On May 5 the OAU released an official statement on the proximity talks that were held in Algiers to resolve the present conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The talks took place between April 29 and May 5 of this year. The objective of these talks was to resolve points of divergence between the disputants as part of the ongoing OAU peace process to resolve the 2-year old war.

The official statement indicates that the talks were attended not only by representatives of both Eritrea and Ethiopia, but also those of the OAU, US and EU; no representative from the UN is mentioned. The document proceeds to explain the events that led to these talks.

According to the document, the OAU attempted to have both parties sign the Framework Agreement and the Modalities of Implementation in July ’99 before turning its attention to details of implementation.  Ethiopia was not receptive to signing the documents piece meal and wanted to sign the documents after all the details were specified and finalized. Also, Ethiopia requested that a detailed plan of implementation be presented to both disputants as non-negotiable. Eritrea, on the other hand, desired to sign the documents immediately but at the time did not object to waiting for the OAU to produce a detailed plan of implementation before signing the peace documents. Furthermore, Eritrea agreed with Ethiopia in accepting the proposition that the OAU submit a detailed implementation plan to both countries as non-negotiable.

Next, the OAU’s statement dwells on the Technical Arrangements. This  document, which  specifies the details of implementation,  was produced by the OAU and presented to both Eritrea and Ethiopia as non-negotiable in August 1999.  This document was prepared with UN’s help since it was expected to play a critical role in implementing the peace plan. The OAU’s statement states that while Eritrea accepted the Technical Arrangements, Ethiopia objected to the document, raising issues of consistency with the Framework Agreement and Modalities of Implementation, and asking for clarification on these issues.

The OAU’s official statement indicates that with UN’s help, the OAU provided Ethiopia with the requested clarifications sometime at the end of August 1999.  Ethiopia asked for time to consider the clarifications. In order to move the peace process forward, the OAU representative met with Ethiopian representatives in October 1999. Seeing that Ethiopia still had serious reservations with the Technical Arrangements, the OAU asked that Ethiopia put its concerns in writing.

As illuminated by the statement, in November 1999 Ethiopia sent a memorandum to the OAU in which it expressed the changes it would like to see to the Technical Arrangements. After holding talks with Ethiopia in order to understand its views, the OAU integrated them in a document called the “non paper.”

The statement continues to explain that having concluded that the “non paper” was acceptable to Ethiopia through its travel to the region between February 24 to March 4 2000, the OAU proceeded to propose that the document be discussed by both countries and that the discussion would take the form of proximity talks. These talks, the OAU hoped, would attempt to fuse Ethiopia's view as expressed in the "non paper" and Eritrea's as specified in the Technical Arrangements and produce a final document called “consolidated technical arrangements” that would be agreeable to both.  In March 2000 both countries accepted the proposal to hold proximity talks in order to narrow down points of disagreement on the Technical Arrangements.

Finally, the statement concludes, the talks took place between April 29 – May 5 2000 but failed to produce the desired outcome because the two could not agree on the timing of signature of the peace documents: Eritrea wanted to sign the Framework Agreement, Modalities of Implementation and a cease-fire agreement upfront; Ethiopia wanted to sign peace documents only after the finalization of the details of implementation.

This OAU document is most remarkable not because of what it expressly states, but because of what it does not :

• 1. As expected, the document should have praised Eritrea for accepting the non-negotiable Technical Arrangements. Because it does not, the document is punishing Eritrea and rewarding Ethiopia; therefore, raising questions of fairness on the mediators' part.
• 2. Consistent with elementary rules of fairness, the document should have expressly stated that due to Ethiopia's reservations and contrary to expectation, the Technical Arrangements were subject to change.

The peace process has been pushed back to July 1999. Ethiopia succeeded in doing so by refusing to accept the Technical Arrangements. This has resulted in the wasting of much invaluable time which could have been used to reduce tension between the two countries, alleviate the plight of ethnic Eritrean deportees, helping drought victims, and work on steps for reconciliation and peace. Instead, just as in July 1999, the Framework Agreement and the Modalities of Implementation are the only two documents that have been accepted by both.

But Ethiopia is not the only obstacle to peace. The mediators share the blame as well. Since the conflict began, they have gone to great length to appease Ethiopia. Ethiopia's territorial claims are not specific, Ethiopia accepts only its own interpretation of the peace texts, Ethiopia refuses to sign any peace documents, Ethiopia rejects all UN resolutions on the conflict; yet, the mediators continue to accommodate its belligerent attitude. Instead of rewarding Eritrea's concessions, i.e. Eritrea accepted a) withdrawing from territories it claims as its own, b) the mediators' interpretation that "Badme and its environment" is no longer "Badme and its vicinity" but means the entire border, c) the modification of the Technical Arrangements which were supposed to have been accepted by both as non-negotiable, the mediators have blindly accommodated Ethiopia's stance, paralyzing the peace process.

Therefore, Ethiopia's launch of yet another offensive on May 12 is no surprise. Encouraged by ineffective mediation and blind accommodation, Ethiopia will continue to exploit a debilitated peace process and to send hundreds of thousands of its youth to a senseless war. On May 13 The Washington Post's story on the conflict describes US UN Ambassador Richard Holbrooke's assessment:

Holbrooke said that in his group's last meeting with (Ethiopian Prime Minister) Meles,  it was clear that Meles was determined to go to war before elections scheduled this  Sunday. He told us he had already paid for this war…..He had already moved up to  250,000 troops, delivered plasma and other supplies to the front and basically written  off his own people who are starving.