I do not think it's necessary for me to start this article by trying to convince anyone of what is, by now, most obvious; i.e., the fact that Ethiopia is hell-bent on pursuing a military "solution" to the present conflict between Eritrea and itself. If anyone who claims to have been following recent events has not come to this realization, I can only say that such a person is in a decidedly receding, if not disappearing, minority.

Of late, the government has abandoned even the slightest pretension of hiding behind the familiar "peace" phraseology. Ethiopia's initial official response to so-called "Technical Arrangements" clearly stated that as far as it was concerned, Ethiopia's oft-repeated military option (with a "capital M") still held utmost priority in the thinking of the TPLF leaders. This stance was reiterated by Mr. Abay Tsehaye, a senior politburo (a strange term in 1999 - a throw back to the old Soviet days) member. He declared as much in a closed session held for the benefit of TPLF sympathizers in the "comrade's" most recent visit to the US. Without mincing words, he stated, "We [the TPLF] must break Eritrea's back militarily first." This article will examine the futility of such thinking.

1. Who in Ethiopia is particularly pushing for the military "option"?

When the conflict initially made headlines, the reaction of most Ethiopians, as I am sure of Eritreans as well was utter disbelief. It hit us all like a blot of lightening. "What in heaven's name just happened?" was the question that dropped out of the mouths of most peoples'.

For those who understand the destructiveness of war and for those to whom the past bloodletting is still fresh in their memories, the news of hostility breaking out had to have been the horror of all horrors. What made this development difficult to accept was that many in Ethiopia, despite the dissatisfaction over the divisive ethnic policies of this government, were growing used to the notion that Ethiopia might have finally outgrown war. It didn't take very long before the Ethiopian parliament dashed the people's hopes and offered its fateful ultimatum and the subsequent declaration of war on June 13, 1998. Regardless of which party to the conflict was at fault, the action of the parliament was hasty, at best. It got the country into an intractable diplomatic and military logjam. From that point on, those who deliberately instigated the conflict have spoken of "peace" only in so far as it served them as a smoke screen for their war preparations.

Again, to have a better understanding of the 'modus operandi' of the war-mongering clique in Addis Ababa cum Mekele, one would have to look at the two distinct messages they put out about their intentions. What the local official government media churns out for the citizens, and the press releases of the Foreign Ministry designed for foreign consumption have always been contradictory. While the latter, until recently, paid a confused lip service to peace, the former never even bothered at such attempts and stuck to that most familiar monotone script, "We will annihilate Eritrea."

Once the euphoria of deceptive promises and the anxiety resulting from being "invaded" dissipated, divergent, disturbing and cynical views soon emerged among various segments of Ethiopians. Many of those who had accepted the independence of Eritrea, not necessarily out of principle but only as a 'fait accompli', easily reverted to their former anti-independence views. Those, who with some legitimacy and mostly Amaras, had never accepted the TPLF as a 'bona fide' government, much less the independence of Eritrea, were often heard making a cynical remark. "Oh, Good!" they said, "The Tigrayans and Eritreans will now finish each other off for us." The cynicism of this view rests in the fact that its proponents perceive war between two countries as something easily containable within certain sub-groups in one's own country and easily manipulate it to suit one's short-term political agenda. Once begun, war, they forget, is like a prairie fire taking a life of its own.

Another new group soon emerged from nowhere. These are people who have never experienced first hand, the devastating effects of war. They view it as something akin to a horseshoe game at a Sunday afternoon picnic. This group, often too distant to know the horrors of past wars, has a tendency to see the conflict as mere Nintendo game. I have been disheartened to see this new generation of "electronic warriors" whose specialized "military training" is limited to video arcades had the temerity to go so far as offering their "expert" advice on military strategies from a world away on how to conduct and win the war against Eritrea. The dangerousness of this group lies in their naivete and gullibility. I see them often being used by those who know exactly what they are doing.

The die-hard militarists have consistently been those within the ranks of the TPLF, with the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray (MLLT) at the core. This is the cabal that controls every facet of life in Ethiopia today. The reason for this group's sworn position to forge ahead on the warpath is discussed in a previous article. It suffices to mention here that behind all the facades they put up, all of this group's decisions and actions are predicated on achieving their all too familiar and historic "Greater Tigrai" scheme. This is the one and only 'casus belli' - not the border, the economy, etc.

