"How much should Ethiopians pay in terms of resources and lives? .let us sign the peace plan and move on to take care of the other equally pressing problems that confront Ethiopia."
-- Dagmawi 'Why Ethiopia Should Sign The Peace Plan', September 2, 1999

Introduction
On September 2 an Ethiopian voice of reason called for peace. In his commentary titled 'Why Ethiopia Should Sign the Peace Plan' Dagmawi - well known Ethiopian world wide web columnist, student of history, and analyst of the Eritrea-Ethiopia border conflict - called on Addis Ababa to accept the Technical Arrangements, the third and final integral component of the OAU peace plan. All things considered, an analysis of Dagmawi's call for peace as well as of his past commentaries demonstrates that his courageous call is based on a belief that at this point the peace settlement is beneficial for Ethiopia.

Untenable Military Option
Notwithstanding his recognition of the heroism displayed by the fallen Ethiopian soldiers, Dagmawi is clearly disappointed with the Ethiopian government's military strategy and performance. In his February 8, 1999 piece titled 'The Obstinacy that Blocks the Road to Peace' he writes, "To guarantee success Ethiopia needs to mobilize a far greater proportion of the country. When attacking fortified positions, overwhelming forces is required. This Ethiopia does not have.A common rule of thumb for such operations is that a numerical superiority on the order of 10 to 1 is needed. Ethiopia has no such advantage right now." In his February 10 commentary titled 'Fierce Fighting and Worse' he continues, " Ethiopia needs patience, and a long-term outlook." Dagmawi momentarily reconsiders in his February 27 article titled 'Operation Sunset Delivers the Medicine' in the aftermath of the battle of Badma when he temporarily concedes, ".I have been suggesting that Ethiopia needs to mobilize far more troops in order to conduct a successful offensive. Well, I was wrong." He, nevertheless, recovers from his emotional lapse in his March 17 column titled 'A Waste of Heroism', "But still, one must question the necessity for a frontal attack on the Eritrean trenches. There are other, less costly ways to get rid of the Eritrean army from our land."

Diametrically opposed to Dagmawi's recommendations, the Ethiopian regime chose to use frontal attack as a military strategy in the two major battles of Badma and Tsorona despite its lack of a significant numerical advantage and its deficient air force. The result was predictably horrendous for Ethiopia. In his June 15 '99 'Butchery Mounts In World's Biggest Battleground' BBC's Alex Last illustrates events in the February '99 Battle of Badma,"The terrible hallmark of this war has been the human-wave tactics of the Ethiopian Army. Sheer weight of numbers seemed to work in February, dislodging Eritrean forces from the disputed border town of Badme, but with huge losses." In his May 18, '99 article titled 'Human Waves Fall As War Aims Unfold' The Guardian's (UK) David Hirst describes the horrific March '99 battle of Tsorona, which controls the most efficient access point to Asmara, the Eritrean capital:

The Ethiopian commanders' strategy was simple. Deploying tens of thousands of barely trained recruits along a 3-mile front, they drove them forward, wave upon wave, with the sole mission of blowing themselves up on minefields until they had cleared a path to the Eritrean front line for better trained infantry, mechanised forces and armour.It did not work. The doomed men hardly raised their weapons, but linked hands in a despairing communal solace in the face of certain death from four sources: mines, perfectly aimed artillery, the trenches and their own officers in the rear, who shot them if they turned and ran.

In his address to the 100th meeting of the Veterans of Foreign Wars in August '99 President Clinton indicated that more than 70,000 lives were lost as a result of the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Given Ethiopia's method of war - heavy use of human waves, one can easily conclude that most of the casualties were Ethiopian. While it is difficult to assess whether Ethiopia's military performance in the two major battles would have been markedly different had Addis Ababa heeded his military prescription, Dagmawi is in all likelihood seriously discouraged with the "costly" military result.

