Mr. Negasso Gidada, Ethiopia's president, has once again assured the world in his national address on the occasion of Ethiopia's New Year that his government will yet again have another go at it - not exactly the way Ethiopians would have wanted to usher in another year.

What makes such a development hard to swallow is that this war is not necessary. The peace plan sponsored by the Organization of African Unity has the full support of the United Nations, the United States, the European Union, and the rest of the international community. What is more, Eritrea has accepted the proposal from stem to stern. Until Ethiopia at the very last minute unexpectedly reversed itself, it too had on several occasions had lauded the peace plan as the only viable solution to the conflict. This article will look at the outcomes of the first two rounds of battles, and shed light on the futility of the promised 'Third Round'.

I. Round One: (June 1998)

The first set of battles was fought three weeks after our government announced that Ethiopia had been invaded. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi appeared on national television and declared that he had "given instructions to the country's armed forces to take the necessary steps to defend Ethiopia's sovereignty."

Ethiopia advanced two conflicting objectives at the time, depending on whether one was listening to Radio Woyane or Ethiopian officials in Addis. While the former intimated that there was no stopping before reaching Assab and Masswa, the latter seemed to more often speak of pushing the Eritreans to some undefined border. As a prelude to the 'First Round', an incomprehensible reorganization was effected in the armed force's command structure. Instead of the Ethiopian Defense Ministry being the body to conduct the planned war, a whole different entity, which dubbed itself "The War Council" was established. The Council almost exclusively consisted of Tigrayans who had hitherto run Ethiopia in one form or another, politburo members of the TPLF, as well as top officials of the Tigray Administrative Region. All others were effectively excluded from any decision-making positions and kept very much in the dark.

In so far as the time frame to accomplish the above confused objective was concerned, the government told Ethiopians that the mission would be accomplished within fortnight. A Tigrayan friend of mine at the time "assured" me that "this is not going to be like the previous long and expensive war." "The TPLF," he whispered in my ears "has an altogether different strategy - quick in and quick out." Whatever that meant, it was clear to everyone that the War Council had envisaged a decisive military victory over Eritrea in as little time as two weeks.

In the aftermath of 'Round One' any thinking Ethiopian - any thinking human being - will then have to ask one important question. What did Ethiopia accomplish in the first round of battles? Nothing! ABSOLUTELY NOTHING is the unequivocal answer. If Eritrea's taking over of Badme had been the cause of the initial conflict, Zalambessa and Bure were all of a sudden added to the list of territories Ethiopia claimed as being occupied. How did Ethiopia's new claims now extend to Zalambessa and Bure?

As soon as the War Council unleashed one offensive after another on Eritrean positions from the Badme Plain to the Assab front, the Eritreans responded by striving for military advantages by controlling important strategic heights. Paul Harris, a military intelligence analyst, writing for Jane intelligence Review, said at the time: "The Eritreans quickly overwhelmed the Ethiopians at Zalambessa and repulsed a drive [Ethiopia's] for the Eritrean Red Sea port of Assab, pushing themselves around 30km into Ethiopian territory." According to Ms. Suzan Rice, the US Assistant for African Affairs, speaking before the House Committee on International Relations affirmed that "after several weeks of fighting the Badme area and areas near Zalambessa and Bure, south of the port of Assab fell under Eritrean control."

Whatever Ethiopian territory Eritrea might be controlling today is, therefore, the result of the first round of battles, now seemingly held for war-time strategic expediency, and not because of any particular claims. Eritrea has on several occasions publicly stated that it is ready to withdraw from all the contested areas in the context of the implementation of the peace proposal by the OAU. The point here is that the War Council failed miserably in its attempts to bring about solutions to the conflict by force of arms within 2-3 weeks following the outbreak of hostilities, as was envisaged. The question at the time became what the War Council would do next. Would it opt for a peaceful resolution of the conflict or continue insisting on settling it on the battlefield?

II. Round Two: (February-March 1999)

Following the above battles, outspoken members of the War Council began to put a spin on the debacle of the first round. The Council's first attempts at declaring a strange sort of victory didn't pan out very well with the Ethiopian people. TPLF/EPRDF's well-greased propaganda machine then immediately set about attempts at explaining away the fiasco. They concocted a simple plan, which surprisingly admitted to the military defeat, but with extenuatory explanations. They went on to argue that there were good reasons for the failure - that Ethiopia wasn't as prepared militarily as it should have been. And the reason they advanced for their failure to make the necessary preparation was that all the government's energies were directed at the country's economic development. Amazingly, the Council succeeded in convincing Ethiopians that Eritrea, on the other hand, had been preparing for war since its independence. Never mind the fact that Eritrea had been lauded by the west in her radical demobilization program before this conflict begun.

