At the time of their country's independence Eritreans believed that their country finally managed to disentangle itself from Ethiopian politics after thirty years of bitter struggle.

The border between the two countries remained largely undemarcated at the time of independence in 1993, but considering that the divorce between the two countries was amicably concluded, the Eritrean government viewed the border issue as something that can be achieved peacefully on the basis of existing colonial treaties and with arbitration if the need arose.

The thirty-year long war had subjected the Eritrean society to immense suffering. It was easy for anyone who visited the country in the 1980s or at the time of its independence to see how an entire population was in distress. The end of the war and independence brought jubilation and genuine relief to the Eritrean population. The war behind it, Eritrea concentrated its efforts on economic reconstruction. It even engaged in a wide-ranging cooperation with Ethiopia. In retrospect, it is astonishing how Eritreans easily forgot the atrocities perpetrated upon them by successive Ethiopian regimes and lowered their guards so quickly. Now Eritrea finds itself wandering how a border problem could lead to a bitter war that has already produced a horrendous number of casualties. Some of the leaders of the Tigrai People's Liberation Front (TPLF), which is presently ruling Ethiopia, like Gebru Asrat, even tell us unashamedly, that "this war will continue for generations."

But if the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia is truly about borders why has Ethiopia failed to accept the peace deal prepared by the collective efforts of the OAU, the UN, and the US? The peace pact on the table unambiguously proposes a cease-fire and redeployment of troops by both countries to positions they held before the outbreak of the war. This would then be followed by demarcation of the boundaries by cartographic experts from the UN on the basis of existing colonial treaties. This peace proposal, which took over a year to develop, is indeed a reasonable solution for the border dispute and the mediators do not have much room left to tinker with it. The proposal meets all the concerns that Ethiopia has articulated to the mediators since the outbreak of the war. Yet Ethiopia has now found it unacceptable and brought the peace process to a grinding halt by making a new demand that the disputed territories be recognized as sovereign Ethiopian territory before demarcation takes place. In order to understand Ethiopia's rejection of the peace deal we need to look at the manifest and latent causes of the war.

From Eritrea's point of view the war is unequivocally about borders. Eritrea claims that it was provoked by Ethiopia's creeping occupation of parts of its territory. The occupation by Ethiopian troops of Adi Murug in the eastern part of Eritrea in July 1997 and the repeated forceful removal of Eritrean farmers from their lands in the Badme plains in the west, despite two letters of protest from the Eritrean President to the Ethiopian Prime Minister, are among the examples Eritrea provides. Eritrea has demanded full investigation of all the events that led to the outbreak of hostilities in May 1998. From Eritrea's point of view the new map of Tigrai that the Tigrai Administration released in October 1997 is another evidence of the expansionist designs of the TPLF since the map incorporates large chunks of territory that Eritrea considers its.

Eritrea now desperately wants to disentangle itself altogether from Ethiopian politics and views demarcation to be the only solution that leads to a lasting peace. It wants nothing more than to demarcate its boundaries on the basis of the colonial treaties, which gave it its territorial identity. No doubt, Eritrea initially had reservations about some of the procedural aspects of the OAU Framework. Its concerns essentially revolved around three issues. One is that the OAU Framework, as the US/Rwanda proposal before it, accepted the condition that existed in May1998 as the status quo ante despite Eritrea's claims that the status quo should be the situation that existed before July 1997, when Ethiopia initiated its creeping occupation of Eritrean held areas altering the existed state of affairs. Another point of apprehension was, the OAU Framework's proposal for unilateral redeployment of Eritrean troops from some contested areas instead of requiring both countries to redeploy their troops from all contested areas.

A third concern was that the OAU Framework was ambiguous on some issues and that is why it was supplemented by the Modalities. Despite its initial reluctance, Eritrea's primary interest remains the demarcation of its borders and has since made significant concessions on the procedural maters. It has now unequivocally accepted the peace pact, which ensures demarcation by neutral brokers.

For Ethiopia too the border problem was at least a manifest cause of the war. The Ethiopian government claims that Eritrea invaded and occupied parts of its territory. However, from Ethiopia's point of view the war is not only about borders. There are many complex latent factors involved. Several key figures among the TPLF leadership have on a number of occasions publicly declared that this war is not about borders. Sebhat Nega, a senior member of the TPLF, has, for instance, publicly announced that the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia is not a border conflict but rather, a war to crush Eritrean 'supremacy'. A TPLF politburo member, Abay Tsehay, also reveals that Ethiopia's objective is to break Eritrea's back.

The multiplicity of the factors involved from Ethiopia's perspective are related to the country's internal political quagmire. Different groups and contestants for power in Ethiopia have different agendas and goals in relation to the war. The TPLF regime itself has a number of objectives. Key among them are;

1. The long-standing goal of creating a 'Greater Tigrai'. It is difficult to explain the 1997 map of Tigrai without this objective. Many Ethiopians, who saw the regime incorporate into Tigrai the districts of Humera and Raya, which were formerly in the Amhara areas, are fully cognizant of the regime's Greater Tigrai objective. Several scholars have traced the 'Greater Tigrai' objective of the TPLF since the mid 1970s.

