I have to admit, reading your article felt a bit strange at first. Your ideas didn't immediately sound that crazy to me. They did, of course, a minute or so later, but not right away. How can that be, I wondered. How can ideas that are so wrong not feel that wrong. And then it hit me. Of course,...it is the time factor. If only this was the 19th century!
You would feel right at home in the last century, and make an excellent adviser to Dejatch Wubi or Wag Shum Gobezi. Paired with anyone of these, and armed with your then 'novel' notion of assertive real politics, you could have turned Lasta into a great nation state. Could even have won a seat for the Wag Shum at the Berlin conference and the partitioning of Africa. It wouldn't be fair to your neighbors, but you wouldn't bother about such flimsy 20th century ideas like justice, rights and conventions, the common good, etc. Would you?
What I don't understand is why you want to give such a high-tech name to your 19th century ideas. True, in our fast moving world even the notion of real politics is woefully outdated, but still. We have a saying in Tigrigna, "Bgze Wubi ztsememes, Wubi Wubi kbl mote" Rendered into English, "No era is like Wube's era to one who goes nuts under Wubi". As interesting as the past is, and believe me I too am interested, a historian is supposed to study it, not altogether move there for good. Thanks, anyway, for confirming my suspicions that the Wubi era still reigns in Woyane's Ethiopia.
As far as the current conflict is concerned, your advice is a recipe for disaster, unless, of course, you're looking for an African World War I. In fact as a historian you should know that your ideas have already been tried in the Europe of the world wars. A resentful Germany, feeling that it has been snubbed by its neighbors, and wanting to flex its muscles to massage a wounded national ego twice ignited a fire that was to consume more than 30 million lives. That was then, at least as far as Europe is concerned. What about now? Now a reconstructed Western Europe has outlawed war and 'real politics' in its midst. It understood, as you should understand, that rational politics can not have as its goals the massaging of a wounded national ego, the bolstering of a weak self image, or the settling of scores for past defeats.
I have also, with some amusement, noted your penchant for terminology and symbolism that are alien to our conditions, both yours and ours. But then, if you want to play that game why not go all the way. Now that we have had our first world war (May-June 1998) and second world war (Feb-March 1999), why not call a truce and officially declare a Cold War between our two countries. We can have our own Ping-Pong diplomacy, or better still, have our leaders meet in Helsinki, kiss, sign a Helsinki Declaration, and pompously inaugurate an Ethio-Eritrean Ditente. What do you say?
Look, let me not waste more of your time with more of this. To bolster my case, I could have raised moral issues, human rights aspects, the question of justice, of fairness. Things that, in your eagerness to sound all that, you would probably simply dismiss as irrelevant. But, believe me, from the level of sophistication you already display here, your best bet is to stick to the rules and forget this talk about real politics. Besides, you would be using the wrong manual to solve problems between two brotherly peoples, problems that are more easily solved with a little touch of rational thinking, without resentment, and without unrealistic notions of greatness.
As a historian who finds himself at the doors of a new millennium, forget this Wag Shum style real politicking, and advise whoever it is that listens to you that peace is the best option; to let both our peoples march in peace towards the new century, and new millennium.
Brotherly
Mussie Msghina
I was really surprised when I realized that a certain Mussie Misghina, obviously a ghost name without a tag, showered unedited polemics over an interview I gave to the "the Reporter" a couple of weeks ago. No wonder the writer and his statement has failed to make any sense. If at all it makes sense it is only and only because it helps to read the besieged mentality of Eritrean scholars.
May be I was naive but I did not expect Eritreans in general and the intelligentsia in particular to continue to support a war of aggression against Ethiopia. Any sane mind can not still reconcile with the sad reality that the EPLF continued to convince and push many Ertireans to fight a war of aggression launched by the 'state' of Eritrea. This is exactly what I did not expect when I talked to "the Reporter" which was paraphrased less properly. Worse it was misquoted by the writer in a bid to fit into the Eritrean rhetoric.
Eritreans were known (as far as I know) for their commitment to engage in a war of liberation. Suddenly everything turned to be upside-down. Suddenly Eritreans lost the precious tag attached to them during the thirty years war. Surprisingly it took Eritrea only four years to join the camp of aggressors in modern world history. No doubt this heralded a negation in contemporary Eritrean historiography.
