Algeris' OAU Proposal: Is It Really a Breakthrough?
Amdetsion Kidane
July 17, 1999

By now, we are all aware that Eritrea has accepted the "Modalities for Implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement" proposed at the 35th OAU Summit in Algeria unconditionally as it always has any effort that brings lasting peace. Reportedly, the Ethiopia also has accepted the proposal, but has delayed formal statement of acceptance until it consulted "its parliament." I hope this is the last alibi that Ethiopia will come out with in this new mediation initiative. The purpose of this paper, however, is neither to praise the Eritrean government for its acceptance of the proposal nor to blame the Ethiopian counterpart for repeat of the many preconditions it posed in the past to prolong the war every time a flicker of peace twinkled. The purpose of this writing is to take an overview of OAU's decision process from the perspective of management science or operations research (OR). I should mention though that the root of the problem is not lack of expertise in the application of the scientific approach to decision making. It is lack of desire, conviction and integrity of the policy makers, as a team, to arrive at a fair decision and monitor its implementation if they did arrive at one. Be it as it may, the logical steps will be briefly discussed in relation to OAU's approach to solving the "border" war between Eritrea and Ethiopia.

First: Identifying the problem.
Needless to say that a clear understanding of the problem should be attained. As obvious as it sounds, this is the most difficult step of the process because what you see on the surface may be a symptom of a more serious hidden problem rather than the problem itself. In this case, OAU either, in good faith, believed that the problem is a border problem or deliberately refused to admit that there is other motive, on the part of the Ethiopian government, despite an official caution from the Eritrean government to that end. The OAU action defies the tenet of decision making process as misunderstanding or denial of a real problem result in a wrong decision. The fact that Ethiopia refused to cease hostilities, continued to bomb civilian centers inside Eritrea, even after the highly-celebrated "victory" on the Badme front and Eritrea accepted the OAU 11-point framework to end the war are indications of the real problem that OAU failed to recognize.

Second: Stating the objective.
The objective has to be clearly stated in relation to the problem identified and defined. When possible, the objective has to be expressed in terms of some quantifiable measure to really assess the impact of the decision taken to solve to the real problem. Needless to say that the objective of OAU, at best, is to bring the war to an end and foster peaceful coexistence between the two nations. A well-defined objective, thouhg, would articulate the time frame within which the objective would be realized. It would even go further and address issues relating to repatriating, resettling and rehabilitating displaced and or deported civilians in terms of actual numbers within a specified time period after the end of the war. But, a comprehensive approach to solving the problem, beyond above silencing the sound of the guns, demands OAU's willingness to admit the core problem and its social, cultural and economic impact. As far as I know, OAU has refused to recognize and publicly condemn documented Ethiopia's deliberate human right violations of Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean decent living in Ethiopia let alone put numbers to assess its level of performance in this regard.

Third: Gathering data.
It is absolutely necessary that quality (accurate and reliable), complete, timely and relevant data be available to make an intelligent decision. With the advent of the computer in general and communication technology in particular, getting data with the attributes specified above is not a problem. What the problem with OAU, with respect to the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, is lack of desire to gather accurate and reliable data, and even the motivation to refer to relevant in-house document file. Think of the Cairo resolution of 1964 that OAU passed with respect to sovereignty of an African state. According to this resolution, the colonial border that was established during the colonial period defines an African state. The bare minimum that OAU had to do to arrive at a just and fair decision regarding the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia is to refer to map of Eritrea as it was during the Italian occupation. The truth of the matter is that OAU did not care to know what the fact about Eritrea is in relation to the "border" war between the two countries.

Fourth: Identifying alternative courses of action:
Under normal condition, the alternatives to be developed should be based on grievances aired by the feuding states. In this case, indications are that inputs provided by the Ethiopian government seem to have more weight in shaping the alternatives considered -- if at all there are. OAU has given deaf ear to suggestions by the Eritrean government that could have enhanced the construction of balanced alternatives. Eritrea has right from the beginning suggested that the President of Eritrea and the Prime Minister of Ethiopia meet for open direct talk to discuss the underlying cause of the war and find a solution to the conflict through mutual understanding. When this attempt failed Eritrea proposed that OAU reviews the border treaties signed between Italy and Ethiopia. Heaven knows if these documents are given the attention that they deserve to develop attainable alternative course of action.

Fifth: Analyzing the alternatives.
The alternatives developed have to be evaluated in light of the objective stated at the outset. Unfortunately, I am not in a position to know if there were comprehensive alternatives to evaluate. But, if the resolutions passed, by OAU and others are indicators of the alternative considered, they all are in line with Ethiopia's stand about the war expressed well ahead recommendations are given and/or resolutions are passed. A typical example of this is the recent resolutions, allegedly composed by the outgoing Chairman of OAU and released to the selected parties and media long before it was delivered to the Eritrean government, that Eritrea withdraw from "all Ethiopian territories" that it occupied.

Sixth: Implement and monitor.
The only acceptable resolution that OAU came up with, with respect to this war, is the 11-point peace initiative framework passed in November 1998. This resolution did not take off the ground despite the fact that OAU had assurances of logistical assistance from the UN Security Council for its implementation. OAU was simply too timid to respond to Eritrea's request for clarification on some sticky issues and to assert its conviction on the decision it took. Its failure to respond to this request immediately has emboldened Ethiopia to deliberately twist the understanding of "Badme and its environs" to mean all fronts of confrontation.

Indeed, OAU has no implementation from past activities to monitor. What it has to monitor is the implementation of the "Modalities for Implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement" proposed at the 35th OAU Summit in Algeria. It has to see to it that this proposal does not stall or go down the drain as the "the 11-point framework' did while lives fall like autumn leaves. Personally, I have reason to believe that Ethiopia will come up with preconditions as it did in the past any time a flicker of hope twinkled. Even now, Ethiopia's acceptance of this resolution is contingent on the approval of the resolution by its parliament. The intent of such preconditions is nothing less than to undermine peace, which the "Modalities for Implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement" is hoped to accomplish. Personally, I do not consider this resolution a breakthrough unless OAU is determined to overcome the pressure that the Ethiopian government is most likely to apply to sway the decision in its favor. But, this is possible if and only if OAU conducts sincere evaluation of its past performance and takes a bold action to change its operation in relation to the decision process outlined above.

Sincerely,

Amdetsion Kidane
Springfield, VA