A neo-conservative--neocon for short--is a one time liberal who has gone through a traumatic life changing experience as a result of getting mugged in broad daylight, by groups whose cause he championed all his life. ( no, Sal; it's not what you are probably thinking. I have not become a "soft" Reaganite)

These days I feel very much like I have gone through a similar life changing experience. It has been a dismal twelve months. I feel like I have been whacked by Ethiopia's Prime Minister Meles & Co (Meles with a two by four, right between the eyes. It hurts bad. I am afraid it has left me with a permanent migraine head ache.

You see, once upon a time I was an avid supporter of the TPLF (Tigray Peoples' Liberation Front). I admired Meles. Now, looking back, I see where I was had. Big Time. Like the neocons I feel abused and betrayed. Yet it was nobody's fault. It was all mine. I should have known better; I should have done my homework. I didn't. So here I am with egg on my face ( or is it what I think it is ? It smells....).

I was a huge proponent of economic cooperation between Ethiopia and Eritrea. I even wrote a couple of academic papers making the case, for which Ghidewon is yet to forgive me:-) My rationale was simple: countries that are economically tied to each other, don't go to war against each other. They have a vested interest in "burying the hatchet," in working for peace. That was the rationale for the establishment of the European Economic Community right after the war.

My model had an excellent pedigree. France and Germany worked out their War related problems. Why not Eritrea and Ethiopia ? So I thought. But there was one fatal flow to my economic model. Against everything I learned in school, and everything I have been teaching in Intro Econ about the difference between positive and normative Economics, I looked at the world not as "is" as I should have, rather as it "ought to be." My desire for peace and prosperity for the two countries was such that I allowed myself to wallow in a muck of wishful thinking.

For me, TPLF was like an empty vessel. Opaque, for sure. But I was seeing with my heart; not with my eyes. I just filled it with what I wanted to believe about its aims and aspirations. That was my biggest mistake.

An Economist's Lament Part II

Any economic model is as good as its underlying assumptions. In the Eritrean-Ethiopian economic cooperation model, the key assumption was that the political leadership in both countries was committed to making the necessary effort for cooperation to work.

If we go back to the first two or three years after liberation, this assumption was right on the money. So it seemed at the time. At least that's how I saw it, and why I had a lot of hope that we may succeed where others failed.

Indeed, all you have to do is reread the 1993 Agreement on Economic Cooperation and you cannot help but say to yourself, "Finally, here are two progressive leaders doing the right thing for their countries." If they could deliver on their promise, they will strengthen their economic relations that they would not have the time or inclination to want to go to war again. France and Germany did it. Why not Ethiopia and Eritrea ?

The Agreement was signed by the two governments in July of that year, just three months after the April Referendum. The air was filled with boundless optimism. There was a lot of talk how the two countries were turning their back to the blood drenched eras of Haile Selassie and Mengistu. The time for turning swords into plough-shares had arrived, we were told. You may recall Prime Minister Meles's famous "don't scratch your wounds" speech. We had the sense that we were embarking on a new era of cooperation. If one were as intellectually disposed towards the efficacy of economic cooperation as I was, one tends to be gullible about glib declarations about a future based on friendship and trust.

I was in Asmara during the Referendum. When the results were announced President Negaso Gidada was there to acknowledge the results in behalf of the EPRDF and the Ethiopian people. He gave a most moving speech. He beseeched the Eritrean people to let bygones be bygones. He said that we were embarking on a new era of friendship and cooperation. It seemed common sensical that the two countries would engage in economic cooperation to lift the standard of living of their people. I knew the Eritrean side believed in cooperation. I thought the Ethiopian side did, too.

But then something else was going on in the border areas with Tigray almost simultaneously with the biggest, grandest Asmara guayla I have ever seen in my life, or roughly about the same time Meles was imploring us "not to scratch" our wounds. Far from letting our wounds heal slowly , TPLF officials were busy opening new ones, and putting salt and berbere on those carried over from the Mengistu era. Actually when Asmara and Addis Ababa were putting together grand plans for economic and political cooperation, Mekele, the capital of the Tigray Region State of Ethiopia, was engaged in unilateral border adjustment and "ethnic cleansing."