Even the most lettered folks in Ethiopia were parroting the newest and most absurd propaganda line of the government which purported to explain Eritrea's alleged invasion. The Council and their spin-doctors told us that Eritrea waged a war in order to divert the people's attention from the serious economic problems the country faced. Such attempts at explaining Ethiopia's "victim-hood" flies in the face of hard reality. No one wanted so much as to glance at the glowing reports of the IMF, World Bank, et al, on the phenomenal achievement of the Eritrean economy prior to the conflict. Furthermore, can any reasonable person believe that a small country, supposedly having serious economic problems, would find it easier to invade a country several times its size than doing something else to solve its supposed economic problems? Now, Reagan might conceivably invade little Grenada for whatever domestic political reasons. Can one think of a scenario in which Grenada attempting to invade the United States "to divert attention" from its internal problems? Excuse the absurd comparison, but the answer is, "Quite unlikely!"

If the reason for the defeat in 'Round One' could be explained in Ethiopia's forgivable ill preparedness, and if Ethiopians could be convinced that Eritrea invaded Ethiopia to divert the attention of its people from some internal problems, the Council could now make another pitch. This it did with surprising ease. It convinced the people of Ethiopia that with better preparation it could achieve the ever-shifting objectives in 'Round Two'. Luckily for the Council, most Ethiopians bit the bait.

Between June 1998 and February 1999 the Council mortgaged the future of Ethiopia by acquiring every imaginable military hardware in the international weapons bazaar. A huge army, reminiscent of the derg's era, was recruited and trained. As zero hour approached in February, the Council was boasting that Ethiopia had made all the necessary preparation to "teach Eritrea a lesson it will never forget". The objective of this mission was the exact replica of the previous one - variegated and confused. One thing, however, was sure. The Council, this time as before, confidently believed that a quick and decisive military solution was within grasp. Sadly, many Ethiopians had already forgotten the similar propaganda of the derg, promising the Ethiopian people the stars. They had forgotten the most recent propaganda line of 'Round One'.

Again, with 'Round Two' far behind us, it is only logical to ask what Ethiopia has gained for all the material and human sacrifices it has paid. Again, the answer is NOTHING! As I write this article, I am reading a piece by a writer for Chicago Tribune reporting from the Eritrean side of Badime. Believe me, what we have there is a checkmate, at best. Let me not even mention the unmentionable "T" word (as in Tsorona). The very sound of the word sends a cold shiver down any Ethiopian spine. The position at Zalambessa remains fixed where it has been since the end of 'Round One'. There has not been an inch of change on the Bure front either. To the credit of "the well planned surgical bombing of our Air Force", the Council did manage to blow the roof off a storage shed at Massawa, even if it missed the port itself.

By any measure of all the publicly stated objectives the Council so confidently set for itself, to say that 'Round Two' was another embarrassing disaster of the highest magnitude will only be an understatement.

Where does the War Council plan to take Ethiopia next? Its spin-doctors have come up with yet another catch phrase designed to prepare Ethiopians for yet another round of battles, 'Round Three', while at the same time giving the impression of victory in earlier rounds. Perched high up either on the hills of Addis Ababa or the sundry academic ivory towers abroad, the sages of the Council and their allies tell the Ethiopian people. "Let us finish off what we have started." They say this without the slightest twinge of conscience. Few things in life, I believe, are as dangerous as believing one's own lies. One cannot finish that which one has not started.

III. Round Three (due anytime soon)

While the objectives of 'Round Three' do not seem to have changed much, few new phrases are added. What is said to have precipitated the conflict has seen dramatic change. The Council has of late been swearing that the conflict has never been about borders. Its reasoning for this somersault is simple. All the efforts at achieving peace thus far are based on the source of the conflict being just that - a border conflict. By claiming that it is not, it makes it easier in the Council's thinking to derail the entire peace plan.

