• to issue ultimatums over a minor border skirmish;
• to escalate the conflict rather than contain it;
• to bomb a city that houses one-fifth of Eritrea's population,
• to pronounce constant and regular threats to teach Eritrea a lesson;
• to take measures that will increase the enmity between the peoples of the two neighboring countries including attempts at economic strangulation and deportations of naturalized Ethiopians of Eritrean origin;
• to equate a popular leader and a long time partner with Hitler;
• to label a long-time strategic ally and partner as "fascist"
• to misrepresent the Eritrean government position to the world;
• to "accept" peace deals and break them in the same breath
• to continuously reject the most important pre-condition to durable peace: cessation of hostilities.
• To seek the role of king-maker

The party is the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF).

The American filmmaker, Woody Allen, made a movie about a man who is so bereft of any core belief, so willing to please his audience, whoever the audience may be, so endowed with chameleon-like traits that he literally transforms himself into his audience. The movie, and the main character of the movie, is called Zelig.

The Ethiopian version of Zelig is called Woyane and, all evidence to the contrary, it has convinced the world that it is peace-loving organization. The evidence I will present is not from government archives or secret notes; it is in the public domain and anyone with access to Lexis-Nexis can find the same information I will cite in this paper. The evidence is direct quotations from Mr. Seyoum Mesfin, Ethiopia's Foreign Minister. And the evidence is irrefutable in showing that there is no peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia of one simple fact: the Ethiopian government is more interested in revenge than justice; it is more interested in humiliating Eritrea than elevating Ethiopia; it is more interested in playing king-maker than peace-maker.

1. ETHIOPIA'S PREFERENCE: REVENGE NOT JUSTICE

   If there is one thing the Ethiopian Foreign Minister has told the international community, the media, the Ethiopian people, and the diplomatic community in Addis who are summoned regularly to hear his frequent trantrums is that (1) Ethiopia is trying its best to solve the border conflict peacefully and has yet to lift a finger other than in self-defense. This was stated as recently as November 11, 1998 by the Ethiopian Foreign Minister in his address to Diplomatic Community in Addis:

   [Ethiopia has a] preference for the peaceful way of resolving this crisis and not responding in kind in terms of force as long as it is possible to regain Ethiopia's full sovereignty over its land without recource to war

   Notwithstanding the sweet talk that HE Seyoum Mesfin gives the diplomatic community, the truth is, as far as the Ethiopian government was concerned, the first choice to resolve the conflict was always a military response as evidenced by at least four examples:

   1. We begin with a direct quote from Tigray Radio, the most direct admission by Ethiopia that it wants war (as transcribed by Deutsche Presse-Agentur back in June 1, 1998J

      Ethiopia has recaptured about one third of the area in northwestern Tigray province occupied by Eritrean forces, radio reports said Monday quoting Ethiopia's Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin. The Ethiopian army launched a counter-offensive because Eritrea had not been prepared to agree to international mediation, Mesfin said on Voice of America, adding that Ethiopian forces had captured a number of Eritrean arms and soldiers. If Eritrean forces failed to withdraw unconditionally from the disputed area, Ethiopia's counter-offensive would continue, Mesfin said.

      Please pay careful attention to the date, June 1, 1998. On May 22, May 23, May 25 and May 31, there were, according to Eritrean government-later confirmed by the US Department of State-sporadic fights in the Badme as well as the Alga- Alitiena areas. The Eritrean government had registered these incidents to the US-Rwanda facilitators at the time. The Ethiopian Foreign Minister's statement is an admission that Ethiopia had opted for the military option WHILE THE FACILITATORS WERE TRYING TO FACILITATE PEACE. His claim that "Eritrea had not been prepared to agree to international mediation" is untrue, as it was Eritrea who had called for mediation.

      In May 30-31, the US-Rwanda facilitators had submitted their plan to both parties for consideration. Ethiopia "accepted" US Rwanda Plan on June 4th ; (in the same breath that it "accepted" the plan, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi declared war on Eritrea); Eritrea had labeled the plan as "not controversial" and-according to the BBC and Deutsche Presse-Agentur--Eritrea gave every sign that it would accept it. So what happened on June 5th? Ethiopia bombed Eritrea. Not bombing the other party was point one of the US-Rwanda Plan. Conclusion: Ethiopia was afraid that Eritrea would actually accept the plan.