The question I have been asking myself the last year or so is one that became famous during the Watergate Senate Hearings. Senator Howard Baker kept asking: What did President know; and when did he know it. What did Prime Minister Meles know about the unilateral border adjustments and ethnic cleansing around the common border, and when was he made aware of it? This is important to know because if he knew what was going on, and did not stop it for whatever reason, but he continued to give beautiful speeches about cooperation and brotherhood, then we had a serious problem in our hands right from the start.

In 1993, the Tigray Administrative Region had initiated "Project Rectification/Cleansing" around Badme, to push the common border into Eritrea. Eritrean farmers were pushed out of their homes and land. Their live stock were confiscated; unharvested crop was burned. Owners of Livestock, sheep and goats, and camels that crossed the ever shifting border and allegedly strayed into Tigray, were fined. The land from which Eritrean farmers were pushed out was given to newly demobilized TPLF fighters. Eighty Eritreans from the Badme area were arrested, and beaten on the charge that they were once ( a decade before ) ELF cadres and were reported to have shown "arrogance" towards Tigrayans !

The mistreatment of Eritreans by TPLF officials was a common occurrence in the border areas. Yet very little about the incidents was known to the public at large. The press did not report it; nor did our public officials discuss it in public although a joint, TPLF and Eritrean officials group first met in Asmara on November 30, 1993 to discuss the deteriorating situation at the border. The secrecy worked to our disadvantage. Ethiopia was able to have it both ways: maintain an official stance on support for cooperation, while giving free hand to local TPLF officials to unilaterally change the common border. Eritrea could not take its complaints public for fear of jeopardizing the on going talks on future economic and political cooperation. The Eritrean government was negotiating with Addis Ababa, when in hindsight it becomes obvious that Mekele was calling the shots.

The dual approach Ethiopia adopted in its relations with Eritrea became clear when the time came to implement the much touted 1993 Agreement on Economic and Political Cooperation between the two countries. That the Agreement collapsed a short four years later, and to be followed by a terrible war is very much the result of TPLF's conclusion that the 1993 Agreements did not serve its version of Tigray's vision of its future as anything else that could have gone wrong. The assumption that the Federal Government of Ethiopia was committed into seeing that economic cooperation could be made to work was not substantiated by the events following the signing of the Agreement. This is where analysts like yours truly went wrong. We assumed a commitment that was never there because we wished it to be there, when in fact what we had was a one sided commitment. The marriage was on the rocks early on; it could not be saved.

An Economist's Lament Part III

The 1993 Agreement on Economic and Political Cooperation between the government of the State of Eritrea and the Federal Republic of Ethiopia called for he following:

• eventual elimination of trade barriers between the two countries;

• free movement of people and capital across the common border;

• designation of Massawa and Asab as free ports for Ethiopia;

• designation of Birr as common currency until Eritrea

When first signed, the Agreement's premise was straight forward. Since the early fifties economic interdependence had taken deep roots on both sides of the border. Massive population movements has occurred on both sides to the point where each country has (had ?) a significant representation of the other's on its soil, giving depth and breadth to their interdependence. Dehai readers probably remember from my "No Dollar, no Taff series" my reference to the economies of Northern Ethiopia and Eritrea's as Siamese twins.

It will not take a rocket scientist to appreciate that the two economies had a lot to gain by taking advantage of their existing interdependence. Furthermore the world economic system is governed by blocks of regional and sub regional entities. The Horn region can improve its negotiating position if the countries of the region were to form a group. It's not unreasonable to think about Eritrea and Ethiopia becoming the core of that group, for others to join later.

During the three years after 1993 total trade between Eritrea and Ethiopia increased three fold, from 187 million Birr to slightly over 600 million Birr. This is recorded trade only. If we add cross border, and unrecorded trade, the volume would be much higher. The bulk of what Ethiopia sent to Eritrea was in the form of commodities, fruits and vegetables. Asab was almost completely supplied by food imports from Ethiopia. Eritrea's exports to Ethiopia were a mixed lot--from "pots and pans" to salt.

