The impression the world got about the last phase of the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia is an elaborate distortion and exaggeration of facts, presented by the Ethiopian propaganda machine, and ballyhooed by the world press. According to this scenario Eritrea was beaten into submission and the Eritrean government and its people have been "subdued". The picture viewed from the Eritrean side is entirely different. Of course, the truth is not hidden from the two antagonistic armies and outsiders that monitor developments in the sky by satellite and other means. One day the whole truth will come out and the whole world will know it.
Unfortunately, sensational stories such as the ruse known as the "jackass offensive", whereby the Ethiopian army slipped across the border allegedly on donkeys will remain long in the minds of people. Apart from its dramatic effect and sensationalism, the offensive did not have any significant military impact. From the very beginning, the Eritrean government discounted the Ethiopian drive into Eritrea simply as a quest for territory using its numerical superiority. Eritrean strategy, according to official Eritrean press releases, was aimed at minimizing casualties, and eventually winning the war by destroying the invading force. The Russians have done a similar thing against Napoleon and Hitler. Nobody in his right mind would consider either of the two invaders were winners against Russia. Both Napoleon and Hitler saw the beginning of their eventual demise in Russia. So will the invasion of Eritrea herald the beginning of the end for the minority regime in control of Ethiopia and that is responsible for the invasion of Eritrea.
The world media run wild with speculation. It was predicting the fall of Mendefera and an attack on Asmara. Some analysts and self-appointed "authorities" were talking about a huge pincer movement whereby the Barentu force makes a rendezvous with a column from Ethiopia crossing the Mereb River and swinging southeast to attack Eritrean forces at Zalambessa. Of course, only impostor military analysts and tacticians that have no idea of military tactics or knowledge of the terrain and alignment of forces would hazard such a fantasy.
As events evolved, the Ethiopian army that went to Barentu got parked on a dead-end street. It stayed in the area for about two weeks vandalizing and looting property, and murdering innocent civilians. A major force tried to push towards Asmara on a short-cut approach to Asmara from near Barentu. It was badly beaten by the Eritrean Defense Force and Air Force. The army that was to capture Areza on the Barentu-Mendefera road could not proceed beyond Mai Dima, a valley west of Areza. Another force that tried to cross into Eritrea near Adi Quala through Adi Qeshi and Daero-kunaat was badly mauled. Military activity on the Tserona front was limited to artillery duel. The Ethiopians realized they could not make headway in this heavily defended area. The Zalambessa front was securely under Eritrean control. The Bure front on the Assab road was firmly under Eritrean control. There was exchange of artillery fire and occasional skirmishes.
The Ethiopian Air Force, despite its undisputed control of the skies did not display any ability to provide close ground support, or mount serious interdicting or strategic bombing. All the Ethiopian government has to show for its hefty investment in Russian warplanes and mercenaries is a few bombs dropped at Asmara airport and the power generating plant under construction at Hirgigo, south of Massawa. On the other hand, the nascent Eritrean Air Force scored and played a decisive role in the Barentu and Tessenei sectors.
When Eritrean forces went on the offensive, they drove the Ethiopian invaders out of Barentu and Tessenei. Swiftly, the situation on the ground returned to what it was before the start of the recent round of fighting. Then, in compliance with the OAU proposal Eritrea withdrew its forces from the Zalambessa and Bure fronts to fall back to positions miles away from the border. Instead of observing the OAU agreement the Ethiopians pushed deep into Eritrean territory and occupied Senafe. Once again media speculation was triggered. There was speculation that Adi Keyih will fall. The VOA even reported that it had already fallen to the advancing Ethiopians.
On June 9-10, barely a day before the deadline set by the OAU for acceptance of a cease-fire by Ethiopia, the Ethiopians launched a four-division-plus attack on the Assab front. The objective was to capture Assab and present a fait accompli situation, similar to what happened to Herman Cohen and Derg officials at the London conference in 1991. At that time, Cohen came to negotiate the creation of a coalition between the government and opposition forces. This time around it wouldn't work, because the Eritreans, a major partner with the TPLF at that time, are on the opposite side. Predictably, repeated Ethiopian offensives were crushed. Right away, Ethiopia accepted the cease-fire and demanded that UN peacekeeping troops be brought to protect Ethiopia from Eritrean attacks. This was the situation when Ethiopia accepted the cease-fire and the peace process.