   2. Compare and contrast the Ethiopian Council of Ministers Statement of May 13, 1998 with Eritrea's Council of Ministers Statement of May 14, 1998. The Ethiopian statement was full of war rhetoric and ultimatums. The Eritrean statement was conciliatory, shell-shocked and an attempt to contain the issue as a local government case rather than a Federal Government case.

   3. Ethiopia's characterization of US-Rwanda Plan as a failure on May 18, 1998, barely TWO DAYS after Ms Rice assumed the position of facilitator because "Ethiopia will not agree to international mediation in its dispute with Eritrea"

   4. The May 27, 1998 EPRDF announcement on its seventh anniversary of coming to power that Ethiopia had no choice but to "use force to eject Eritrean troops."

   This goes to TPLF's habit of having it both ways: if the military incursions were successful, TPLF would enhance its waning prestige and would be seen as the Great Liberator and Great Conqueror in the eyes of the armchair generals of Addis Tribune (who have, on record, wondered why Eritrea has two ports and Ethiopia has none) and Washington Restaurant regulars (who were told by vice foreign minister Tekeda that Ethiopia will soon have at least one port). If they failed-and they failed miserably-the world would be told that Ethiopia is patiently awaiting a peaceful solution; war is being imposed on it by the fascist shabbiyah. Thus every Ethiopian aggression was sold as a legitimate defensive posture: the sneak bombing of Asmara was a defensive retaliation; the escalation of war to Zalambesa was self-defense; the failed march to Asab was safeguarding Ethiopian sovereignty. But the evidence-as documented by Western reporters who have no vested interest in either outcome-shows that it was Ethiopia that began the bomb raids (Reuters), it was Ethiopia that escalated the war to Zalambesa (AFP) and it was Ethiopia that opened the war front on the road to Asab (Financial Times).

   So, how does one explain Ethiopia's habit of punching people and yelling 'help!' Once again, the answer is found in the Great Projector himself who described the malady perfectly in his address to the 34th Session to the Assembly of the Heads of State and Governments of the OAU

   "the Eritrean Government has continued with its provocative acts, with the aim of creating further facts on the ground by trying to occupy additional Ethiopian territory which were all repulsed. However, when its continuuing aggression is foiled, the Eritrean Government resorts to accusing Ethiopia of committing aggression against Eritrea...this should come as no surprise the distinguishing characteristics of aggressors is to claim to be the victim of aggression even while continuing their wanton acts."

   As Dr. Kebire demonstrated in a previous post, Dr. Seyoum always gets the symptoms right; he just confuses the patients. Just substitute Eritrea for Ethiopia and vice versa and you have the explanation.

2. POISONING THE ELEMENT OF TRUST: THE DEMONIZATION OF THE ERITREAN GOVERNMENT

   In the Information Age, it is not easy to conceal your identity for long. You cannot be all things to all people; eventually, your own words come back and you are held accountable. For example, the Ethiopian Foreign Minister, as recently as last year, was complimenting the different parties of Sudan's civil war on their decision to agree to a unilateral cease-fire. The question is: how has Seyoum Mesfin managed to be all things to all people for. The answer: sheer flattery of the audience and outrageous pretension.

   In front of the Non-Aligned Conference, Ethiopia is non-aligned (unlike Eritrea which continuously attacks non-aligned nations); infront of the OAU, Ethiopia is the champion and headquarters of Pan-Africa (unlike Eritrea which has "contempt for our continental congress"); in front of the UN, Ethiopia is a founding member of the UN (unlike that upstart Eritrea). In front of the Arab nations, Ethiopia is anti-zionist (unlike that Israel-coddling Eritrea); in front of Israel, Ethiopia is sympathetic to Zionism-being the lone holdout against the Arab and the Mussulman (unlike that Arab-friendly Eritrea); around Sudan, Ethiopia is a good neighbor (unlike that war-mongering Eritrea); in front of democrats, Ethiopia is a democrat (unlike that despotic Eritrea.) In front of the the Great Ethiopia folks, Ethiopia has a 3000 year history; in front of MLLT, Ethiopia's history goes back only 100 years.