The Ethiopian regions next to the Eritrean border gained a lot from the liberal economic arrangements. Increased disposable income, mostly from remittances, was spent on commodities imports from across the border. High end Taff, butter and honey from the Amhara and Tigray Regions found a lucrative market in Eritrea. Historically the commodities trade in Eritrea has been controlled by Ethiopians, who in turn bought their commodities from Ethiopia. As importers the Ethiopian settlers in Eritrea, were able to do a thriving business. The same can be said about the Asmara Jewelers (gold merchants) and the zuria people--all Ethiopians. The booming construction sector attracted thousands of Ethiopian workers from across the border, who were able to support their families and communities from their earnings. Very often they returned home with merchandises made and purchased in Eritrea. The new environment deepened the economic interactions that had been there for a long time.

Eritreans also took advantage of the new arrangements. For a complex set of reasons, many Eritreans with capital took their investments to Ethiopia. Again we have no hard numbers. However there's enough anecdotal evidence that shows that many Eritrean investors--we don't know how many, or how much capital they had--preferred to do business in Ethiopia. Reported reasons vary, but most include the following: Ethiopia provided them with a larger market, hence a higher return on their capital. Others complained that they have been squeezed out by a the powerful Red Sea Corporation, PFDJ's business arm. Some said housing problems were a serious factor in their decision to take their business to Ethiopia. And some openly admitted that they had a better chance evading tax in Ethiopia's corrupt bureaucracy. Eritrea's tax assessors were less susceptible to corruption. There were also people who made money in the Mengistu years who felt more comfortable in Ethiopia.

There's no group that gained more, only to lose it all a short while later, than Eritrean businessmen and professionals based in Ethiopia. They took full advantage of the 1993 Agreements. They voted for EPRDF, and they gave lots of money to TPLF projects in Tigray. It appeared they had the best of two worlds. They basked on the achievements of Eritrean independence, although less than half of the 150,000 or so of the Eritreans in Ethiopia voted during the referendum. For whatever reasons, including sound business decisions, they opted to do business in Ethiopia. They believed that as long as EPRDF was in power, their capital was safe.

Although a few hedged their bets by moving some of their capital to Eritrea, most did not. They were comfortable in Ethiopia. Eritrea was a nice place to visit, but their capital worked better in Ethiopia. They believed Ethiopia was safer for their capital than Eritrea. Because of their closeness to TPLF, the press in Addis saw them as exploitative, taking advantage of their connections "to suck Ethiopia's wealth." It was an unfair charge, but it did not matter. It resonated with a resentful Ethiopian public. Some of the Eritrean business people went even so far into working with TPLF on projects in Tigray. Then their world came crashing down on June 1998. They were deported to Eritrea with their shirt on their back, betrayed by the people on whom they put their trust. Even the 1993 Agreement on Economic and Political Cooperation, from which so much was expected, could not stop TPLF from confiscating the businesses and savings of Eritreans it helped attract to Ethiopia through promises of safety for their investments, good returns, and conducive business climate.

I have been grappling for a year to try to understand how a simple border dispute could have ignited a disastrous war that no one, least of all Eritrea and Ethiopia, two of the poorest of the poor countries in the planet, could ill afford. Anyone who's looking for a single, neat explanation, is likely to be disappointed. There must be a constellation of factors, all coming together into a combustible mix, that needed no more than a single shot from an irresponsible armed militia, to ignite.

Elsewhere I have likened the conflict to a Greek tragedy--in its passion, its sense of betrayal, its unbridled ambition, and ultimately its senseless fratricide. My personal view is that at its core the conflict is about destiny, about the accident of geography, about history, real and imagined. It is about Eritrea and whether history will permit Eritreans follow their destiny without interference from a landlocked neighbor to the South, still unreconciled to the reality of an independent Eritrea. It's also about TPLF's vision of Tigray's future whose leaders have come to realize that a truly independent Eritrea is a threat to Tigray's definition of its future, a definition that includes a Tigray with its old borders restored, and more ominously for a Eritrea, a Tigray with an outlet to the sea.

Indeed, in hind sight, it's a mystery how the two sides misread each others incompatible visions. Either each side wanted to believe what it wished to believe about the other, or at least one of them thought the other side could be made to come around, and see things its way. The 1993 Agreement on Economic and Political Cooperation is an obvious example of what I have in mind. If one goes by the written text, its difficult to fault the document for its vision, for its, let's bury-the-hatchet and move-on-to-peace approach. As I said in my last piece, for Eritrea the Agreement was a down payment for peace, prosperity, stability. The country's policy makers had clearly understood that for Eritrea and the region to prosper they had to have peace, and open border trade. The advantages of a regional approach to development were discussed in public. The key elements of the 1993 Agreement were discussed in a public forum two years early. The Eritrean public was well informed about the advantages of economic cooperation with Ethiopia. In fact the entire premise of the Macro Policy White Paper (1994) is based on the assumption that peace in the region would enable Eritrea and the others reach their potential.