2. A second objective of the regime is to divert the attention of opposition groups from their demands for democratization. Considering that the regime primarily represents a minority ethnic group and is unlikely to win a fairly contested election, this diversion has become a critical strategy for extending its tenure in power.

But the regime's ulterior motives are not the only factors that have made it difficult for Ethiopia to accept the peace deal. There are also forces in Ethiopian politics that have yet to reconcile with Eritrea's independence. One dream among such forces is that Ethiopia should at least obtain the Eritrean port city of Assab. The fact that Eritrean independence did not deny Ethiopia's full access to Eritrea's ports is of no consequence to this group. The regime has, by and large, succeeded to forge a coalition of convenience with this group. Weakening Eritrea and reducing it to a satellite state is a common intermediate goal that both parties share albeit for different long-term objectives. A strong Eritrea is a stumbling block to the TPLF's dream of creating a Tigrai-centered new empire. It is equally an obstacle to the goal of resurrecting the old empire that many among opposition groups dream of.

The peace pact on the table, which culminates in demarcation of borders, thus, undermines the identified objectives of the different actors in Ethiopia. With demarcated borders, the 'Greater Tigrai' objective becomes unattainable. So does the goal of obtaining or controlling Assab by weakening Eritrea. Moreover, if the conflict were resolved, the TPLF regime would have to confront the rising demand for democratization. It is thus not surprising that Ethiopia brought the peace process to a deadlock by rejecting the Technical Arrangements. The OAU Framework and the Modalities address only the border issue, which no longer seems to be the critical issue as far as the principal actors in Ethiopian politics are concerned.

So where do we go from here? If the Ethiopian regime reconsiders its position, perhaps under pressure from the international community, and accepts the peace deal then the region can be spared of a serious calamity. Given the fact that the two countries are among the poorest five countries in the world with the bulk of their populations living in near famine conditions, war is the last thing they should be waging. If the Ethiopian regime sticks to its new position and rejects the peace deal, however, we are likely to see tragic developments in the region. The peace mediators cannot accommodate Ethiopia's imperialistic designs and Eritrea has no more concessions to give. Fighting will become Eritrea's only option. And no doubt it will fight. The calculations of the Ethiopian regime that Eritrea will not be able to sustain an extended war and that its economy will collapse are simply wrong.

One of the TPLF regime's advisors, Dr. Medhane Tadesse, in a crude analysis of real politic tells us that Ethiopia is the big power in the Horn of Africa and that Eritrea should learn from what Ethiopia is doing in Somalia and accept Ethiopia's terms lest it becomes another 'failed state.' Medhane's expectation of a quick collapse of Eritrea is obviously laughable. It is highly unlikely that the Eritrean economy will turn worse than it was in the 1980s when it was under the strangle hold of Mengistu's regime. Nor is it likely that the Eritrean people's determination in guarding their autonomy will be any less firm than their resolve during the struggle for independence. So the war is likely to go on for a long time making the sad predictions of people like Gebru Asrat a reality. How tragic that the 21st century is not shaping up to be any more promising than the 20th century for the peoples of those two countries.

Any sane analysis of the African condition would suggest that African countries to have any chance to face up to the challenges of globalization would have to concentrate their resources and efforts on improving the living conditions of their populations.

They are in no position to squander any resources by waging wasteful wars. They have to settle internal conflicts in a democratic manner and resolve disputes with their neighbors peacefully. Real politic, especially in its crude form, is simply a prescription for disaster.

The intermittently fought war between Eritrea and Ethiopia over the last 16 months is said to have produced about 70,000 casualties. The next war is unlikely to be so gentle. There is indeed a catastrophic tragedy looming upon the Horn of Africa. The 'Somaliazation' of the region is not at all far fetched. How ironic that the Ethiopian leaders are telling us that Eritrea is not serious about peace and that its acceptance of the peace pact is nothing more than public relations exercise for the consumption of the international community. Why then don't they accept the peace deal and let us find out what the true intension of the Eritrea's leaders is? Ethiopian leaders also claim that Eritrea cannot be trusted and that it is arming and supporting "terrorist" groups to destabilize the Ethiopian government (never mind that yesterday's liberation fighters are labeling today's liberation fighters as terrorists).

The question of interference in the affairs of neighboring countries by supporting rebellious groups is a legitimate concern. However, the hands of Ethiopia's leaders are not exactly clean of the sins they accuse Eritrean leaders of. They have been fishing for Eritrean opposition groups to support against the government of Eritrea.

More importantly, this concern should be part of a separate comprehensive peace deal after the peace deal to end the wares concluded.