The discussion on whether the Technical Arrangements (TA) were amended or not or whether Eritrea should or shouldn't accept an amended TA is important but misses the larger point. Notwithstanding whatever the OAU told Meles, if the OAU decides that it wants to amend its own proposal, it is entitled to do so. You would think that it would come out and say, "We have to amend the proposal because one of the parties won't accept it" but that, apparently, is not the way the OAU and its partners work.

This is not to criticize the OAU or its partners; after all, they could easily throw up their hands and say to both parties, "Go ahead fight it out. We will talk to you when you exhaust each other out." They should be thanked for their efforts. But there is something wrong with a process that waits out seven months to reward the party that threatens war and rejects a proposal endorsed by the world.

Remember, the last time there was a controversy on the definition of "Badme Town and Environs", the OAU and its partners could have taken the position of telling one party "you are wrong" and the other party "you are right". For fear of jeopardizing their neutral status, they simply presented a new proposal called OAU Modalities which, at least on the issue of "Badme Town and Environs" contradicts the OAU Framework Agreement. Now, same with the Technical Arrangments. After 7 months, instead of telling Ethiopia, "you are wrong", the OAU may simply go about drafting a "new, improved" document. This is like a painter who, when painting a wall, doesn't sand or scrape off the old layer; he just keeps adding new coats of paint whether or not they clash with the old one.

There is a danger, of course, that the whole--old and new layer of paint--could come tumbling down and it is the responsibility of the parties to remind the OAU of this possibility. According to Friday issue of the Washington Post article, Eritrea has reminded the US of this real possibility.

The larger picture for Eritreans is: what is Eritrea's bottom line? It is demarcation and demarcation consistent with colonial treaties and applicable international law. Every position Eritrea has advocated since May 14, 1998 has been to ensure that the peace process, once started, always ends with demarcation. Ethiopia's position regarding demarcation has been consistently worrisome. Ethiopia cannot come out and say we refuse to abide by the OAU resolution honoring the sanctity of colonial borders without pissing away its darling status in Africa. What it can do is present roadblock, hurdles, objections and filibusters so that the process is derailed.

THE ETHIOPIAN POSITION ON DEMARCATION

If the Ethiopian Government is to be taken at its word, it has made numerous assertions that indicate that, in addition to restoration of status quo ante, there are (1) other demands that Eritrea has to meet before Ethiopia agrees to demarcation and that, to the extent that there will be demarcation, Ethiopia wants (2) veto power over the process. Specifically, it wants (a) veto power over areas that are subject to demarcation (b) veto power over outcome of the demarcation; and (c) veto power over which third parties can supervise the demarcation process.

1. The "Other" Ethiopian Demands & Precondition:

   [The documents that will be cited here are all available at the Ethiopian Government Spokesperson's website. ]

   On March 12, 1999, the Ethiopian Government issued a press release entitled "The Crux of the Matter" stipulating a 3-point condition for peace. Point 3 states that for Ethiopia to agree to ceasefire and implement the peace treaty, Eritrea must

   "bear full responsibility for the loss of lives, the humanitarian crisis and the destruction of property that has resulted from its unbridled aggression."

2. The Veto Power on Demarcation:

   On April 15, 1999, the Ethiopian Government issued a press release entitled "Prime Minister Meles Reiterates Ethiopia's Position". A key statement from the release is the following:

   "Until the government in Asmara officially acknowledges that its troops are occupying sovereign Ethiopian territory and agrees to withdraw them, the rest of the package cannot be implemented."[Emphasis mine]

   Despite its oft-repeated mantra that the Ethiopian government wants "nothing more and nothing less" than restoration of status quo ante, here the Ethiopian Government is saying that in addition to withdrawing its troops, Eritrea should concede "officially" that the territories it is withdrawing from are Ethiopian. This acknowledgement would mean, by definition, that the territories would be permanently Ethiopian, notwithstanding any demarcation mandates.

   In case you are thinking that was a year ago, prior to Ethiopia's "acceptance" of the OAU modalities and that Ethiopia has dropped this precondition, here's another statement from Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, in an interview he gave to Ethiopian TV in December 1999-- 5 months after Ethiopia "accepted" the modalities and 4 months after it was presented with the Tech Arrangements and Episode 1 of: The Clarifications):

   "They [Eritreans] should have said clearly that they would withdraw from this or that specific territory. And after expressing their readiness to withdraw, they should go further and declare their recognition of Ethiopia's sovereignty over these territories." -- Meles Zenawi Interview with Ethiopian TV, December 6, 1999.

Ethiopia also wants veto power over the make-up of the peacekeepers. It wants veto power over their decision.

Ethiopia wants Eritrea to withdraw unconditionally so that, either explicitly or implicitly, Eritrea can be labeled as the Aggressor. Once the "aggressor" label is affixed, Ethiopia (as the victim of aggression) can put demands that it seeks remedies to be whole. The remedies can be financial restitution or political (reduced Eritrean military, an Eritrea with a more sympathetic government). Let's say that the world bribes Ethiopia to proceed to demarcation. Ethiopia will then argue that Eritrea, by withdrawing from the territories, has, implicitly or explicitly, accepted that the territories belong to Ethiopia therefore, they are not subject to demarcation. If the mediators prevail and the entire common border is subject to demarcation, Ethiopia will then insist that any decision on demarcation is not final until and unless both parties (read: Ethiopia) agree to abide by the decision. If the decision is not in its favor, Ethiopia will not accept the decision on demarcation.

If Eritrea is to accept a "Peace Now, Justice Later" peace proposal, the "later" better be soon and it better be guaranteed by third parties in a position to enforce justice (demarcation). Because we know that once the threat of war is gone and "peace" is declared , there will be no urgency to deal with the matter and, in the words of the BBC, the Eritrean demarcation question will collect dust at OAU and UN shelves.

Perhaps because the Eritrean Government has not, as Ethiopia has, threatened war on a weekly basis, perhaps because Eritreans everywhere have been protesting for peace, the mediators may have gotten the impression that Eritrea will accept any form of peace. If the guarantors cannot guarantee a timely and fair demarcation process, the Eritrean advocates of "Peace Now, Justice Now" will prevail and we will have no peace deal to enforce.