Possible Causes of the War and its Elongation
Much have been said and much more will be said about the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia.It should, however, be understood some facts, past and present, about the war will either pass with the actors and / or be kept as classified information. This will make knowing the whole truth difficult even for the consummate current events historians. One would add to this - first leaders may design and lead the execution of a war; but in the process the outcome of the battles can turn out to lead the leaders. Under such conditions war will continue however senseless and irrespective of the available peace avenues.

Among the many possible causes of the war I would like to concentrate on two: basic and immediate causes. The basic cause is the TPLF plan to establish enlarged and developed Tigray Republic with access to the Red Sea; and the immediate cause the necessity by the clique to stay in power to implement the plan in a hostile environment Keeping power by minority in such an environment requires internal repression and an external enemy to divert attention. Because of the distorted historical Ehtio-Eritrea relationship propaganda and the desire of most Ethiopians to own a national seaport, Eritrea was the best target to rally even the opposition with the government. Each opposition group may had calculated its own benefits from the conflict, but the declaration of war on Eritrea had indeed got even the support of the arch enemies of TPLF albeit short lived.

The war was thought and planned to be short with astounding victory for the Addis Ababa regime. Such a victory would have enabled the Weyane to hold on power for much longer time with less internal repression and unmake the sovereignty of Eritrea. Based on such assumptions the TPLF carried out the first offensive in June 1998. In these battles, TPLF lost more of the contested area to Eritrea and sustained heavy material and human losses. In my view, the outcome of these battles started to lead the TPLF leadership at this point and much more elaborate preparations followed this failure. The second offensive had taken place in February and March of 1999. In this offensive the TPLF forces gained some ground in the Badme front but at high cost. Eritrea accepted the OAU peace proposal but the TPLF forces continued the offensive in the Tserona front. The Tserona battle was a military debacle to Ethiopia. Because of the Ethiopian defeat and the acceptance of the OAU peace plan by Eritrea, some hoped for a peaceful resolution of the conflict but to no avail; basically because the Ethiopian leaders were led by the war. Such rejection of any peace plan by the TPLF had the acquiescence of the powerful and most of black African leaders. The reasons include:

1. The western world may differ, for that matter, may even quarrel over the division of benefits/spoils; but they think and act unison regarding their strategic interests. The definition of strategic interests, though, are quiet often influenced by special interest groups and NGOs which may have interests of their own at times contrary to the interests of their respective countries. The EPLF policy of self- reliance and independence is rather considered as nuisance to the interests of some of such organizations and groups;
2. Ethiopia had established a very positive, albeit based on historical distortions and lies, image in the world. This coupled with the ability of the successive Ethiopian regimes to serve as agents of alternating superpowers (Britain, USA, ex-USSR and again the USA) helped the TPLF to get the assistance and act against any peace plan apparently endorsed by the world community;
3. TPLF have never had an Ethiopian national agenda; whatever agenda it claims to have is meant to serve the long term objective of establishing independent Tigray Republic. The Addis Ababa regime's plan to replace the Eritrean government with a TPLF surrogate was understood by some world leaders and Ethiopian opposition groups as a process of recreating Hailesilassie's Ethiopia to be under the tutelage of the only superpower and some allies. Such an Ethiopia is indeed desirable;
4. Another desert sand under which the TPLF covered its sinister plans and acts against the Eritrean and Ethiopian peoples is the attitude of mast black African leaders and politicians towards Ethiopia-Ethiopia is looked at as a symbol of independence of black people and its contribution to the political independence of black African states is very much appreciated. Based on this attitude and given the ethnical composition of black African states, Eritrea was never taken to what it is creation of colonialism. Thus the Eritrean independence struggle and its ultimate success was taken to be as a bad omen to black African states;
5. Confused Arab and Israeli view of the Eritrean struggle and the State of Eritrea, though, source of concern for Eritrea, proved to be an opportunity to be exploited by the TPLF. Most of the Arab leaders' view oscillated between taking Eritrea as an Islamic Arab country and as another Israel in the Arab world. Taking Eritrea, as an Israeli ally was further strengthened by Eritrea's diplomatic relations with Israel and friendly neighborhood with Ethiopia; Ethiopia is considered anti Arab and an ally of USA and Israel. When the war irrupted, though, long friendly relationship with Ethiopia and the USA support for the TPLF seem to have weighed more; and.
6. Independence and self-reliance of EPLF as a liberation front as well as a government had no welcome from the leaders of the haves and have-nots. Some political leaders and NGOs of the west considered such a policy and practice to have a negative ramifications on their leverage on African leaders through aid and assistance mechanism; and some African leaders took it as a threat to their survival in power by means of aid and attendants. This was displayed by labeling the Eritrean leadership as inexperienced, infantile or even as nescient of modern politics and diplomacy.