What is significantly different about the anticipated 'Round Three', however, is Ethiopia's explicit resort now to a prolonged war rather than the brief, decisive and "blitzkrieg" strategy, which characterized the attempts of the first two rounds. The apparent abandonment of this notion of quick, decisive victory is a stark admission by the War Council of the absolute failure of its military ventures thus far. The question one must ask here is not whether or not Ethiopia will pursue a military option. For that, the die is already cast. The fact that the catastrophic results of the first two rounds have shown beyond the shadow of doubt that a military solution is simply another will-o-the-wisp matters little to them. Here, let me briefly outline the utter foolishness of prolonging the conflict.

How long is a prolonged war? Have we forgotten the death and destruction the thirty-year war with Eritrea brought Ethiopia? What will be different this time? Let us put the bravado of the Council aside for a moment, and put Ethiopia up to a mirror. The mirror never lies, you know!

1. Ethiopia is not a Country of Inexhaustible Resources.
   Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world, feeding its people with handouts. At the moment, close to six million of her people are facing starvation. Two and a half million people are infected with the AIDS virus. On the misery index, Ethiopia finds itself in the company of such poor and dysfunctional countries as Somalia, and Sierra Leone. Records of the UNDP show that Ethiopia, the oldest free nation in the continent, occupying the dubious distinction of the172nd place out of 174 countries on the poverty index. What is more amazing is that its per capita income is lower than that of even Eritrea.

   Ethiopia is not an industrial country that is able to produce any of the war implements that it uses. Everything in its arsenal is bought with precious hard currency. The country is one of the most heavily indebted countries that must use much of its export earnings to service its debts. To make matters worse, Ethiopia's export has seen an alarming decline lately. Listening to the boastful claims of Ethiopia's leaders, however, one can almost confuse the country with a super power.

2. The International Community Will No Longer Stand for It.
   Following Ethiopia's valte-face on the peace effort, the United States was the first country to have announced that it would drastically cut its assistance to Ethiopia. This action was followed by practically all of Ethiopia's traditional "sugar daddies". The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Union have all put a price tag on their future loans and assistance. They are all insisting that Ethiopia affix its signature to the peace plan before resumption of assistance. At present the so-called first world countries are about to embark upon the most comprehensive debt forgiveness initiative in history. Although Ethiopia is at the top of the list of beneficiaries, the road will certainly be blocked in the present circumstances of war fever in the country.

   Nothing more attests to the havoc such development is about to wreak on Ethiopia than the unusual and frank admission by Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin in his most recent speech to the UN General Assembly. Among other countless strange statements, he admitted that "the punishment meted out [on Ethiopia] has had almost no limits..." And he accuses "the IMF which suspended its cooperation with Ethiopia" and that "the EU, other institutions and countries [that have] joined the bandwagon." Mr. Seyoum - "You ain't seen nothing yet!" And welcome to the world of reality.

   Why does the world seem to finally side with Eritrea? It is because Ethiopia, by its irrational rejection of peace, has delivered the moral high ground to Eritrea on a silver platter. Now the international community perceives Ethiopia as not committed to peace. By comparison, Eritrea's leaders sure have the look and sound of champions of peace, worthy of the Nobel Peace Prize.

3. Ethiopians Do Not Support the War
   It is true that in the hysteria of May-June 1998 and for the period shortly thereafter the Ethiopian people did support the war. They believed that Ethiopia might have indeed been invaded. As time passed, however, the support has almost entirely disappeared, except within the EPRDF hard-core cadre class. As a consequence, the War Council has had increasing difficulty in its endless conscription drive.

   Here is an anecdotal illustration of the degree of support Ethiopia received from its people in the Diaspora even at the height of the hysteria. Some seventy self-appointed "representatives" of "a million Ethiopians living abroad" were flown to Ethiopia with much pomp and circumstance to hand over less than three quarters of a million dollars they managed to collect hither and thither. Once in Ethiopia, these self-styled "representatives" were paraded throughout the country as heroes, and even given audience with the Prime Minister for that.

   Compare this with what a couple of hundred Eritreans in the very mid-size city I live and work managed to do in one evening. They collected almost as much as the amount that was raised from "the million Ethiopians" to support their country's war effort. Report has it that Eritreans the world over have managed to raise over a hundred million dollars since the outbreak of the conflict. This does not include the 400 million dollars their country is supposed to rake in for the year in remittance receipts alone. This is almost as much hard currency as Ethiopia gets in its annual coffee export - in a good year, that is.