In retrospect, it does not appear Ethiopia had the same level of commitment to the Agreement as did Eritrea. The substance of the Agreements were not discussed in public, although references to economic and political cooperation with Eritrea were cited as benefiting the two countries. But no attempt was made to build a consensus within the Ethiopian public. Subsequently the opposition press interpreted the Agreements as against Ethiopia's interest. Eritrea's continuing use of he Birr, and Eritrean investments in Ethiopia raised the ire of opposition press. Except for the use of the ports, and out side of salt, the press did not think Eritrea had anything to offer Ethiopia. The sense that Eritrea was economically not viable if it were not for imports from Ethiopia gained wide currency. Many Ethiopians saw the Agreements as a mechanism for transferring Ethiopia's wealth to Eritrea.

Eritrean businessmen in Ethiopia were seen as the Trojan Horse who facilitated the transfer of Ethiopian assets to Eritrea. These were wild speculations, the Ethiopian government did not bother to correct. In fact when the negotiations on the transition from Birr to Nakfa were underway, a special regulation against Franco Valuta trade was passed to curtail, implicitly, the activities of Eritrean businessmen in Ethiopia. The negotiations on the currency became the catalyst through which anti Eritrean elements within the Ethiopian government and the press began to coalesce. Instead of creating goodwill, the Agreements induced backlash against Eritrea and Eritreans, a backlash the anti Eritrea elements within TPLF would soon exploit, using the border dispute as a pretext.

The 1993 Agreement on Economic cooperation was done in by the confluence of two forces, the Addis press and the Tigray Administrative Region authorities, implacable enemies under ordinary circumstances ,but momentarily joined in a common cause by their mutual antipathy towards independent Eritrea. The former were obsessed with the "loss" of Asab; the later felt that a truly independent Eritrea was a stumbling block that would prevent Tigray from rising to the top, not only in Ethiopia but also in the region, as a future independent state.

The opposition press waged a strident campaign against the economic and political arrangements which the press saw as one favoring Eritrea. Mekele's campaign was surreptitious, underhanded, and at least before 1998, was waged below radar detection. For Mekele's stealth campaign to succeed it was important that the authorities at the highest level of the Federal Government of Ethiopia and the government of Eritrea had maintained good personal relations and that they managed the foreign affairs of the two countries as if they were a single team.

Before the eruption of the border war there was hardly any difference between the foreign policies of the two countries. In most cases their positions were well synchronized. This was very much to Mekele's liking. The closer the two governments got on foreign policy, especially those of interest to Eritrea, the less likelihood that Eritrea would complain loudly about Tigray's actions around the common border for fear of giving ammunition to the "enemies"(read: the Amhara press and the diehards in the TPLF) of close cooperation. This was Mekele's calculation. And in most cases it worked.

(Looking back one can only notice in utter admiration how Meles and Gebru Asrat played the good guy/bad guy routine in deceiving top Eritrean officials into believing that there were sharp differences within the TPLF on Eritrea. Was there ever...)

Mekele used the Agreement as a fig leaf to cover its agenda : surreptitious expansion of its border with Eritrea, and the pursuit of an aggressive economic development program based on protectionism. For Mekele's authorities economics was a zero sum game: they believed Eritrea's economic progress came at Ethiopia's expense, and that they were determined to reverse the process. They saw no reason why Tigray could not do for the rest of Ethiopia what Eritrea had been doing--sell goods and services to the Regions of the Federation. It was one thing if the venue they had in mind was fair competition and an even and plain field. Rather they made up their mind to use their power in the Federal Government to choose and pick aspects of the Agreement on the basis of what was good for Tigray, and Tigray only.