   Certainly, flattery is one of Ethiopia's strength and it has every right to use its strength to build up its case. But in its hatred, envy and inferiority complex, the Ethiopian government drives itself to hyperbolic froth and over-plays its hand. Consider the following quote:

   "I do not hesitate to compare Isssayas (the Eritrean president) to Hitler. He is a dictator, pushed by a wild ambition which drives him to invade Ethiopia," affirmed the Ethiopian foreign minister, Seyoum Mesfin, Tuesday in Paris^E.Ever since the conflict, the two countries have taken different strategic approaches toward the media and military. Addis Abeba beats war drums, makes noisy declarations and proudly advertises the number of enemy deaths. On the other hand, the government of Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, believes that "this is not an issue to brag about", and handles its communications with parsimony, and even avoids using the word 'war'. ([French paper] Liberation, July 7, 1998)

   Or the following quote from the statement of HE Mr. Seyoum Mesfin to UN General Assemly, October 1, 1998 (this is the same address where he equated Eritrea with fascist Italy):

   In the face of such destructive attitude one may ask why such belligerence by Eritrea was tolerated for so long. The answer is that we somehow entertained the hope that since transition from leading a liberation movement to running an independent state would take time and that the Eritrean leadership would mature over time as it is the case in almost all other similar circumstances.

   Imagine. Malcolm X had a perfect description for the man who, just because he is well-dressed, thinks he is fine and refined and can insult his brothers recklessly just to please the bosses. But, in the interest of civility, we won't go into that. Suffice it is to say that the Foreign Minister's statement, along with its reference to Fascist Italy and League of Nations, must have been dusted off from Haile Selasse's Imperial Palace because coming from the current Ethiopian government, it makes no sense: the Ethiopian TPLF had exactly the same number of days to transform itself from "a liberation movement to running an independent state" as the Eritrean government.

3. ETHIOPIA'S NOT SO SECRET PLAN: A NEW ERITREAN GOVERNMENT

   Let's dismiss, for now, that the Eritrean government's claim that Ethiopian prisoners of war were operating on the principle that the Eritrean government would be overthrown are just unsubstantiated claims. Let's, instead, go to direct quotes from Ethiopian government officials and see if we can read between the lines:

   In his address to the UN General Assembly of October 1, 1998, HE Seyoum Mesfin also said:

   To many this Eritrean aggression against Ethiopia has been incomprehensible. But to those like us who are familiar with the internal Eritrean situation the behavior of the Eritrean government stems directly from the total absence of the normal characteristics of a state in Eritrea. The absolute failure of institutions, the absence of the rule of law, and the lack of accountability can explain the aggressive behavior of the Eritrean leadership^EAs a result, these factors also constitute the single most important cause for the current crisis between Ethiopia and Eritrea^EIt is a total illusion, Mr. President, to believe that Eritrea would be tamed and we are saying this from experience.

   Let's ignore, for now, that the Ethiopian government-a government that can boast of having the highest number of journalists arrested in the world, a government that deports its own citizens, a government that recruits mercenaries and war criminals to its armed forces, a government made up of 50 parties that report to one party-is in no position to lecture others on how to run their country. Instead, read the last sentence and ask the next question: if it is total illusion to tame Eritrea, what is the inference? A new government, of course. After all, the current Eritrean government doesn't have the support of Eritreans. So implied Mr. Seyoum Mesfin on at least two occasions:

   1. The Eritrean people, whether they are inside or outside their country, have been greatly shocked by the current aggression of the sha'biyyah rulers and government, and they cannot accept nor comprehend the situation.

      - (Excerpt from Seyoum's interview broadcast on Ethiopian TV, June 18, 1998)

   2. "the Eritrean people who cannot be presumed to be pleased with what is being decided on their behalf by a leadership which many, in their hearts, believe or suspect lacks either rationality or sanity.