It is difficult to think of winners and losers in this war. There are bound to be no winners - only losers. Nevertheless, if by some chance, both sides can see themselves coming out as winners, and then it is a win-win situation. It is an ideal situation for conflict resolution. In short, a dangerous zero-sum situation is been transformed into a developmental situation where everybody gains. It is a situation where two people fighting over an orange make peace in the end. One gets the rind; he was a bartender and was interested in the rind for flavoring. The other person got the rest of the orange and ate it.
Eritrea achieved the acceptance of demarcation based on colonial borders as a way of solving the conflict. That is all what Eritrea is interested in. For Ethiopia, withdrawal of Eritrean forces from the disputed areas is an achievement, although the future of the territories is going to be determined by demarcation. Ethiopia has to swallow its pride and accept the fact that it could not destroy the Eritrean army and its fighting capability, or topple the Eritrean government. Assab and the Red Sea will always remain distant mirages. Destruction of property and displacement of 750,000 Eritreans are accomplishments for pusillanimous people with Oedipus complex. But, the lasting accomplishment is the animosity they have created between the peoples of Tigray and Eritrea.
Ethiopia's non-acceptance of the peace process and the introduction of U.N peace-keepers in the disputed areas will leave no option for Eritrea but to drive them out by force. The Ethiopian army has reached the zenith of its strength and effectiveness. From now on everything will be downhill. Ethiopia is playing with fire every day it stays on Eritrean territory without the start of the peace process.
The Ethiopian military had obviously developed a complex plan that looked nice on paper. Incidentally, Russian generals are well known for producing elaborate war plans. However, the army the TPLF built is not capable of opertionalizing complex pincer movements, movements that are to be performed sequentially and simultaneously, that are interdependent and have to be performed with high degree of precision and predictability. When the Eritrean forces cut the tentacles of the various pincers and killed them, the entire operation on the western and southern Eritrea spattered and collapsed.
The Ethiopian Chief of Staff characterized the strategy and tactics followed by his army as modern and mobile, something akin to the German blitzkrieg. By contrast, he considers Eritrean strategy and tactics as stationary and static. One anonymous interviewee from Ethiopia was even quoted as saying that the Eritrean army has "no clue", when it comes to fighting a conventional war. The lesson is lost to these Ethiopians that the Eritreans drove the Ethiopian army out of Eritrea in 1991 primarily using conventional mechanized warfare. They also forget that it was Eritrean mechanized units and heavy weapons that spearheaded the drive and final entry into Addis Ababa.
Military correspondent Abubaker has a good description of Ethiopian tactics. He considers Ethiopian tactics seen in this war as vintage Nineteenth Century Battle of Adowa type. Perhaps the analogy of the bull and the bullfighter will augment Abubaker's description of Ethiopian and Eritrean tactics. The Eritreans move to the side, like a good torrerro, to let the Ethiopian torrro pass by harmlessly, and then stub the bull and kill it.
Eritrean military performance is appreciated when one considers the asymmetry in population size (1:20) and the territory. For Eritrea the shape of its territory is an obvious tactical disadvantage. The Eritrean soft-belly, Gash-Setit, Seraye, and Hazemo regions which are the breadbaskets of the nation are close to the Ethiopian border. The Assab-Bure front is the Eritrean Achilles heel. It has little tactical depth. Add to these disadvantages the almost inexhaustible manpower the Ethiopian could muster. The greatest strategic depth Eritrea has is its seacoast and the impregnability of its center and northwestern areas.
The natural defense for the Eritrean soft belly and Achilles heel are around the border areas. The fall back positions from these areas are miles inside Eritrean territory. That is why when Eritrean troops voluntarily withdrew from the disputed areas, the Ethiopians could occupy Senafe and create the displacement of thousands of people in various areas and run amok with their characteristic looting and vandalism. This, incidentally, is the only damage the Ethiopian vandals inflicted on Eritrea. The Eritrean defense forces displayed the confidence to withdraw even whey they were firmly in control of their positions to give peace a chance. The Ethiopian troops, true to their nature, took advantage of the situation and pushed forward. Once again, the Eritrean forces demonstrated their superiority by crushing the invading force and hurling them back.
An army that can defend, withdraw, and attack shall never be defeated. This is the dictum of war. These are qualities Eritrean forces displayed repeatedly. What is encouraging is the Eritrean spirit of defiance towards the enemy, valor in front of danger, and self sacrifice to the level of martyrdom, qualities that won Eritrean independence and embraced and enhanced by the "warsay". The young Sawa tigers (national service conscripts) have demonstrated their fitness to carry the torch of struggle and sacrifice that is passed to them from the older generation of fighters. They are the future of Eritrea. It is indeed a bright future.