Of all the elements in the 1993 Agreement the one TPLF made the most use of to the maximum extent feasible was the provision about Massawa and Asab being free ports for Ethiopia. For all practical purposes Asab was turned over to Ethiopia. At least three out of four of Assab's population was Ethiopian. Ethiopia Customs operations functioned as if Asab was part of Ethiopia. Businesses serving shipping, clearing and handling were predominantly Ethiopian, operating out of their head offices in Addis Ababa. Goods in transit to Ethiopia came in free of all duties, except for a nominal port fees. Massawa was the gateway to Tigray.

By a special arrangement with the Government of Eritrea, relief supplies came in not only free of all duties, but even the nominal port fees was waived. Much in a hurry to expedite the industrialization of Tigray, TPLF related companies imported huge quantities of equipment, which under normal circumstances should have paid port fees to the Eritrean government and customs duties to the Ethiopian authorities. But TPLF officials mislabeled their imports as relief supplies, thus evading all duties and port fees. The Eritrean government knew what the TPLF companies were doing, but chose to look the other way, knowing full well that the port fees that should have been paid to the Eritrean Treasury were going uncollected. Nor did the Federal Ethiopian Treasury collect the monies that were due, but if the Federal Customs officers let TPLF go with a wink and a wave, it was none of Eritrea's business. What's important to note here is that importing via Massawa was lucrative for Tigray based firms. They enjoyed advantages that were not available to their competitors, the firms in the other Regions of the Federation.

The governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia's Federal Republic had agreed that goods or commodities produced in one country could go to the other tax free. Subsequently Ethiopian products coming into Eritrea came in tax free. But there were constant problems for Eritrean exporters sending commodities to Ethiopia through Tigray. The Tigray Administrative Region unilaterally taxed all commodities that crossed its border into the rest of Ethiopia. For example iodized salt to be sold in the rest of Ethiopia was taxed at Zalambesa. Most often exporters would complain to the Eritrean government which in turn would complain to Addis Ababa. More often than not Addis Ababa will say the matter will be studied, and almost always nothing happens. Tigrayan officials often say that they have the right to tax everything that passes through Tigray, and if Eritreans did not like it then they ought to take the matter with Addis Ababa. The selective application of the 1993 Agreement became quite explicit after 1994 with the reorganization of TPLF business under quasi monopolies operating out of Mekele and Addis Ababa.

The constitution of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia forbade political parties from owning business enterprises. To get around the constitutional prohibition several TPLF owned companies reorganized as NGOs and privately owned enterprises under the chairmanship of TPLF leaders. The most prominent of these enterprises was the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT, for short). The company's Board of Directors included Siye Abraha (Chairman), Sebhat Nega, and Abadi Zemo, both Board members. The company's capital investment was estimated at 2.7 billion Birr. The company controlled through its subsidiaries almost all aspect of economic and commercial activities in Tigray. Firmly established in Tigray, it envisaged its activities to spread throughout Ethiopia. It saw its first task of business taking Eritrea's share of the Ethiopian market away from Eritrea, since whatever Eritrea could produce for the Ethiopian market EFFORT believed it could without much difficulty, given its influence in the highest reaches of the Federal and Tigray Region's governments.

With the emergence of EFFORT the free trade regime promised by the 1993 Agreement soon became a dead letter. Asmara Beer disappeared from Tigray by order of Gebru Asrat, Tigray's Governor to leave the market for Ethiopian beer sold in Tigray by GUNA, a subsidiary of EFFORT. Tigray Administrative Region's authorities were actively engaged in making sure Eritrea made products found it difficult to pass through Tigray. There have been times when Eritrean trucking enterprises were forbidden from crossing Tigray to pick up cargo from parts of Ethiopia. EFFORT had insisted that the cargo be carried by one of its subsidiaries, the Trans Ethiopia, a 100 million Birr transport company established in 1995 to compete head to head outside Ethiopia with PFDJ's Trans Horn while maintaining a monopolistic presence in Ethiopia.