      (Addressing he Diplomatic community in Addis Ababa, November 11, 1998)

      If the Ethiopian Government truly believes that the Eritrean government cannot be "tamed", why would it ever enter into peace agreements with the wild? This explains Ethiopia's sabotaging of every peace effort: unreasonable preconditions followed by escalation of rhetoric and war whenever peace seems to break out.

4. HOW ETHIOPIA SABOTAGED THE US-RWANDA PLAN

   About the only thing the Ethiopian government does faster than to "accept" a peace deal is to announce to the world that Eritrea has rejected it. The truth is this: Eritrea has yet to reject a peace proposal. Eritrea was willing to accept the US-Rwanda plan, with all its imperfections, provided some serious questions of implementation were answered. This, of course, was back in May when the Eritrean government believed that the Badme issue was a problem with the state of Tigray not the entire nation of Ethiopia. Read the Eritrean government's response to the US-Rwanda Plan and you will read that, back then, the Eritrean government had signaled its intention to approach the issue of the reinstatement of the Ethiopian administration into Badme with "flexibility." There is only one party to blame for the fact that the Eritrean government is now reluctant to do so: it is the party that decided to bomb it; it is the party that decided to open three war fronts; it is the party that told its citizens in Washington, DC and diplomats in Addis Ababa that Asab would fall into Ethiopian hands.

5. THE OAU FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS:

   The great news about the OAU Framework Agreement is that it is a good foundation to finalize a deal that both parties can live with. The bad news is that Ethiopia, is once again, beating the war drums and, in the words of Ato Seyoum Mesfin, being characterized as having been rejected by Eritrea. Before I ask any open-minded person to reach conclusion on who has "accepted" it and who is giving it serious consideration, and what the reservations are, if any, it is best to reproduce the proposal:

   We recommend that:

