Thus Assab was not the sole outlet to the sea.

He goes on to say that the problem was solved only after the annexation of Eritrea by Ethiopia He also makes it clear that even when the Italians wanted to sell Assab to Ethiopia, in exchange of some economic concessions to Italy, the Ethiopian delegation considered the price too high - meaning that Assab was not that important to them after all. A propos, guess what
happened when annexation took place in 1962 Yemene Misghina, in his book Italian Colonialism: A case Study of Eritrea, writes that: "Perhaps because the purchase of armament from Italy was too slow or perhaps the French and British competition was too effective [that] Ö in the end the leaders including the sultans invariably associated themselves to the British and the French spheres." When Abu-Bakar, the Egyptian governor of Zeila, offered the port as a route to Shawa it was immediately rejected. It was evident that Yohannes' interest was in Massawa and Menellik's interest was in Djibouti. This is also amplified by Harold Marcus in his Life and Times of Menellik. Especially after the conquest of Harer, Menellik made good use of the city. The city became the center of his arms trade and significantly enhanced the importance of the French colony at Obok. He was now in an excellent position to supervise and regulate trade and to bargain for better and more modern weapons. By September 1887 the arms traffic in Harer overshadowed all other commerce. To pay for the new weapons the king increased the number of caravans to the coast controlled by the French. This is clear evidence that Assab was not the natural or sole outlet for Ethiopia to the sea.

Some Ethiopians argue that there will be no peace and security in the Horn of Africa unless Ethiopia gets Assab.

The Ethiopian claim that there will not be peace in the Horn of Africa unless Eritrea cedes Assab to Ethiopia is tantamount to blackmail and a threat, both of which are condemned by international law. This provocation is a flagrant contravention of the provisions of the UN and OAU charters and several international instruments and conventions which prescribe respect for of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. One of these Ethiopians, Dejazmach Zewde Gebreselassie, writes that "for the sake of peace and security in the region", Eritrea must outrightly cede Assab and, for good measure, the territories around Assab including the area around Bada, Rahaita extending 60 kms from the Red Sea inland. This sounds more than a threat to me than a proposal for peace. When Ethiopian intellectuals and politicians claim that Assab is not negotiable and that there will be no peaceful resolution of the dispute if Assab is not ceded by Eritrea to Ethiopia, they in fact are telling the world that they will advise the government to go to war in order to annex Assab. Wherein lies the peace in this academic declaration of war if they are not ready to solve their problems by peaceful means on the basis of international law? One of the provisions of international law and international practice is the peaceful resolution of disputes. This is automatically being rejected by those intellectuals who at one time or another had served worked as foreign ministers, diplomats, permanent representatives to the UN either in New York or Geneva and as senior ministers. One of them was also a highly
respected revolutionary who had struggled for the self-determination of colonial peoples. Accordingly, they should have known better than to senselessly echo the 1976 TPLF Manifesto on Greater Tigray which, inter alia defines the geographic boundaries of Tigray as including Humera and Wolkait in Begemidir, Alamata, Ashenge and Kobo in Wello and the Kunama region, including Badme, the Saho region, including Zalambesa as well as Bada, Alitena and the Afar lands, including Assab in Eritrea. The territories in Ethiopia have already been annexed by Tigray. Only the Eritrean territories remain before a fulfillment of the TPLf's pipe dream. Such educated persons with wide experience have the responsibility of upholding international law and practice and should have exerted all efforts to bring peace between the two countries on the basis of international law rather than promoting ethnic irredentist ambitions which will surely only lead to further bloodshed. Is it possible that those who had damned Somalia's irredentist polices four decades ago will forget the principles, norms and values enshrined in the OAU and UN charters, as well as the decisions sanctifying colonial borders, on the basis of which they had defended the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ethiopia? Will they now legitimize Somalia's irredentist claims by advocating the dismemberment of a sovereign state with defined colonial borders to satisfy the ambitions of another irrredentist government? Such persons must know that they will be held responsible by history and future generations of
both countries.