As time wore out, and to an increasingly lesser degree, the satellite organizations within the EPRDF have taken an ambivalent and vacillating stance. The support these organizations offer is largely due to the fact that they owe their existence and their extremely limited powers in their respective 'kilils' (regions) to the TPLF - their creator and patron.

2. Eritrea is an anvil that has worn out many hammers

The government of Atse Haile Selassie embarked upon its attempts at "solving" the Eritrean dilemma militarily. It began this policy simultaneously with its scrapping of the Ethio-Eritrean federal arrangement. The thinking at the time was quite simple. Pacify the Eritrean opposition among the intelligentsia and the labor unions by overawing and overpowering them with military and police presence. This, it was thought, would take care of things in no time.

What followed, of course, was something entirely different. As all means of expression of dissent were muffled and the opposition were killed, jailed, or exiled, the anti-Ethiopian reaction in Eritrea began to take the form of armed struggle. The 1960s was a period in which the Eritrean peoples' struggle dealt with two important issues. While on one hand the struggle grew by lips and bounds commensurate to the repressive measures instituted by the government; on the other hand, the movement's internal contradictions were being exacerbated.

In the very early 1970s the Ethiopian student movement, the issues surrounding the famine in northern Ethiopia and the varied socio-political crisis throughout the empire attained the requisite internal critical mass necessary for the collapse of the 'ancien regime'. In the final analysis, however, it was the 2nd Division of the Ethiopian armed forces stationed in Eritrea, which had long borne the brunt of the ever-growing military casualty that got the ball rolling. In their long list of grievances, the army correctly concluded that the war in Eritrea could not be solved militarily. They became the first organized body in Ethiopian history to jettison the notion of military solutions for problems that can and should be solved politically. With support from other segments of the armed forces, these also became important catalysts for the overthrow of the monarchy.

The coming of the dergue did show initially the promise of peaceful resolution in Eritrea. Even if it is short lived, resolving the Eritrean problem peacefully became the new mantra - a shibboleth. It didn't, however, take too long for the clique within the PMAC, led by Colonel Mengistu, to usurp power and change the course of events.

It is not within the scope of this article to analyze either the emergence, the internal dynamics of the dergue, or the Ethio-Eritrean war, which ended in 1991. The point of focus here is simple. By 1976 the new military leaders of Ethiopia, again with Mengistu Haile Mariam at the helm, had reversed the anti-war views and concluded that Ethiopia's war in Eritrea was winnable. To do so, what Ethiopia needed, in their thinking, was more men and weapons. Armed with this belief, the dergue led Ethiopia on another steeplechase. For seventeen years the Mengistu regime sacrificed scores of thousands of men and squandered a lion's share of the country's meager resources - all for naught. Mengistu persisted on the military option right up to his down fall. There is no doubt that his demise, as that of the monarchy before him, is directly linked to the war in Eritrea.

It is important to note here that the 1989 attempted military coup d'etat by the best and the brightest in the military top brass, mainly those stationed in Eritrea, had an uncanny resemblance to the events of 1974. The leaders of this unsuccessful bid to overthrow Mengistu had just as correctly concluded that the war in Eritrea could never be settled militarily. These leaders experienced their own epiphany following that fateful Battle of Afabet, which David Basil likened to the debacle at Dien Bien Phu. Unfortunately for these generals, their ineptitude and the sabotage by opportunist elements in their midst resulted in their wholesale massacre by Mengistu.

These days there are unconfirmed reports that even old Mengistu has thrown in his two-cents worth on issues of war and peace from his exile in Harare (before he left for N. Korea, that is). He supposedly shared his belated "wisdom" by stating, "If we [the dergue] couldn't win that war with all that we had, what makes the fools in Mekele think they can!" If this "latrine rumor" has any kernel of truth in it, I say, "Hurrah!" for the human spirit. It just might be possible to teach that old dog a new trick after all.

3. Changed equation: the futility of the military "option".

Nothing can show the futility of the military adventurism of the present Ethiopian government than a brief comparison and contrast of the present situation to that of the era of the dergue. This comparison is of crucial importance in that it shows Eritrea is today the strongest it has ever been since the beginning of its armed struggle almost forty years ago. Now, I know this is a hard fact to swallow to many. Be that as it may, conversely, Ethiopia's relative position and strength has precipitously declined to its weakest point since the 1980s - the period in which Ethiopia had transformed itself into a veritable military state with the help of the Soviet Union and other powerful benefactors.