   1. The two Parties commit themselves to an immediate cessation of hostilities;
   2. In order to defuse tension and build confidence, the two Parties commit themselves to put an immediate end to any action and any form of expression likely to perpetrate or exacerbate the climate of hostility and tension between them thereby jeopardizing the efforts aimed at finding a peaceful solution to the conflict;
   3. In order to create conditions conducive to a comprehensive and lasting m,settlement of the conflict through the delimitation and demarcation of the border, the armed forces presently in Badme Town and its environs, should be redeployed to the positions they held before 6 May 1998 as a mark of goodwill and consideration for our continental Organization, it being understood that this redeployment will not prejudge the final status of the area concerned, which will be determined at the end of the delimitation and demarcation of the border and, if need be, through an appropriate mechanism of arbitration;
   4. This redeployment be supervised by a Group of Military Observers which will be deployed by the OAU with the support of the United Nations. The Group of Military Observers will also assist the reinstated Civilian Administration in the maintenance of law and order during the interim period;
   5. 1. The redeployment be subsequently extended to all other contested areas along the common border within the framework of demilitarization of the entire common border and as a measure for defusing the tension and facilitating the delimitation and demarcation process. In effect, the demilitarization which will begin with the Mereb Setit segment, will then extend to the Bada area and the border as a whole;
      2. The demilitarization process be supervised by the Group of Military Observers;
   6. 1. The two parties commit themselves to make use of the services of experts of the UN Cartographic Unit, in collaboration with the OAU and other experts agreed upon by the two Parties, to carry out the delimitation and demarcation of the border between the two countries within a time-frame of 6 months which could be extended on the recommendations of the cartographic experts;
      2. Once the entire border has been delimited and demarcated, the legitimate authority will immediately exercise full and sovereign jurisdiction over the territory which will have been recognized as belonging to them;
   7. In order to determine the origins of the conflict, an investigation be carried out on the incidents of 6 May 1998 and on any other incident prior to that date which could have contributed to a misunderstanding between the two Parties regarding their common border, including the incidents of July - August 1997;
   8. 1. At the humanitarian level, the two Parties commit themselves to put an end to measures directed against the civilian population and refrain from any action which can cause further hardship and suffering to each other's nationals;
      2. The two Parties also commit themselves to addressing the negative socio- economic impact of the crisis on the civilian population, particularly, those persons who had been deported;
      3. In order to contribute to the establishment of a climate of confidence, the OAU, in collaboration with the United Nations, deploy a team of Human Rights Monitors in both countries;
   9. 1. In order to determine the modalities for the implementation of the Framework Agreement, a Follow-up Committee of the two Parties be established under the auspices of the OAU High-Level Delegation with the active participation and assistance of the United Nations;
      2. The Committee begin its work as soon as the Framework Agreement is signed;
   10. The OAU and the UN working closely with the international community, particularly, the European Union, endeavour to mobilize resources for the resettlement of displaced persons and the demobilization of troops currently deployed along the common border of both countries;
   11. The Organization of African Unity, in close cooperation with the United Nations, will be the guarantor for the scrupulous implementation of all the provisions of the Framework Agreement, in the shortest possible time".
       1. Both sides accept this point. Has Ethiopia agreed to item one? In words, yes. In deed, no. Eritrea has accepted this point and has been asking for it since May 14, 1998.
       2. Both sides accept this point. The Ethiopian Government, which continues to deport innocent Eritreans and hold thousands in concentration camps including Eritrean exchange students (8 of whom have died in jail) and regularly uses inflammatory language including threats of war.. Eritrea has unilaterlly released some prisoners of war; unilaterally sent home Ethiopian exchange students.
       3. Only Ethiopia claims to accept this point. Eritrea's position is that when an area is disputed, it is wrong to ask only one party to withdraw on the basis that the other party used to administer it-without regard to the legality of how it came about to administer it to begin with. Instead, both sides should withdraw pending the resolution of ownership. The OAU contends that status quo must be maintained. Why is status quo May 12, asks the Eritrean government. Because the reason we are involved, says OAU, is because of May 12: that's when Ethiopia complained. On the issue of demarcation, Eritrea wants clarity and zero ambiguity that it is to be done in accordance with established colonial treaties. This is necessary because the Ethiopian Government has given indications by words (to disgruntled Ethiopians who think those treaties are illegal) and deed (by issuing illegal maps) that it does not respect Eritrea's soverignty.
       4. Both sides agree. Ethiopia requested for clarification on the role of the Ethiopian Civilian Administration and the Observor Group.
       5. Both sides agree.
       6. Both sides agree.
       7. Both sides agree. Eritrea asks the question: this is inconsistent with item 3: what is the point of conducting an investigation if you have already recommended that only Eritrea withdraw from badme?
       8. Both sides agree. Eritrea, however, asks the OAU to be specific; i.e., the OAU, conducting an independent investigation, has found that only one party--the Ethiopian government--is violating the human rights of the other party. Why the vague reference to both parties?
       9. Both sides agree.
       10. Both sides agree.
       11. Both sides agree.

   The Ethiopian Government requested clarification on three questions: first, is the reference to in item (3) to "armed forces presently in Badme Town" specifically addressed to Eritreans? Answer: yes. Second, with respect to the role of Ethiopian civilan administration and foreign Group of Military Observors, is our understanding that the Ethiopian civilian administration will do police work and admin work? Answer: yes. Third, with respect to the definition of "Badme Town and its environs" is that "all Ethiopian territory occupied after May 6, 1998"? Answer: "The High-Level Delegation took note of the position of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. There was, however, no further discussion on the issue."

   The Eritrean Government submitted a list of questions requesting clarification; one of which dealt with the definition of "Badme Town and its environs" Any person looking at the proposal and the responses of both parties, would say that peace is about to break out^E.