The other reason given by these Ethiopian intellectuals for the need of a place in the coastline is that without a place in the seacoast Ethiopia would be vulnerable to the encroachment of its natural enemies, the Arabs and Moslems. This too is an old Ethiopian foreign policy tactic, which had been used as a convenient bogey by both politicians and academics.
Hitherto, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria and Iraq had been the demons of Ethiopian foreign policy. Today, only Egypt is singled out as the primary enemy. In the 21st Century the world is, in spite of several failures, still a world of laws, institutions and procedures; and it is hardly likely that these countries would resort to blatantly violating the OAU and UN
charters as well as commonly accepted international rules and procedures. Ethiopia is thus, as before, only inventing enemies to suit its foreign policy purposes. Ethiopia has no enemy but itself. It is the exclusionary nature of the state which denies the basic rights of half, if not more, of its population (i.e. the Ethiopian Moslems) as well as the ethnic cleavage
and hostility that successive "Ethiopian" regimes had promoted that is the root cause of problems. It is the predatory nature of the Ethiopian State that has been the bane of peace in the region. At one time or another Ethiopian governments had coveted neighbouring countries. Thus, Ethiopia has declared that Somalia was part of Ethiopia and that, therefore, it should be "reunited with the motherland." At one time or another, Ethiopia has also claimed Djibouti. It had claimed that Djibouti was definitely part of Ethiopia, because both countries had mutual economic interests, because Djibouti was Ethiopia's natural outlet to the sea, that the Afars of Djibouti are kith and kin of the Afars of Ethiopia. The Ethiopians also claimed that in order to safeguard and promote the interest of the Afars, Djibouti must be united with Ethiopia and that in any case economically Djibouti was not viable and is entirely dependent on Ethiopia. This was the policy of the Ethiopian government until 1977. After all, there was an Ethiopian sponsored liberation movement called the Djibouti Liberation Movement which advocated for the annexation of Djibouti to Ethiopia. Those who opposed were the Afars of Djibouti under Ahmed Dini and his colleagues as well as the Somalis under Hassen Guled Optidon and his colleagues. Yet, until 1977 Ethiopia had claims on Djibouti. Let us give an example. Emperor Haileselassie had, in a press interview on 4 February 1967, claimed that
"it must not be mistaken that the Djibouti territory is an integral part of Ethiopia. This is not fictitious claim; it is based on factsÖ that Ethiopia's frontiers had stretched from time immemorial to the shores of the sea and the area that is known today as Djibouti territory formed an indisputable, integral part of EthiopiaÖ that in addition to the fact that Djibouti territory had formed an integral part of Ethiopia, there is an important economic link between the territory and EthiopiaÖthat the geographical location of the territory forms an important strategic area of Ethiopia [since] out of the five hundred kilometers frontier of Djibouti territory, four hundred are with EthiopiaÖ that such an area particularly inhabited by a people whose sole means of survival and viability is based on the Ethiopian economy and whose composition of citizenship derives from
Ethiopia and whose historical links with Ethiopia have been affirmed by history can not be separated from Ethiopia herself." He concludes that "the Ethiopian people and government will not accept the solution to the Djibouti problem, which is in contradiction to the interest of the people concerned and in violation of the rights of the Ethiopian people." Does this sound familiar now? Of course, this claim was rejected at that time by a world which respected laws and had procedure. Yet, history is repeating itself, this time with threats, blackmail and hypocrisy.

It seems that Ethiopians consider all agreements, colonial or otherwise, which do not allow them to Annex Assab irrelevant. Where could this lead?