Mekele was in a hurry to build Tigray's economy and its infrastructure, to reconstitute its borders, and if that meant violating parts of the Agreement while making use of theirs, well, so be it. In Mekele's view the widow of opportunity was narrow. It was now or never. In fact a case can be made that it was the sudden recognition that political power was slipping by that turned TPLF against Eritrea, to curry favor with the enemies of Eritrea's independence for no other reason than to buy more time to consolidate its economic power. TPLF knew quite well that an ethnic based party representing 4 million of Ethiopia's 60 million people cannot go on forever ruling Ethiopia. If it's pushed out of power where would TPLF go ? It faces two choices: either it would have to consolidate its economic power by creating monopolies and quasi monopolistic institutions to increase its control of Ethiopia's economy, which in the end, would strengthen its political bargaining power, or move to land locked Tigray. From what we have seen so far the first option has been made operational, but the second option has been ruled out. It has been replaced by a third option: give PFDJ the old OLF treatment--"vanquish and replace," then create a pseudo Eritrean political party, a TPLF front in Asmara to renegotiate Eritrean independence to give TPLF control of access to Massawa, and possibly Asab. There was a time when this would have been dismissed as a delusional fantasy, but after the battles of Badme and Tserona a few weeks ago, Ras Alula's heirs have put Eritreans on notice that the plan still remains to march onto Asmara, and from there to the Red Sea.

The stark truth is that TPLF leaders believe that as far as they are concerned they have the right to mold and reshape Eritrean independence to fit Tigray's vital interests. What are Tigray's interests ? Let Meles Zenawi tell us in his own words. In a conversation with Paul Henze in 1989, this is what the future Prime Minister said :

"We look at this (Eritrea's independence) from the viewpoint of the interests of Tigray, first, and then Ethiopia as a whole. We know that Tigray needs access to the sea and the only way is through Eritrea....There are many Tigrayans in Eritrea. They don't want to be treated as foreigners there. They have the same history. We are worried about Eritrea because we are not sure that differences among the different groups can be kept under control..."

Meles could not have made it any clearer.

I keep returning to the same question: How did the hope for peace and stability that were thought to have been firmly in the hands of the governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia a short seven years ago turn into a major catastrophe of wasted lives of unspeakable proportion ? Surely, no one could have foreseen the disaster, and definitely not the architects of the 1993 Agreements on Economic and Political Cooperation.

Although the Agreements cannot be blamed for turning hope for peace into the nightmare of war, one needs to recognize that the Agreements papered over fundamental differences on the most basic issues that only came to light recently. Some were not raised because they were not considered a priority given the unusual close relations between leaders of the two governments. For Eritrea, for example, border issues were not as important as issues of peace and prosperity for the two countries since disagreements about borders could be settled on the basis of colonial maps and treaties.

Unfortunately , Eritrea misjudged the extent to which the TPLF could harbor such a radically different interpretation on the drawing of common borders, an interpretation that went to the heart of Eritrea's sovereignty, but was an integral part of TPLF's vision of Tigray's future. While Eritrea was striving to make peace with the Ethiopian Federation, the TPLF was intent in pushing its agenda, even if its efforts run counter to the core definitions of the independence and sovereignty of the Eritrean state.

It is hard to believe that the so-called border war is really about something so fundamental that it goes to the heart of the central meaning of Eritrean independence. One would think, and certainly Eritreans thought, that the issue was last settled, eight years ago, after a long armed struggle, and reaffirmed peacefully by the Referendum vote of 1993. Yet in the fanciful minds of TPLF leaders, the issue was far from settled, as if Eritreans did not have the final say on their future. The TPLF wished to reopen Eritrea's status and its future. What would Eritrea's future be ? The energetically independent African state its people wanted it to be, or the nominally independent but loosely connected to Tigray, TPLF officials had hoped it would become? Perhaps never convinced that it had a future in Ethiopia, the TPLF was angling to expand its influence in Eritrea through a client government, to exercise control over access to the sea.

In his 1989 interview with Paul Henze, Meles Zenawi made it clear the significance of Eritrea's independence for Tigray in terms of Tigray's need for access to the sea and that Tigray could only get through Eritrea. The future Prime Minster also stated that Tigrayans have been in Eritrea for a long time and that they shared a common history with Eritreans. He warned that he did not want Tigrayans in independent Eritrea to be treated as foreigners. The message was clear--crystal clear: the TPLF had a legitimate interest on who administered Eritrea, or how, since the issue impinged on Tigray's vital interests.