Diplomatic Predicament
Dagmawi appears to be manifestly disappointed with Ethiopia's diplomatic performance thus far. In his 'Why Ethiopia Should Sign the Peace Plan' he laments, " All this is not because the mediators favored Eritrea. It is simply because the current Ethiopian leadership has not done enough to present Ethiopia's case." He correctly assesses the mediators' deference to Ethiopia as evidenced not by the speed with which they asked Eritrea to unilaterally withdraw from Badma - a territory on which it has a considerable claim- but by their failure to have Ethiopia agree to a cardinal Eritrean request: an immediate cessation of hostilities.

But Ethiopia's diplomatic predicament did not result only from weakness on the Ethiopian side but from strength on the Eritrean side as well. Indeed, Eritrea's diplomatic ascendancy began with its unequivocal acceptance of the OAU's Framework for Agreement in February 1999 after Ethiopia's military recapture of Badma. Eritrea's new diplomatic corps were able to successfully counter Ethiopia's intense effort to portray Eritrea as the aggressor in the eyes of the international community. As its chairmanship was transferred from Burkina Faso's Blaise Campaore to Algeria's Abdelaziz Bouteflika in July '99, the OAU produced both the Modalities of Implementation in that same month and the Technical Arrangements in August '99 out of the Framework Agreement. As of August 7, Eritrea has accepted the entire package, earning worldwide praise. Ethiopia, on the other hand, has all but rejected it, finding itself at serious odds with the US, UN and the international community.

Peace Plan to the Rescue
Judging from his articles, particularly the one calling for Ethiopia to sign the peace plan, Dagmawi is unimpressed by Addis Ababa's military as well as diplomatic performance thus far. Realizing that the EPRDF's military strategists are no Ras Alula, whose military genius is well documented, and cognizant of the fact that their diplomats are no Aklilu Habtewold, the Ethiopian diplomat extraordinaire who architected the OAU's policy of blocking Eritrea's right to self-determination for over three decades, Dagmawi in all likelihood deduced that Ethiopia has only one option if it is to avert further human and material losses: swift exit from the present state of affairs by signing the peace plan. He, however, had two conditions on the details of the plan.

In his July 16 article titled 'The Dead-end Road to Final Capitulation' Dagmawi warns, ".the Ethiopian government should not formally accept this plan until it is clarified in detail." In this article he argues that the plan's details must establish the May 6, 1998 status quo ante both in terms of 1) Eritrean withdrawal from occupied territories and 2) restoration of the pre-existing Ethiopian civilian administration. Since the OAU's Technical Arrangements completely accommodated Dagmawi's two main concerns in section 8a (Eritrea re-deploys its troops within 2 weeks. This redeployment is verified by the peacekeeping mission) and 8b (upon verification of Eritrea redeployment by peacekeeping mission, the peacekeeping mission observes and assists the restoration by Ethiopia of the civilian administration, including police and local militia, within 7 days, to enable the restored civilian administration to prepare for the return of the population) respectively, he called on Addis Ababa to sign the peace plan in a climactic, unforgettable, and admirable exercise of intellectual honesty.

Dagmawi's expressed reasons for recommending that Ethiopia sign the peace plan are based on common sense: Eritrea has accepted "all Ethiopia's conditions for a cease fire"; the objective of continuing the war is unclear; the economic cost of financing continuation of the war is prohibitive; building democracy in Ethiopia should be the overriding objective; and failure to accept the plan would result in Ethiopia's unaffordable diplomatic isolation. Dagmawi's call for peace is a commendable display of courage because in a time of unparalleled tension between Eritreans and Ethiopians, his position on the OAU's plan coincides with that of Eritrea.