This is probably the strangest, most bizarre and outrageous statement that is coming out from Ethiopian intellectuals. If you consider international law irrelevant and agreements which have been signed as not binding, whether colonial or otherwise, because Ethiopia does not have access to international waters and the right to annex Assab, then the world becomes not a world of laws, institutions and procedures but would turn itself into a Hobbesian jungle. Ethiopian intellectuals are trying to change the Horn of Africa into such a jungle, where the big would kill the small, the mighty would conquer the weak. That is of course not a recipe for peace, stability and security in the region. This is a recipe for chaos. The relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia are based on legal documents. Eritrean boundaries were delimited by international agreements with the
actual participation of the Ethiopian Emperor Menellik. The UN decided to create a federation between a colony which had been created by Italy on the basis of these legal documents and Ethiopia which helped create the colony on the basis of the same documents. When the Federation was annulled the liberation struggle was waged in the name of that country which was-and is-known as Eritrea as was created by these documents. In 1991 Eritreans liberated the Italian colony of Eritrea, later annexed by Ethiopia. The territory did not-and could not change-because Ethiopia had annexed Eritrea and lost it in a liberation struggle. They conducted a referendum in this country. It was accepted as a member of the UN and the nternational community as a state which was created by the liberation of a colony created by Italy and later annexed by Ethiopia. It was accepted by the Ethiopian government itself as such.

There is an argument that because the Federation has been annulled and Eritrea had been turned into another province of Ethiopia, a new reality had made past legal documents irrelevant. If anything, the annulment of the Federation by Haile-Selassie returned the question to the status-quo-ante Federation. Eritrea reverted back to being a colony and not an integral part of Ethiopia because the annulment contravened a UN resolution and was consequently illegal. Therefore, the struggle of the Eritrean people became a struggle of self-determination for the Italian colony of Eritrea. If, therefore, there is to be peace, security and stability in the region this sine-qua-non would have to be accepted and should never be forgotten. The security and economic interest of one country cannot be achieved at the expense of its neighbours. To achieve peace, security and stability in the region the vital interests of all the states in the region must be addressed and not only of one at the expense of the others - and the territorial integrity of each state must be respected.

The other argument which we must address is the one which is advanced on the basis of the economic needs of Ethiopia, and in particular the necessity to annex Assab to meet these needs. In one of the articles that I read a few days ago, it is claimed that the population of Ethiopia which is projected to grow to about 100 million in the near future makes it imperative for Ethiopia to have additional space. This is nothing more and nothing less than the Nazi argument of Lebensraum. The Ethiopian academics who are submitting these Haushoferean theory of Geopolitik are in fact presenting a mix of chauvinism, historical distortions and myth to justify Ethiopia's annexation of Eritrean territory and expansion to the Red Sea. Many of these arguments were in an earlier age used to justify Hitler's expansion at the expense of Germany's neighbours, including Czechoslovakia and Poland. Then too, the argument that Ethiopia must have a presence in the sea coast to obviate the dangers of being surrounded by enemies is fallacious, since having a sea coast does not help a country from being surrounded by enemies. It is therefore obvious that these academics are employing distorted historical, geographical, sociological and legal arguments only as an excuse for Ethiopia's aggression and conquest of Eritrean territory. I believe what they are doing has a purpose, however misguided it maybe. By using the typical strategy of Geopolitik in the way that it was used by Hitler's "scholars", the present series of articles, discussions and radio
broadcasts are trying to create an international and domestic atmosphere which would foster Ethiopian aggression. The basic tactics include:

1. psychological warfare by which they are preparing the world to accept Ethiopian aggression;
2. ideological warfare to prepare their own citizens to accept the need for space and expansion;
3. an economic warfare in which they are committing huge amounts of money and wealth on armaments and pushing Eritrea to change its economic priorities since it would have to divert much needed development fund for defense purposes - in effect, to attempt to "bleed" Eritrea as Foreign Minister Seyoum had already declared.

When this is achieved, "the drive to the sea" will take place.