What explains the monumental misreading of TPLF's motives? Was it the giddiness from the euphoria that followed the hugely successful Referendum, or could it have been the misplaced goodwill of a magnanimous victor, or was it simply a sad case of unforgivable gullibility of one side, and a willful treachery of another ? Indeed we now know that TPLF officials were very much concerned that if Eritrea were to take its independence seriously, such action would irreparably wreck Tigray's vital interests in regards to access to the sea or the welfare of Tigrayans living in Eritrea. Surely the TPLF could not allow this to happen. And as far fetched as it may seem now, the TPLF saw in the Agreements a suitable device for "managing" Eritrea, to permit local TPLF officials in Tigray to implement their plan.

It seems so clear now that when Ethiopia and Eritrea signed the 1993 Agreements they were not looking at the same objective. Eritrea concentrated on the economics ; Ethiopia aimed at the political. While Eritrea put a lot of emphasis on the free movement of people and capital, and the free trade aspects of the Agreement, for Ethiopia the most important features were "free" access to Massawa and Assab ports, and Eritrea's use of Birr as a common currency.

Ethiopia envisaged the Agreements as a way of tying Eritrea into a web of economic relationships to persuade Eritreans that they would be better off maintaining a lose political relationship with Ethiopia, and not the type of independence they voted for at the Referendum of April 1993. If the Agreements could demonstrate that Eritreans would be better off economically because of economic and political cooperation, Meles Zenawi and the TPLF had hoped that Eritrea could be persuaded to "rejoin" Ethiopia. It has been an article of faith among Ethiopian "progressive" officials and academics that if only Emperor Haile Selassie and Colonel Mengistu had provided economic opportunity to Eritreans, there would have been no 'urge" for Eritreans to demand independence. Apparently Meles and the TPLF leadership have bought into the "economic" basis of the quest for Eritrean independence.

Looking back then, it appears that Eritrea signed the Agreement to invigorate its economy, to provide a solid footing for its sovereignty, and to enjoy its political independence as a full fledged member of the family of nations. It saw itself as an emerging African state, building its economy on the ashes of the 30 year war of independence. It saw the Agreements as the first building block on a projected economic and regional alliance of the countries of the Horn. Since becoming independent Eritrea has carved an identity and a presence in the Horn of Africa.

Ethiopia and particularly the ruling TPLF, on the other hand, had something else in mind: an Eritrea with the trappings of independence, but one fully dependent on Ethiopia economically, an Eritrea whose government can be controlled from Mekele, and its economy from Addis Ababa. Ethiopian officials and academics were universally skeptical whether Eritrea had anything to offer to Ethiopia. They saw the Agreements as a free ride for Eritrea to gain at Ethiopia's expense. But as long as Ethiopia had free access to the ports, they felt it was a fair price to pay. In Ethiopia's use of Eritrean ports, and Eritrea's continuing use of the Birr, Ethiopian officials felt that Eritrea's economy would be tethered to Ethiopia's with a long leash that could be jerked at will anytime Eritrea went "out of line." The Ethiopian view was that port fees will remain Eritrea's principal source of revenue, something Ethiopian officials thought Ethiopia could use as a stick over Eritrea.

(Ironically, when Tedla Bairu was setting up Eritrea's government under the Federation in 1952, Emperor Haile Selassie denied him port revenues the UN General Assembly said should be collected by Eritrea. The Emperor's purpose was to use the port revenues as a leverage against the fledgling Eritrean government. It looks like the more Ethiopia changes rulers, the more they remain the same, even almost half a century later !)

Indeed with the publication of the 1994 Macro Policy White paper and the start of the negotiations on the introduction of the Nakfa, Eritrea sent unmistakable signals that it was taking its independence seriously. Far from permitting its economy to be managed from Addis Ababa, Eritrea outlined a bold course for its economy, a course not dependent on Ethiopia's goodwill. And in order to manage its economy better, Eritrea had embarked on a process to terminate the use of Birr and introduce its national currency. Ethiopia's and particularly TPLF's reaction was immediate. Taking advantage of Eritrea's commitment to the Agreements, and Asmara's reluctance to do anything to hurt EPRDF's standing with its internal and external opponents, TPLF officials accelerated a project they had started two years early, the Project on Border Rectification. The Project called for moving the border deep into Eritrea, and the removal of Eritrean farmers from their land. The farmers complained to their government which told them to be patient, out of a concern not to create a crisis for the Addis Ababa government who claimed that it was under siege from its internal and external enemies.