But still the truth remains. Two new elements belong to the eternal treasury of Eritrean history and Eritreans owe it to the EPLF i.e. aggression and defeat. If the EPLF is the engine which drove Eritrea in to this war of aggression, attention must also be paid to the fuel it consumes: the blind support of many Eritrean scholars? In fact what really sustained the Eritrean war of invasion against Ethiopia is the support it continued to enjoy from irresponsible Eritrean scholars.
Given all the facts that led to the Eritrean - Ethiopian war, I hoped that Eritrean scholars would develop a rational insight into the conflict. Yet, since all the value systems and parameters of judgment according to which the situation was interpreted by Eritrean scholars has not been altered, it is not surprising to read such inflated analysis pertaining to the conflict, the peace process and the military balance of power in the Horn of African sub-region.
Had it not been for the senility within which most Eritrean scholars are operating, Ethiopia's military victory at Badme is a lesson from which Eritreans must have learned a lot. To the amusement of international defense analysts, operation sun-set dealt a heavy blow to the highly entrenched Eritrean army. The Badme operation, the first of its kind after the Second World War, is the only large-scale successful conventional war operation. Some may want to compare it with operation over-lord (D-Day) which liberated western France from a highly entrenched German army.
In terms of the possible obstacles it should have faced, the machinations and deceptions applied as well as the tactical, organizational and technological variables displayed, the operation is unparalleled in the history of modern warfare since W.W.II. Surprisingly it took Ethiopia only four days to dislodge the highly entrenched and numerically superior Eritrean army. All these characteristics demonstrate the dynamics of Ethiopian military power.
Had it not been for their madness, the Badme debacle must have been a good lesson for Eritrean leaders. Even historically Ethiopia's victory over Egypt and Italy was considered as a blessing in disguise for the invaders because it forced them to ask about themselves. Ethiopian victory at Gundet and Gura and later at Adwa drastically changed the history of Egypt and Italy. Both Italians and Egyptians were forced to question what went wrong with their own societies. Both Italians and Egyptians came to realize that aggression does not pay. In fact the emergence of anti-colonialist lobby in Italy and the genesis of a modern and more realistic Egyptian nationalism is directly related to the humiliating military defeats both countries suffered in the hands of Ethiopians. As such, after their humiliating defeat at Badme, at least Eritrean scholars were expected to become more realistic and find a speedy solution to their own problems.
The EPLF and many Eritreans also failed to note that it was the victory at Adwa, which led to the downfall of the government of Crispi in Rome. It was again Ethiopian victory at Gundet and Gura which resulted in the frustration and eventual demise of successive Egyptian governments. It is really a paradox that Ethiopia's military muscle displayed at Adwa was one of the reasons, which facilitated the colonization of the Sudan. Eritrean scholars should be reminded that Egypt lost its independence partly due to the blunders it committed by invading Ethiopian territory. May be it is not accidental that the government of Eritrea lost its balance after February 1999. In fact the 'state' of Eritrea was quick to loose its sovereignty shortly after it concocted the Badme incident. It is not surprising that after operation sun-set Eritrean leaders are busy looking for powerful patrons. It is not accidental that the Eritrean military establishment sustained a long-lasting wound when it provoked Ethiopia. It is a fact that Eritrea had provoked all its neighbors. But the reaction became so painful for Eritrea when it came from Ethiopia. After all, within a few months time Ethiopia managed to initiate a makeover in the military engagement in an attempt to eliminate the security threat, which came from Eritrea. This clearly shows the dynamics of Ethiopian military power in the sub-region. Then it is not difficult to argue that Ethiopian victory at Badme is a total victory with far reaching implications on sub-regional balance of power in general and the defense posture and political future of Eritrea in particular.