Part III and Final
"Old Ethiopian Foreign Policy Tactic is Repeating Itself"

In the first and second part of the interview, Dr. Amare Tekle pointed out that the issue of Assab is being raised by Ethiopian intellectuals of all stripes to put pressure on the international community on behalf of the Ethiopian Government. He further emphasized that although all countries have an unequivocal right to defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity, access to the sea is not, and has never been a sine-qua-non to such a right and that the Law of the Sea Convention provides that no country gets land and a presence in the sea coast at the expense of its neighbours and the present Ethiopian claims are in essence illogical. Dr. Amare went on to say that Ethiopian claims that Assab was the historical, natural and sole outlet of Ethiopia is untrue and that Ethiopian intellectuals should have exerted all efforts to bring peace between the two countries instead of instigating propaganda which will only lead to further bloodshed. He further outlined that to achieve peace, security and stability in the region the vital interests of all the states in the region must be addressed and not only of one at the expense of the others and the territorial integrity of each state must be respected. Following is the third and final part of the interview.

You've just explained that what Ethiopia is doing to Eritrea is similar in every aspect of it to what Nazi Germany had done to its neighbours. We know how the powerful of the time had rushed to stop the madness of Hitler then. Why is it then that the international community is silent now while its own charters and conventions are being violated by Ethiopia's madness?

To begin with, history tells us that the powers of the day had in fact played the game of appeasement rather than upholding the rule of law as prescribed in the Convention of the League of Nations. And I say history is repeating itself. But that is a different issue.

I personally believe that the Ethiopian intellectuals, who are either being pressurized by the government to make such outrageous statements or are conversely trying to pressure the government to undertake an adventurist policy, realize that the international community will not be sunctioning Ethiopia for whatever it is doing. If there was any lesson to be learned from the past two years it is that, at every given historical point, Ethiopia would break agreements that it had signed, would repeatedly violate international law including the Charter of the United Nations and the OAU, come out with new conditions to frustrate any peace effort and prevaricate endlessly P and it had gone away with it. Ethiopia had in fact the temerity to announce to a visiting UN peace delegation in May of its impending aggression if its conditions were not met and it had gone away with it because the powers of the day had in fact adopted such Munich-like policies.

It is well known that the policy objective of the Ethiopian government had never been the resolution of border conflict but the acquisition of an outlet to the sea not for Ethiopia but for Tigray. This has always been clear since the adoption of the TPLF charter. The need for Tigray to have its own seaport has been the subject of many official TPLF statements and pronouncements by TPLF leaders during and after the liberation struggle. There seems to be a temporary alliance between the Tigrayan controlled government and the Opposition, notably the Amhara, on the need to annex Assab. Yet, even in the unlikely event that Assab is taken away from Eritrea, there will be no peace and stability in the region. First, Eritreans will fight for Assab whatever it takes and how long it takes and whoever sanctions the annexation. Ethiopian victory will thus be pyrrhic and occupation would be a nightmare. That is a crucial matter that must be understood by all and sundry. Ethiopia might be able to take Assab but I do not think it would be able to use it. Then too, there will not be peace in Ethiopia itself for the simple reason that Tigray and the rest of Ethiopia will fight over Assab. When the time comes for Tigray to declare its independence there will surely be a conflict between Tigray and the rest of Ethiopia over Assab and the region will not experience peace and security. In fact, it is hardly likely that Ethiopia would survive such conflagration since it might succumb to the iron law of empires and disintegrate into its component parts as a result of its misadventures. All this will have repercussions in the Red Sea subsystem as well as the Gulf. If therefore the world powers are truly interested in the security and stability of the region and safeguarding the Red Sea as an international waterway, it surely would not be a wise policy option to even contemplate Ethiopia's annexation of Assab.

The Afar issue is being raised as another pretext for Ethiopia's expansionist policy and its projected annexation of Assab. Ethiopian intellectuals are arguing that Ethiopia's annexation of Assab is also necessary to safeguard and promote the interest and welfare of the Afar people.