At the height of the Mengistu regime, Ethiopia had close to half a million man under arms, led by some of the best trained and ablest generals and officers. According to reliable military intelligence reports, during this period the Ethiopian government was pronounced as having the largest and best-equipped air force in the continent south of the Sahara, South Africa excepted, of course. It possessed the largest number of tanks and armored personnel.

The Soviet Union considered the Mengistu regime its most trusted ally in the continent and spared no effort to assure not only its survival but its unquestionable dominance in the continent as well. Mengistu got anything and everything it asked for in the form of military hardware, training, and advice - no question asked. The eleven billion-dollar debt Ethiopia incurred during this time, mainly for the purposes of waging the war in Eritrea, is a living testimony to that commitment.

During this same period, Eritreans were outnumbered four to one in ground forces. The Ethiopian air force was indisputably in full control of the skies, with a major air force base in Asmara and other smaller ones and airstrips throughout. All the cities and towns along with 70%-80% of the civilian population of Eritrea were controlled and administered by Ethiopia. Ethiopia also was in uncontested possession of Massawa and Asseb, Eritrea's two strategic ports, as well as the 1000 kilo meter coastline.

This had enabled Ethiopia to become a major maritime nation in the region with a relatively strong navy. On top of all this, the Ethiopian government tightly controlled and utilized practically every aspect of Eritrea's economic resources. Ethiopia's own command economy was geared to bolster the war efforts of the government.

Diplomatically, despite the fact that the Ethiopian-Eritrean war was by far Africa's longest and most devastating, Ethiopia's insistence that the conflict was "its own internal affair" had found wide and unquestionable currency. Consequently, the OAU, the UN, Europe, the United States, etc., much to Ethiopia's liking, were content to look the other way as the country hemorrhaged. Except for a few journalists that managed to slip through the Sudan, Ethiopia made sure that Eritrea was completely closed off to journalists and foreigners in general. Not surprisingly, during much of the war Eritrea remained as isolated internationally as heaven is from hell.

On the other side of the equation, Eritrea was mired in internal squabble and a civil war. The Fronts had withdrawn from most of the territories they had occupied by 1978 and retreated to the redoubts of Sahel in northern Eritrea. It is there that the EPLF regrouped its forces and concentrated on defending its base area from Ethiopia's massive, concentrated, and repeated military campaigns without any of the above mentioned advantages Ethiopia enjoyed.

Reading through some of the most thrilling and important works on this particular period by scholars we can't simply dismiss as Eritrean propaganda, one could reasonably conclude the following. If ever there were a time for Ethiopia to impose its will on Eritrea by force of arms, this period would have had to be the most optimum. Ethiopia had in its grip all the advantages anyone embarking on any war could ever wish. On the other hand, the Eritreans seemingly had all the disadvantages one could possibly wish on one's enemy. Yet it wasn't to be. Eritrea overcame Ethiopia's relentless military campaign and finally triumphed.

The Eritrea of 1999 is a far cry from ten years ago - not "your grandfather's Oldsmobile" anymore, to borrow from GM's commercial. The equation is reversed radically. Never mind those who have been tantalizing us for the past fifteen months that another war with Eritrea would be a walkover this time. For anyone who wants to look at the cold, hard facts, today's picture is a whole different ball of wax. Look at the results so far, if any illustration is needed.

The days when Ethiopians were told by their previous governments that the problem in Eritrea involved only a few "wenbediewotch" (bandits) is over. Leaders who might dare try to paint the conflict today as "Arab instigated and supported", as the former governments somewhat successfully did, would be laughed straight out of town. Today, Ethiopians, with some exceptions, have by and large resigned themselves to the reality of Eritrea's independence.

Diplomatically, Eritrea is a sovereign nation and recognized as such by the community of nations. Unlike during the previous war, the country is in full control of its territory, including the ports of Massawa and Asseb. It possesses a small but respectable air force and a navy. It has an experienced, well-trained, and disciplined army the number of which closely matches that of Ethiopia. Reading independent assessment of its economy by the same international organizations that assess Ethiopia's using the same measuring rod (the IMF, the World Bank, UNDP, etc.), Eritrea doesn't seem to be doing bad at all.