6. FAST FORWARD TO THE PEACE BREAKER

   No sooner had the Ethiopian Foreign Minister recovered from his jet lag than he assembled the Diplomats assigned to Addis Ababa and local media to give them the most negative spin he could muster. Let's listen in as the spin- meister panics at the prospects of peace:

   Ethiopia: Minister Explains "accepted" OAU proposal on dispute with Eritrea

   ^EWe understand and believe that the current proposal [OAU's Framework^E] is based and founded on that proposal [US-Rwanda]^EOther proposals deal with the suspension of unnecessary measures against innocent citizens and seeking ways by which the citizens of the two countries could be saved from the dangers brought about by this conflict^E.After receiving this proposal, the Ethiopian delegation requested further clarification on issues which were not very clear and received sufficiently clear clarification from the facilitators^E.Instead of accepting this proposal^Ethe sha'biyyah resorted to pouring scorn on it and rejecting it. Thus the OAU's efforts have failed^E

   (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: Source, Radio Ethiopia, Amharic, 1725 gmt, November 9, 1998)

   And here's the Foreign Minister addressing the diplomats in Addis Ababa on November 11, 1998

   [Ethiopia has a] preference for the peaceful way of resolving this crisis and not responding in kind in terms of force as long as it is possible to regain Ethiopia's full sovereignty over its land without recource to war^EEritrea has rejected the OAU proposal for peace^E

   Now, recall that the OAU had not answered Prime Minister Meles Zenawi's request for clarification on the meaning of "Badme Town and its environs". No matter, though. This is how His Excellency Seyoum Mesfin spins it:

   That the reference to redeployment from Badme and its environs is meant to be understood as the withdrawal of Eritrean troops from all occupied Ethiopian territory and their return to positions held before May 6, 1998^E

   This is not an accidental slip of tongue; it is a deliberate effort to mislead. It is frighting to think of which is worse: that the Ethiopian government accepted a proposal that it doesn't understand just to beat Eritrea to the punch or that it accepts them with the full knowledge that Eritrea will take time in deliberating.

   Peace negotiations and concessions are based on mutuality and trust. Since May 1998, the Eritrean Government has been asked to show "good will" and to entrust its territories, temporarily, in the hands of third parties and the Ethiopian Government. The Ethiopian Government has refused to reciprocate- even on an issue as mutually beneficial as the cessation of hostilities. Mutual goodwill would be to put an end to deportations and mindless detentions. The Third Parties have continuously been browbeaten by the Ethiopian Government's Victimization Act. That the EU and the USA which, after all, are Ethiopia's only audience, want peace and they want it now is understandable. Even if it means signing half-finished projects; what matters is the signing ceremony not what comes after. But why would Ethiopia rush to sign something that it does not understand?

   The only pre-requisite to negotiate in good faith is to trust the other party. The Ethiopian Government seems to get more perverse pleasure in punishing Eritreans than working towards the betterment of Eritreans. How does it benefit a single Ethiopian when Ethiopia doesn't just stop at revoking the Ethiopian citizenship of Eritreans in India but actually asks the Indian government to deport them? How is the Ethiopian people's search for economic development advanced when the Ethiopian government deports elderly Eritreans at Bure, Humera and Zalambesa? How does an Ethiopian benefit when his Eritrean brother is accused of deliberately bombing his children in Mekele- when the Ethiopian government knows FOR A FACT that that is not true? How could the Eritrean government-a government that fines its owns citizens a steep 500 Nakfas for derogatory reference to Tigrayans-turn around and bomb civilians?

   The OAU Framework is a good beginning to building a solid agreement for a durable and just peace. The Ethiopian Government, as it has done shortly after the US-Rwanda Plan was submitted, is now actively involved in tearing the agreement down through threats and war drums and exaggerated cries for help. The international community-led by the USA and the EU-is, as it did during the bombing of Asmara in June, running for cover. This is no less than cheerleading a war. There are over 500,000 heavily armed young men and women staring into the horrors of war. There could be untold devastation, death and carnage. And after the war, men will sit around a table and discuss what they should have discussed before the war.

   This young men and women should not be abondoned at their hour of need simply because the international community was bullied by the temper tantrums of tyrants whose efforts to be king-makers were frustrated. Or because they were tired, or bored. Let each country get the government it deserves . We ask all people of goodwill to stop marching to the drums of the king-makers who can smooth-talk us into a devastating war. Let's listen to the voices of the young Eritreans and Ethiopians who are calling for peace. Young children should not be sent to wars to lose life and limb just so someone could save face. There is still a chance for peace and it begins with a cessation of hostilities by both parties.