This is farcical actually. It is true that it is the duty of any state to defend the rights of its citizens or national groups. But it must be understood that there are also other states in the region who must also defend the interest and welfare of their national groups. Somalia has, since the sixties, espoused such a policy. Such a policy could also be pursued by the Sudan in the west, Kenya in the east, and Eritrea in the south-west. While it will be ideal to have national groups united, it has, in the real world, been difficult to achieve such an ideal situation and there are several examples of nations that are found in different states and states which have different nations and nationalities within their boundaries. There is no better example of this than the Empire-State of Ethiopia. When, therefore, one argues in favour of uniting divided nations, one must, at a conceptual level, realize that one would be opening a pandora's box. We are being told by Ethiopian intellectuals that the Afar people have expressed their interest to be united by bringing the Eritrean Afars under Ethiopian rule. There is of course no empirical evidence for this. On the other hand, all available evidence indicates that the Afar of Ethiopia are extremely unhappy with the present Ethiopian regime. We are thus inclined to conclude that the desire of the Afar people must be similar to the desire expressed by the people of Humera and Wolkait who were "united" with Tigray recently and are living happily ever after. They are so happy, in fact, that the people of the two regions of Gondar are of course being expressed by a liberation struggle for a status-quo-ante TPLF rule.

There are Afars in Eritrea. There are Afars in Djibouti. The Eritrean Afars have proved to the world in general, and Ethiopians in particular, that they were Eritreans by fighting for 30 years in the liberation struggle; by being part and parcel of the development effort in this country and by their active participation in the struggle to defend their country against the present Ethiopian aggression. Besides, there were several Afars who had the courage to stand up and say "no" to the annexation of Eritrea by Ethiopia in the Eritrean National Assembly. The name of that grand old man Akito, who is still alive, still brings warm memories of Eritrean nationalism. If we go further back in history, we also note that during the time that the Italians acquired Assab and its environs by purchase from the local Sultans, it was the Afars led by yet another Akito who objected to that sale and not Ethiopia.

There is an effort by Ethiopian intellectuals to give the impression that Afars had always been united under the Sultan of Aussa. This is not true. History is replete with evidence that the Afars in Djibouti, Tajura, Obock etc, and the Afars of the Eritrean coast lived in independent principalities equal to the principality of Aussa. And while the Sultan of Aussa would at times, (i.e. when Menelik became strong), pretend to be submissive to him, there was no evidence that the other Sultans, had submitted to him or the Sultan of Aussa. The claim by Ethiopian intellectuals is therefore a misrepresentation of history. In fact, there is ample evidence that, on more than one occasion, it was these same sultans that had, as sovereigns, mediated between the Sultan of Aussa and Italian authorities.

Lastly, what is now argued in order to annex Assab has been used in an attempt to annex Djibouti in earlier times. There is nothing new in it. As made clear earlier, Emperor Haile-Selassie has declared that "Afars are our brothers; they cannot live without Ethiopia; Djibouti's survival is dependent on Ethiopia and that the Afars must be united with their brothers in Ethiopia." In any case, the more recent articles on the issue by Ethiopians indicate that the Afar question should not in fact be raised as an issue, since the issue is not whether or not the Afars should be united under Ethiopian rule, but of the whole of Eritrea being forcefully re-annexed by Ethiopia.

Irredentism has never been a viable foreign policy option. That has been proved on several occasions since World War II. Several examples abound. Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia and Great Britain over territories in Borneo and, most relevantly for our region, Somalia's decades-old conflict with Ethiopia and, to a lesser extent, with Kenya and Djibouti (France) are two such good examples. In both instances such irredentism was condemned by the international community as a contravention of the UN Charter. In the case of Somalia, in particular, it also was a contravention of OAU resolution AHG/RES16(I) which had made respect for colonial borders part of customary international law. A propos, Ethiopia was a major sponsor of the resolution and had used it effectively in its diplomatic struggle against Somalia. Now, the same generation of Ethiopian intellectuals, which had considered any questioning of the validity of the resolution to be diplomatic and political sacrilege, are actively encouraging their government to flout it and the international community to consider it irrelevant. What is more, while Indonesian and Somali policy was at least consistent, the position of Ethiopian intellectuals smacks of opportunism since, unlike the policies of the above countries, it does not seem to care about the fate of the Afars in other countries (e.g. Djibouti).