Likely Resumption of War
Dagmawi's momentous call for peace is in direct contrast with the FDRE. In his Ethiopian New Year September 11 address Nominal President Negasso Ghidada said the following, "If Ethiopia's sovereignty is not fully restored in the occupied territories, Ethiopia has an obligation to liberate its territories by force." Ethiopian Government Spokesperson Selome Tadesse continues to generate war mongering statements such as the September 14, 1999 press release which states the following in reference to the OAU mediators, "The Ethiopian Government cannot be expected to tell its people after all that has passed that the restoration of Ethiopian sovereignty is dependent on the decision arrived at by third parties at a future date."Furthermore, Dagmawi's call for Ethiopian acceptance of the peace plan clashes with The Monitor, a privately owned but government dominated publication. In its September 19 article titled 'Implications & Possible Pitfalls Of The Third Document' The Monitor asserts the following in reference to the Technical Arrangements,"Indeed, the invasion of Ethiopia by UN peace-keepers would make this moment of colonial legacy even more iniquitous than the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, that led to what is now called Eritrea.The bottom line of all this is Ethiopia is incapable of managing its affairs including that of a runaway province of Eritrea." Finally, web-based Walta Information Center, another privately owned but government dominated medium, on September 28 opposed signing the plan by combatively asserting,"No to stationing of foreign forces in our soil or region, no to delimitation and demarcation of borders by third parties,.." The daily language directly and indirectly generated by the Ethiopian government is conspicuous not only in its affront to the mediators, but also in its flagrant disregard for norms of diplomatic conduct. The views and statements expressed by Ethiopian President Negasso Ghidada, Ethiopian Government Spokesperson Selome Tadesse, The Monitor and Walta Information Center signal the Ethiopian regime's intent to launch another major attack against Eritrea, auguring more death, destruction and resultant poverty and backwardness for both Eritrea and Ethiopia

OAU Peace Plan: Viable Option
As evidenced by the present military stalemate, this conflict can only be resolved peacefully, i.e. on the negotiation table. Accordingly, the internationally supported OAU's plan is presently the only viable option to resolve the dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia. International experts from the US and UN have laboriously worked for over a year to formulate this plan which will one day be a key vehicle that will play an important part in resolving the conflict. Eritreans have come to terms with the plan and fully accepted it. Ethiopians, on the other hand, do not appear ready to join their compatriot Dagmawi in embracing the peace plan. They are at this juncture seriously frustrated with the Ethiopian regime's military and diplomatic debacles. In its August '99 editorial titled 'Ethnicism and the Defense of Ethiopia' Ethiopian Register illustrates:

In the long run, the greatest danger to Ethiopia's national unity and territorial integrity comes not from Isayas Afeworki..but from Meles Zenawi, who has created the constitutional mechanism, the political atmosphere, the ideological pretext, and the military incapacity for Ethiopia's disintegration.

Realizing that the present conflict will neither punish Eritrea for choosing a national destiny separate from Ethiopia, nor weaken the extremely unpopular government of Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi without placing Ethiopia's existence in question, Ethiopians in general will soon be receptive to the peace plan. Unfortunately, it may take another round of war for them to reach critical mass in favor of the plan, rendering Dagmawi's call for peace a dissonant reminder of a crucial reality: peace is the only path to co-existence.

Conclusion
As the Horn of Africa braces for yet another round of war, Dagmawi's call for peace could not have been more timely and opportune. Blessed are all roads to peace, including the one he travailed. Delivered with refreshing candor, his call for the Ethiopian government to accept the OAU's peace settlement is unequivocal. It represents a scintilla of hope for an environment conducive to harmony between the two sovereign people of Eritrea and Ethiopia.

His February 8, 1999 words will one day come true, "It is a peace plan that is drawn up according to the principles of international law. There is not going to be another peace plan. There are not going to be amendments to this peace plan. No matter how many Eritreans and Ethiopians end up wounded or killed on the battlefield, the final resolution of this conflict is already clear. We know what the outcome will be." Yes, we know that sooner or later the OAU's plan will be signed and implemented by both Eritrea and Ethiopia, but at the present time all signal points to the following: Dagmawi's call will go unheeded and another round of war is imminent. Nevertheless, his call remains courageous and crucial