Both in terms of history as well as the present future it is not difficult to justify Ethiopia's power and position in the east African sub-region. In fact what is really odd and difficult is to argue otherwise. Ethiopia's geographic centrality, its material and human resources, the historic nature and capacity of the Ethiopian state, its capability to dominate the sub-regional lines of communication, the quality and seriousness of the leadership are some of the factors which could empower Ethiopia to play an important role in the sub-region. Ethiopia is still a power short of economics. I am not down playing the role of the economy in analyzing the status of a sub-regional power.
No doubt, at present Ethiopia is not an economic power. But had it not been for Eritrean aggression, it was already heading towards a two-digit annual growth. Nevertheless the variables which would enable Ethiopia to emerge economically country are still in place. These include, interalia, natural resources, a dynamic population, seriousness of purpose, proper policies and an enlightened leadership.
Thus one can say that it is only a matter of time before Ethiopia becomes the center of gravity in the sub-region. The economic aspect is potential, while the fact that Ethiopia is the most assertive power politically and military, is actual.
The above fact explains why Ethiopia presided over the only successful, most swift large-scale conventional (high-tech) war in contemporary world history. Ethiopia is also the only country in Africa which launched the most successful cross-border defensive military operations against international terrorist forces in the sub-region. The fact that Ethiopia will continue to be more realistic and assertive regarding its role in the sub-region does not mean that it would become a hegemonic power. Rather it is poised to become the positive center of gravity in sub-regional affairs. In fact Ethiopia should, for the sake of the region, play real politics by combining power and wisdom. Given its power, Ethiopia should be instrumental in the effort to institute the sub-regional rules of the game. This is so because Ethiopia can't afford to ignore its actual power.
To this effect Eritrean leaders should know their proper place in the sub-region. They should be reminded of the sad story of Siad Barre and Somalia. Siad Barre created a highly militarized state identical to that of Eritrea today. The only difference between the two is that numerically the Eritrean army is far superior to the then Somali army.
As was expected, shortly after Siad Barre attacked Ethiopia the Somali army was to suffer a catastrophic military defeat. The sad thing about it is that Siad Barre and Somalia never recovered from that disastrous defeat. Then followed the issue of the failed state. This should serve as a telling commentary to Eritrean leaders and their supporters. The fact that the Eritrean 'state' survived 15 months of conflict with Ethiopia should not give a wrong message. For one thing Eritrea was long prepared and had to make a surprise. But Ethiopian military leaders are still selective in approaching the war. The special relations with the Eritrean people seem to have made Ethiopian war strategists over careful in dealing with the conflict. Simply put so far Ethiopia did not use its force in its fullest sense. This fact is clearly known even by Eritrean leaders. The desperate search for a saviour on the part of the Eritrean leadership is one part of the story.
Secondly the fact that the Eritrean state is perceived as intact by its blind supporters is simply because, what we have in that country is not the usual type of 'state'. It resembles a classic Mafia type of medieval city-states. In the absence of a proper 'state' one can't talk of a failed state scenario. But if Eritreans fail to learn from history and to make use of the lesson provided by Ethiopia's Badme military operation then what we will have in Eritrea is the scenario of a failed society.
Moreover Ethiopia seems to be restrained due to the concern that the sudden and total failure of Eritrea would create power vacuum and influence. Thus, preferred not to rush things. In this context Eritrean scholars need to understand the dilemma of Ethiopia. This is also the time for Eritreans to discuss about the future of their country than to talk about their hatred towards a powerful, highly confident and calculative Ethiopia.
Since The Eritrea of today is " authoritarian and weak" after what happened at Badme, a catastrophic breakdown of Eritrea that still possesses millions of small-scale armaments is a never-too-distant possibility. The overall depressed 'state' of Eritera is left with one option i.e. unconditional withdrawal from Ethiopian territories and the return of the status quo ante. That is what the peace process is all about. This is also in line with international laws and civilized norms. Given its actual power why would Ethiopia accept settlement of the issue short of the laws and engage in unhealthy and unsustainable bargain. Whether through peaceful means or by force Ethiopia is destined to achieve its rightful goals of restoring its sovereignty. I think EPLF members like Mussie Misghina would understand their country's malign reality. The days of lopsided security relationship are gone. That is what real politics means in its rudimentary form. Hopefully in the future a realistic Eritrea is expected to coexist with a highly assertive Ethiopia.