The Hanish situation created another opportunity for TPLF to continue its stealth encroachment into Eritrean territory, knowing full well that the Eritrean government had its hands full with a crisis. Furthermore the fact that Addis Ababa stood on the side of Asmara on the crisis made it less likely for Eritrea to complain loudly about incidents many in the Eritrean government mistakenly thought were the acts of overzealous local officials. As the preparations for the introduction of the Nakfa reached their most advanced stage in 1997, the relations between the two countries took a most ominous turn. Official Ethiopia was making preparations to use Djibouti instead of Asab. This is what two years before the eruption of the border war.

Knowing full well Eritrea was preoccupied with Hanish and discussion on the Nakfa, TPLF officials became brazen in their push into Eritrean territory. Their abuse of Eritrean farmers continued. They became uncompromising during the discussions on the termination of the Birr as a common currency. They declared that henceforth only hard currency would be used in bilateral trade transactions. The Nakfa would be a non negotiable currency in Ethiopia. Trade would be conducted on the basis of Letter of Credit. ( For more discussions on this read my "No Dollar, no Taff" series in Dehai Archives)

The unilateral actions on the border and the insistence on hard currency as means of settling accounts were designed to "teach Eritrea" a lesson for having the nerve to take its independence seriously. The border dispute that exploded in May 1998 became the catalyst for a full fledged assault on Eritrea's independence and sovereignty. The Agreements that were signed with so much hope and goodwill were swept aside because they interfered with TPLF's long concealed plan to bring Eritrea under its control, by giving the PFDJ the old OLF treatment, which said, first "vanquish," then "replace." The TPLF has had every reason to plan for the removal of the present government of Eritrea to replace it by one more amenable to TPLF's designs on Eritrea. Economic or border issues have very little to do with the on going war. For all practical purposes the war is about the very existence of Eritrea as a truly independent state. For Eritreans, in a couple of days (June 5; the bombing of Asmara), could very well be the first year of what could be called Eritrea's Second War of Independence. If the TPLF had its way, that is.

A friend told me a story two weeks ago, a story that's still ringing in my head. I like to share it with you, if you don't mind.

My friend was relating to me a conversation he had with a "tegadali" a few weeks ago. I think the incident the tegadalai was relating happened in the early eighties.

This tegadalai and his comrades were accompanying a team of TPLF recruits to their training grounds in Sahel. On their way north they passed a village. The villagers received them well. They fed them. They gave them s'wa.

An elderly man was puzzled by the Tigrigna of the recruits. He did not think they were Eritreans. Something about them, not just their language, was different. But just to make sure his intuition was correct, he asked the EPLF guy who the recruits were and where they were going.

The EPLF guy said the recruits were Tigrayans and were on their way to Eritrea to be trained. The elderly man responded, " Son, if you have to train them please do it in their own country, on their land."

The EPLF guy was puzzled, and asked the man why he did not want the recruits to cross into Eritrea. The elderly man's response was, " They will study the terrain. And when they fight us next time, as surely they will, they will make use of what you have taught them and their familiarity with our terrain will help them...Be careful, son, be careful."

The elderly man was certain the EPLF trained TPLF fighters would come back at a convenient time to take land from Eritrea. The ever trusting EPLF guy thought the elderly man was unnecessarily paranoid, and with his trainees in tow, he was off to Sahel.

When telling the story to my friend, the EPLF guy ruefully admitted that the elderly man was right. (According to a recent report from the Ministry of foreign Affairs, Asmara, the TPLF is now 20 KM inside Eritrea.)

How did the EPLF and most of Eritrea's academics, including yours truly, fail to read what the TPLF was up to ? Surely this is a question that would have to be debated at some point in the future, when the dispute is over.

Raising the question will provide a healthy catharsis, although I am not certain we would know exactly, or fully, how we got taken. But taken we were. There are no two ways about it. That's why I feel I was whacked by a two by four, between the eyes, by a group whose cause I championed. If this is not a life changing experience, I don't know what is.

I have learned a very important lesson, though. It's better to listen to the people in situations like this. People much wiser than I were very leery about our embrace of TPLF. They remembered vividly Andinet's shock troops of the late forties, and Ethiopia Tekdem's Piano Wire Stranglers of the seventies. They did not think the new guys would be any different. They were right. The thread is there. After all they were all cut from the same cloth.

The END of my 'mournful reflections."