4. The Ethiopian vs. the Eritrean Army
   Few Ethiopians abroad or in Addis can tell you the name of a single person in the rank and file of the Ethiopian army that they might know in person. I certainly can't. This is because the army is traditionally the province of the poorest in the society, mostly from the rural areas. This is also the reason why Ethiopian rulers seem to traditionally care less whether these "wretched of the earth" live or die. They are the sacrificial lambs, the throwaway of society.

   The thirty-year struggle of the Eritrean people, on the other hand, has taught them an important lesson about how their army should be composed. The army becomes dear to the society if it is composed of all the citizens - a citizen army much like that of Israel or Switzerland. They come from all sectors of society, the privileged and not so privileged, the cities and rural villages, men and women, college educated, the shopkeeper, etc. As a consequence of such a composition, the army becomes the heart and the soul of the country, enjoying tremendous support. In a war of attrition, therefore, such an army is much more likely to wear out its opponent.

   I know somebody is bound to interject here, "how about our numerical preponderance? Doesn't it count for anything?" True, number counts; but only as a secondary consideration and only when all the other important variables are in place. Remember that Ethiopia had the same numerical and many more advantages in the thirty-year war. And yet, not only did the country suffer ignominious defeat militarily, but also sustained unimaginable economic, political and social consequences.

   If our own past experience is not sufficient, perhaps another important lesson in this regard could be drawn from the USSR's venture into Afghanistan. Here was a super-power with seemingly limitless war-making capability - immense wealth, military industrial complex, and its population several times that of Afghanistan. The result, as is well known, was catastrophic for both. The USSR never recuperated from that disaster. In fact, the Soviet adventure in Afghanistan in no small measure contributed to its final dissolution. - a great metaphor for the present situation in Ethiopia Worse yet, Russia failed to learn from this experience, and repeated the same mistake in 1996 when it waged war against tiny and backward Chechnya.

5. Eritrea is Well-Practiced in a War of Attrition
   War, without a doubt, is always devastating. Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea. Neither will come out of this war a winner. When peace is finally achieved, the scars on both countries will most assuredly last for generations. I say this lest some might misconstrue this comparative assessment as one that elevates Eritrea's apparent advantages to a point of suggesting that Eritrea will go unscathed. It will. It is in this context that I say waging war for thirty years with little outside help has taught Eritreans to become defiantly self-reliant. They have fine-tuned their policy of self-reliance during the past nine years, turning it into a science.

   I personally have my own reservations about Eritrea's ejecting of almost all foreign NGOs out of their country in 1996 and 1997, which was perhaps a forgivable indiscretion of a young country, or a hasty act of a maiden who has just come of age. One, nevertheless, can't help but admire their courage and long-term outlook. No other third world country has ever taken such a bold step. In the two years after Eritrea's independence, the army and those who run the country volunteered to work without any compensation. The huge army that is in the trenches today can go on fighting for years without salary and even complaint. This is the national ethos Eritreans have developed and others would want to emulate. The short and long end of it is that Eritrea will put this great experience to use once again. And such self-reliance will give them a clear edge in outlasting our "aid-dependent" existence.

Conclusion:
Ethiopia is now at a crossroad. It can choose war and get itself in more trouble than it can never get out of; or it can choose peace with honor. The experiences of the past year and a half clearly teach us that talk of prolonging the war is not going to yield any better result. It is foolhardy. Violence will have to be renounced once and for all, and countries must learn to settle differences peacefully.

How can both countries extricate themselves from this "loose-loose" situation? Is there any way out of this morass? Can Ethiopia and Eritrea be courageous enough to put an end to this cruel war that should never have happened in the first place, and get back to the business of the other war that must be waged - the war against poverty? I don't think there is any other choice.

There is already a peace proposal on the table, which I believe gives both countries a way out. One party seeking to humiliate the other can never achieve lasting peace. The world has learned that bitter lesson at Versailles following World War II. For peace to be lasting, it has to be fair and honorable. Neither the people of Ethiopia or of Eritrea are asking to be the victor. What they are calling for is peace. That is all. And the only way of achieving peace is by signing on to the peace proposal that is already before us. All else is a pipe dream.

Write your comments about this article to the author at Prof. Habtamu Bihonilign Bihonilign@hotmail.com