Why Peace Accord Now?
Had the cause of the war been boarder, this peace accord would have been signed at least in the second half of 1999 after Eritrea had reaffirmed its acceptance of the OAU peace plan in the Algiers' Summit of the organization and subsequent concessions. Some of the reasons that compelled the Addis Ababa regime to sign the peace agreement now:

1. Because of the heavy losses the regime couldn't continue the war and needed respite;
2. Internal problems and the need to divert available resources and part of the army to counter theses problems;
3. The danger looming over Ethiopia's territorial integrity and the determination of the USA and allies to avert such a danger;
4. Urgent need of financial and material assistance of the Ethiopian government and the preconditions by the donors to provide such assistance and loan;
5. Some western leaders and NGOs may have concluded that the Eritrrean government has learned enough lessons, through the TPLF, to soften its stand on independence and self-reliance policy; and
6. Hard work by some countries and notable individuals (friends of the Eritrean and Ethiopian peoples).

Chances for Lasting Peace
Chances for lasting peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia in general and through this accord in particular can be seen from two prospective: peace while Weyane is in power and peace after Weyane.

While the TPLF is in Power
As stated repeatedly, the TPLF does not have an Ethiopian national agenda. What so ever it claims to have is meant to serve its long-term objective - establishing enlarged Tigray Republic.The second point one has to reckon about this clique is that its shortsightedness and deceptive natures. As an unwelcome minority, it can not hold power without internal repression and external purported enemy. The regime, therefore, signed the peace agreement to enable it to get the necessary assistance and loans and to try to quell internal armed oppositions. Based on this premise one would expect the TPLF to try to delay and derail the implementation of the peace accord and start the hostilities whenever it feels strong enough. That is why one would call the TPLF at this moment 'a devil donned in angel's clothes'.

The international community at large and the USA in particular has the capacity to enforce the agreement to its sprit; but, providing the Addis Ababa regime with massive development assistance and loans for signing the peace accord may turn out to be like " trying to look like a neutral angel while actually supporting the devil." This brings to the conclusion that the clique will try to cripple the agreement and start hostilities at any time it considers appropriate.

Peace after TPLF
Given its unacceptability in Ethiopia, internal peaceful and armed opposition and failure to achieve the minimum target it promised to the people in this war with Eritrea, the TPLF days in power seem to be limited. The current peace accord seems to have also eroded the already thin base of the regime. This leads to the question, will there be peace with Eritrea after Weyane? The first worry: will there be Menelik's Ethiopia to be ruled and/ or exploited by any group that replaces the TPLF? This will depend on the Ethiopians (minority at this time) on the main; the international community and the USA can also be of help if they stop befriending short sighted individuals and cliques and work for their lasting interests in Ethiopia and the horn.

Lasting peace with Eritrea will hinge on the ability of Ethiopian academic and political leaders to change their attitude towards Eritrea. Individuals and people may long for the past, Ethiopian leaders and academics are excessive - they want to create glorious past that did not exist and live in today. Learning from the past is natural and important, but failure to cognize and address today's reality will definitely generate more problems for tomorrow. Acts based on such mentality and superpower support for Ethiopian leaders led Ethiopia from bad to worse. This is also the main cause for the past and present war with Eritrea. Should the mentality of living in the past and ascribing failures to others prevail, then, one can not expect to see an Ethiopia reconciled with itself and in peace with Eritrea.

Hailesilassie tried to modernize Ethiopia technically, but in the process inculcated fabricated history about Ethiopia and Eritrea. The present politicians and academics, therefore, consider Eritrea as part of Ethiopia. Add to this the blind desire to have a national seaport even if by force. The above reasoning leads one to conclude lasting peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia may very well depend on the attitude of present and future Ethiopian leaders. Eritrea has been and is a major issue in the power struggle in Ethiopia. It was one of the major causes for the disgraceful down fall of Emperor Hailesilssie, collapse of the Mengestu Regime, ascending to power of the TPLF; and now the main card by the Weyane regime to stay in power and the opposition to dethrone it.
In the advent of the Eritrean independence many had thought that Ethiopian academics and politicians had got enough bitter lessons and thus may leave Eritrea alone. Such expectations proved to be wrong. As the attitude of both the opposition and the Addis Ababa regime indicate, the thirty year war and its negative impact on the development of Ethiopia, indeed to the very existence of Ethiopia as state, doesn't seem to had taught enough lesson to Ethiopian leaders. Will the recent war and in particular the December 12, 2000 peace agreement do? It may because:

1. The accord is agreed upon even by the very and countries international organizations that helped Ethiopia to annex Eritrea in the first place; and
2. The agreement says- Eritrea was not is not, and will not be part of Ethiopia; period!

Your independence and sovereignty achieved and preserved by excoriating price should never be compromised and mutilated by TPLF and allied forces propaganda and subversive clandestine acts.
 
25 December, 2000.