In this respect, perhaps the line propagated by Ethiopian intellectuals is similar to the one advocated by Afghanistan in connection with Pakhtoonistan/Pushtunistan. Not happy with the creation of the state of Pakistan itself, Afghanistan formally demanded that a new state (called Pakhtoonistan) be formed in the North-West Province of Pakistan inhabited by a national group known as Pathans in Pakistan and Pushtus in Afghanistan. Yet, Afghanistan never adopted a policy which advocated the incorporation of the Pathans into Afghanistan or ceding the Pushtus to a new state to be carved out of Pakistan. There was no attempt to create a "Greater Afghanistan". It was only a short-term political expedient to satisfy its yearning for a seacoast. The Ethiopian intellectuals seem to be pursuing that line. They seem to be oblivious to the existence of those Afars outside Ethiopia and Eritrea, mainly because their real interest is not the safeguarding and promotion of the welfare of the Afar people but the acquisition of Assab. If they seem to have the interest of the Afars close to their hearts P an interest which had hitherto not existed and will surely disappear as fast as a snowflake in mid summer heat if they succeed in annexing Assab P it is because they have to cross Eritrean Afar territory to reach the sea and Assab.

The Ethiopian intellectuals seem to forget that Afars can speak, and have in the past spoken, for themselves. I had said earlier that Eritrean Afars have acsertained their identity by fighting Ethiopia during the liberation struggle. What cannot be said is that Afars have voluntarily fought for Ethiopia at any time in history. In fact one of the causes for the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia was the refusal of the Ethiopian army which had moved into sovereign Eritrean territory in hot pursuit of members of one of several Afar liberation movement fighting the present Ethiopian regime. Is it conceivable that the Afars who are fighting Ethiopian rule would be happy to be ruled by Ethiopia? Would it not be just as logical to argue that the Afars of Ethiopia would actually want to join their kith and kin in Eritrea? If the Afars of Djibouti had said "No thank you" to Ethiopian rule three decades ago, would it be logical to argue that the Afars of Eritrea would say "yes", especially after they had fought for Eritrea's independence for 30 years?

You mentioned earlier that the Ethiopian government is behind this campaign by the intellectuals. On the other hand, Prime Minister Meles, three months ago, told members of his parliament that Assab is Eritrean sovereign territory and that his government had no intention to capture it? What do you think is the reason behind this?

I think there is a two track policy. In the field of propaganda they would declare "no, no ,no, we have nothing to do with this". But then, as I mentioned earlier, they are preparing their citizens and the world for war and they want to fight it in the name of the Afars who, according to Ethiopian intellectuals "are yearning to be reunited with mother Ethiopia". The more things change, the more they remain the same.

Do you have some final words?

Yes. There is the tendency among Ethiopian intellectuals to glorify and to give weight to a mythical past which has no relevance to the modern world. The Ozymandian claims of past rulers, including those that had claimed that their realms had extended from Arabia to Madagascar can not be used as a basis for foreign and security policies. Even when there is historical truth, the tendency to harken back to the glories of Yore can be woefully dangerous. Now there are those who would give credence to the myth and Ozymandian claims of antiquity and who would then dream of restoring the glories of past ages. Is it not wise to mentally look around and learn from those countries with equal, if not more, claims to history. Shouldn't the way they conduct themselves in the modern world be emulated?

Is it possible to restore the Axumite Empire in the 21st century any more that it is possible to restore the Ottoman, Habsburg, Austro-Hungarian, Chinese and indeed Mali, Ghana, Songhay, Dahomey, Bornu, Funj, Oroma, and Adal Empires? Would such an attempt not lead to expected dire consequences? Ethiopians must learn to look to the future, not the past and to use their resources for development rather that warfare. The improvement of their backward economy - one of the worst in the world P rather than the forceful acquisition of the territories of other states will solve their Malthusian problems. Their present aggression and its inevitable failure will, I hope, be an appropriate wake-up all.