The entire population Eritrea appears to be more united in common purpose today more than at any other time in their history, and unlike most other countries in Africa. The Eitrean government is far more popular among its citizens than is the case with the minority regime in Ethiopia. If anyone is in doubt about this, as many TPLF propagandists who like to dream up the worst about Eritrea would have us believe, just refer to the recent unbelievably warm reception they gave their president during his visit to the US. When was the last time an Ethiopian leader received such a welcome by its people? It is to be remembered that Ethiopians who couldn't stand the sight of Mr. Meles Zenawi in his last visit to the US showed their contempt by pelting him with rotten tomato. Compare this to the way Isayas, the man certain Ethiopians love to hate, mixes with his own people within and outside of the country without any fear for his life - or of rotten tomato. If the many newspaper accounts we read about him are half-true, he is often seen in the most public places in Asmara without the accompaniment of any security personnel - mind you, even when they are in a state of war!. When was the last time any Ethiopian has ever seen Prime Minister Meles Zenawi or any of MLLT's politburo members taking a leisurely stroll beyond the confines of their heavily fortified palace? Think about this the next time that you refer to Isayas as a "dictator". Remember this the next time you shade crocodile tears for the people of Eritrea for living "under the heavy yoke of his rule." This, in any case, is none of our business. Let Eritreans worry about that.

4. Prologue For 40 years and a thousand times over the death knell of Eritrea has been sounded, the funeral procession formed, the inscription cut on the tombstone, and committal read - all too prematurely.

In 1969 the London times and many other prestigious newspapers wrote their epitaph for the end of the armed struggle following adverse reports of internal squabble within the ranks of the Eritrean liberation movement. When the USSR threw all its military and diplomatic weight behind the Mengistu regime, or against the Eritrea, The New York Times in 1978 had declared the Eritrean rebellion "over and done with." As the dergue's much vaunted, no holds barred Red Star Campaign, waged to put an end to the war in Eritrea once and for all, was under way no one gave the Eritreans a fighting chance. As everyone saw it, the dergue had put all the manpower and economic resources of Ethiopia, not to speak of that of the USSR, Cuba, Korea, South Yemen, the GDR and the other East European Soviet satellite states, to administer what all had predicted to be the 'coup de grace'. Mengistu was sure that it had put all its ducks in a row for the anticipated and decisive finishing blow.

Many a pundit looked at the balance sheet and again prematurely wrote the obituary for the Eritrean peoples' armed struggle. And to be honest, who could blame them! The obvious arithmetic of the forces arrayed against each other was convincing enough - one David against many Goliaths. Even in the most recent war, using the same old flawed arithmetic, many had concluded and strangely some still do, that Eritrea was too small a country for the next door behemoth. Eritrea, however, remains the same anvil that has worn out many Ethiopian hammers. If the past is any indication, as I wholeheartedly believe it is, Ethiopia's present third-rate hammer will fare no better on that same anvil.

The dergue refused to learn a lesson or two from the mistakes of the preceding government. Ethiopia paid for it dearly. Now, the discredited minority government in Ethiopia/Mekele has learned a great deal from its predecessors. The sad thing is that, as a reading of the government's plagiaristic script shows, it has learned all the wrong lessons. As a consequence, it is bound to repeat the same deadly mistakes. The result this time, however, can be a catastrophe of epic proportion Ethiopia will never be able to dig itself out of. The sooner we learn this lesson of great import the better off we will be before the country finalizes its downward spiral into the Balkan-style fragmentation. This process, which has already been enshrined in the Woyane constitution, is well underway on the ground as well.

Let me try to make my point with a simple illustration. My brother-in-law, a successful and middle aged business man related to me an interesting story. He could no longer go to Bishoftu (Debre Zeit), just an hour's drive from Addis to conduct business. "It has a feel of a foreign country with all the attendant linguistic and cultural barriers," he lamented.

I am not one to believe even for one minute that Eritrea is the culprit if Ethiopia splinters into its many constituent pieces. I am not buying this propaganda line, which seems to have recently replaced the "we-are-victims-of-invasion" line. Eritrea never wrote Ethiopia's constitution. Eritrea never drew up a map of Ethiopia carving it up into the ethnic enclaves or "kilils". The TPLF government did all that without anybody's help. If we have already started looking for a "fall guy" for what appears to be inevitable, look no farther than a certain address in lower 'Arat Kilo' with a forwarding address to Mekele.

For the recidivist elements and the war-mongers in Ethiopia that are intent upon turning back the wheels of history, I say, "Wake up, and smell the coffee." Your case is hopelessly out of tune with the wishes and interests of the Ethiopian people. ENOUGH IS ENOUGH! And if you think that the sons of Ethiopia will keep on bleeding for your pie-in-the-sky dreams, my parting word of advice to you is this: "mikerew mikerew embi kale mekera rasu yimkerew."